Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00138-COA WILLIAM ERVIN EDWARDS A/K/A APPELLANT WILLIAM EDWARDS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/17/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN WILLIAM ERVIN EDWARDS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/17/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A defendant’s trial for charges of murder and possession of a firearm by a felon resulted in a deadlocked jury. When the State began proceedings for retrial, the defendant was appointed a new attorney. However, the defendant repeatedly protested that his appointed attorney failed to communicate with him. The State even admitted that defense counsel failed to access crucial discovery materials. So, the defendant sought to terminate his appointed counsel and asked the trial court for a different lawyer. ¶2. Months later, at a hearing eight days before the scheduled retrial, the trial court allowed the appointed attorney to withdraw. The defendant was told he would have to secure new counsel on his own due to the withdrawal essentially being on the eve of retrial. No continuance was given for the defendant to seek a new lawyer, despite the State’s offer to agree to a continuance. In turn, the defendant argued he did not want to proceed pro se and wanted an attorney. The trial court appointed the defendant “hybrid” counsel and proceeded to trial. ¶3. The jury found the man guilty of both counts. The man was sentenced to serve a term of life in custody for the murder conviction, and a concurrent term of ten years for the firearm possession conviction. ¶4. The man appeals, asserting that his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel was violated. In addition, he takes issue with three evidentiary matters, two of which involve a lack of authentication and the other an improper comment. Because we find the defendant’s right to counsel was violated, we reverse and remand for a new trial. BACKGROUND FACTS ¶5. William “Polo” Edwards and Shadow Robinson were in a romantic relationship. Robinson ended their relationship when she discovered Edwards was still married. Robinson then began spending time with Bobby Carlton Davis. ¶6. On May 1, 2022, Davis was preparing dinner for Robinson, her adult son, and her teenage twins when Edwards came to the house unannounced. ¶7. According to Robinson, she saw Edwards pull into her driveway from her bedroom window around 5:00 p.m. Edwards was driving a black Ford F-450 dually truck. Robinson 2 went to the kitchen to alert Davis to Edwards’ presence, stating “[y]ou won’t believe who’s pulling up in my yard. . . . Polo.” Davis offered to deal with Edwards, but Robinson told him that she would handle it. ¶8. Robinson then walked away, down the hallway towards her bedroom nearby. Davis remained near the kitchen area. The kitchen was located at the back of the house, at one end of a hallway. At the opposite end, there was a side door that led out to the driveway. ¶9. The next thing Robinson remembered was hearing “rapid firing, continual firing,” and seeing “sparks coming out the hallway[.]” She recalled “t[aking] off running” to find “Robert [Davis] laying on the floor with his foot . . . holding the door open kind of sort of.” Davis was “dying. He was shot. He was bleeding.” ¶10. Meanwhile, “William was standing over him with a gun.” Robinson would later testify that as Edwards towered over Davis’ body, he said, “Motherf***er now.” Edwards then placed the gun in his waistband, calmly turned, took a step back, took a step forward, and just walked away. He got into the truck and then slowly backed out of the driveway. Robinson immediately shut the door and called 9-1-1 for assistance, but Davis was pronounced dead at the scene. The Crime Scene at Robinson’s House ¶11. Detectives subsequently arrived and began their investigation—questioning witnesses and collecting evidence. Notably, a projectile and two sets of shell casings were collected from the hallway and around Davis’ body. Based on Robinson’s testimony, Edwards was deemed a prime suspect. 3 ¶12. Detectives also searched for and reviewed cameras from neighboring businesses. One of the businesses was Funtime Skateland, which was a half mile from Robinson’s house in Clinton. Funtime provided surveillance video of their parking lot which faces the highway. The video pictured what “appears to be a black Ford pickup truck matching the description of the suspect vehicle” driving away from the Clinton area and towards the city of Jackson on “Sunday, 5:14, on May the 1st.” The Investigation into Edwards ¶13. In an attempt to locate Edwards, an “exigent circumstance permit” was issued to “ping” his cell phone number to find his location. One of the pings led detectives to Lexington, Mississippi, where a friend reported seeing Edwards on the night of the incident. Later, detectives spoke with Edwards’ children and wife, and obtained additional cell phone numbers of Edwards to “ping.” Two days later, Edwards was located in Louisiana and taken into custody. He was then extradited to Mississippi. ¶14. Simultaneously, a search warrant was issued for Edwards’ apartment in Jackson. At Edwards’ apartment, detectives found a gun case on the dining room table with a magazine loaded with four bullets. The magazine contained two types of bullets. A black gun holster and weapon cleaning kit also accompanied the gun case. ¶15. Detectives further discovered several cameras set up in and around the suspect’s apartment, including a Ring camera. A black thumb drive to a Blink camera system was also found in the upstairs bedroom under a dresser. ¶16. A jury would later hear that as a part of their investigation, detectives reviewed the 4 camera footage and created “a snippet, excerpt” of “some sample content from April 30th on” for use in court. The sample content allegedly depicted Edwards with “the same black shirt, [and] white pants that Ms. Robinson described[,]” “walking out of th[e] door . . . the morning of the murder, with what appear[ed] to be a . . . handgun sticking on the side of his pants.” The extracted content was not time stamped or dated. But according to detectives, in its original format “it actually showed the dates.” ¶17. After Edwards was transferred back to Mississippi, detectives began processing the work truck he had been driving. Detectives found an unfired bullet in “the front center console on the dash[,]” and another one in “the center console between the front and passenger seat.” Four iPhones and an AT&T SIM Card were also found amongst the front passenger seat, floorboard, and center console. ¶18. Search warrants were then obtained for the phones. This allowed detectives “to get the GPS data or the historical call data from those devices.” The data showed that before the murder occurred, the phones in Edwards’ possession pinged on towers traveling from Jackson in the direction of Robinson’s house. Around the time of the 9-1-1 call, those same phones pinged on a tower within a mile of Robinson’s residence. After the murder, the pings traveled back from Clinton to Jackson, and then to Lexington. Finally, the pings culminated in New Orleans, where Edwards was eventually apprehended. ¶19. The day after Davis’ murder, a linked Facebook/Instagram post was shared from an account with the username “Napoleon Edwards.” The post read: God, I don’t need you to forgive me for nothing I do. Save that for the ones I’m go (sic) send to you. 5 Based on this post, detectives submitted a “preservation request” for Edwards’ social media accounts. A search warrant was subsequently issued resulting in 1400 pages of data. The social media data showed detectives that one of the “telephone numbers . . . [detectives] were tracking and pinging” was a “telephone number[] that w[as] certified for that user”—Napoleon Edwards. A detective would later testify over authentication objection of the post’s entry into evidence that this meant that “at some point[,] whoever created that account listed that number.” Though “the numbers associated with the account [were] not necessarily the user [themselves].” PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶20. In August 2022, a Hinds County grand jury indicted Edwards on two counts. The first count was for the first-degree murder of Davis. The second count was for the possession of a firearm by a felon “on, and about the 1st day of May, 2022.” ¶21. After finding Edwards indigent, the Hinds County Circuit Court appointed two attorneys to represent him, Thomas Fortner and Arman Miri. Due to his perceived flight risk and threat to the community, Edwards was held without bond at the Raymond Detention Center. Trial was scheduled for the end of August 2023, and spanned the course of eight days. However, the jury was unable to come to an agreement on the verdict. So, the proceedings ended in a mistrial. A. New Counsel ¶22. Following the mistrial, the trial court entered an order continuing the retrial of Edwards’ two charges until March 11, 2024. Subsequently, on November 30, 2023, Fortner 6 and Miri withdrew as Edwards’ counsel. On the same date, the trial court appointed sole- practitioner Brandon Dorsey as Edwards’ new defense counsel. ¶23. But according to Edwards, he was unaware that he had been appointed a new attorney “due to no verbal or physical contact from Attorney Dorsey for weeks leading up to [the] trial date for March[.]” ¶24. Excluding Edwards’ pro se letter to the judge requesting bond, no filings had been made in the case since Dorsey’s appointment until the beginning of February 2024, when the State filed its notice of supplemental discovery with Dorsey’s signed receipt. Edwards’ affidavit and ore tenus motion requesting and accepting Dorsey’s appointment then followed. B. Defense Counsel’s First Request for Continuance ¶25. Roughly a month out from the retrial, Dorsey filed a motion to obtain discovery. Two days later, Dorsey filed a motion to continue trial, citing a scheduling conflict. The court granted the motion, and continued Edwards’ retrial from March to July. C. Request for Defense Counsel’s Withdrawal ¶26. In mid-March, Edwards filed a pro se motion seeking Dorsey’s withdrawal. In support of his motion, Edwards cited Dorsey’s lack of criminal experience and failure to communicate. He asserted that, [p]ublic records will show scant evidence that . . . Dorsey has tried a major criminal case. In Mr. Dorsey[’]s 22 years of practi[ci]ng law most of them were spent in civil litigation and not criminal cases as complex as said cause. . . . [D]efendant has made numerous attempts to contact Atty[.] . . . all to no avail. Whereas this shows the courts a major communication problem that poses a great danger to the defense of Defendant[.] ¶27. Dorsey responded in a separate motion for withdrawal joined by Edwards. In the 7 motion, Dorsey explained that “he d[id] not object to Defendant’s request for new counsel,” nor did he want to “minimize the Defendant’s concerns[,]” but that he objected “to the basis cited within the contents of the Defendant’s Motion.” He asserted that “at no time ha[d] he . . . received any phone call (s) nor received any ‘message’ from Defendant.” Rather, that “medical emergencies sustained by his . . . mother and sister” caused him “to be out of the office” “from on or about February 8, 2024 until on or about March 7, 2024.” Dorsey further argued that “sufficient evidence exist[ed] to demonstrate [that] the attorney-client relationship . . . [wa]s irretrievably broken[.]” ¶28. Both Edwards’ and Dorsey’s motions for withdrawal went unaddressed by the trial court for four months. D. Defense Counsel’s Second Request for Continuance ¶29. Less than three weeks before retrial, Dorsey once again filed a motion to continue. Dorsey cited both family health emergencies and scheduling conflicts in his request. Soon after, a hearing was held during which the trial court granted the continuance. An order was then entered re-setting the matter for December 9, 2024. ¶30. At the hearing, the trial court also addressed various open motions, including Edwards’ pro se motion to withdraw counsel. Since “the motion was withdrawn by Defendant Edwards,” the trial court found the motion “moot.”1 E. Request for Edwards’ Transfer ¶31. The parties continued preparations for retrial. Notably, earlier in the course of these 1 Dorsey’s withdrawal was not specifically addressed or disposed of by the trial court. 8 proceedings, Edwards was moved from Raymond Detention Center in Hinds County to Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, roughly two and a half hours north of Jackson. By Fall 2024, Dorsey and Edwards only “had an opportunity to visit . . . on three (3) separate occasions.” ¶32. As a result, Dorsey motioned for Edwards to be transferred back to Raymond. In his motion Dorsey argued that the facility’s “‘geographical distance’ created a barrier for preparation for trial,” as both the courthouse and Dorsey’s law office were located in Jackson. Dorsey asserted transferring Edwards would reduce barriers, prevent undue prejudice, and promote judicial economy by mitigating expenses. However, this motion went unaddressed. F. Edwards’ Pro Se Motion for Hearing ¶33. In October, Edwards filed a pro se motion to show cause, requesting that all parties appear before the court for a hearing. In his motion, he raised several procedural due process issues, including the State and Defense Counsel’s failure to produce requested evidence, and the trial court’s failure to timely respond to both Edwards’ and Dorsey’s motions for attorney withdrawal. ¶34. To mitigate the effects of the unproduced discovery, Edwards posited that “the Court has the authority to fashion [an] appropriate remedy” under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, that the Court should “enter an Order . . . compelling the [State] and Defense Counsel to provide the Defendant with the requested discovery[.]” ¶35. As it relates to the court’s timeliness, Edwards explained that his motion “went 9 unanswered by this Honorable Court” until two weeks before the retrial was scheduled. He argued that “this pre-trial delay prejudiced him by forcing him to maintain appointed counsel.” He believed that “the delay to answer the Motion to Withdraw Counsel was a[n] intentional device use[d] by the court to obtain a tactical advantage over trial.” ¶36. Now only two months out from retrial, in lieu of withdrawing counsel, Edwards asked that Dorsey receive assistance: Due to the fact that trial is set for December 9, 2024 and Defendant Edwards is against any further delay, Defendant Edwards further request[s] this Court to add additional counsel from the Public Defender[’s] Office of Hinds County to assist Appointed Counsel Brandon Dorsey in Case in Chief #00549 EFP. However, the court never addressed Edwards’ show cause motion. G. Pre-Trial Motion Hearing ¶37. A pre-trial motion hearing was then scheduled around Thanksgiving. On the morning of the hearing, the State filed two motions for consideration: a motion to continue trial, and a motion in limine to exclude Robinson’s prior manslaughter conviction. ¶38. As the basis of its request for continuance, the State cited discovery issues. It also had a scheduling conflict with its lead prosecutor, who was assisting in a two-week criminal matter outside of the jurisdiction. ¶39. In its motion to continue, the State explained that Edwards’ appointed counsel never accessed discovery: On February 7, 2024, Attorney Dorsey filed a motion for discovery; and within a matter the State digitally disseminated discovery via its case management system. None of this discovery, however, was ever downloaded by current defense counsel. 10 Noticing this and in preparation for the upcoming trial, the State spoke to defense counsel . . . and agreed to re-send all previously tendered discovery. (Emphasis added). Discovery was then produced “[o]ver the course of the month of November[.]” However, the State informed the court that it could not “ensure that discovery [wa]s complete” “due to the voluminous amount of discovery[.]” ¶40. The hearing began with the court addressing the parties. Let me just say this. I heard a rumor that the State was seeking a continuance. It’s not going to be granted. This case was set in the spring of this year to go forward this week behind a civil setting. The defendant has been in pretrial detention now over a year since his last trial and this is a retrial. This is not a first setting. So the Court is not inclined to grant any continuance. I’ll let you make a record of that from the State, but because it was set so long ago and everybody’s been on notice of this trial setting for very -- a long time, I will caution the State to let you know that if you establish good cause, he’s getting a bond today because it makes no sense not to be ready to go to trial 16 months after the last trial setting. ¶41. The State also alerted the court to several errors contained in the prior trial transcript: Your Honor, we have been . . . looking at the transcript of the prior trial that we received and I e-mailed Attorney Dorsey about this . . . , but the transcript that I received is -- is not correct. Like it doesn’t -- it’s missing whole portions of testimony. The court provided its ruling: Well, let me just ease your mind a little bit. The last time this case was tried was August of 2023. It is now November of 2024, and the first time the Court is hearing anything about this is two weeks before the trial setting. So guess what? The Court is not taking that as any reason to delay this trial because you’ve had plenty of opportunities, both State and the defense, to bring those matters to the Court’s attention so the Court could assist. The fact that you all have waited until the eve of trial to announce that, it doesn’t matter to the Court. Figure it out as best you can. It’s a retrial. 11 .... -- I am not -- I am not -- number two, I am not delaying my court’s calendar for another jurisdiction. My priorities are my priorities and my priority is this jurisdiction. So the DA’s office needs to figure out what it’s going to do, but this case is set for trial the week of the 9th and that’s my ruling on the issue of the continuance. So now let’s move on to some substantive issues other than that. ¶42. Defense counsel then argued the motion to transfer Edwards’ place of detention to Raymond. However, before Dorsey could begin his argument, the court stepped in—“[t]hat’s not a proper motion for this hearing[,]” but, that the court would “take [it] under advisement with the sheriff’s department.” The court further noted that it “may be able to get him here at some point closer to the trial date[.]” ¶43. Following up on the motion, the trial judge asked if “there [was] anything of substance . . . in that motion?” Dorsey referred back to his written argument that Edwards’ detention 140 miles away from court and counsel was a substantive issue as it limited the proper preparation of his defense. But again, the trial court declined to take up the matter. ¶44. His appointed counsel indicated Edwards wanted to personally address the trial court. But the trial court advised that all communication needed to be through counsel. So instead, Dorsey argued for a continuance based on the “hardship” of distance, stating: While I do understand and appreciate that the Court has had this matter set for some time, but the geographical barriers have created a hardship. We would ask Your Honor that you consider setting this matter on the Court’s term that is set for January the 13th and continue this matter from its current setting in December so as to allow us an opportunity to thoroughly go through the evidence. In turn, the trial court responded: 12 Court: Let me just explain something to you. If this case doesn’t go now, next year will probably be full with those TANF cases -- okay -- those civil cases. I’m expecting them to start lining up for very lengthy trials in 2025. I would highly suggest you take advantage of being able to try this case now because I don’t know that I’ll have space in 2025 to hear it. Do you understand? Dorsey: Yes, ma’am, I do understand. Court: And I understand how many times he has asked for bond and it’s been over a year and some given sufficient time for everybody to get ready for this December setting because I can tell you now, I’m not going to pivot back to this case in January. That’s a no-go. Dorsey: Yes, ma’am. Court: And I come back in the spring -- I am gearing up to deal with those extensive welfare cases. Dorsey: Yes, ma’am. Court: So he will not be prioritized at all in ‘25. So you’re looking at ‘26. So you need to consider that -- and I’m not looking at the issue of bond on that. The only way the Court will consider issuing a bond is if the State said they were not ready to go and they force the Court to continue this case because it’s a retrial. Dorsey: Yes, ma’am. Court: Most retrials could have gone forward a long time ago. As a matter of fact, having the transcript is not necessarily a necessity on a retrial. It’s a retrial and this is an old case now. Dorsey: Yes, ma’am. ¶45. Edwards then interrupted: I need to speak for myself. I don’t need you to speak for me because you’re not doing what I need you to do. I need to speak for myself. I need the Court 13 to hear me. Dorsey chimed in, “Your Honor, my client is adamant about speaking to the Court.” The court responded, “[a]nd I’m adamant in my no. Do you have any other motions?” ¶46. The hearing concluded and the parties were dismissed with retrial still scheduled to begin December 9th. H. The Withdrawal of Counsel Before Retrial ¶47. The day after the pre-trial motion hearing concluded, Dorsey “received a communication from a family member of Mr. Edwards indicating that he wanted [Dorsey] to withdraw as his attorney of record.”2 In response, Dorsey went to see Edwards at the correctional facility in Tallahatchie the following day. He confirmed Edwards’ request for his withdrawal, and noted that they “discussed the communication,” and “the impact that communication would have going forward.” Based on this conversation, Dorsey filed another motion to withdraw only days before retrial. ¶48. A hearing to address Dorsey’s withdrawal took place the very next day. After Dorsey was allowed to withdraw, the trial judge continued on with the hearing as follows: Court: All right. So we are still scheduled for trial on Monday in regard to this matter. Anyone want to be heard from the State? State: If I might, is he going to be proceeding pro se on this, Your Honor, or -- Court: Well, that’s my -- Mr. Edwards, do you have any other counsel prepared to proceed on your behalf on Monday? .... 2 Edwards wrote Dorsey a letter, which was later placed under seal due to attorney- client privilege. 14 Edwards: Your Honor, not at this time. . . . .... Court: The Court has not granted a continuance in this matter. And so if you do not have counsel, that places you in the position where you would have to proceed pro se meaning you would have to be representing yourself. Do you understand that? Edwards: Yes, ma’am, I understand that. ¶49. The trial court then informed Edwards that he would be appointed someone to “assist” him, but that Edwards “would be responsible for [his own] representation.” The trial court further inquired, “is that what you want to do?” Edwards answered, “No. That was not my intentions.” (Emphasis added). The trial court responded: Okay. Well, unfortunately, Mr. Edwards, what you did not understand was that the reasons for [Dorsey’s] inability to proceed were not any errors on his part. They were errors on part of the State, which the Court would have weighed heavily against the State upon the trial of this matter. Having now excused him, those issues are now waived. So -- and that’s why these are things left to best -- with trained attorneys because it is a matter of knowing what really can be sought and what relief cannot be sought as you proceed procedurally with this trial in this case. It also places you in a very precarious situation[.] ¶50. The court then instructed the parties that it was willing to offer a continuance if the State’s lead attorney did not appear before the court. In doing so, the court told Edwards “then you can have some time to locate your counsel and get a new setting.” Next, the court asked the State for its preference, and the State opted to proceed as scheduled. ¶51. The court returned its commentary to Edwards before the hearing concluded: Now, we still have this other issue to deal with you and counsel, and the Court cannot advise you on what to do as far as that issue is concerned. You’re going to have to make some diligent efforts, and you’ll be here in the local 15 area to try [to] locate some counsel or someone to appear on your behalf so the Court can resolve that issue as soon as possible. I. Pre-Trial Status Hearings ¶52. Two days later, the court “circle[d] back” in yet another hearing “to find out what [Edwards was] going to do as far as counsel[.]” Edwards explained “as I stated on the record Monday, I had no intentions on proceeding to this trial pro se.” Edwards advised that he had “reach[ed] out to a counsel,” but that they “would only be willing to come on and discuss bond.” But the court halted any further discussion on bond, the State having agreed to proceed with trial—“whatever your counsel -- you can’t retain an attorney just to come in here and discuss with me bond. I can tell you that right now.” The court continued: [Y]ou discharged your attorney knowing that we had a trial setting. . . . Now, if you don’t have counsel and you want to retain counsel, that is fine, but they have to be prepared on Monday or they will be asking – possibly asking the Court to continue the case on your behalf waiving certain issues such as speedy trial and the detention and the length of it. That is why . . . this trial date is set and why the Court is not granting [a continuance] to the State unless the State agrees on a bond. ¶53. Edwards pushed back on the idea that he willingly discharged his attorney. But the trial court indicated that there was no one who would help Edwards: So the Court has exhausted who -- you know, in the area that I can locate to even assist with representation. So you do have a huge dilemma, Mr. Edwards, you really do. You really do. I don’t know how to fix this. .... And so we’re -- I hadn’t heard from your family or anyone so I don’t know what to do, even if they had found someone who would be willing to be appointed to assist you, you know, because I’ve exhausted my list of individuals who accept appointments on my docket[.] . . . So I . . . 16 ¶54. Edwards protested, “So, in other words, the Court is going to force me to move forward pro se?” ¶55. When the trial court demurred, Edwards continued, “I’ve been waiting 18 months for a trial, a retrial. I didn’t want any further delays, and my right to effective counsel was – was not being taken seriously.” ¶56. Edwards asked the court if it would contact Attorney Abby Robinson on his behalf. The trial court advised “we will reach out to Ms. Robinson and see if she’s willing to be appointed. And then after that, she can approach the Court with what she needs to do as far as being ready for trial on Monday.” ¶57. Edwards questioned what would occur “if she doesn’t accept the appointment[?]” He noted, “I still -- I mean, I don’t have any discovery to move forward with the trial on Monday. If I wanted to go pro se, the state hasn’t provided me anything. I don’t have --.” But the court quickly stopped Edwards to explain that because the State provided his first attorney with discovery, under the rules “[Edwards] was deemed to have received [his] discovery.” “[A]nd that is . . . why you understand you’re in a strange situation.” ¶58. The hearing began to wind down. The trial court indicated it would “reach out to the person suggested.” The trial court also told Edwards “But you do understand you manufactured this situation unfortunately.” Edwards argued, “Your Honor, that’s not a fair assessment saying I manufactured -- the Court appointed Mr. Dorsey.” ¶59. The exchange continued: Court: Let me just explain to you. Other defendants in other cases throughout the state’s history of jurisprudence have been in this 17 same situation that you are in and [are] determine[d] to relieve their counsel on the eve of trial. The Court is under no obligation to continue this case or do anything further. Edwards: Understood. Court: You see? You understand? Edwards: I understand that. Court: Okay. And it would not be error on this Court’s part to proceed with trial on Monday. Do you understand? But the Court because of the nature of the penalties, because the Court understands the seriousness of this situation is at least trying to determine if there is someone that we can contact as far as representation. Do you understand? Edwards: Understood. Court then stood adjourned, with the parties “on standby” to potentially “circle back again[.]” ¶60. On December 6, 2024, the Friday before trial, the court convened a hearing, once more, to discuss the status of Edwards’ legal counsel. Attorney Abby Robinson appeared in court, but advised that she “came today to be an observ[er],” agreeing with the trial court that she was not “retained counsel or counsel of record.” The trial court further noted that “we did reach out to . . . Attorney Robinson, in regard to representation, and she indicated that she would not accept an appointment in this case.” ¶61. The trial judge then proceeded to assign Edwards hybrid co-counsel and indicated trial would move forward as scheduled. ¶62. Not understanding the role or context of “co-counsel” in this scenario, Edwards questioned the court, “So -- and let me just make sure I’m clear on this. When you’re saying 18 ‘co-counsel,’ then the Court is not appointing a counsel; you’re just saying that I can proceed or the Court wants me to proceed with a co-counsel?” ¶63. To answer Edwards’ question, the court attempted to define the roles of appointed counsel, pro se representation, and hybrid counsel. But Edwards, still not understanding, questioned: So, I mean, I guess my understanding is we are at a critical stage of the prosecution and according to the Amendments, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth, I’m supposed to have counsel. That’s my guaranteed right. The way you’re explaining it to me is still like the Court is telling me to go ahead because this Monday deadline and we want to give you this hybrid attorney, but we’re not -- the Court is not really appointing the counsel themselves. ¶64. The court again tried to clarify Edwards’ confusion explaining that, “the Court is still assigning counsel to you, but I can’t make an attorney accept an appointment that does not want to.” ¶65. Edwards remarked, “[d]enial of counsel at any critical stage of a criminal procedure is per se constitutional error, and I’m -- I’m just kind of feeling like we’re teetering on that.” The court countered, “[y]ou may feel that way, but this is not about feelings[.]” The court continued: You have placed yourself in this dilemma. You were made aware when the Court was able to obtain an attorney with Mr. Dorsey to represent you that it was difficult. And at any point the defendant does have the option of retaining their own counsel if they don’t like the attorney that this Court appoints. The Court is still doing the same thing. So, no, sir. You are not being denied counsel. ¶66. Edwards replied, “[a]nd this counsel -- me and this counsel have -- you’re saying we got 72 hours to prepare for trial.” His exchange with the court continued. 19 Court: This is not your first -- [trial]. Edwards: But this is his. .... Edwards: Okay. So once again, on the record, is the Court denying me counsel? Court: No. The Court has an attorney who will be assisting you with this case. He had a prior engagement this morning. He will be meeting with you this afternoon, and he will be -- he says that he will be engaged to assist you next week with trial. The court further notified Edwards that he “was going to be [receiving] the discovery today.” At this point Attorney Abby Robinson attempted to address the court, but was denied. A brief recess was called. ¶67. Following the recess, the exchange between Edwards and the trial court continued. Edwards stated: [T]his is trial by ambush because now this same discovery that I’ve wrote numerous motions and asked for and didn’t get, now I have it on the eve of trial. It’s no way I can be prepared or a hybrid can be prepared properly between now and Monday. And, Your Honor, that’s just . . . . This is not a fair trial. [I] want this trial to happen just as much as you do. But I want a fair trial and that’s all I’ve ever asked you from the beginning of this. I’ve written you. I’ve motioned you and asked for a fair shake[,] . . . and I’m not getting it today. But the trial court was not persuaded, stating “your arguments, in regard to readiness fall on deaf ears.” ¶68. As the hearing began to come to a close, the State spoke up to notify the trial court 20 that it had spoken with Attorney Abby Robinson. The State advised the court that “she indicated that she may be willing to accept the appointment.” But “due to the nature of the case and the voluminous records, she would not be prepared on Monday for trial.” The State further explained that “if she did take the appointment and requested this Court to continue it, that the State would not object.” ¶69. Despite this solution, the trial judge told the parties that “[t]he Court is of the opinion this case needs to proceed.” J. Retrial ¶70. The parties appeared before the court three days later, on December 9, 2024. The court began by addressing outstanding motions. This included a motion for continuance filed the night before by Attorney William Mullennix, Edwards’ newly assigned hybrid co- counsel. Mullennix argued that a continuance was necessary “in the interests of justice and to ensure a fair trial” because “discovery [wa]s not complete[,]” the State “[could] not certify that discovery [wa]s complete[,]” and Edwards did “not wish to proceed pro se[.]” But the trial court denied the motion. ¶71. Trial commenced and the parties presented their cases. Edwards led a majority of the defense’s case while Mullennix conducted the voir dire of the venire and made objections throughout trial. Mullennix also crossed two witnesses, provided the motion for directed verdict, and assisted during the jury instruction conference. ¶72. Edwards’ retrial substantively differed from the first. Unlike the first trial which lasted eight days, Edwards’ retrial only lasted four days. 21 ¶73. Additionally, two witnesses—the medical examiner and the owner of Edwards’ truck—were unavailable to testify and had their prior testimony read into the record. Most notably, the trial court precluded the introduction of the previous manslaughter conviction of the sole eyewitness, Shadow Robinson, which was a major alternate theory for the defense during the first trial. ¶74. At the close of trial, the jury deliberated and found Edwards guilty of both charges. Edwards was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the first