Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00602-COA ZAYRICK KEUNE TAYLOR A/K/A ZAYRICK APPELLANT TAYLOR A/K/A ZAYRICK K. TAYLOR A/K/A JUICE v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/24/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL M. TAYLOR COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: STACY L. FERRARO ZAYRICK KEUNE TAYLOR (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIAM BRENDON ADAMS NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/17/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ. LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Zayrick Taylor was indicted in Lincoln County for murder, kidnapping, conspiring to kidnap, and possessing a firearm as a felon. He was found guilty as charged. On appeal, his appellate counsel raised five issues, and Taylor raised eight issues in a separately filed pro se brief. ¶2. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. Taylor was indicted for the first-degree murder of Tarvuirs Lyons; kidnapping of Brittany Richardson, kidnapping of Mikyuna Beasley, conspiracy to kidnap, felony fleeing, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The felony fleeing charge was not pursued. ¶4. Taylor’s friend Chase Anthony Wallis was indicted on the charges for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. The indictment also contained counts for accessory after the fact for Alisia Sims and Allie Bergeron, Taylor’s then-girlfriend. Taylor was tried separately. ¶5. The jury found Taylor guilty. He was sentenced to serve life for the murder, fifteen years for kidnapping Richardson, fifteen years for kidnapping Beasley, and ten years for possession of a firearm. The trial judge gave “no additional time” for the conspiracy conviction. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¶6. Officer Reginald Cain responded to a 911 dispatch about a possible hit-and-run near Vanzie Street and Rance Drive in Brookhaven. Officer Cain found a deceased Black male, later identified as Lyons, in the road. As he waited for the coroner to arrive, Officer Cain noticed a 9-millimeter shell casing near the body, which he collected. He also collected a bullet fragment in a puddle of blood, and once Lyons had been moved, Officer Cain recovered an additional bullet. ¶7. An autopsy revealed that Lyons had three gunshot wounds: one to the head and two graze wounds. The medical examiner also recovered bullet fragments from Lyons’s brain, skull, and pants. ¶8. Brittany Richardson and Mikyuna Beasley were in a romantic relationship. The two 2 women spent a day hanging out with Beasley’s cousins, Lyons and Taylor. The group hung out at Ford’s Trailer Park and drove around in a car that belonged to Taylor’s girlfriend. ¶9. Taylor drove the group to a nearby convenience store so they could get some beer. Lyons sat in the front seat, and Beasley and Richardson rode in the back. Taylor asked Lyons if he could hold Lyons’s gun, but Lyons said no. Lyons showed the gun to Taylor but kept it on his lap or at his side and would not allow Taylor to hold it. Richardson and Beasley both later described this interaction, but neither woman felt tension or any “signs of danger.” ¶10. When they got to the convenience store, Taylor bought a twelve-pack of beer, but he refused to share, so Richardson bought her own twelve-pack to share with Beasley and Lyons. At some point in the night, Taylor also snorted a white substance. It was unclear whether Lyons snorted the substance as well, but both women denied it. The group also smoked some marijuana. Richardson testified that she did not smoke and drank only one beer. ¶11. After the group returned to the trailer park, they continued hanging out for several more hours. Other than Lyons’s refusal to give Taylor his gun and Taylor’s refusal to share his beer, neither Richardson nor Beasley saw any disagreement or tension between the men. Around 2:00 a.m., Lyons asked Richardson to drive him to his house near Vanzie Street. Richardson drove in a car she borrowed from a friend. Lyons sat in the front passenger seat; Taylor was in the backseat behind the driver; and Beasley was in the backseat on the passenger side. 3 ¶12. Lyons asked to be dropped off in the street and said he would walk the rest of the way. Lyons got out and walked away. He and Taylor did not speak to each other as he left. Richardson started to drive away, but Taylor told her to turn around and go back to Lyons. Beasley testified that Taylor had pulled out a gun at this point, but Richardson could not see it because she was driving. ¶13. Richardson returned to the area where they had left Lyons and stopped the car in the street. Taylor called out to Lyons and asked if he had a lighter. Richardson testified that she thought this was strange because she had seen Taylor using his own lighter “all day.” Beasley also testified that Taylor asked Lyons if he had Taylor’s lighter, which she thought was odd because she could see it attached to Taylor’s pants as he was asking Lyons about it. Lyons turned around and approached the car, patting his pockets, apparently looking for a lighter. ¶14. On cross-examination, Taylor’s counsel asked if Richardson thought that Lyons’s patting himself while looking for a lighter was threatening toward Taylor. She did not think so but acknowledged that Lyons had a gun that night. Richardson testified that Lyons was not the type of person to carry a gun or even to need one and that there were no threats from him that night. ¶15. Beasley testified that she heard a shot, and she turned toward the noise and saw Lyons on the ground. Taylor shot a second time, and this time Beasley saw the flash from the gun. Richardson testified that Lyons approached the car and ducked his head down slightly to look inside at Taylor, and then Taylor shot him in the head. Lyons fell, and Taylor shot him again. 4 Beasley jumped into the front passenger seat. ¶16. Richardson started to drive away, but Taylor pointed the gun at her and told her not to leave. Taylor stepped out, walked to Lyons’s body, and took Lyons’s gun before getting back in the car. ¶17. Richardson drove away. She testified that she was shaken and driving too fast, and Taylor told her to slow down and not to draw attention to them. Richardson and Beasley both testified that Taylor seemed completely at ease. He told them not to tell anyone and said if they did, he would kill them and “everyone around” them. Richardson testified that Taylor said he had “no hesitation” in shooting Lyons and that he had done it because “[Taylor’s] been messed up in the head.” Richardson testified that Taylor said he had never killed anyone around others before. Both women testified that Taylor named several other people he had killed.1 ¶18. When they returned to the trailer park, Taylor walked the women inside, then got his friend Chase Wallis to come over. Wallis and Taylor stayed outside while Beasley and Richardson eavesdropped. Taylor showed Wallis the gun he had taken from Lyons, and Taylor said, “I told you I was going to get it.” Wallis and Taylor came inside, and then Taylor left to go pick up his girlfriend, Allie Bergeron. He told Wallis to “watch” Beasley and Richardson. Wallis sat on one couch, while Beasley and Richardson sat on the other. Both 1 The defense objected before she made this statement, arguing that her testimony without any other evidence would be “very prejudicial.” The court overruled the objection but allowed a standing objection to the testimony. 5 women testified that Wallis had a gun in his lap. Wallis eventually fell asleep, and Richardson and Beasley were able to escape. ¶19. Alisia Sims testified that she had known Taylor since they were children. On the day Lyons was killed, she had been working in Flowood and then returned to Lincoln County and stopped at her mother’s house to shower and nap. She left her mother’s to go to her own house, and when she got home, she noticed that the door was ajar and appeared to have been pried open. She found Taylor inside. ¶20. Taylor told her they needed to leave, and they got in her car. Taylor threw a black bag into the backseat and then got in the driver’s seat. Taylor drove south toward Summit. Taylor stopped at a house, and Sims heard Taylor ask a man if he could get a gun. The man and Taylor talked for a few minutes; then Taylor got back in the car, and they drove back toward Brookhaven. Taylor took Sims’s phone and called someone. Sims heard him say, “D**n, I should have killed them b*****s first,” and “I got to kill Man.[2] I got to kill that b***h-a** n***a.” ¶21. At some point, the police had begun following them, so Taylor sped up. The police chased them a while, then Taylor wrecked the car and jumped out. Sims testified that a magazine clip fell out of Taylor’s pants onto the floor of the car as he jumped out. ¶22. Sims was arrested after Taylor crashed the car. While she was in jail, Taylor approached her and told her to “tell [Wallis] to kill them b*****s, kill both of them.” Sims 2 Sims testified that “Man” was Charles Lyons, Lyons’s father. 6 testified that she had originally been charged as an accessory after the fact, but the charges had been dismissed “because of what really happened.” On cross-examination, Sims was less sure of the status of her case—she did not know if the charges were totally dismissed or simply remanded to the file—but she denied that she had received a deal in exchange for her testimony. ¶23. Law enforcement recovered a shell casing, a bullet fragment, and a bullet from the scene where Lyons’s body was discovered. During Lyons’s autopsy, medical examiners retrieved a bullet from Lyons’s brain and some bullet fragments from his pants. Officers later found a spent shell casing at the outer edge of the windshield of the car Richardson had been driving when Lyons was shot. Testing revealed the presence of gunshot residue on the exterior of the rear passenger’s side door and suggested the presence of residue on the interior side. ¶24. The Mississippi Crime Laboratory later tested the collected casings and fragments and determined that the shell casing found at the scene and the shell casing found on the car Richardson had been driving were fired from the same gun. The bullet retrieved from Lyons’s brain and the bullet recovered from the crime scene were similar in caliber, lands and grooves, and rifling, but due to damage to both, examiners could not conclusively determine that the bullets came from the same gun. Both bullets exhibited polygonal rifling, and an expert testified at trial that Glock-brand firearms have such rifling. The bullet fragment recovered from the scene and the fragments recovered during the autopsy were too 7 mutilated for testing. ¶25. Vincent Fernando testified that law enforcement focused their investigation on Taylor as Lyons’s killer because he was the person last seen with Lyons. Fernando testified that he did not consider Beasley or Richardson as suspects even though they were present as well; he only considered them as witnesses. Even though the gunshot residue test showed residue only on Beasley’s side of the car, he did not ask to test her or Richardson’s clothing. ANALYSIS ¶26. Taylor’s appellate counsel’s brief lists five issues for review, but many of the issues listed are interrelated and can be discussed together.3 We have restated the five issues into three: addressing the use of a jury instruction to stipulate that Taylor was a felon; addressing the admission of prior bad acts evidence through an indictment and witness testimony; and addressing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. ¶27. Taylor also filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he raised at least eight issues.4 3 Taylor’s counsel’s brief lists: (1) “The trial court erred by rejecting Taylor’s stipulation”; (2) “The trial court erred by giving a burden shifting jury instruction”; (3) “The trial court erred in admitting a highly inflammatory doctored indictment and a sentencing order . . . and other testimony that Taylor had killed before”; (4) “The trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the doctored indictment”; and (5) “Prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal.” 4 Taylor’s supplemental brief lists the following argument headings: “The indictment is improper and defective with regards to its variance between evidence and proof”; “A substantial claim of actual innocence”; “Prosecutorial misconduct”; “Prosecuting attorney Mr. Waldrup’s improper, unsubstantiated comments in closing arguments and trial courts abuse of discretions”; “Inconsistent testimony of alleged kidnapped victims Brittany Richardson and Mikyuna Beasley”; “Co-Defendant Alisha Samhara Sims turnt State of Mississippi witness”; “Effective assistance of counsel violation”; and “Right to a speedy trial 8 After reviewing Taylor’s brief and the arguments raised throughout, we have addressed his claims as follows: sufficiency of the evidence; weight of the evidence; actual innocence and newly discovered evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and speedy trial. I. It was not error to use a jury instruction for Taylor’s stipulation. ¶28. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by “rejecting” a stipulation that he was a felon and that it was error to give a peremptory jury instruction informing the jurors that he was a felon. However, Taylor’s arguments on this point misrepresent the record. The trial court did not reject any stipulation. Before trial began, Taylor’s counsel stated that he wanted to stipulate that Taylor was a felon for purposes of the felon-in-possession charge. Taylor’s counsel, the State, and the court discussed the best way to do that, and the parties agreed that the stipulation would be presented via jury instruction. At the close of the trial, an instruction was presented and agreed to by the State and Taylor. The instruction read: “The Court instructs the jury that the Defendant is a convicted felon under the laws of the State of Mississippi, as such term applies in this case.” ¶29. This issue is procedurally barred because Taylor agreed to the instruction and form of the stipulation at trial. The argument also lacks merit because the trial court did not refuse any stipulation offered by Taylor, so there was no error by the trial court. Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that a jury instruction is the proper method by which to inform violation.” 9 the jury that a defendant has stipulated to certain facts that the State must otherwise prove. See Wells v. State, 396 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (¶10) (Miss. 2024). II. The trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear details of Taylor’s prior conviction, but the error was harmless. ¶30. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of his prior bad acts through the details of a prior conviction and indictment, essentially allowing the State to present a propensity argument that is not allowed under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Taylor also argues that the trial court erred by allowing Richardson, Beasley, and Sims to testify about statements Taylor had made in which he claimed to have killed and shot others. ¶31. The admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Hargett v. State, 62 So. 3d 950, 952 (¶7) (Miss. 2011). The trial judge “enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling.” Id. Even so, “evidence of a crime other than the one for which the accused is being tried generally will not be admissible.” Id. ¶32. Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides: Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. MRE 404(b). Evidence that is admissible under Rule 404 must still pass through the 10 “ultimate filter” of Rule 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” MRE 403. However, the State must “clearly articulate[] the alternative purpose for the evidence and show[] that the Rule 404(b) exception is a material issue in the case.” Byrd v. State, 294 So. 3d 86, 91 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). A. 2018 Indictment ¶33. The State sought to introduce a 2018 indictment in which Taylor had been indicted for attempted murder. The indictment alleged that Taylor had “discharge[d] a firearm, multiple times, into [a man’s] body.” Taylor later pled guilty to aggravated assault. ¶34. The State argued that the indictment proved Taylor’s intent toward Lyons and lack of mistake. Taylor’s counsel argued that the 2018 indictment had no factual connection to the present trial and had no probative value. The trial judge agreed that Taylor’s indictment for attempted murder should not come in, but the judge questioned whether the fact that Taylor had pled guilty to aggravated assault—rather than the simple admission that he was a felon—should come in. Taylor’s counsel continued to argue that it violated Rule 404 because the State was seeking to show that he had acted in conformity with his 2018 guilty plea. The State disagreed, arguing, “I know we have it on the issue of intent. We have it on the issue of knowledge. We have it on the issue of absence of mistake or lack of accident. . . . It was an absence of mistake when [Taylor] shot [Lyons] and that it was not an accident and it goes to his intent when he shot [Lyons].” Taylor maintained that none of these reasons applied to 11 him. ¶35. After discussion both on and off the record, the trial court held that Taylor’s aggravated assault conviction “is admissible for the purpose of proving lack of mistake, all that sort of stuff under—more specifically motive, intent, opportunity, lack of knowledge, plan absence of mistake, whatever. And on that point, more probative than prejudicial.” ¶36. The State continued to press that the jury needed to hear specifically that Taylor had shot a man multiple times because “an aggravated assault [c]ould be nicking him with a knife. . . . What makes it relevant in this case is what he plead guilty to. He pled guilty to shooting a guy multiple times.” After proceedings in chambers, the trial judge reasoned that it was important for the jury to hear that Taylor had “used a gun in the past . . . and that shows [when he shot Lyons,] he had a gun, he didn’t make a mistake, he didn’t accidentally do this.” ¶37. The trial court redacted most of the information in the indictment except that which showed that Taylor had been indicted for discharging a gun into a man’s body. The State also sought to introduce the sentencing order to show that Taylor had actually pled guilty under the cause number associated with the indictment. Taylor maintained his objection to any of this information being admitted as evidence. ¶38. When the jury was brought back to the courtroom, the State asked for permission to publish the document to the jury, and the trial court declared that it was “tak[ing] judicial notice of [the indictment and sentencing order] being an official record of Circuit Court of 12 Lincoln County.” Both the redacted indictment and sentencing order were given to the jury and admitted as exhibits. ¶39. This was an abuse of discretion. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may be admissible for certain purposes, but the State must “clearly articulate” the purpose for the evidence and show that the exception “is a material issue in the case.” Byrd, 294 So. 3d at 91 (¶21). Here, the State claimed that the evidence was relevant under Rule 404(b) to show intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident: “It was an absence of mistake when [Taylor] shot [Lyons] and that it was not an accident and it goes to his intent when he shot [Lyons].” ¶40. The State’s listing of allegedly relevant exceptions merely paid lip service to Rule 404(b). At no point did the State connect any exception with the facts of Taylor’s case. As Taylor’s counsel argued, there was “no connection whatsoever factually” between Lyons’s death and the earlier shooting. In this trial, Taylor was not claiming that he did not have access to a gun or had never shot a gun before; his defense was that he did not do it. ¶41. The trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce the facts and documents of Taylor’s prior conviction without a specific, clear reason that an exception applied.5 ¶42. However, this conclusion does not end our analysis. To determine whether the error requires reversal, we must determine whether the admission of the evidence “affected a 5 This error is even more apparent when considering that Taylor stipulated to the fact that he was a felon—a tactic usually taken to avoid evidence of a prior crime being admitted. 13 substantial right . . . or if in light of overwhelming evidence of [Taylor’s] guilt, it may be deemed harmless error.” Smith v. State, 90 So. 3d 122, 131 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “Erroneously admitted evidence is harmless when the same result would have been reached had error not existed.” Caldwell v. State, 6 So. 3d 1076, 1079 (¶9) (Miss. 2009). ¶43. Here, the error was ultimately harmless because even without evidence of Taylor’s prior conviction, the evidence against Taylor was overwhelming. Two eyewitnesses testified that Taylor shot Lyons in the head with no provocation, and their story was not contradicted in any material respect. Projectiles recovered from Lyons’s body and casings recovered from the scene had rifling consistent with a Glock-brand firearm, and Sims testified that she saw a magazine fall out of Taylor’s pants onto the floor of a car, where it was later photographed and identified as a Glock-brand magazine. Sims also testified that Taylor’s statements after Lyons’s death suggested that he had shot Lyons. ¶44. Because the evidence against Taylor was such that “a fair minded jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty,” the trial court’s error in admitting evidence of Taylor’s past conviction is harmless. Forrest v. State, 335 So. 2d 900, 903 (Miss. 1976).6 B. Testimony and Statements about Prior Bad Acts ¶45. Taylor argues that testimony about Taylor’s alleged statements from Richardson, 6 Taylor also argues that the trial court erred by admitting the indictment and sentencing order as exhibits, although it is unclear why having these documents admitted as exhibits is different than the general claim of error addressed here. Either way, the error in admitting evidence of Taylor’s prior bad acts is addressed here, and the admission of the physical documents does not alter the analysis or the conclusion that the error was harmless. 14 Beasley, and Sims violated Rule 404(b) and that the State’s mention of that testimony in closing compounded the error. 1. Sims’s Testimony ¶46. Sims testified that about a month before the murder, Taylor told her that he “hunt[ed] people for the fun of it.” Taylor objected and argued that the statement was too remote and had no relevance, but the State argued that it showed why Sims, an indicted accessory, was scared of Taylor. The court allowed the statement to “explain[] her state of mind and her actions subsequent.” ¶47. Sims also testified that shortly before that incident, Taylor asked her what she would do if he killed someone. She thought he was joking, but then he told her that if she was “not down, too, then [he would] have to kill [her] too.” Taylor did not object to this testimony. ¶48. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Sims’s testimony that Taylor said he hunted people. Taylor did not object to her testimony about his direct threat to kill her, so any challenge to that testimony is waived. Even so, admitting it was not an abuse of discretion. Taylor attacked Sims’s credibility by emphasizing that she had originally been charged as a co-conspirator. He also recalled her during his case-in-chief and suggested that she was a spurned lover who fabricated her allegations against him. Taylor’s statements were relevant to explain why Sims initially failed to give a statement against him and continued speaking with him while they were in jail. They supported her explanation that her conduct was motivated by fear rather than love. 15 2. Beasley’s and Richardson’s Testimony ¶49. Both Beasley and Richardson testified that after Taylor shot Lyons, he told them that he would kill them if they told anyone what happened. Both women testified that Taylor then began listing all the people he had killed before. Richardson testified that Taylor said he had “no hesitation” when he shot Lyons and that he had done it before because he (Taylor) was “messed up in the head.” Taylor objected to Richardson’s testimony about the others Taylor had claimed to kill, arguing that the statement would be “very prejudicial” without any evidence to support it. The circuit court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony but recognized a standing objection to the testimony. ¶50. The basis of the circuit court’s ruling is not apparent from the record. Even assuming that admitting the testimony was an abuse of discretion, however, any error was harmless. As discussed above, the evidence against Taylor was overwhelming. Without the testimony that he claimed to have killed others, the jury still could have reached no verdict other than guilty. 3. Prosecutor’s Remarks ¶51. During closing argument, the prosecutor brought up Sims’s, Beasley’s, and Richardson’s testimony, noting that “[y]ou don’t . . . talk about hunting people unless there’s something wrong with you. You don’t look at another young lady and say, ‘What would you do if we killed somebody in front of you,’ if you weren’t sick.” Taylor did not object. ¶52. At another point during closing, when arguing that Taylor was “vicious,” the 16 prosecutor emphasized that Taylor had told Beasley and Richardson that he had killed other people. Taylor did not object. ¶53. Because Taylor did not object to these statements, his arguments on appeal are waived. Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 31 (¶78) (Miss. 2017). To the extent Taylor claims that the statements were prosecutorial misconduct, the claim is also waived for lack of contemporaneous objection. Additionally, the statements are not “so inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion.” Id. III. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived for failure to contemporaneously object. ¶54. Taylor argues that the State committed misconduct during closing arguments by attempting to bolster Sims’s testimony through statements explaining why she had gotten a good plea arrangement. Taylor did not object contemporaneously and has shown no prejudice, and this issue is waived. Id. IV. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions. ¶55. Taylor argues in his pro se supplemental brief that the State failed to prove the essential elements of murder, arguing there was no physical evidence connecting him to the murder.7 He also argues that the conviction of kidnapping was based on Richardson and 7 Taylor titles the section of the argument: “[t]he indictment is improper and defective” based on a “variance between evidence and proof,” but the crux of his argument focuses on the State’s evidence against him. We address his claims about Beasley’s and Richardson’s testimony as an attack on the weight of the evidence. We do not address his argument that his co-indictees (Wallis, Sims, and Bergeron) were not convicted, as they were not subjects of this prosecution and trial. 17 Beasley’s “fabrications.” ¶56. When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Goode v. State, 374 So. 3d 592, 604 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, accepting all evidence supporting the convictions as true and giving the State the benefit of all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id. ¶57. Taylor was indicted for the first-degree murder of Lyons, so the State had to prove that Lyons had been killed without authority of law and with deliberate design to cause his death. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a). Both Richardson and Beasley testified that Taylor shot and killed Lyons at close range. Bullets and casings recovered from the scene and Lyons’s body were from a Glock-brand firearm, and Taylor dropped a Glock-brand magazine in the car when he attempted to flee. Sims testified that the day after the murder, she overheard Taylor talking about having killed someone. This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor killed Lyons with deliberate design. V. The jury’s verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence. ¶58. Many of Taylor’s issues on appeal relate to what he alleges is “false testimony,” inconsistent testimony, and the deals that coconspirators and indictees received. ¶59. When we review a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will affirm unless the verdict is “so contrary to the 18 overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Goode, 374 So. 3d at 606 (¶35). We must “bear in mind that when evidence or testimony conflicts, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and worth of evidence and witness credibility.” Id. ¶60. Beasley, Richardson, and Sims were all thoroughly cross-examined on their relationships with each other and Taylor, and Sims was cross-examined about her role as a co-indictee. None of the arguments Taylor presents regarding these witnesses’ credibility meaningfully cut against the weight of the State’s evidence, which has already been discussed. Any issues between the evidence and the witness credibility were the jury’s to resolve, and the jury resolved them in favor of the State. VI. Taylor’s arguments regarding actual innocence and previously undiscovered evidence are barred, as they present facts not contained in the record. ¶61. Taylor argues that he is actually innocent and that he possesses previously undiscovered evidence to support this claim, but his arguments contain evidence not in the record. As such, they are not appropriate for review on direct appeal. See Smith, 90 So. 3d at 133 (¶39). ¶62. Additionally, most of the argument Taylor presents for his “actual innocence” claim is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, which was addressed above. VII. Taylor’s argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct is already addressed by his appellate counsel or procedurally barred for lack 19 of objection. ¶63. Taylor appears to argue that the State committed misconduct by not telling him about a co-indictee’s charges having been dropped and suggesting that the witnesses or the State had exculpatory evidence. This argument is not supported by the record, and we will not address it. See id. ¶64. Taylor also raises misconduct arguments related to the State’s closing argument. None of these were objected to contemporaneously and are therefore waived. VIII. Taylor’s claim about ineffective assistance of counsel is not appropriate for review on direct appeal. ¶65. Taylor argues that his counsel failed to file motions in limine or seek a speedy trial; failed to file motions regarding “deals” others were getting; failed to discuss the case with him; and failed to object at trial. ¶66. Generally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are better addressed in post- conviction review, as we are limited to the trial court record on direct appeal, and there is usually insufficient evidence to properly evaluate the claim. Norton v. State, 394 So. 3d 1057, 1060 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). However, if the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions or the parties stipulate the record is adequate, we may address the claims. Id. ¶67. The State does not stipulate that the record is sufficient to address these on direct appeal, and Taylor’s claimed errors are not apparent from the record. Therefore, we decline to address the issue, and, should he be permitted to do so, Taylor may address the issue by 20 post-conviction review. Id. at 1061 (¶11). IX. Taylor’s speedy trial claim is waived under Rule 28. ¶68. Taylor does not actually make any speedy trial argument beyond noting that there were 1,095 days between arrest and his trial. However, Taylor does not cite any authority in support of his argument, and it is therefore procedurally barred. Stevens v. State, 294 So. 3d 699, 704 (¶20) (Miss. 2020); M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). CONCLUSION ¶69. The only issue with any merit is Taylor’s argument regarding the aggravated assault indictment and sentencing order. They should not have been admitted and did not serve a valid purpose under Rule 404(b). They were not relevant to the charged crimes and were not used to rebut any defense. However, the evidence against Taylor was overwhelming, so the error was ultimately harmless. ¶70. Taylor’s other issues lack merit or are procedurally barred. ¶71. Taylor’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. 21