Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00587-COA JOHN WILLIAM ANDERSON APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/26/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEPHEN B. SIMPSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: STACY L. FERRARO ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIAM CROSBY PARKER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/15/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND WEDDLE, JJ. LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On March 20, 2025, John William Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Anderson appeals and argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence obtained through a warrantless search of his cell phone records, and all derivative information, to be shown to the jury. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On October 11, 2022, Destinee Bonner was “taking a smoke break” on a bench outside the Country Kwik Stop gas station in Harrison County. Bonner worked as a cashier at the store. Bonner stated that she saw “a man standing at a [white Impala] vehicle” that was parked near the gas pumps that were visible from the bench. She said that she heard a “bang, bang” and saw the man standing at the white car “slowly looking around, and then he look[ed] back – he duck[ed] back down into the vehicle, and then he g[ot] back up, and look[ed] back around.” The man then walked to a “red Ford Explorer with brown trim packaging” while “peel[ing] a bag off around the gun in his hand.” According to Bonner, the man was white and wearing “blue jeans, a navy blue shirt, and he had on men’s sunglasses that had blue lenses.” The bag around his hand was “like a Walmart bag or a grey Family Dollar bag.” ¶3. Bonner grabbed her phone and called 911. She watched as the red SUV “waited for the light” at the gas station to “turn green, and he waited for [two other] vehicles to go through the light.” The red SUV then drove away. Bonner approached the vehicle and saw a “black male . . . leaning in towards the console of the vehicle,” and she observed “brains . . . dripping out of the back of his head.” Bonner stayed on the line with dispatch until the police arrived.1 ¶4. Another woman, Tammaneque Callahan, had stopped at the Country Kwik Stop to get gas on her way home. She stated that she saw “a guy” who “was parked on the side of the building” in a “red Ford with beige trim, an SUV.” She stated that the guy “got out of his car . . . [and] walked over to the gas pump where another vehicle was at the gas pump.” Callahan stated that the guy “fired one shot, walked off, stopped, looked at everyone, went back to his vehicle, took off his top shirt, threw it in his car and drove off.” Callahan 1 Recordings of Bonner’s conversation with the dispatcher were introduced at trial. 2 described the man as “a tall, slender, white guy, looked to be in his late 30s, early 40s” and was wearing “blue jeans, a blue polo style shirt with a white T-shirt up under it.” ¶5. Callahan fled the scene “because [she] didn’t want to be in trouble,” but she eventually went back to the store “to render aid” to the person who was shot at the gas pumps. Callahan had a “CNA license” and was certified to provide “medical assistance, first aid, and CPR.” When she approached the car, she saw “a black male, looked to be in his 30s, had tattoos on his face,” and was positioned with “one of his legs out the car and his body was slumped over the side of the passenger seat.” She saw “a gunshot wound on the side of his head,” and “brain matter coming out of the other side and bleeding.” Callahan checked for a pulse, performed sternum rubs, and then informed Bonner and the dispatcher that the man was dead. ¶6. Harrison County law enforcement arrived at the Country Kwik Stop around 6:04 p.m. Crime scene investigator Morgan Barry recovered “the victim’s cell phone right near his arm and near the [driver’s] seat,” a shell casing by the gas pump, and a pair of gloves. Criminal Intervention Patrol officer Josh Macko was returning from a SWAT call when he heard the “call-out” regarding the murder and “self-initiated . . . due to the circumstances surrounding it.” Macko arrived at the scene and eventually was able to identify the victim as Jeneation Lewis. ¶7. Investigator Nickolas Pennington later arrived and began talking with witnesses and attempted to gain “access to the surveillance cameras.”2 Pennington stated that the officers 2 The surveillance cameras captured the red SUV arriving and then the white sedan parked at the pump, but “did not capture the actual shooting.” 3 were able to preview3 the phone that was found on Lewis. The “phone showed that there was a text conversation that had taken place just prior to [Lewis] arriving at the gas station.” ¶8. Lieutenant Jason Walker, an officer who handled electronic forensic examinations for the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office, “heard the radio traffic” but was “en route to” another homicide that had happened that same day near the same time. Walker described that day as “probably the busiest day” that he had experienced in his “13 years . . . in Investigations at Harrison County.” When he later arrived on the scene, Walker was “tasked with trying to get the information off of [Lewis’s] phone to help identify the suspect.” A judge issued a search warrant for Lewis’s phone, and Walker performed an extraction.4 A report was generated from the extraction that showed “a breakdown of the timeline or the activity” of incoming and outgoing text messages. ¶9. A text conversation with a contact who was saved in Lewis’s phone as “JHN” revealed that Lewis and JHN had agreed to meet that evening at the Country Kwik Stop. The conversation started at 2:52 p.m. that day, and the last text to JHN was sent at 6:03 p.m.5 Throughout the conversation, Lewis called the person “John.” ¶10. Mary Katherine Sullivan, an intelligence analyst with the Harrison County Sheriff’s 3 Officer Pennington explained the “preview” as where the officer “picked the phone up and immediately the phone lights up[.]” 4 Walker explained that he uses computer software called Cellebrite that allows the connection of “a phone to [a] forensics computer” and allowed Walker to see “an exact copy of the data from the phone on[] the computer.” 5 Forty seconds after this message, Lewis sent his last text to someone named “Baby,” asking what they wanted for dinner. 4 Office, was called in to assist with finding the shooter. Sullivan began searching through “tag readers” to locate a red Ford Expedition with silver or tan trim. She stated that through the Mississippi Department of Revenue, she could search for the make and model, although she did not know the year, and “there [were] a lot of Ford Expeditions.” ¶11. Eventually, Sullivan used the number extracted from Lewis’s phone for JHN to make a request with C Spire to provide information connected with the number. C Spire provided the “subscriber information for the phone,” which was the name and address on the account—John Anderson at 18068 Dedeaux Clan Road. Additionally, C Spire provided four location “pings” based off cell towers in the area. The location data was gathered at 6:38 p.m., 10:24 p.m., 10:53 p.m., and 11:46 p.m. The last three locations showed that Anderson’s phone had not moved since 6:38 p.m. ¶12. Sullivan ran the information for Anderson with the police “tag reader” and was able to obtain a copy of a Florida driver’s license for Anderson. The license listed Anderson’s emergency contact as his mother, who was registered as owning a red Ford Expedition. Anderson’s driver’s license photo was used to create a six-photo lineup that was given to Bonner. Bonner identified Anderson as the man she saw at the gas pumps. At some point, SWAT officers went to the address and confirmed that “the vehicle was at the house” and “visible from the roadway.” ¶13. An arrest warrant for Anderson and a search warrant for his address were obtained and executed in the early morning hours of October 12, 2022. Anderson was arrested at the Dedeaux Clan Road address, and the police located “clothing in the washing machine that 5 matched the description that was originally given by the 911 caller.” A second search warrant for the property was later obtained, and a 9-millimeter pistol was found in the backyard on a wheel hub of an old white truck. On October 21, 2022, the circuit court issued a search warrant for Anderson’s October 11 and 12 phone records. The newly acquired C Spire records for Anderson’s phone confirmed the prior information sent on the evening of October 11. ¶14. On June 12, 2023, Anderson was indicted for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. On June 11, 2024, prior to trial, Anderson’s counsel filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Anderson’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution had been violated by a warrantless search of C Spire records associated with Anderson’s phone account. Officer Pennington and Analyst Sullivan testified at the hearing about the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office’s investigation procedure, as detailed above. The circuit court denied Anderson’s motion to suppress, reasoning that “[t]he information obtained from C Spire in this case was real time location data” that was “necessary to protect public safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.” The circuit court found that under “the exigency doctrine exception” the information obtained from Anderson’s cell phone without a search warrant was admissible. ¶15. The jury found Anderson guilty of both first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Anderson was sentenced to serve life in prison for Count I and ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for Count II. The 6 sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Anderson filed a post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied. Anderson appealed. ANALYSIS ¶16. Anderson raised one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. “The standard of review for the suppression of evidence is abuse of discretion.” Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 641 (¶47) (Miss. 2009) (citing Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320, 366 (Miss. 2008)). “[W]hen reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court looks to determine whether the trial court’s findings, considering the totality of the circumstances, are supported by substantial credible evidence.” Hampton v. State, 966 So. 2d 863, 865-66 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Garrison v. State, 918 So. 2d 846, 848 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). “Where supported by substantial credible evidence, this Court shall not disturb those findings.” Knight v. State, 407 So. 3d 137, 143 (¶18) (Miss. 2025) (quoting Moore v. State, 933 So. 2d 910, 914 (¶9) (Miss. 2006)). ¶17. Anderson argued that because the police “did not obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before obtaining identity and location information about Anderson from C Spire[,]” all evidence from the C Spire records and derivative evidence of the C Spire records should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Anderson relied on Carpenter v. United States, a United States Supreme Court case where, without a warrant, “the government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements” over the span of more than 127 days. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 301 (2018). The cell-site location 7 information (CSLI)6 was used as evidence against Carpenter on “six counts of robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.” Id. at 302. ¶18. “Prior to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the wireless carriers[,]” arguing that “the Government’s seizure of the records violated the Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause.” Id. at 302. Carpenter’s motion was denied. Id. The government mapped out Carpenter’s CSLI to show at trial that “Carpenter’s phone [was] near four of the charged robberies” at the time of each of the robberies. Id. Carpenter was convicted, and eventually his case was heard by the United States Supreme Court. Id. ¶19. The Court found that “when the Government accessed CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.” Id. at 313. The Court held that “the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring” CSLI data.7 Id. at 316. However, the Court stated that its decision “is a narrow one” which did not apply to “real-time CSLI.”8 Id. 6 CSLI was described by the Court as information generated and time-stamped “[e]ach time the phone connects to a cell site.” Id. 7 The parties do not raise the third-party search doctrine before this Court; however, we note that the Supreme Court in Carpenter rejected such arguments as exceptions to its ruling. Id. at 316 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”). Such a decision has not been made or recognized by the Mississippi Supreme Court. See Knight, 407 So. 3d at 143 (¶19) (deciding that under the facts of that case it did not need to discuss third-party consent as it related to warrantless searches of cell phones because the private search doctrine applied instead). 8 In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Carpenter and stated that an unlawful search occurs “whenever the Government accessed 8 ¶20. The Court also ruled that an exception to its ruling applied when “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011)). The Court gave examples of exigent circumstances such as “the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Id. at 320 (citing Kentucky, 563 U.S. at 460). The Court noted that “[w]hile police must get a warrant when collecting CSLI to assist in the mine-run criminal investigation, the rule we set forth does not limit their ability to respond to an ongoing emergency.” Id. ¶21. The Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed the exigent circumstances exception to gathering CSLI data without a warrant. However, our Mississippi caselaw requires generally that in order for a warrantless search to be legal under the exigent circumstances exception, the State must show that (1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency situation exists and that there is an immediate need for police assistance in order to protect life and property; (2) the primary motivation for the search is not to make an arrest and/or to seize evidence, and (3) there is some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause to associate the emergency with the area or place[] searched. Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905, 923 (¶79) (Miss. 2015) (citing Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 79 (¶7) (Miss. 2001)). The United States Supreme Court in Carpenter clearly excepted a week or more of CSLI data (with everything below that amount reserved).” Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2193, 2209 n.8 (June 29, 2026) (citing Carpenter 585 U.S. at 310 n.3). The Court’s statement provides further context to the meaning of “real-time” location data for the arguments in this case. Id. The exigent circumstances exception, however, was not relevant to the legal issues or discussed by the Court in Chatrie. 9 from the warrant requirement CSLI data that has been gathered under exigent circumstances for specific enumerated purposes, and courts around the nation have relied on this exception. See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 319-20.9 Accordingly, this Court finds that the exigent circumstances exception to warrantless searches is applicable to CSLI data. This Court is now tasked with deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the State proved exigent circumstances that authorized Harrison County police to obtain Anderson’s name and address along with four real-time CSLI pings. ¶22. Anderson contended that there “was no emergency,” as evidenced by the fact that the police had control of the scene, interviewed witnesses, and did not immediately go to Anderson’s address when the CSLI was obtained. Instead, the police “waited for a witness to confirm” Anderson’s involvement by creating a six-photo lineup. Further, Anderson contended that the “C Spire request was made to arrest and seize evidence, not to prevent harm.” According to Anderson, “there was no reason to believe that C Spire would destroy the subscriber information or the cell location information.” 9 For example, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Briseño affirmed a district court’s ruling allowing the admission of cell phone location information obtained without a warrant by FBI agents in an “exigent request form to T- Mobile.” United States v. Briseño, No. 23-10797, 2025 WL 619169, at *12-13 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2025) (unpublished). The information was used to find and arrest Briseño based on the FBI’s belief that he was involved in kidnapping a nineteen-year-old woman and her young child. Id. at *7. The Fifth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court “recognized in Carpenter, urgent situations, like child abductions, ‘will likely justify the warrantless collection of CSLI.’” Id. at *12 (citing Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 320). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “at least two other circuits have held that obtaining real-time cell-site location information . . . to locate a suspect was appropriate based on exigent circumstances.” Id. at *13 (citing United States v. Karmo, 109 F.4th 991, 995-96 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hobbs, 24 F.4th 965, 970-72 (4th Cir. 2022)). 10 ¶23. The State argued before this Court and the trial court that “[b]ecause a public, execution-style murder with an armed suspect at large threatened public safety and risked evidence destruction, the warrantless search of Anderson’s cell phone account for identity and location information was justified by exigent circumstances.” The State relied on Officer Pennington’s and Analyst Sullivan’s testimony from the suppression hearing. ¶24. Officer Pennington stated that the shooting occurred “in broad daylight” at “a busy gas station” so “[p]ublic safety was an issue, clearly.” Further, Officer Pennington stated that there was a concern “about any potential destruction of evidence.” Analyst Sullivan and Officer Pennington testified that they requested “real-time location information” to find Anderson’s current location.10 Officer Pennington stated that the purpose of the request to C Spire was “[t]o locate this individual, to find out what they knew about Jeneation and the purpose of the meeting and anything that they may have seen if they arrived there.” ¶25. The trial court found that the facts of Carpenter distinguished the United States Supreme Court’s holding from this case. The trial court stated that the information obtained “was real time location data, not historical data” like in Carpenter, and the real-time data was “necessary to protect public safety[] and prevent the destruction of evidence.” “The immediacy to locate a potentially violent and armed suspect falls under the exigency doctrine exception,” so the trial court denied Anderson’s motion. ¶26. The evidence showed that there had been two homicides that day close in time, and 10 Analyst Sullivan testified that all CSLI is technically “historical” because it is a log of where the cell phone has already contacted the cell tower. However, the police requested “real-time” data, meaning they requested the latest CSLI, not CSLI from days or weeks prior. 11 the shooting at the Country Kwik Stop was public and in broad daylight. Accordingly, there were “reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency situation exist[ed,]” and the police acted quickly to “protect life and property[.]” Crawford, 192 So. 3d at 923 (¶79) (citing Baker, 802 So. 2d at 79 (¶7)). ¶27. Further, the police did not immediately arrest Anderson upon obtaining his name and address. While Anderson argues that this fact proves there was no emergency, it also equally shows that “the primary motivation for the search [was] not to make an arrest[.]” Id. Instead, Officer Pennington testified that SWAT team members drove by the house and saw the vehicle from the roadway. Officer Pennington explained that they “had no purpose to rush to that house until” further warrants were obtained. ¶28. This Court finds that Anderson provides no legal authority for finding that an unlawful search occurred when the police obtained the name and address associated with Anderson’s account. Carpenter, and related caselaw, find that generally it is unlawful for the police to obtain location information from a cell phone without a warrant, but nothing prohibited the officers from obtaining the name and address associated with Anderson’s account. See Pryor v. Gregory, No. 3:25-CV-237-RPC-JMV, 2026 WL 1180477, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 30, 2026) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy to subscriber details, such as names and addresses, that are voluntarily disclosed to third-party providers (citing United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747-48 (5th Cir. 2016))). We find that it was not unlawful for the police to obtain Anderson’s identifying information from his C Spire account without a warrant. 12 ¶29. The third element for determining whether there was an exigent circumstance asks whether “there is some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place[] searched.” Crawford, 192 So. 3d at 923 (¶79). This element is traditionally applied to a warrantless search of a place, so the phrasing is strange in light of the facts of this case for a warrantless search of a phone. In the context of this case, the issue is better rephrased as whether there was probable cause to associate Anderson’s phone information with the emergency situation. Because the victim was planning to meet Anderson and texting with Anderson immediately prior to being shot, there was probable cause to search Anderson’s phone. ¶30. This Court finds that the trial court did not err by denying Anderson’s motion to suppress.11 CONCLUSION ¶31. This Court holds that under Carpenter, the exigent circumstances exception to warrantless searches applies to warrantless searches of this cell phone information. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 319-20. However, as provided by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the three elements for the existence of exigent circumstances must be proved. Crawford, 192 So. 3d at 923 (¶79). This Court finds that the trial court did not err by applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrantless search of Anderson’s cell phone records. There 11 The State submitted, as alternative grounds for affirming, that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, Anderson’s name and location would have eventually been discovered based on the search of the tag-reader information for the red Ford Expedition, search warrants, and subpoenas. We do not reach a discussion of this issue because we find that the exigent circumstances exception applies. 13 is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to suppress. Anderson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. ¶32. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES, C.J., McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.; WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS IN PART. WILSON, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING: ¶33. I concur but write separately to note that law enforcement had probable cause for the arrest warrant for Anderson and search warrant for his residence even without the limited CSLI obtained from C Spire. ¶34. To begin with, Anderson obviously had no standing to object to the search of Lewis’s phone.12 Text messages from Lewis’s phone showed that Lewis planned to meet “John” at the Country Kwik Stop at the time of the shooting, and the last message was sent only one minute before the shooting. C Spire informed law enforcement that the account for John’s phone number belonged to John Anderson at 18068 Dedeaux Clan Road. Law enforcement did not need a warrant for this information, as Anderson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in such basic information regarding his account.13 Law enforcement then created a 12 See, e.g., Waldrop v. State, 544 So. 2d 834, 837 (Miss. 1989) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and may not be asserted vicariously.”). 13 See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 307-09, 314, 316 (2018) (reaffirming that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” including “telephone numbers and bank records”); United States v. Beverly, 943 F.3d 225, 230 n.2, 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in basic “subscriber information,” which “includes the 14 photo lineup with a photo from Anderson’s Florida driver’s license, and a witness identified Anderson as the shooter. Law enforcement also learned that a red Ford SUV matching the description of the shooter’s vehicle was registered to Patricia Anderson at 18068 Dedeaux Clan Road. Law enforcement confirmed that the vehicle was parked at that address, and a neighbor stated that Anderson had returned there, “parked his vehicle in an area out of sight of the roadway,” which was “unusual for him,” and “made the comment . . . that he [(i.e., Anderson)] just needed to get off the road for a while.” ¶35. Based on all this, law enforcement clearly had probable cause to arrest Anderson and search the premises without regard to the limited CSLI provided by C Spire. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances had not justified law enforcement’s request for limited CSLI, there was probable cause for the warrants, and the trial court properly denied Anderson’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search.14 BARNES, C.J., McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART. name, address, and other identifying information for the person to whom the phone number is registered,” and therefore such information may be obtained without a warrant). 14 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (holding that suppression of evidence was not required because it was “clear that the warrant affidavit, after striking the facts [learned unlawfully], contained sufficient untainted information to furnish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant”); Bevill v. State, 556 So. 2d 699, 712 (Miss. 1990) (“Information . . . may be purged from an affidavit and the remainder of the affidavit may be considered to determine if probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant.”). 15