Lisa Logan v. State of Mississippi
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2024-KA-00950-COA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-KA-00950-COA
LISA LOGAN APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/19/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CALEB ELIAS MAY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NESHOBA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: STACY L. FERRARO
LISA LOGAN (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: STEVEN SIMEON KILGORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/17/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.
EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On August 22, 2023, a Neshoba County grand jury indicted Lisa Logan on four
counts, as follows: Count I: trafficking hydrocodone and acetaminophen in violation of
Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) (Rev. 2018); Count II: selling
oxycodone and acetaminophen in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-
139(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); Count III: possessing morphine in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 41-29-139(c)(1)(C), each with a firearm enhancement per Mississippi
Code Annotated section 41-29-152 (Rev. 2018); and Count IV: felony fleeing in violation
of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-9-72 (Rev. 2020). A jury found Logan guilty of
each of the four counts. Logan now appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Over the course of several months, the Neshoba County Sheriff’s Department
conducted an investigation into potential drug activity in the parking lot of a Dollar General
(the store) in House, Mississippi. Investigators were provided information by an informant
regarding the make, model, and license plate numbers of two vehicles that were believed to
be involved in frequent drug transactions in the store parking lot. One vehicle was a tan Ford
Taurus, and the other was a white Lexus sports utility vehicle (SUV). On February 23, 2022,
while conducting surveillance near the store, investigators observed two vehicles pull up
side-by-side in the store’s parking lot. The two vehicles matched the descriptions of those
previously described by the informant.
¶3. The Ford Taurus left the parking lot first, and Investigator Josh Jolly followed behind
the car as it left the lot. After Jolly observed the car cross the center line of the road multiple
times, he pulled the car over and initiated a traffic stop. The driver of the car was Erin
Lewis. Lewis told Jolly that she had purchased prescription pills from Lisa Logan in the
store parking lot immediately prior to the traffic stop. According to Jolly, Lewis “seemed
very nervous,” and “she couldn’t be still.” Jolly testified that
Ms. Lewis stated she had just bought 16 Percocets, which is oxycodone, a
schedule II controlled substance, from Lisa Logan, and she stated that [Logan]
was the driver of that white Lexus. She stated—Ms. Lewis stated that she
gave Ms. Logan $240 in $20 bills, and she said, as I was leaving—or Ms.
Lewis stated when she was leaving that Ms. Logan went inside the Dollar
General store.
Jolly recovered an unlabeled pill bottle from Lewis’ purse that was located on the front
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passenger seat of her vehicle. According to Jolly, there were fourteen whole dosage units
and one-half dosage unit of oxycodone in the pill bottle. Lewis testified that she consumed
one and one-half pills immediately after she purchased them from Logan. According to
Lewis, she and Logan had been friends for approximately twelve years. She testified that she
had been meeting up with Logan “a couple of times a week” for a period of seven or eight
years to purchase drugs. Lewis said that she would usually purchase either Lortab or
Percocet pills from Logan. Lewis testified that many of their meetings occurred in the Dollar
General parking lot in House, Mississippi. Lewis was arrested, and later indicted, for
possession of oxycodone.
¶4. Investigator Matthew Winstead testified that on February 23, 2022, he was called to
respond to a potential drug-related crime at the Dollar General in House. According to
Winstead, he parked just north of the store on County Road 298 waiting for the two vehicles
to leave the parking lot. Once Winstead was informed that the second vehicle, the white
Lexus SUV, had left the lot, he left his post on County Road 298 and traveled south towards
the store. Winstead followed the Lexus and initiated a traffic stop. While Logan did pull her
vehicle to the side of the road, she refused to roll down her window to interact with
Winstead. Winstead testified that he asked her multiple times to roll down her window, but
she refused each time. After multiple refusals by Logan, Winstead pulled a window punch
kit out of his vest, showed it to Logan, and told her that he was going to punch the glass out
if she did not comply. Winstead proceeded to bust out Logan’s car window. After he did
so, Logan began to drive away, heading north on Highway 19. Logan led Winstead and
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several other officers in a high-speed chase going through the House community at
approximately eighty miles per hour. At some point during the pursuit, one of the officers
shot one of Logan’s tires, and Logan stopped her vehicle about four miles down the highway.
Logan was taken into custody, and Winstead began a search of her vehicle. Winstead found
four pill bottles in a purse on the passenger side of the vehicle. Winstead also found $220
in $20 bills in Logan’s purse. Finally, he found a .380 handgun inside the console. Logan
was arrested and charged with trafficking of hydrocodone and acetaminophen, sale of
oxycodone and acetaminophen, possession of morphine, and felony fleeing. Because officers
recovered a gun from Logan’s vehicle, she was charged with a firearm enhancement.
¶5. After a jury trial, Logan was found guilty of all four counts in the indictment. Logan
was sentenced to fifty years, with twenty-five years suspended and twenty-five years to serve,
and five years of post-release supervision for Count I; twenty-five years, with five years
suspended and twenty years to serve, and five years of post-release supervision for Count II;
fifteen years, with five years suspended and ten years to serve, and five years of post-release
supervision for Count III; and a fine of $500 for Count IV. The court ordered the sentences
be served concurrently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Logan
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
¶6. On February 26, 2025, Logan’s appointed appellate counsel with the Office of State
Public Defender, Indigent Appeals Division, filed an appellant’s brief in accordance with
Lindsey v. State, 939 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 2005), finding no appealable issues in Logan’s case.
On March 6, 2025, this Court entered an order allowing Logan time to file a pro se
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supplemental brief. On April 21, 2025, another attorney with the Office of State Public
Defender entered an appearance on Logan’s behalf. That attorney then filed a letter stating
that since the date of its initial brief, the office had identified at least four arguable appellate
issues. The letter identified and summarized those four issues for this Court’s consideration.
On May 15, 2025, Logan filed her pro se supplemental brief. On July 7, 2025, the State filed
a response brief. The State’s brief only referenced the public defender’s letter but did not
address each issue because they were not fully briefed for this Court at that time. On July
14, 2025, a third attorney with the Office of State Public Defender entered an appearance on
Logan’s behalf. At Logan’s counsel’s request, this Court entered an order on September 18,
2025, setting forth a supplemental briefing schedule to give all parties an opportunity to fully
brief and respond to the four issues set forth in the letter dated April 21, 2025, and any other
issues counsel determines are necessary for appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶7. Logan’s final supplemental brief addressed not only the four issues set out in the
public defender’s letter dated April 21, 2025, but also addressed two additional issues.
Further, the supplemental brief encompassed the issues set forth in Logan’s pro se brief filed
on May 15, 2025. Logan’s supplemental brief alleges that (1) the evidence seized from her
car should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of her constitutional
rights; (2) the trial court’s erroneous strike of a potential juror for cause violated Logan’s due
process right to a fair trial; (3) the trial court erred in refusing the jury instruction on Logan’s
theory of defense that she had a right to flee an unlawful arrest; (4) the trial court erred in
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admitting evidence of prior bad acts and violated her right to due process and a
fundamentally fair trial; (5) Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) is
unconstitutional as applied to Logan in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process; and (6) as to Count I and Count III, the State failed to present legally sufficient
evidence, and the jury’s verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.
I. Did the trial court err by not suppressing the evidence found in
Logan’s car?
¶8. On July 10, 2024, Logan filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was seized from
her vehicle on the day of the incident and to suppress her statement given as a result of the
illegal search and arrest. Logan claims that Investigator Winstead lacked probable cause for
an arrest; therefore, the evidence seized from her vehicle and her subsequent statement were
fruit of the poisonous tree. Logan argues that while Investigator Winstead might have had
reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, he lacked probable cause to arrest her and
search her car. Because Logan claims that the search of her car was illegal, she claims that
anything found during the vehicle search should have been suppressed at trial. Logan’s
motion was not heard until after the first witness had testified at trial. Outside the presence
of the jury, Logan’s counsel moved on the record:
Comes now Lisa Logan and moves the Court to exclude the evidence that was
seized from her vehicle, as it was part of the fruit of the poisonous tree; that
Lisa Logan would contend the officers did not have the proper cause to search
her vehicle at the time; that it was not incident to a lawful arrest, and they did
not have evidence to arrest her when they attempted to arrest her.
¶9. In Smith v. State, 396 So. 3d 163, 166 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court
addressed the standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress:
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A “mixed standard of review” applies to the denial of a motion to suppress.
Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (¶20) (Miss. 2006). We review a finding of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion de novo. Floyd v. City of Crystal
Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 113 (¶11) (Miss. 1999). However, the trial judge’s
findings regarding underlying “historical facts” will not be disturbed unless
they are “clearly erroneous.” Dies, 926 So. 2d at 917 (¶20). Our “[r]eview of
the record is not limited to evidence presented to the trial judge at the
suppression hearing; this Court may look to the entire record to determine
whether the trial judge’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 669 (¶181) (Miss. 2013).
Concerning the issue of whether there was probable cause to effect an arrest, in Jones v.
State, 841 So. 2d 115, 124-25 (¶21) (Miss. 2003), the supreme court stated:
Probable cause is a practical, non-technical concept, based upon the
conventional considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act. It arises when the facts and circumstances
within an officer’s knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that
a crime has been committed and that a particular individual committed it.
Conerly v. State, 760 So. 2d 737, 740 (Miss. 2000). This determination is to
be made from the “totality of the circumstances.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Sims v. State 512 So. 2d 1256
(Miss. 1987).
¶10. During the suppression hearing, Jolly testified that investigators were given specific
information about two vehicles that had frequently been involved in what seemed to be drug
activity in the Dollar General parking lot. Investigators set up surveillance as a result of
obtaining the information regarding the specific makes, models, and license plate numbers
of the vehicles that they suspected of illegal activity. After those vehicles arrived in the
parking lot and Lewis’ vehicle departed the lot, Investigator Jolly initiated a traffic stop on
Lewis. During that stop, according to Jolly, Lewis told him that she had just purchased
prescription pills from Logan. Further, Lewis told Jolly how many pills that she purchased
7
and how much money she paid for the pills. Jolly gave this information to the other officers
and advised them to stop Logan for the violation.
¶11. Winstead then testified at the hearing that after receiving the information from Jolly,
he began his portion of the operation as described above. Winstead waited for Logan to
leave the Dollar General parking lot and began following her vehicle. Winstead initiated a
traffic stop; however, Logan refused to comply with Winstead’s request to roll down her
window. At the time of the traffic stop, Winstead had probable cause to believe that a felony
had been committed and probable cause to believe that Logan was the one who committed
it. Winstead attempted to make a lawful arrest prior to the chase that ensued. Because
Winstead had probable cause to arrest Logan, the evidence retrieved from her vehicle was
not illegally obtained, and the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the evidence at trial.
II. Was Logan’s due process right to a fair trial violated by the trial
court allowing the State to strike a potential juror for cause?
¶12. Logan alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to strike a potential juror
named B. Madison for cause despite objection from defense counsel. Logan claims that
despite Madison’s answers that were given in response to questions about prior drug-related
criminal charges and his employment in law enforcement, Madison indicated that he could
still be fair and impartial. Because Madison stated that none of his life experiences would
make him favor one side or the other, Logan argues on appeal that the trial court should not
have allowed the State to strike him for cause.
¶13. In Davis v. State, 401 So. 3d 1029, 1034 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court
stated:
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“Whether a potential juror can be fair and impartial is a judicial question
reserved for the trial judge and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.”
[Patton v. State, 248 So. 3d 763, 767 (¶30) (Miss. 2018)] (citing Archer, 986
So. 2d at 957 (¶23)). “[A] juror who may be removed on challenge for cause
is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely [a]ffect his
competency or impartiality at trial.” Id. (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d
613, 653 (Miss. 1997)). “A denial or grant of a challenge for cause is within
the discretion of the court[.]” Gardner [v. State], 379 So. 3d [367,] 379 (¶56)
[(Miss. Ct. App. 2023)].
Further, in Patton, 248 So. 3d at 767 (¶30), the supreme court stated that “No general rule
can be stated which would control every conceivable situation with respect to a juror’s
qualifications; each case must be decided on its own merits in light of the facts before the
court.”
¶14. During voir dire, the State asked the venire, “[H]ave you or any of your immediate
family been charged with a drug related crime?” Madison responded that in early 2000 he
“had some drug charges.” Madison answered a series of follow-up questions regarding his
response. Madison stated that he had been charged with “possession of marijuana and maybe
paraphernalia or something.” He indicated that he really was not sure if it was a felony or
a misdemeanor but that he served six months in a “drug court type thing.” Madison also said,
“I don’t trust the government that much. I’ve seen too much.” Later during voir dire, the
venire was asked if they previously or currently worked in law enforcement or had close
family that worked in law enforcement. Madison responded again that he was previously in
law enforcement for four years. Madison claimed that other than having the knowledge
gained from specialized on-the-job training, nothing would affect his decision in the case or
sway him towards either side.
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¶15. During the jury selection conference, the State requested to strike Madison for cause.
The State argued:
State would also strike for cause Panel 7, No. 12, Mr. Madison. He
approached the bench and disclosed that he had been charged with possession
of marijuana out of Horn Lake, did some type of – wasn’t really clear if he was
in drug court or if he had served six months. He’s also served in law
enforcement, and then told the Court that he didn’t trust the government. We
would strike for cause.
Logan’s counsel responded:
We would object to that, Judge. He never said he couldn’t be [fair] or
impartial. He’s worked as a law enforcement officer; he was in jail for six
months for apparently – sounds like some sort of misdemeanor or something,
some drug matter, and he never said he couldn’t be fair and impartial; he just
said he didn’t trust the State. Well, there’s plenty of folks that don’t trust the
Defendant.
The court responded:
I understand that but I’m agreeing with the State. Mr. Madison’s answers to
the question, both of the Court and counsel, were vague and unresponsive at
best. And I could not tell whether his past experiences, both in law
enforcement, would affect his ability to be fair and impartial based on the
answers he had given. So, again, out of abundance of caution, based on the
answers given, the Court would strike him for cause.
In Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269, 293 (¶87) (Miss. 1997), the Mississippi Supreme Court
noted, “The United States Supreme Court has stated that a trial court is entitled to deference
when its for-cause strikes are reviewed because of its ability to evaluate the demeanor of
potential jurors, and reversal is not warranted where its findings are fairly supported by the
record.” (Citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)). In the case at hand, the trial court
judge stated on the record that he could not tell whether Madison’s past experiences would
affect his ability to serve on the jury. Based on Madison’s responses to not one but two of
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the questions in voir dire, we find no error by the court in allowing the State’s strike for
cause.1
III. Did the trial court err in refusing Logan’s proposed jury
instruction stating that she had a right to flee an unlawful arrest?
¶16. Logan argues on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to give jury instruction
D-8 outlining her right to refuse an illegal arrest. Logan claims that her conviction on Count
IV should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the court failed to instruct the
jury on her theory of defense. However, Logan failed to include the proposed jury
instruction in the record on appeal for this Court’s review. The only jury instructions that are
contained in the record on appeal are the jury instructions that were given by the trial court.
¶17. In Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010), the supreme court stated, “It
is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so
the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” (Citing Davis
v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (citing Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 223 (Miss.
1998))). Further, the supreme court stated:
Additionally, we have explained that “[a] defendant is entitled to have jury
instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this
entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which
incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is
without foundation in the evidence.” Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (Miss.
2008) (quoting Chandler v. State, 946 So. 2d 355, 360 (Miss. 2006)). See also
Brooks v. State, 18 So. 3d 833, 839 (Miss. 2009).
Newell, 49 So. 3d at 74 (¶20).
1
Further, Mississippi Code Annotated section 13-5-79 (Rev. 2019) provides in part
“Any juror shall be excluded, however, if the court be of the opinion that he cannot try the
case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error.” (Emphasis added).
11
¶18. In any event, while proposed jury instruction D-8 is not contained in the record on
appeal, it is clear from the jury instruction conference that D-8 was an instruction on the right
to resist an illegal arrest. The trial court had previously overruled Logan’s argument in her
pre-trial motion to suppress claiming that certain evidence had been discovered as a result
of her illegal arrest and search of her vehicle. Because the trial court had already made the
determination that Logan’s arrest was not illegal, there was no factual basis to give the
instruction in the present case. See Keys v. State, 963 So. 2d 1193, 1202 (¶33) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007); Brown v. State, 852 So. 2d 607, 611 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court
did not err by its refusal of the instruction.
IV. Did the trial court err in admitting text messages between Lewis
and Logan?
¶19. Logan argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad
acts violating her rights to due process and a fundamentally fair trial. More specifically,
Logan argues that three text messages at the top of Exhibit S-1 were not part of the text chain
between Lewis and Logan on February 23, 2022, but were sent the day before as evidence
of a completely separate encounter. Logan claims that the admission of those unrelated text
messages violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404.
¶20. Lewis was the first witness for the State. On direct examination, the State asked
Lewis how she knew Logan and how long she had known her. Lewis testified that she met
Logan through a friend and was “just buying pills from her.” She further testified that she
had bought drugs from Logan “hundreds” of times. According to Lewis’ testimony on direct
examination, she met up with Logan “probably a couple of times a week” for a period of
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seven or eight years. Lewis testified that she typically purchased either Lortab or Percocet
from Logan. All of Lewis’ testimony on direct examination was given without objection
from Logan’s counsel. After the State asked Lewis a series of questions regarding the time
period leading up to her encounter with Logan on February 23, 2022, the State provided
Lewis with a few pages of text message screenshots from Lewis’ phone. Lewis identified
the information depicted in the exhibit and testified as to the general contents of the text
messages and verified that they were, in fact, text messages between her and Logan. When
the State sought to have the text messages entered as its first exhibit, Logan’s attorney
objected to the text messages being admitted on the grounds of hearsay. The State argued
in response:
Your Honor, she’s properly authenticated as her text messages with the
defendant. She’s identified the content of the messages, as well as verified the
content of the messages and they accurately depict their conversation, as well
as that’s how she had the defendant’s name saved in her phone.
The court overruled Logan’s objection, and the screenshots of the text messages were
admitted into evidence as S-1.
¶21. After the text messages were entered into evidence, Lewis testified that several of the
text messages on the first page were not sent on February 23, 2022. At the end of Lewis’
direct examination, the State sought to publish Exhibit S-1 to the jury. Logan objected to the
exhibit being published because of Lewis’ testimony that some of the text messages were not
from the day in question. The trial court responded, “I’ll allow some cross-examination on
it. And if you want me to re-visit my ruling after the cross-examination, I can do it at that
point in time.”
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¶22. During cross-examination, Logan’s counsel asked Lewis some additional questions
about the three unrelated text messages as well as the remainder of the messages contained
in Exhibit S-1. Lewis indicated that she did recognize the three unrelated text messages
between her and Logan but verified that those messages were unrelated to the incident on
February 23. Lewis testified again on cross-examination that she had been buying pills from
Logan. Lewis testified that she had sporadically purchased pills from other individuals but
primarily and most recently from Logan. According to Lewis, Logan’s name was saved in
her phone as “Lisa,” and the messages depicted in Exhibit S-1 were between her and Logan.
¶23. After a brief redirect examination, the State sought to publish the text-message exhibit
to the jury. Logan’s attorney renewed the objection, which was then addressed outside the
presence of the jury. Logan’s counsel argued:
Your Honor, we objected earlier on the basis of hearsay, but it was developed
through testimony after the document was admitted that the first three lines of
that document are evidence of a separate incident, which would be a separate
crime for which she’s not charged. It’s been admitted into evidence, but I
believe it would – we would request the Court to mark through or be re-copied
so the first part of that exchange is not included in what she’s – what the
Defendant is charged with.
The State responded to Logan’s request stating:
Your Honor, this witness has already testified, and it’s already been before the
jury that this witness was meeting the defendant a couple of times a week for
the purchase of illegal drugs and that these meetings occurred for seven or
eight years. Your Honor, the fact that there’s been multiple drug transactions
between these two individuals is already before the jury. It’s already her
testimony. It also further shows that it was not, you know, mistake of identity
or it shows the opportunity, the motive.
The trial court ruled:
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The Court overruled that objection on the grounds of hearsay, and we
continued on. After the State stopped its direct examination but prior to the
cross-examination, a request was made to publish this to the jury. The
defendant’s attorney objected at that point in time. At that point, the Court
took that as an authentication type objection in which I did not publish it to the
jury at that time and allowed cross-examination on this specific document
before the jury. Defense counsel took opportunity to do that; did question
about those three lines; did tell the jury that this was a separate incident. So
defense counsel, through cross-examination, made sure the jury knew this was
a separate incident. But the Court, at this time, will allow this to continue as
is, and I will allow that under Rule 404(b) as some other evidence other than
to prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . other than to show that the
defendant acted in conformity with these acts as stated within this exhibit.
¶24. Our well-established “standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of
discretion.” Anderson v. State, 62 So. 3d 927, 933 (¶13) (Miss. 2011); Allen v. State, 179 So.
3d 1138, 1143 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Further, “It is well established that failure to
contemporaneously object to the admission of evidence constitutes a waiver of the issue on
appeal.” Willis v. State, 348 So. 3d 1035, 1040 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).
¶25. While Logan did make a contemporaneous hearsay objection at the time that the text
messages were introduced into evidence, Logan’s counsel made no objection based on
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404 at that time. In McGuire v. State, 170 So. 3d 570, 576-77
(¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), this Court stated:
“An objection must be made with specificity, and failure to articulate the
grounds for objection constitutes a waiver of the alleged error.” Ross v. State,
954 So. 2d 968, 987 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2007). “Furthermore, when a party makes
an objection on specific grounds, it is considered a waiver regarding all other
grounds.” Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So. 2d 1066, 1073 (¶24) (Miss. 2004)
(citing Burns v. State, 729 So. 2d 203, 219 (¶67) (Miss. 1998)).
By the time a Rule 404 objection was made, the text messages had been admitted into
evidence, and Lewis had testified at length, without objection, about her prior pill purchases
15
from Logan. We find that Logan waived her objection under Rule 404(b) and that the trial
court did not err by admitting the text messages at issue over a hearsay objection.
¶26. Logan argues in the alternative that if this Court finds that the trial court did not err
in admitting Exhibit S-1 into evidence, she received ineffective assistance of counsel when
her counsel failed to object to the admission of Exhibit S-1 into evidence. We find that this
claim cannot be decided in this direct appeal and will be denied without prejudice to Logan
raising such issue in a properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief, should she
desire to do so.2
V. Is Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C)
unconstitutional as applied to Logan in violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process?
¶27. Logan argues that “the statute, the jury instruction, and the prosecution’s argument
impermissibly shifted the burden to Logan by presuming possession equaled trafficking and
denying her due process of law.” Logan claims that the jury was improperly instructed that
they could presume she was guilty of trafficking after being presented with evidence of one
drug sale and possession.
¶28. Pursuant to Section 41-29-139(c), simple possession of controlled substances is made
illegal. This subsection provides for the charging and punishment, as simple possession, for
the possession of controlled substances classified in Schedule I or II, except marijuana and
synthetic cannabinoids, in the amount of ten or more grams but less than thirty grams, or the
amount of twenty or more dosage units but less than forty dosage units. Mississippi Code
2
See Rash v. State, 416 So. 3d 1024, 1034 (¶¶32-35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025).
16
Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) provides that where a defendant violates subsection
(c) by possessing more than thirty grams or more than forty dosage units of a Schedule I or
II controlled substance, except marijuana or synthetic cannabinoids, the defendant can be
charged and punished for trafficking in controlled substances. Regardless of how the word
“trafficking” may be used in other contexts, the Mississippi Legislature has determined that
simple possession of the amounts set forth above constitutes “trafficking in controlled
substances” in Mississippi. In Hathorne v. State, 267 So. 3d 798, 801 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2018), this Court responded to a similar argument as Logan has raised here:
In his reply brief, Hathorne also argues that both section 41-29-139(f)(2)(A)
and section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) subject an offender to the same punishment
options regardless of whether there is an intent to transfer under subsection
(2)(A) or simple possession under subsection (2)(C). The Legislature,
however, has defined trafficking to include the possession of specific amounts
of controlled substances, in this instance ethylone. It is our Legislature’s
prerogative “to define crimes and set out punishment for offenders, and
this prerogative is given great latitude.” Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295,
302 (Miss. 1987).
(Emphasis added). We find that Logan’s due process rights were not violated in this case. We
further find this claim to be without merit.
VI. Was the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Logan
of Count I and Count III, and were the jury’s verdicts against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence?
¶29. In her final issue on appeal, Logan combines two distinct issues. She argues first that
there was not sufficient evidence to support her conviction of Count I (trafficking) and Count
III (possession of morphine). Secondly, Logan contends that the jury’s verdicts for these
counts were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We will address the legal
17
sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence separately below.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶30. In Rainey v. State, 334 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (¶6) (Miss. 2022), the supreme court
explained our standard of review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence:
This Court reviews a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge de novo. Body v.
State, 318 So. 3d 1104, 1108 (Miss. 2021). “[T]he critical inquiry is ‘whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Parish v. State, 176 So. 3d 781, 785 (Miss. 2015)). “This Court ‘accept[s] as
true all evidence that is favorable to the State, including all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom, and . . . disregard[s] evidence
favorable to’ [the defendant].” Barfield v. State, 22 So. 3d 1175, 1186 (Miss.
2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Moore v. State, 996 So. 2d 756, 760-1
(Miss. 2008)).
Count I: Trafficking in Controlled Substances
¶31. It appears that Logan’s only challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
her conviction in Count I is that Logan’s cousin Candelaria Rubio testified that Logan had
a prescription for 120 pills and had picked up their relative Jim Claude Jr.’s prescription for
eighty-nine pills. She argues that leaves only twelve pills that she did not have a prescription
for, and she cannot be convicted of trafficking based upon her possession of twelve pills.
However, the jury was not required to accept Rubio’s testimony as the truth of the matter. See
Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶20) (Miss. 2017).3
3
Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-148(1) (Rev. 2018), the
State was not required to prove that Logan (or Rubio) did not have a valid prescription for
the controlled substances found in her car, the burden was on Logan to prove that she did
have one. See also Smith v. State, 527 So. 2d 660, 661 (Miss. 1988). Obviously, the jury did
not find Rubio’s testimony to be sufficient.
18
¶32. In our de novo review, as set forth in Rainey, we are required to view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and to disregard all evidence favorable to the
defendant. When viewed in this light, the record evidence shows that Logan, in Neshoba
County, willfully and unlawfully possessed more than forty dosage units of hydrocodone and
acetaminophen, a Schedule II controlled substance, while in possession of a firearm. We find
this evidence to be legally sufficient to support Logan’s conviction in Count I.4
Count III: Possession of Morphine
¶33. Logan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on this count of the indictment based
upon Rubio’s testimony. Rubio was apparently living with Logan at the time of these
offenses. She testified that she had recently had back surgery and that the morphine and
Percocet found in Logan’s car were hers. Again, when we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, based upon the testimony at trial from Lewis, Jolly,
Winstead, and Jackson, the evidence shows that Logan willfully and unlawfully possessed
more than ten dosage units but less than twenty dosage units of Morphine, a Schedule II
controlled substance, in Neshoba County. We find the evidence to be legally sufficient to
support Logan’s conviction of Count III.
B. Weight of the Evidence
¶34. In Little, 233 So. 3d at 289 (¶1), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained our
standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence:
4
This evidence was presented by Lewis, Jolly, and Winstead as stated above. We
also rely upon the testimony of expert witness Diamonisha Jackson, from the Mississippi
Forensics Laboratory, who tested the substances submitted by the officers and determined
the number of dosage units and the identity of the substance.
19
[N]either this Court nor the Court of Appeals assumes the role of juror on
appeal. We do not reweigh evidence. We do not assess the witnesses’
credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts between evidence. Those decisions
belong solely to the jury. Our role as [an] appellate court is to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only
when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence t