Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2023-KA-01192-COA CURTIS RYALS A/K/A CURTIS V. RYALS APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/25/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FRANK G. VOLLOR COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: AMBER LAUREN STEWART ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 11/10/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ. EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, Curtis Ryals (Ryals) was convicted of aggravated assault upon Bobby Potts, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and culpable negligence manslaughter (as a lesser-included offense to first-degree murder) in the shooting death of Khalil Ryals (Khalil). This appeal followed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. According to the evidence presented at trial, on July 22, 2016, around 10:30 a.m., Ryals was working at his vehicle repair shop when the owner of Bailey Fuel Express (the store) called him and told him he had a vehicle that needed some repairs and that his wife would arrive at the store with the vehicle in about thirty minutes. Around 11:00 a.m., Ryals went to the store, parked his car by the gas pumps, and went inside. The owner’s wife had not yet arrived with the vehicle, so Ryals and the owner sat around talking while he waited for the vehicle. According to Ryals, Potts came into the store and “gave him verbal grievance,” so Ryals went outside and sat in his car to wait for the owner’s wife to arrive. ¶3. Ryals testified that while he was sitting in his car, Potts backed up his car and pulled up beside Ryals with his (Potts’) window down.1 According to Ryals, the following exchange occurred: I opened my door, and he said, “Curt, what’s that punk ass shit you said to me?” I said, you know I ain’t said nothing to you. I don’t say nothing to you. You know what I’m saying? Ryals further testified: And at that time he upped the gun. And when he upped that gun, I usually laugh at him because he’s a joke, you know. When he upped that gun, that day for some reason it wasn’t a joke to me. I thought about my baby girl. She’s sitting out there, 25 years old. I’ve got four children that depend on me daily. So when he upped that gun, I thought about my baby girl. And at that moment I went to talking to God. You know, “Please, God, don’t let him shoot this gun.” Because I’m looking at the barrel. If he shoots, he’s going to kill me, you know. For like five, six, ten seconds I’m steady talking to God. “Please, God, just take him away. Please just,” you know what I’m saying, “just take him away.” Ryals testified that at this point, he cranked his car and was getting ready to leave when he 1 Potts was in the driver’s seat, Khalil was in the front passenger seat, and an infant was in the back seat. Ryals claims he never saw Khalil or the infant. Potts is Ryals’ cousin, and Khalil is Ryals’ nephew. 2 heard a gun click. Ryals said he looked over and saw Potts with a gun pointed at him.2 ¶4. Video footage from the store’s cameras shows Ryals’ vehicle parked, facing the store, with the passenger side next to a gas pump. At approximately 11:16 a.m., Potts’ vehicle, which had been parked in front of the store, backs out of the parking space. Potts stops his vehicle next to Ryals. The driver’s side of Ryals’ car was so close to the passenger side of Potts’ vehicle that Ryals could not completely open his door. ¶5. On the surveillance video, around 11:17, Ryals leaned out of his vehicle and fired his gun, shooting into Potts’ car through the passenger’s window.3 Ryals then got out of his car, stuck his gun through the passenger’s window into Potts’ car and fired more shots. Potts jumped out of the driver’s side door of his vehicle and tried to run away. Ryals is seen chasing Potts. They came back into view running towards Potts’ car. Ryals pinned Potts against the driver’s side of Potts’ vehicle and beat Potts in the head with his weapon nine times. Ryals testified he did not know Khalil was dead until he went back into the store to call the police. ¶6. During trial, Ryals’ defense was that he acted in self-defense. Ryals testified that he was defending his life, that he had no malice towards Potts, and that he had no intent to harm Potts. In support of his theory, Ryals and his girlfriend, Erika Bailey, each testified about an altercation between Ryals and Potts about a week prior to July 22. Bailey testified that Potts 2 At some point in his testimony, Ryals claimed he saw two guns pointed in his direction, although he maintained that he never saw Khalil. Ryals was questioned about that but never explained the contradiction. 3 Ryals testified that he emptied his gun, which had five bullets in it. 3 was fixing his car and Potts got “frustrated at [Ryals] for something I don’t know. [Potts] walked away and then came back with a gun and put it in [Ryals’] face.” She testified that Potts shot at Ryals, but the bullet did not hit him. According to Bailey, Potts struck Ryals with the gun. Ryals also testified about Potts shooting at him at his shop. The jury found Ryals guilty of culpable negligence manslaughter, aggravated assault, and shooting into a vehicle. The court sentenced Ryals to serve twenty years for manslaughter and a consecutive twenty years, with ten years suspended, for aggravated assault, and a concurrent five years for the shooting, all in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He was further ordered to be placed on ten years of post-release supervision. ¶7. After the trial court denied Ryals’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, Ryals appealed his convictions of culpable negligence manslaughter and aggravated assault.4 Ryals raises five issues on appeal, which we will restate and reorder for purposes of analysis below. ANALYSIS I. Did the trial court fail to properly instruct the jury on the elements of culpable negligence manslaughter? ¶8. Ryals argues that the elements instruction for culpable negligence manslaughter did not properly instruct the jury on the essential elements of the crime. Jury Instruction 9 provided: The Court instructs the Jury that even if you do not find that Curtis Ryals, killed Khalil Ryals with a depraved heart, you may proceed in your deliberations to determine if he committed Culpable Negligence Manslaughter. 4 Ryals does not challenge his conviction of shooting into a vehicle. 4 Therefore, if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, 1. Curtis Ryals: 2. On or about the 22nd day of July 2016; 3. In the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi; 4. Without authority of law 5. With culpable negligence, by discharging a gun in the direction of Khalil Ryals 6. Without any premeditated design to affect the death of any individual, then you shall find the Defendant guilty of Culpable Negligence Manslaughter. If the State has failed to prove any one or more of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty. ¶9. Ryals argues on appeal that this instruction failed to require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that through his culpable negligence, Ryals actually killed Khalil Ryals. The State argues that because Ryals’ counsel failed to object to Instruction 9 during trial, his argument in this regard is waived, citing Edwards v. State, 723 So. 2d 1221, 1227 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he appellant bears the burden of making sure that the facts which support his claim of error are present in the record for appellate review.”). ¶10. In Harris v. State, 396 So. 3d 1258, 1265 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), we explained: “A defendant’s failure to object to a jury instruction at trial creates a procedural bar that prohibits appellate review of the issue, unless there is plain error.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 175 So. 3d 515, 522 (¶31) (Miss. 2015) (reh’g denied Oct. 15, 2015) (citation omitted). “Under such circumstances, [an appellate court] will find plain error only where a fundamental right of the defendant has been violated.” Id. (citations omitted). “Failure to submit to the jury the essential elements of the crime is fundamental error.” Hunter 5 v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 636 (Miss. 1996). Furthermore, “even though the defendant did not present an acceptable instruction, the State was obligated to do so.” (Emphasis added). ¶11. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-47 (Rev. 2014) defines a homicide by culpable negligence as manslaughter: Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter. We have held that “[t]he statutory elements of culpable-negligence manslaughter are ‘an unlawful killing by the culpable negligence of another.’” Wise v. State, 263 So. 3d 668, 675 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Ramage v. State, 914 So. 2d 274, 276 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). Failure to include the essential element that Khalil was killed by Ryals’ culpable negligence is a fundamental error that demands that we reverse Ryals’ conviction of culpable negligence manslaughter and remand for a new trial. II. Was the evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction of culpable negligence manslaughter? ¶12. In Seales v. State, 400 So. 3d 511, 513 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), this Court explained: “When this Court reviews the sufficiency of evidence . . . , we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decide if rational jurors could have found the State proved each element of the crime.” Lenoir v. State, 222 So. 3d 273, 279 (¶25) (Miss. 2017). The issue is not “whether we think the State proved the elements. Rather, we must decide whether a reasonable juror could rationally say that the State did.” Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293-94 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). ¶13. The State maintains that Ryals waived this issue by failing to move for a directed 6 verdict, either at the end of the State’s case or by renewal of the motion at the conclusion of all the evidence. The State points to Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(c), which provides in relevant part: (a) After the Prosecution’s Case-In-Chief. After the prosecution rests, the court, on its own motion or upon motion by the defendant, may consider whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. A motion for directed verdict must specify the manner in which the evidence is deficient. When, with respect to one (1) or more elements of the offense charged, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, the court shall order a directed verdict of “not guilty.” The trial shall proceed with respect to the remaining count(s), if any. (b) At the Close of the Evidence. If the motion for directed verdict is denied, the defendant may rest or proceed to introduce evidence on his/her behalf. If the defendant chooses to go forward with his/her own case, the defendant may renew the motion for directed verdict after the close of all the evidence. (c) Waiver. The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner prescribed will constitute a waiver of any argument on appeal pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. (Emphasis added). After the State rested, the trial court asked defense counsel, “[D]o you have a motion,” to which defense counsel replied, “[T]he defense would call its first witness, Ms. Erika Bailey.” At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court recessed for the evening before beginning closing arguments. Before the recess, the trial court asked, “[I]s there anything I need to take up before I go,” to which defense counsel replied, “[N]ot from the defense.” Pursuant to Rule 21(c), the State argues that the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence is procedurally barred from consideration on appeal. ¶14. While the record confirms that Ryals did not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and did not move for a peremptory instruction, we must note that in his 7 “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for New Trial,” Ryals did raise the issue by arguing: The evidence presented at trial by the State prosecution was not sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty. While new Rule 21(c) took effect on July 1, 2017, before the trial here occurred, we have found no case where this provision of the rule has been applied. The comment to the rule states that “Rule 21 follows common-law practice for a motion for directed verdict.” In another case that was tried after the effective date of the rule, Carpenter v. State, 311 So. 3d 1268, 1275 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), this Court stated: “The sufficiency of the evidence is challenged with a motion for a directed verdict, a request for a peremptory instruction, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).” Pace v. State, 242 So. 3d 107, 117 (¶24) (Miss. 2018) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993)). “When the defendant proceeds with his case after the State rests and the court overrules the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the defendant has waived the appeal of that directed verdict.” Id. at (¶25) (quoting Holland v. State, 656 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (Miss. 1995)). To preserve an issue for appeal if the defense presents witnesses or other evidence, the defendant must renew his motion for a directed verdict when he rests. Goldsmith v. State, 195 So. 3d 207, 212 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Page v. State, 990 So. 2d 760, 761 (¶9) (Miss. 2008)). “Stated another way, if a defendant put on evidence in his own defense after the denial of his motion for directed verdict, he waives his challenge to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence up to that point.” Washington v. State, 298 So. 3d 430, 439 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Woods v. State, 242 So. 3d 47, 54 (¶24) (Miss. 2018)). “In the absence of a renewal of the directed verdict, a request for a peremptory instruction, or a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the defendant has waived the sufficiency error on appeal.” Pace, 242 So. 3d at 117 (¶24). (Emphasis added). So it would seem that despite the language used in Rule 21(c), the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence may be preserved for appellate purposes by raising the issue in a post-trial JNOV motion, as was done in the present case. 8 ¶15. There is, however, another hurdle that must be cleared by Ryals. In Thomas v. State, 195 So. 3d 843, 850 n.4 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), this Court stated: “A motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that the state has failed to make out a prima facie case must state specifically wherein the state has failed to make out a prima facie case. Motions for a directed verdict must be specific and not general in nature.” Sheffield v. State, 749 So. 2d 123, 126 (¶10) (Miss. 1999) (quoting Banks v. State, 394 So. 2d 875, 877 (Miss. 1981)). Here, Thomas’s oral directed verdict motion was as follows: “Judge, at this time, we would make a motion for a directed verdict as a matter of law. That’s for the record.” Under Sheffield, that is not sufficient to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. Thomas’s post-trial motion for JNOV or a new trial was even less specific. Although the motion requested “a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict,” the motion failed to address the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. This was also insufficient to preserve a challenge to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence because the same “specificity” required of a motion for a directed verdict “is also required in a motion for JNOV.” Riley v. State, 11 So. 3d 751, 753 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). As shown above, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence raised in Ryals’ post-trial motion was not specific. Therefore, regardless of new Rule 21(c), failure to specifically address the alleged deficiency of the evidence in his post-trial motion procedurally bars the issue from consideration on appeal. ¶16. The procedural bar aside, Ryals’ assertion of insufficiency of the evidence on appeal has no merit. Ryals’ sole contention is that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense. However, Ryals cites no authority for the proposition that self-defense is an available defense to a charge of culpable negligence manslaughter. To the contrary, in Figueroa v. State, 337 So. 3d 1104, 1110-11 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), this Court explained: “Our [S]upreme [C]ourt has upheld the trial court’s denial of a self-defense 9 jury instruction in a murder case as having no evidentiary basis when the defendant’s defense was that the shooting was unintentional and accidental.” Brown v. State, 33 So. 3d 1134, 1140 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Wadford v. State, 385 So. 2d 951, 955 (Miss. 1980)). In Wadford, “[t]he [S]upreme [C]ourt clarified that ‘the legal concept of self-defense in a homicide case is based upon justification of a purposeful killing because it was necessary to kill in order to save the killer from imminent danger of suffering death or grave bodily harm at the hands of the person killed.’” Brown, 33 So. 3d at 1140 (¶22) (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Wadford, 385 So. 2d at 955). As this Court explained in another case, “a self-defense claim involves the intentional killing of a human being”—not an accidental killing. Birge v. State, 216 So. 3d 1174, 1177 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added) (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he killed the victim “by accident” “negate[d] [his] claim of self-defense”). We further find, based upon the above, that this issue is without merit because self-defense is not an available defense to culpable negligence manslaughter.5 III. Were the verdicts of the jury convicting Ryals of culpable negligence manslaughter6 and aggravated assault against the overwhelming weight of the evidence? ¶17. Ryals argues that the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that he was acting in self-defense when he shot and beat Potts. He contends that the evidence shows that Potts had shot at him during a recent argument. Further, Ryals contends that not one, but two guns were pointed at him from Potts’ vehicle before he started shooting. ¶18. Count II of the indictment charges Ryals with aggravated assault by repeatedly “striking Bobby Potts about his head with a .45 caliber Revolver handgun.” The evidence, 5 In his fourth issue on appeal, Ryals contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense as a defense to culpable negligence manslaughter. Based upon our conclusion on Issue II above, we also find this claim is without merit. 6 Because we reverse the manslaughter conviction on other grounds and remand the charge of culpable negligence manslaughter, this issue is moot. 10 particularly the store video, shows that after Ryals shot into Potts’ vehicle, Potts ran from the vehicle and away from Ryals. The video shows Ryals chasing Potts down and herding him back toward the vehicle. When Potts was then pinned against his vehicle, Ryals repeatedly beat Potts in the head with his handgun. It is clear from the video that Potts was not, at that time, acting aggressively toward Ryals. Potts was trying to get away from Ryals. ¶19. In Alvarado v. State, 343 So. 3d 391, 399 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), this Court stated: And “[a] successful self-defense argument requires that the jury believe that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe he was in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm.” Wilder v. State, 118 So. 3d 628, 631 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Also in Thomas v. State, 145 So. 3d 687, 695 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), this Court found: Furthermore, this Court has found that it was reasonable for a jury to conclude a defendant did not fear for his safety when evidence indicated the victim tried to flee. Knox v. State, 912 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). We find the overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case shows that Ryals was not in “imminent danger” when he chased Potts down, while Potts was trying to flee, and beat Potts in the head with his firearm. This issue is without merit. IV. Was Ryals’ trial counsel constitutionally ineffective? ¶20. Ryals contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly and timely raise “his applicable Weathersby defense.” In Thomas v. State, 416 So. 3d 102, 110-11 (¶¶19-20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), we explained the Weathersby rule: Where the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses are the only eyewitnesses to the homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or 11 witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts or by the facts of common knowledge. (Emphasis added). Because Weathersby only applies in homicide cases and because Ryals’ manslaughter conviction is being reversed and remanded, this issue is moot. CONCLUSION ¶21. Based upon the above analysis, Ryals’ conviction of culpable negligence manslaughter is reversed and remanded for a new trial. We affirm Ryals’ conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, and his conviction and sentence for shooting into an occupied vehicle are undisturbed by this appeal. ¶22. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. 12