William Ervin Edwards a/k/a William Edwards v. State of Mississippi
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2025-KA-00138-COA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00138-COA
WILLIAM ERVIN EDWARDS A/K/A APPELLANT
WILLIAM EDWARDS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/17/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
WILLIAM ERVIN EDWARDS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/17/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A defendant’s trial for charges of murder and possession of a firearm by a felon
resulted in a deadlocked jury. When the State began proceedings for retrial, the defendant
was appointed a new attorney. However, the defendant repeatedly protested that his
appointed attorney failed to communicate with him. The State even admitted that defense
counsel failed to access crucial discovery materials. So, the defendant sought to terminate
his appointed counsel and asked the trial court for a different lawyer.
¶2. Months later, at a hearing eight days before the scheduled retrial, the trial court
allowed the appointed attorney to withdraw. The defendant was told he would have to secure
new counsel on his own due to the withdrawal essentially being on the eve of retrial. No
continuance was given for the defendant to seek a new lawyer, despite the State’s offer to
agree to a continuance. In turn, the defendant argued he did not want to proceed pro se and
wanted an attorney. The trial court appointed the defendant “hybrid” counsel and proceeded
to trial.
¶3. The jury found the man guilty of both counts. The man was sentenced to serve a term
of life in custody for the murder conviction, and a concurrent term of ten years for the
firearm possession conviction.
¶4. The man appeals, asserting that his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel was violated.
In addition, he takes issue with three evidentiary matters, two of which involve a lack of
authentication and the other an improper comment. Because we find the defendant’s right
to counsel was violated, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
BACKGROUND FACTS
¶5. William “Polo” Edwards and Shadow Robinson were in a romantic relationship.
Robinson ended their relationship when she discovered Edwards was still married. Robinson
then began spending time with Bobby Carlton Davis.
¶6. On May 1, 2022, Davis was preparing dinner for Robinson, her adult son, and her
teenage twins when Edwards came to the house unannounced.
¶7. According to Robinson, she saw Edwards pull into her driveway from her bedroom
window around 5:00 p.m. Edwards was driving a black Ford F-450 dually truck. Robinson
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went to the kitchen to alert Davis to Edwards’ presence, stating “[y]ou won’t believe who’s
pulling up in my yard. . . . Polo.” Davis offered to deal with Edwards, but Robinson told him
that she would handle it.
¶8. Robinson then walked away, down the hallway towards her bedroom nearby. Davis
remained near the kitchen area. The kitchen was located at the back of the house, at one end
of a hallway. At the opposite end, there was a side door that led out to the driveway.
¶9. The next thing Robinson remembered was hearing “rapid firing, continual firing,” and
seeing “sparks coming out the hallway[.]” She recalled “t[aking] off running” to find
“Robert [Davis] laying on the floor with his foot . . . holding the door open kind of sort of.”
Davis was “dying. He was shot. He was bleeding.”
¶10. Meanwhile, “William was standing over him with a gun.” Robinson would later
testify that as Edwards towered over Davis’ body, he said, “Motherf***er now.” Edwards
then placed the gun in his waistband, calmly turned, took a step back, took a step forward,
and just walked away. He got into the truck and then slowly backed out of the driveway.
Robinson immediately shut the door and called 9-1-1 for assistance, but Davis was
pronounced dead at the scene.
The Crime Scene at Robinson’s House
¶11. Detectives subsequently arrived and began their investigation—questioning witnesses
and collecting evidence. Notably, a projectile and two sets of shell casings were collected
from the hallway and around Davis’ body. Based on Robinson’s testimony, Edwards was
deemed a prime suspect.
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¶12. Detectives also searched for and reviewed cameras from neighboring businesses. One
of the businesses was Funtime Skateland, which was a half mile from Robinson’s house in
Clinton. Funtime provided surveillance video of their parking lot which faces the highway.
The video pictured what “appears to be a black Ford pickup truck matching the description
of the suspect vehicle” driving away from the Clinton area and towards the city of Jackson
on “Sunday, 5:14, on May the 1st.”
The Investigation into Edwards
¶13. In an attempt to locate Edwards, an “exigent circumstance permit” was issued to
“ping” his cell phone number to find his location. One of the pings led detectives to
Lexington, Mississippi, where a friend reported seeing Edwards on the night of the incident.
Later, detectives spoke with Edwards’ children and wife, and obtained additional cell phone
numbers of Edwards to “ping.” Two days later, Edwards was located in Louisiana and taken
into custody. He was then extradited to Mississippi.
¶14. Simultaneously, a search warrant was issued for Edwards’ apartment in Jackson. At
Edwards’ apartment, detectives found a gun case on the dining room table with a magazine
loaded with four bullets. The magazine contained two types of bullets. A black gun holster
and weapon cleaning kit also accompanied the gun case.
¶15. Detectives further discovered several cameras set up in and around the suspect’s
apartment, including a Ring camera. A black thumb drive to a Blink camera system was also
found in the upstairs bedroom under a dresser.
¶16. A jury would later hear that as a part of their investigation, detectives reviewed the
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camera footage and created “a snippet, excerpt” of “some sample content from April 30th
on” for use in court. The sample content allegedly depicted Edwards with “the same black
shirt, [and] white pants that Ms. Robinson described[,]” “walking out of th[e] door . . . the
morning of the murder, with what appear[ed] to be a . . . handgun sticking on the side of his
pants.” The extracted content was not time stamped or dated. But according to detectives,
in its original format “it actually showed the dates.”
¶17. After Edwards was transferred back to Mississippi, detectives began processing the
work truck he had been driving. Detectives found an unfired bullet in “the front center
console on the dash[,]” and another one in “the center console between the front and
passenger seat.” Four iPhones and an AT&T SIM Card were also found amongst the front
passenger seat, floorboard, and center console.
¶18. Search warrants were then obtained for the phones. This allowed detectives “to get
the GPS data or the historical call data from those devices.” The data showed that before the
murder occurred, the phones in Edwards’ possession pinged on towers traveling from
Jackson in the direction of Robinson’s house. Around the time of the 9-1-1 call, those same
phones pinged on a tower within a mile of Robinson’s residence. After the murder, the pings
traveled back from Clinton to Jackson, and then to Lexington. Finally, the pings culminated
in New Orleans, where Edwards was eventually apprehended.
¶19. The day after Davis’ murder, a linked Facebook/Instagram post was shared from an
account with the username “Napoleon Edwards.” The post read:
God, I don’t need you to forgive me for nothing I do. Save that for the ones
I’m go (sic) send to you.
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Based on this post, detectives submitted a “preservation request” for Edwards’ social media
accounts. A search warrant was subsequently issued resulting in 1400 pages of data. The
social media data showed detectives that one of the “telephone numbers . . . [detectives] were
tracking and pinging” was a “telephone number[] that w[as] certified for that
user”—Napoleon Edwards. A detective would later testify over authentication objection of
the post’s entry into evidence that this meant that “at some point[,] whoever created that
account listed that number.” Though “the numbers associated with the account [were] not
necessarily the user [themselves].”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶20. In August 2022, a Hinds County grand jury indicted Edwards on two counts. The first
count was for the first-degree murder of Davis. The second count was for the possession of
a firearm by a felon “on, and about the 1st day of May, 2022.”
¶21. After finding Edwards indigent, the Hinds County Circuit Court appointed two
attorneys to represent him, Thomas Fortner and Arman Miri. Due to his perceived flight risk
and threat to the community, Edwards was held without bond at the Raymond Detention
Center. Trial was scheduled for the end of August 2023, and spanned the course of eight
days. However, the jury was unable to come to an agreement on the verdict. So, the
proceedings ended in a mistrial.
A. New Counsel
¶22. Following the mistrial, the trial court entered an order continuing the retrial of
Edwards’ two charges until March 11, 2024. Subsequently, on November 30, 2023, Fortner
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and Miri withdrew as Edwards’ counsel. On the same date, the trial court appointed sole-
practitioner Brandon Dorsey as Edwards’ new defense counsel.
¶23. But according to Edwards, he was unaware that he had been appointed a new attorney
“due to no verbal or physical contact from Attorney Dorsey for weeks leading up to [the] trial
date for March[.]”
¶24. Excluding Edwards’ pro se letter to the judge requesting bond, no filings had been
made in the case since Dorsey’s appointment until the beginning of February 2024, when the
State filed its notice of supplemental discovery with Dorsey’s signed receipt. Edwards’
affidavit and ore tenus motion requesting and accepting Dorsey’s appointment then followed.
B. Defense Counsel’s First Request for Continuance
¶25. Roughly a month out from the retrial, Dorsey filed a motion to obtain discovery. Two
days later, Dorsey filed a motion to continue trial, citing a scheduling conflict. The court
granted the motion, and continued Edwards’ retrial from March to July.
C. Request for Defense Counsel’s Withdrawal
¶26. In mid-March, Edwards filed a pro se motion seeking Dorsey’s withdrawal. In
support of his motion, Edwards cited Dorsey’s lack of criminal experience and failure to
communicate. He asserted that,
[p]ublic records will show scant evidence that . . . Dorsey has tried a major
criminal case. In Mr. Dorsey[’]s 22 years of practi[ci]ng law most of them
were spent in civil litigation and not criminal cases as complex as said
cause. . . . [D]efendant has made numerous attempts to contact Atty[.] . . . all
to no avail. Whereas this shows the courts a major communication problem
that poses a great danger to the defense of Defendant[.]
¶27. Dorsey responded in a separate motion for withdrawal joined by Edwards. In the
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motion, Dorsey explained that “he d[id] not object to Defendant’s request for new counsel,”
nor did he want to “minimize the Defendant’s concerns[,]” but that he objected “to the basis
cited within the contents of the Defendant’s Motion.” He asserted that “at no time ha[d]
he . . . received any phone call (s) nor received any ‘message’ from Defendant.” Rather, that
“medical emergencies sustained by his . . . mother and sister” caused him “to be out of the
office” “from on or about February 8, 2024 until on or about March 7, 2024.” Dorsey further
argued that “sufficient evidence exist[ed] to demonstrate [that] the attorney-client
relationship . . . [wa]s irretrievably broken[.]”
¶28. Both Edwards’ and Dorsey’s motions for withdrawal went unaddressed by the trial
court for four months.
D. Defense Counsel’s Second Request for Continuance
¶29. Less than three weeks before retrial, Dorsey once again filed a motion to continue.
Dorsey cited both family health emergencies and scheduling conflicts in his request. Soon
after, a hearing was held during which the trial court granted the continuance. An order was
then entered re-setting the matter for December 9, 2024.
¶30. At the hearing, the trial court also addressed various open motions, including
Edwards’ pro se motion to withdraw counsel. Since “the motion was withdrawn by
Defendant Edwards,” the trial court found the motion “moot.”1
E. Request for Edwards’ Transfer
¶31. The parties continued preparations for retrial. Notably, earlier in the course of these
1
Dorsey’s withdrawal was not specifically addressed or disposed of by the trial court.
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proceedings, Edwards was moved from Raymond Detention Center in Hinds County to
Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, roughly two and a half hours north of Jackson.
By Fall 2024, Dorsey and Edwards only “had an opportunity to visit . . . on three (3) separate
occasions.”
¶32. As a result, Dorsey motioned for Edwards to be transferred back to Raymond. In his
motion Dorsey argued that the facility’s “‘geographical distance’ created a barrier for
preparation for trial,” as both the courthouse and Dorsey’s law office were located in
Jackson. Dorsey asserted transferring Edwards would reduce barriers, prevent undue
prejudice, and promote judicial economy by mitigating expenses. However, this motion went
unaddressed.
F. Edwards’ Pro Se Motion for Hearing
¶33. In October, Edwards filed a pro se motion to show cause, requesting that all parties
appear before the court for a hearing. In his motion, he raised several procedural due process
issues, including the State and Defense Counsel’s failure to produce requested evidence, and
the trial court’s failure to timely respond to both Edwards’ and Dorsey’s motions for attorney
withdrawal.
¶34. To mitigate the effects of the unproduced discovery, Edwards posited that “the Court
has the authority to fashion [an] appropriate remedy” under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, that the Court should “enter an Order . . . compelling the [State] and Defense
Counsel to provide the Defendant with the requested discovery[.]”
¶35. As it relates to the court’s timeliness, Edwards explained that his motion “went
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unanswered by this Honorable Court” until two weeks before the retrial was scheduled. He
argued that “this pre-trial delay prejudiced him by forcing him to maintain appointed
counsel.” He believed that “the delay to answer the Motion to Withdraw Counsel was a[n]
intentional device use[d] by the court to obtain a tactical advantage over trial.”
¶36. Now only two months out from retrial, in lieu of withdrawing counsel, Edwards asked
that Dorsey receive assistance:
Due to the fact that trial is set for December 9, 2024 and Defendant Edwards
is against any further delay, Defendant Edwards further request[s] this Court
to add additional counsel from the Public Defender[’s] Office of Hinds County
to assist Appointed Counsel Brandon Dorsey in Case in Chief #00549 EFP.
However, the court never addressed Edwards’ show cause motion.
G. Pre-Trial Motion Hearing
¶37. A pre-trial motion hearing was then scheduled around Thanksgiving. On the morning
of the hearing, the State filed two motions for consideration: a motion to continue trial, and
a motion in limine to exclude Robinson’s prior manslaughter conviction.
¶38. As the basis of its request for continuance, the State cited discovery issues. It also had
a scheduling conflict with its lead prosecutor, who was assisting in a two-week criminal
matter outside of the jurisdiction.
¶39. In its motion to continue, the State explained that Edwards’ appointed counsel never
accessed discovery:
On February 7, 2024, Attorney Dorsey filed a motion for discovery; and within
a matter the State digitally disseminated discovery via its case management
system. None of this discovery, however, was ever downloaded by current
defense counsel.
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Noticing this and in preparation for the upcoming trial, the State spoke to
defense counsel . . . and agreed to re-send all previously tendered discovery.
(Emphasis added). Discovery was then produced “[o]ver the course of the month of
November[.]” However, the State informed the court that it could not “ensure that discovery
[wa]s complete” “due to the voluminous amount of discovery[.]”
¶40. The hearing began with the court addressing the parties.
Let me just say this. I heard a rumor that the State was seeking a continuance.
It’s not going to be granted. This case was set in the spring of this year to go
forward this week behind a civil setting. The defendant has been in pretrial
detention now over a year since his last trial and this is a retrial. This is not a
first setting.
So the Court is not inclined to grant any continuance. I’ll let you make a
record of that from the State, but because it was set so long ago and
everybody’s been on notice of this trial setting for very -- a long time, I will
caution the State to let you know that if you establish good cause, he’s getting
a bond today because it makes no sense not to be ready to go to trial 16 months
after the last trial setting.
¶41. The State also alerted the court to several errors contained in the prior trial transcript:
Your Honor, we have been . . . looking at the transcript of the prior trial that
we received and I e-mailed Attorney Dorsey about this . . . , but the transcript
that I received is -- is not correct. Like it doesn’t -- it’s missing whole portions
of testimony.
The court provided its ruling:
Well, let me just ease your mind a little bit. The last time this case was tried
was August of 2023. It is now November of 2024, and the first time the Court
is hearing anything about this is two weeks before the trial setting.
So guess what? The Court is not taking that as any reason to delay this trial
because you’ve had plenty of opportunities, both State and the defense, to
bring those matters to the Court’s attention so the Court could assist. The fact
that you all have waited until the eve of trial to announce that, it doesn’t matter
to the Court. Figure it out as best you can. It’s a retrial.
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....
-- I am not -- I am not -- number two, I am not delaying my court’s calendar
for another jurisdiction. My priorities are my priorities and my priority is this
jurisdiction. So the DA’s office needs to figure out what it’s going to do, but
this case is set for trial the week of the 9th and that’s my ruling on the issue of
the continuance. So now let’s move on to some substantive issues other than
that.
¶42. Defense counsel then argued the motion to transfer Edwards’ place of detention to
Raymond. However, before Dorsey could begin his argument, the court stepped
in—“[t]hat’s not a proper motion for this hearing[,]” but, that the court would “take [it] under
advisement with the sheriff’s department.” The court further noted that it “may be able to
get him here at some point closer to the trial date[.]”
¶43. Following up on the motion, the trial judge asked if “there [was] anything of
substance . . . in that motion?” Dorsey referred back to his written argument that Edwards’
detention 140 miles away from court and counsel was a substantive issue as it limited the
proper preparation of his defense. But again, the trial court declined to take up the matter.
¶44. His appointed counsel indicated Edwards wanted to personally address the trial court.
But the trial court advised that all communication needed to be through counsel. So instead,
Dorsey argued for a continuance based on the “hardship” of distance, stating:
While I do understand and appreciate that the Court has had this matter set for
some time, but the geographical barriers have created a hardship. We would
ask Your Honor that you consider setting this matter on the Court’s term that
is set for January the 13th and continue this matter from its current setting in
December so as to allow us an opportunity to thoroughly go through the
evidence.
In turn, the trial court responded:
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Court: Let me just explain something to you. If this case doesn’t go
now, next year will probably be full with those TANF cases --
okay -- those civil cases. I’m expecting them to start lining up
for very lengthy trials in 2025.
I would highly suggest you take advantage of being able to try
this case now because I don’t know that I’ll have space in 2025
to hear it. Do you understand?
Dorsey: Yes, ma’am, I do understand.
Court: And I understand how many times he has asked for bond and it’s
been over a year and some given sufficient time for everybody
to get ready for this December setting because I can tell you
now, I’m not going to pivot back to this case in January. That’s
a no-go.
Dorsey: Yes, ma’am.
Court: And I come back in the spring -- I am gearing up to deal with
those extensive welfare cases.
Dorsey: Yes, ma’am.
Court: So he will not be prioritized at all in ‘25. So you’re looking at
‘26. So you need to consider that -- and I’m not looking at the
issue of bond on that. The only way the Court will consider
issuing a bond is if the State said they were not ready to go and
they force the Court to continue this case because it’s a retrial.
Dorsey: Yes, ma’am.
Court: Most retrials could have gone forward a long time ago. As a
matter of fact, having the transcript is not necessarily a necessity
on a retrial. It’s a retrial and this is an old case now.
Dorsey: Yes, ma’am.
¶45. Edwards then interrupted:
I need to speak for myself. I don’t need you to speak for me because you’re
not doing what I need you to do. I need to speak for myself. I need the Court
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to hear me.
Dorsey chimed in, “Your Honor, my client is adamant about speaking to the Court.” The
court responded, “[a]nd I’m adamant in my no. Do you have any other motions?”
¶46. The hearing concluded and the parties were dismissed with retrial still scheduled to
begin December 9th.
H. The Withdrawal of Counsel Before Retrial
¶47. The day after the pre-trial motion hearing concluded, Dorsey “received a
communication from a family member of Mr. Edwards indicating that he wanted [Dorsey]
to withdraw as his attorney of record.”2 In response, Dorsey went to see Edwards at the
correctional facility in Tallahatchie the following day. He confirmed Edwards’ request for
his withdrawal, and noted that they “discussed the communication,” and “the impact that
communication would have going forward.” Based on this conversation, Dorsey filed
another motion to withdraw only days before retrial.
¶48. A hearing to address Dorsey’s withdrawal took place the very next day. After Dorsey
was allowed to withdraw, the trial judge continued on with the hearing as follows:
Court: All right. So we are still scheduled for trial on Monday in
regard to this matter. Anyone want to be heard from the State?
State: If I might, is he going to be proceeding pro se on this, Your
Honor, or --
Court: Well, that’s my -- Mr. Edwards, do you have any other counsel
prepared to proceed on your behalf on Monday?
....
2
Edwards wrote Dorsey a letter, which was later placed under seal due to attorney-
client privilege.
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Edwards: Your Honor, not at this time. . . .
....
Court: The Court has not granted a continuance in this matter. And so
if you do not have counsel, that places you in the position where
you would have to proceed pro se meaning you would have to
be representing yourself. Do you understand that?
Edwards: Yes, ma’am, I understand that.
¶49. The trial court then informed Edwards that he would be appointed someone to “assist”
him, but that Edwards “would be responsible for [his own] representation.” The trial court
further inquired, “is that what you want to do?” Edwards answered, “No. That was not my
intentions.” (Emphasis added). The trial court responded:
Okay. Well, unfortunately, Mr. Edwards, what you did not understand was
that the reasons for [Dorsey’s] inability to proceed were not any errors on his
part. They were errors on part of the State, which the Court would have
weighed heavily against the State upon the trial of this matter. Having now
excused him, those issues are now waived. So -- and that’s why these are
things left to best -- with trained attorneys because it is a matter of knowing
what really can be sought and what relief cannot be sought as you proceed
procedurally with this trial in this case.
It also places you in a very precarious situation[.]
¶50. The court then instructed the parties that it was willing to offer a continuance if the
State’s lead attorney did not appear before the court. In doing so, the court told Edwards
“then you can have some time to locate your counsel and get a new setting.” Next, the court
asked the State for its preference, and the State opted to proceed as scheduled.
¶51. The court returned its commentary to Edwards before the hearing concluded:
Now, we still have this other issue to deal with you and counsel, and the Court
cannot advise you on what to do as far as that issue is concerned. You’re
going to have to make some diligent efforts, and you’ll be here in the local
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area to try [to] locate some counsel or someone to appear on your behalf so the
Court can resolve that issue as soon as possible.
I. Pre-Trial Status Hearings
¶52. Two days later, the court “circle[d] back” in yet another hearing “to find out what
[Edwards was] going to do as far as counsel[.]” Edwards explained “as I stated on the record
Monday, I had no intentions on proceeding to this trial pro se.” Edwards advised that he had
“reach[ed] out to a counsel,” but that they “would only be willing to come on and discuss
bond.” But the court halted any further discussion on bond, the State having agreed to
proceed with trial—“whatever your counsel -- you can’t retain an attorney just to come in
here and discuss with me bond. I can tell you that right now.” The court continued:
[Y]ou discharged your attorney knowing that we had a trial setting. . . .
Now, if you don’t have counsel and you want to retain counsel, that is fine, but
they have to be prepared on Monday or they will be asking – possibly asking
the Court to continue the case on your behalf waiving certain issues such as
speedy trial and the detention and the length of it. That is why . . . this trial
date is set and why the Court is not granting [a continuance] to the State unless
the State agrees on a bond.
¶53. Edwards pushed back on the idea that he willingly discharged his attorney. But the
trial court indicated that there was no one who would help Edwards:
So the Court has exhausted who -- you know, in the area that I can locate to
even assist with representation. So you do have a huge dilemma, Mr.
Edwards, you really do. You really do. I don’t know how to fix this.
....
And so we’re -- I hadn’t heard from your family or anyone so I don’t know
what to do, even if they had found someone who would be willing to be
appointed to assist you, you know, because I’ve exhausted my list of
individuals who accept appointments on my docket[.] . . . So I . . .
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¶54. Edwards protested, “So, in other words, the Court is going to force me to move
forward pro se?”
¶55. When the trial court demurred, Edwards continued, “I’ve been waiting 18 months for
a trial, a retrial. I didn’t want any further delays, and my right to effective counsel was – was
not being taken seriously.”
¶56. Edwards asked the court if it would contact Attorney Abby Robinson on his behalf.
The trial court advised “we will reach out to Ms. Robinson and see if she’s willing to be
appointed. And then after that, she can approach the Court with what she needs to do as far
as being ready for trial on Monday.”
¶57. Edwards questioned what would occur “if she doesn’t accept the appointment[?]” He
noted, “I still -- I mean, I don’t have any discovery to move forward with the trial on
Monday. If I wanted to go pro se, the state hasn’t provided me anything. I don’t have --.”
But the court quickly stopped Edwards to explain that because the State provided his first
attorney with discovery, under the rules “[Edwards] was deemed to have received [his]
discovery.” “[A]nd that is . . . why you understand you’re in a strange situation.”
¶58. The hearing began to wind down. The trial court indicated it would “reach out to the
person suggested.” The trial court also told Edwards “But you do understand you
manufactured this situation unfortunately.” Edwards argued, “Your Honor, that’s not a fair
assessment saying I manufactured -- the Court appointed Mr. Dorsey.”
¶59. The exchange continued:
Court: Let me just explain to you. Other defendants in other cases
throughout the state’s history of jurisprudence have been in this
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same situation that you are in and [are] determine[d] to relieve
their counsel on the eve of trial. The Court is under no
obligation to continue this case or do anything further.
Edwards: Understood.
Court: You see? You understand?
Edwards: I understand that.
Court: Okay. And it would not be error on this Court’s part to proceed
with trial on Monday. Do you understand?
But the Court because of the nature of the penalties, because the
Court understands the seriousness of this situation is at least
trying to determine if there is someone that we can contact as far
as representation. Do you understand?
Edwards: Understood.
Court then stood adjourned, with the parties “on standby” to potentially “circle back again[.]”
¶60. On December 6, 2024, the Friday before trial, the court convened a hearing, once
more, to discuss the status of Edwards’ legal counsel. Attorney Abby Robinson appeared in
court, but advised that she “came today to be an observ[er],” agreeing with the trial court that
she was not “retained counsel or counsel of record.” The trial court further noted that “we
did reach out to . . . Attorney Robinson, in regard to representation, and she indicated that she
would not accept an appointment in this case.”
¶61. The trial judge then proceeded to assign Edwards hybrid co-counsel and indicated trial
would move forward as scheduled.
¶62. Not understanding the role or context of “co-counsel” in this scenario, Edwards
questioned the court, “So -- and let me just make sure I’m clear on this. When you’re saying
18
‘co-counsel,’ then the Court is not appointing a counsel; you’re just saying that I can proceed
or the Court wants me to proceed with a co-counsel?”
¶63. To answer Edwards’ question, the court attempted to define the roles of appointed
counsel, pro se representation, and hybrid counsel. But Edwards, still not understanding,
questioned:
So, I mean, I guess my understanding is we are at a critical stage of the
prosecution and according to the Amendments, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth,
I’m supposed to have counsel. That’s my guaranteed right. The way you’re
explaining it to me is still like the Court is telling me to go ahead because this
Monday deadline and we want to give you this hybrid attorney, but we’re not
-- the Court is not really appointing the counsel themselves.
¶64. The court again tried to clarify Edwards’ confusion explaining that, “the Court is still
assigning counsel to you, but I can’t make an attorney accept an appointment that does not
want to.”
¶65. Edwards remarked, “[d]enial of counsel at any critical stage of a criminal procedure
is per se constitutional error, and I’m -- I’m just kind of feeling like we’re teetering on that.”
The court countered, “[y]ou may feel that way, but this is not about feelings[.]” The court
continued:
You have placed yourself in this dilemma. You were made aware when the
Court was able to obtain an attorney with Mr. Dorsey to represent you that it
was difficult. And at any point the defendant does have the option of retaining
their own counsel if they don’t like the attorney that this Court appoints. The
Court is still doing the same thing. So, no, sir. You are not being denied
counsel.
¶66. Edwards replied, “[a]nd this counsel -- me and this counsel have -- you’re saying we
got 72 hours to prepare for trial.” His exchange with the court continued.
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Court: This is not your first -- [trial].
Edwards: But this is his.
....
Edwards: Okay. So once again, on the record, is the Court denying me
counsel?
Court: No. The Court has an attorney who will be assisting you with
this case. He had a prior engagement this morning. He will be
meeting with you this afternoon, and he will be -- he says that he
will be engaged to assist you next week with trial.
The court further notified Edwards that he “was going to be [receiving] the discovery today.”
At this point Attorney Abby Robinson attempted to address the court, but was denied. A
brief recess was called.
¶67. Following the recess, the exchange between Edwards and the trial court continued.
Edwards stated:
[T]his is trial by ambush because now this same discovery that I’ve wrote
numerous motions and asked for and didn’t get, now I have it on the eve of
trial.
It’s no way I can be prepared or a hybrid can be prepared properly between
now and Monday. And, Your Honor, that’s just . . . . This is not a fair trial.
[I] want this trial to happen just as much as you do. But I want a fair trial and
that’s all I’ve ever asked you from the beginning of this. I’ve written you.
I’ve motioned you and asked for a fair shake[,] . . . and I’m not getting it today.
But the trial court was not persuaded, stating “your arguments, in regard to readiness fall on
deaf ears.”
¶68. As the hearing began to come to a close, the State spoke up to notify the trial court
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that it had spoken with Attorney Abby Robinson. The State advised the court that “she
indicated that she may be willing to accept the appointment.” But “due to the nature of the
case and the voluminous records, she would not be prepared on Monday for trial.” The State
further explained that “if she did take the appointment and requested this Court to continue
it, that the State would not object.”
¶69. Despite this solution, the trial judge told the parties that “[t]he Court is of the opinion
this case needs to proceed.”
J. Retrial
¶70. The parties appeared before the court three days later, on December 9, 2024. The
court began by addressing outstanding motions. This included a motion for continuance filed
the night before by Attorney William Mullennix, Edwards’ newly assigned hybrid co-
counsel. Mullennix argued that a continuance was necessary “in the interests of justice and
to ensure a fair trial” because “discovery [wa]s not complete[,]” the State “[could] not certify
that discovery [wa]s complete[,]” and Edwards did “not wish to proceed pro se[.]” But the
trial court denied the motion.
¶71. Trial commenced and the parties presented their cases. Edwards led a majority of the
defense’s case while Mullennix conducted the voir dire of the venire and made objections
throughout trial. Mullennix also crossed two witnesses, provided the motion for directed
verdict, and assisted during the jury instruction conference.
¶72. Edwards’ retrial substantively differed from the first. Unlike the first trial which
lasted eight days, Edwards’ retrial only lasted four days.
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¶73. Additionally, two witnesses—the medical examiner and the owner of Edwards’
truck—were unavailable to testify and had their prior testimony read into the record. Most
notably, the trial court precluded the introduction of the previous manslaughter conviction
of the sole eyewitness, Shadow Robinson, which was a major alternate theory for the defense
during the first trial.
¶74. At the close of trial, the jury deliberated and found Edwards guilty of both charges.
Edwards was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
for the first