Maurice Forte v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2024-KA-01397-COA MAURICE FORTE APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/21/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ADRIENNE ANNETT HOOPER- WOOTEN COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART - 09/15/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Maurice Forte was indicted on four counts of capital murder in Hinds County. Following a trial, a jury convicted Forte of all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Forte argues that the trial court’s exclusion of authenticated medical records violated his right to present a complete defense, that the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial was an abuse of discretion, that the State failed to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the effect of these alleged errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. ¶2. After review, we affirm on all issues raised by Forte. We vacate and remand in part to address a sentencing error as to Forte’s conviction on Count I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. On September 16, 2018, Jackson Police Department officers were dispatched to Marwood Drive after receiving a 911 call from a man claiming that he had been abused and kept hostage. Officer James Anderson was the first person on the scene. When Anderson arrived, he found Forte heading down the driveway in his wheelchair. Before Anderson stepped out of his car, Forte jumped out of his wheelchair and began crawling toward Anderson. Anderson asked why he had jumped out of the wheelchair, and Forte said, “Because I want to go with y’all!” Anderson asked where he wanted to go, and Forte said “to jail.” Anderson asked why, and Forte said, “I just shot somebody,” and pointed to a nearby gun in the grass. Forte told Anderson, “I didn’t want to shoot the kids.” Anderson asked where the children were, and Forte said there were two children inside the house. ¶4. Anderson and another officer placed Forte in the back of the patrol car. As they moved Forte’s wheelchair, they noticed a backpack hanging on the wheelchair. Inside the backpack were three 9-millimeter bullets. An officer retrieved the gun Forte had indicated, which was later identified as a 9-millimeter handgun Forte had purchased in December 2017. ¶5. As officers started toward the house, Forte told them that the victims were out back. Anderson discovered Miyuki Wofford, Forte’s mother, on the patio, partially clothed. Anderson continued inside the house, looking for the children. He found Eddie Mae 2 Wofford, Forte’s grandmother, in the doorway to the home and Kyisha Wofford, Forte’s sister, in the kitchen. All three women were dead. Anderson called out for the children, and a little girl answered. Anderson was able to get the children out of the house without them seeing the victims. The children were later determined to have been unharmed. ¶6. Officers recovered eighteen 9-millimeter shell casings, a live round, and several bullets and fragments, among other items, from the home. A firearms expert later testified that the 9-millimeter gun retrieved from the grass was used to shoot all the bullets recovered at the scene as well as those recovered during the autopsies. ¶7. Detective Kevin Nash interviewed Forte after the shooting. Nash said that the house was clean and tidy, and it appeared as though someone had been in the middle of cooking breakfast when the murders happened. Nash testified that he learned Forte was a rapper who went by the name Mico Thug. ¶8. Nash said he saw no evidence that Forte was being abused or mistreated. Nash did not believe that Forte was malnourished or unkempt. Nash said that Forte told him he had gotten mad at his family that morning, so he retrieved the gun. Forte also told Nash that he wanted to keep the children inside where they were safe. Nash said the children were not interviewed because Forte had said they stayed in the bedroom and did not witness the shooting. ¶9. Nash’s interview with Forte was played for the jury. Forte told Nash that family members had been stealing his money and lying about it for the last few months. He said his mother had been beating him when she came home drunk. Forte told Nash that on the 3 morning of the murder, he asked his mother to take him to the bank, but it was Sunday, so the bank was closed. He got dressed and started looking for his money so he could buy candy from a nearby woman, but he could not find the cash. He asked his mother if she knew where it was, and an argument followed. Forte claimed that his mother yelled at him and hit him, so they got “into a tussling match,” and he “freaked out” and “started shooting.” He said he did not mean to shoot anyone else, just his mother. ¶10. Martrall Camper, Kyisha’s boyfriend, testified that Kyisha was visibly pregnant at the time she was killed and was approximately eight months along. Camper testified that the baby was healthy. ¶11. On the day of the murder, Camper was on the phone with Kyisha as she fed the dogs. Camper heard shots from Kyisha’s end of the line. Kyisha said that Forte was shooting, and she was going to see what was going on. Camper could hear “hollering and screaming” and Kyisha “calling for her mama.” Camper testified that he could hear Forte talking to them, and the State asked what he was saying. Camper said that Forte said, “I told y’all I was gone kill y’all.”1 Camper testified that he hung up the phone and called 911. ¶12. Camper testified that he was often at the Wofford home because he viewed them “like family.” Camper had never noticed that Forte was dirty or unable to bathe. Camper testified that Forte’s mother and sister helped him bathe due to his handicap. Camper testified that he 1 Camper was cross-examined on why he had not told police that Forte said he was going to kill everyone. This discrepancy is addressed in greater depth infra. 4 sometimes heard Forte talking to himself in his room, though he admitted that Forte made music as a rapper and said he might have been rapping, not talking. ¶13. Shanier Ladner, a neighbor, testified that when she first met Forte, he was “always neat” in appearance, but as time passed, she noticed that he had developed sores, smelled badly, and had flies and mosquitoes following him. A week before the murders, Ladner saw Kyisha in the front yard, beating or attempting to beat Forte with a stick. Miyuki was trying to stop her, and Eddie Mae came out to help. Sometime before the shooting, Ladner saw Forte going up and down the street talking to himself in the rain. ¶14. Ladner testified that Forte confided in her that his family was mistreating him by taking his money and not feeding him. The last time they spoke, Ladner noticed “a sadness about him.” Ladner testified that “something broke” inside Forte to cause him to shoot his family “because he wasn’t the same young man that [she] . . . met and talked with.” ¶15. Ladner testified that she had only known Forte for a few months before the murders. The morning before the murder, she spoke with Eddie Mae, as everyone was working in their front yards before church. Ladner and Eddie Mae joked about going to church that morning, and Forte asked Ladner to pray for him. ¶16. Dr. Robert Storer testified for the State as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology. Dr. Storer evaluated Forte twice: in November 2020 to evaluate competence and in March 2022 to evaluate sanity. Dr. Storer explained that he collected Forte’s medical records and conducted interviews with Forte, Forte’s brother, and Forte’s aunt. 5 ¶17. Dr. Storer testified that there were “inconsistencies” about Forte’s mental health. Forte claimed that he had received mental health treatment, but Dr. Storer found little to no records of any treatment. Dr. Storer reviewed a report prepared by a Dr. Patel at St. Dominic’s Hospital in Jackson around August 29, about two weeks before the murders. ¶18. Family members had reported that Forte was paranoid and threatening them. Kyisha told a social worker that Forte had recently woken her up in the night and told her the house was bugged and that “they” wanted him to kill her. She also reported that Forte was accusing her of taking his money. Forte reported during that hospitalization that he had been hearing voices for two months, and he was prescribed an antidepressant and a small dose of an antipsychotic medication. Dr. Patel’s discharge summary stated that Forte was experiencing “psychosis, [likely] schizophrenia.” ¶19. Dr. Storer explained that “severe and persistent mental illness generally does not come on quickly” and that most official diagnoses require at least six months of symptoms, so even if Forte was having hallucinations or hearing voices, he would not have been diagnosed at that time. ¶20. During his interviews with Forte, Forte told Dr. Storer the first time he had auditory hallucinations was after smoking marijuana that had been dipped in embalming fluid,2 which Storer said was a known hallucinogen. But Dr. Storer said that Forte’s description of the 2 Dr. Storer later clarified that Forte had actually said he had used phencyclidine (PCP) with embalming fluid, not marijuana. 6 auditory hallucinations did not match the descriptions that most mentally ill people describe, and Storer did not believe they were consistent with genuine mental illness. ¶21. Dr. Storer testified that much of Forte’s paranoia stemmed from his probable post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from his paralysis, which occurred after Forte had been injured in a drive-by shooting. Dr. Storer agreed that someone experiencing those things could have an “overreaction” to a situation if the person felt threatened. When Dr. Storer asked about others reporting that Forte was afraid his family was going to kill him, Forte responded that he was afraid everyone was going to kill him, and he did not voice a specific concern about his family. ¶22. Dr. Storer testified that Forte’s family said Forte had become more suspicious and hypervigilant after having been shot. Forte disclosed some suicidal ideations after his paralysis. Dr. Storer learned from Forte’s brother that Forte had become very depressed after his paralysis. Dr. Storer noted records from an ambulance company that they had been called to Forte’s residence frequently over the six months leading up to the shooting. The EMTs reported that they were told Forte was “not himself” and “had been having outbursts.” ¶23. Dr. Storer also testified that Forte had a different version of events about the shooting. Dr. Storer said that Forte first claimed to have no memory of the event and then claimed that he simply woke up and found everyone dead. But Dr. Storer testified that these stories did not match the confession Forte had given law enforcement, either. ¶24. Dr. Storer also noted that Forte told St. Dominic’s staff in August that he had no 7 medical issues and denied any drug use. But when Dr. Storer interviewed him, Forte claimed to have mental health issues and confessed that he had started using marijuana at nine years old. ¶25. Dr. Storer concluded that even if Forte was mentally ill, there was no reason that he would not know the nature and quality of his acts or the difference between right and wrong. He said that Forte did not have a mental disease, defect, or disability that could have prevented him from knowing the nature and quality of his alleged acts or the difference between right and wrong in regard to those acts. Dr. Storer testified that he believed that Forte was “exaggerating or fabricating cognitive, intellectual deficits as well as psychotic symptoms,” and was “endorsing things that sounded psychotic but were not genuine symptoms of psychosis.” ¶26. The jury convicted Forte of all counts. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment and set his terms to run concurrently. His post-trial motions were denied, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Forte raises four issues. First, he argues that the trial court’s exclusion of authenticated medical records violated his right to present his insanity defense. Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial following undisclosed and inflammatory testimony. Third, he argues that the State failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Fourth, Forte claims that the cumulative effect of these errors denied his right to a fair trial. ANALYSIS 8  I. Did the exclusion of Forte’s medical records violate his Constitutional right to present a complete defense? ¶27. Forte argues that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to present his medical records without a sponsoring witness violated his right to present a complete defense of insanity. We review the exclusion or admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 881 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). That discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence as well as the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi. Id.; Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 997 (¶56) (Miss. 2007) (“The trial court’s discretion must also insure the constitutional right of the accused to present a full defense in his or her case.”). Indeed, “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Ambrose v. State, 254 So. 3d 77, 100 (¶52) (Miss. 2018). However, “an abuse of discretion will be found only where the defendant shows clear prejudice resulting from undue restraint on the defense.” Cage v. State, 149 So. 3d 1038, 1044 (¶13) (Miss. 2014). ¶28. Before trial, Forte’s counsel told the court they planned to admit Forte’s medical records from St. Dominic’s from an inpatient stay approximately two weeks before the murders. The State objected, arguing that the defense needed a sponsoring witness to admit and explain the evidence and could not simply place the records into evidence. The trial court agreed with the State, and defense counsel said they would try to find Dr. Patel, the doctor who completed the report, or caselaw to support their position that a sponsoring witness was not necessary. 9 ¶29. At a later pretrial hearing, defense counsel admitted they could not find caselaw to support their argument and could not locate Dr. Patel. But counsel argued that the reports were crucial to Forte’s defense because two weeks before the murders, Dr. Patel diagnosed Forte with “homicidal psychosis.” The court denied counsel’s request, ruling that under the Rules of Evidence, “there has to be a person with personal knowledge about the substance of the records . . . . In order for that diagnosis to come in, you have to have someone with personal knowledge testify.” ¶30. Forte argues that this ruling was an abuse of discretion and prevented him from presenting a complete defense. He argues that Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(4) allows statements made for medical diagnosis to be admitted without a sponsoring witness, though he presents no caselaw to support this interpretation. In one case relied upon by Forte, Anthony v. State, 23 So. 3d 611 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), this Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of records under Rule 803(4). In Anthony, the trial court allowed the State to admit medical records that reflected a report of sexual abuse even though the sponsoring witness had not prepared all the reports. Id. at 616 (¶21). This Court found no abuse of discretion because the sponsoring witness in that case testified about the creation of the record and preparation of the document, both generally and personally to him. Id. at 617 (¶28). One glaring difference between Anthony and the present case is that in Anthony, there was a sponsoring witness who could explain the document and testify about its creation and information contained within it. 10 ¶31. Forte argues that because the records were properly noticed, authenticated, and directly relevant to his defense, his right to present his defense was prejudiced. However, as the State points out, Forte was able to present evidence of the August diagnosis through the State’s expert, Dr. Storer. Although Forte did not admit the medical record into evidence, defense counsel presented Dr. Storer with the record, which he admitted he had not reviewed previously, and was able to cross-examine him about Dr. Patel’s conclusions. So the jury heard that two weeks before the murder, Forte’s family had him committed to St. Dominic’s for mental health purposes and reported that Forte was paranoid, suspicious, and threatening. In this same manner, the jury heard that Dr. Patel had diagnosed Forte two weeks before the murder with psychosis. Forte does not explain how having the actual documents in evidence would have caused a better outcome than having Dr. Storer testify about the documents. ¶32. Finally, as the State notes, Forte did not mark the medical records for identification at trial; thus, they are not available for our review on appeal. Although we find no abuse of discretion or prejudice stemming from the trial court’s ruling, we note that the lack of documents in the record on appeal would likely prevent reversal on these grounds if the Court cannot actually review the documents.3 II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial following repeated instances of undisclosed and inflammatory 3 For one thing, trial counsel and appellate counsel both claim that Dr. Patel diagnosed Forte with “homicidal psychosis,” but Dr. Storer testified that the diagnosis was “psychosis of an unspecified type” and “psychosis [likely] schizophrenia.” Without the documents, we cannot confirm the alleged diagnosis of “homicidal psychosis.” 11  testimony? ¶33. Forte argues that Camper’s repeated testimony that Forte said, “I told y’all I was going to kill y’all,” was overly inflammatory, undisclosed prior to trial, and contradicted by the witness’s earlier statements, and that the jury could not possibly have disregarded it. Forte argues that because of the inflammatory nature of the testimony and the State’s role in eliciting it, the trial court should have granted a mistrial. ¶34. The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not reverse the trial court absent an abuse of that discretion. Trest v. State, 377 So. 3d 981, 987 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). The trial court should declare a mistrial “only when there is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case.” Id.; MRCrP 23.5. “The trial judge sits in the best position to determine if an improper comment has a prejudicial effect.” Trest, 377 So. 3d at 989 (¶26). ¶35. During Camper’s testimony, he testified that he was on the phone with Kyisha when Forte began shooting. Camper testified that he heard Forte say, “I told y’all I was gone kill y’all.” The defense did not object. The State then repeated the statement, and Camper confirmed that was what he heard. The defense did not object at this point either. ¶36. On cross-examination, the defense asked Camper why he had not told police that he heard Forte say he was going to kill everyone. To impeach him, the defense played portions of Camper’s recorded interview with police, and Camper testified that he “didn’t say it on 12 the video, but when we had the conversation, I said it.” However, he denied any other conversations with law enforcement. ¶37. On redirect, the State tried to ask Camper about this inconsistency, but the defense continually objected to the questions as leading and irrelevant. The State explained that it was attempting to have Camper testify about the trauma he felt to explain why he might not have told the police everything he saw or heard that day. The trial court explained that the State’s questions about Camper’s feelings that day were not relevant and advised counsel to ask Camper about the inconsistency more directly. ¶38. Redirect continued. The following occurred: STATE: . . . The morning of September 16th, did you hear Maurice Forte during the phone call when you were on the phone with Kyisha? CAMPER: When he was doing the shooting? STATE: Did you hear him talking? CAMPER: When he was doing the shooting? STATE: And what did he say? CAMPER: “I told y’all I was going to kill y’all.” The defense objected again and argued that this statement had not been disclosed prior to trial. The State explained that it did not know Camper was going to testify to it but wanted to explore it because it had come out during trial. The trial court admonished the State that the court had previously decided that the statement should not be brought up again. The State tried to explain again why it wanted to talk about the statement, and the trial court said that 13 if the State wanted Camper to explain why he had not told law enforcement about the statement, then that is what the State should have asked. ¶39. At that point, the defense moved for a mistrial because the jury had heard the statement three or four times, and the State was attempting to put in facts that had not been previously disclosed. The court denied the motion for mistrial and told the jury to disregard Camper’s testimony about the statement. ¶40. The State asked Camper why his testimony was different than what he told law enforcement. Camper replied, “I didn’t never say nothing about it, but it ain’t changed. I said he was saying ‘I’m gone get y’all, I’m gone get y’all.’” The defense objected again and moved to strike the statement, and the jury was excused. The defense moved for another mistrial, arguing that Camper’s statement had not been provided in discovery. The State responded that it did not know that Camper was going to testify about it, so it could not have been a discovery violation, and that the State was simply trying to get an explanation for the inconsistency that the defense had explored on cross-examination. ¶41. The court denied the mistrial but allowed the defense to cross-examine Camper again about whether he had told law enforcement about Forte’s alleged threat. ¶42. We affirm the trial court’s denial of mistrial for three reasons. One, the arguments for mistrial offered at trial differ from those presented on appeal. At trial, both of the defense’s motions for mistrial primarily argued that the statement had not been disclosed to them before trial—an alleged Brady violation. On appeal, Forte argues mostly that the statements 14 were inflammatory and overly prejudicial. ¶43. Two, when Camper first testified about Forte’s alleged remark, the defense did not object. It was not until cross-examination, when Camper would not testify that he had not told the police about Forte’s statement, that the defense objected. Again, the objection focused on the fact that the testimony was undisclosed—not the allegedly inflammatory nature of the remark. ¶44. Finally, a mistrial should be granted only where there has been “substantial and irreparable damage” to the defendant’s case, and that high bar has not been met here. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard Camper’s testimony about the statement, and the defense thoroughly—and more than once—cross-examined Camper on his inconsistency. There is no evidence that the jury failed to follow the court’s instruction, and Forte has not shown how the remark substantially and irreparably damaged his case. ¶45. We affirm the denial of Forte’s motions for mistrial. III. Did the State present sufficient evidence for a jury to find Forte’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so, was the evidence overwhelmingly against their verdict? ¶46. Forte argues that he raised reasonable doubt as to sanity through hospital records diagnosing him with homicidal psychosis and that the burden shifted to the State to prove that he was sane under the M’Naghten rule, which Forte argues that the State failed to do. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found 15 the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Rodriguez v. State, 413 So. 3d 646, 654 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). ¶47. As recently stated by this Court, Mississippi follows the M’Naghten test for determining sanity at the time of the offense. The M’Naghten test for determining insanity is whether the accused knew right from wrong at the time the act was committed. To prove insanity under M’Naghten, it must be proven that, at the time of the act, the accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or (2) if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Mount v. State, 412 So. 3d 538, 553 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). ¶48. The defendant is presumed sane until he raises a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 434 (¶55) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). Once a reasonable doubt has been raised, the State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The determination of a defendant’s sanity is within the jury’s province, and “the jury has discretion to accept or reject expert and lay testimony on the subject.” Ealey v. State, 158 So. 3d 283, 294 (¶33) (Miss. 2015). ¶49. Forte argues that the medical records showing that he had been diagnosed with psychosis shortly before the killings and lay testimony from witnesses who heard him talking to himself “overwhelmingly point[s] to insanity.” He argues that Dr. Storer’s opinion was the only evidence rebutting evidence of insanity and that Dr. Storer’s opinion was “limited [and] retrospective.” 16 ¶50. The jury heard the State’s evidence of sanity and Forte’s evidence suggesting insanity, and it was the jury’s role to weigh the credibility of that evidence to reach a verdict. Dr. Storer testified extensively about his examination of Forte and his conclusions that Forte did not have a genuine mental illness at the time of the killings. ¶51. Dr. Storer reviewed the St. Dominic’s records created during Forte’s August hospitalization, and the diagnosis of psychosis did not change his opinion that Forte was sane. Dr. Storer testified that much of Forte’s paranoia and hypervigilance was linked to his PTSD, not a mental illness. Dr. Storer also believed that some of Forte’s reported symptoms were exaggerations or fabrications of symptoms and that the symptoms “sounded psychotic but were not genuine symptoms of psychosis.” Dr. Storer testified that a crucial part of his conclusion that Forte was sane was that Forte’s explanation for the killings changed several times, both to law enforcement and to Dr. Storer himself. Additionally, the State presented evidence that suggested Forte knew right from wrong. He did not harm the children present at the home and made sure that they stayed away from the bloodshed. He called law enforcement, and when they arrived, he told them that he needed to go to jail because he had killed someone. ¶52. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Forte was sane at the time of the murders. To the extent Forte challenges the weight of the evidence, “[a] jury’s finding on a defendant’s sanity will not be reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence,” Mount, 412 So. 3d at 553 17 (¶46), and as shown above, the jury here “had ample evidence from which it could determine that [Forte] was sane.” Ealey, 158 So. 3d at 294 (¶36). IV. Did Forte receive a fundamentally fair trial? ¶53. Forte’s final argument is that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. Because we find no error in the trial, we reject Forte’s argument that we should reverse for cumulative error. V. Was Forte properly sentenced? ¶54. The State argues that Forte’s sentencing order reflects an unauthorized sentence and urges this Court to vacate and remand for resentencing. ¶55. The State is correct that the sentence reflected in Forte’s sentencing order is unauthorized. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21(1)(c) (Rev. 2014). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court imposed Forte’s sentences as follows: Okay, Mr. Forte, you have been found guilty of the charges of Capital Murder, in all 4 Counts of the indictment by a jury of your peers. I, hereby, sentence you, on each Count, to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of Parole. Each Count will run concurrent to one another. While the sentencing orders for Counts II, III, and IV followed the announcement from the bench and imposed a life sentence for each count, the sentencing order as to Count I imposed a sentence of “99 years, 99 months, 99 days to serve.” However, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21(1)(c), the only statutorily authorized sentence for convictions of capital murder in cases where the State does not seek the death penalty is “imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without parole.” 18 ¶56. This Court, sua sponte, can address this issue as a matter of plain error. See M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3). In Ellzey v. State, 412 So. 3d 358, 374-75 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court set out the requirements that must be met to establish plain error: “Plain-error review is properly utilized for correcting obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law.” Green v. State, 183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “in order to determine if plain error has occurred, we must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule” and “whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious.” Id. (emphasis added) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). (Emphasis omitted). In the present case, the trial court deviated from the only sentence authorized by statute. This is plain, clear, and obvious. See Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 220-21 (¶6) (Miss. 2017) (“An illegal sentence is an obvious error subject to plain-error review.”); see Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 150-51 (¶19) (Miss. 2014) (citing Grayer v. State, 120 So. 3d 964, 969 (Miss. 2013)). ¶57. In Shaheed v. State, 205 So. 3d 1105, 1114 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of “life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with all but twenty years suspended.” Id. at 1108 (¶1). Finding that the trial court had no authority to suspend any portion of the statutorily required life sentence, this Court stated: Since life imprisonment is the applicable sentence for first-degree murder, the circuit court had no authority to suspend any part of Shaheed’s life sentence. See State v. Hayes, 887 So. 2d 184, 186 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Marshall v. Cabana, 835 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988); Miss. Att’y Gen. Op., 2000- 0239, 2000 WL 799997 (May 5, 2000). Accordingly, the circuit court exceeded its authority by suspending all but twenty years of Shaheed’s life sentence. We vacate Shaheed’s sentence and remand the case for the circuit 19  court to impose the sentence required by law. Id. at 114 (¶29). Because life imprisonment without parole is the only statutorily authorized sentence in this case, we vacate the sentence as to Count I and remand the case to the circuit court to impose the sentence required by law. CONCLUSION ¶58. For the reasons addressed above, we affirm Forte’s convictions, vacate his sentence as to Count I, and remand for the correction of his sentence on Count I. ¶59. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, C.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., AND McCARTY, J. BARNES, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶60. Although the State argues that the defendant’s sentence in Count I was unauthorized, the Mississippi Supreme Court has admonished this Court that sua sponte review of a defendant’s illegal sentence is prohibited when the State fails to file a cross-appeal. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate and remand for resentencing in Count I. ¶61. In Lester v. State, 744 So. 2d 757, 761 (¶¶11-12) (Miss. 1999), the supreme court reversed and rendered our Court’s vacating of a defendant’s sentence because neither party had “assigned the sentence he received as error.” The supreme court held, “Without a cross-appeal by the State on this issue, and with an opportunity to the appellant [] to respond 20 to a cross-appeal, this Court does not address this suggestion.” Id. at (¶11) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 585 So. 2d 753, 757 (Miss. 1991)). ¶62. Likewise, in Winston v. State (“Winston-SCT”), 754 So. 2d 1154 (Miss. 1999), the supreme court reversed and rendered this Court’s decision to review sua sponte a defendant’s sentence,4 finding it “in conflict” with the Lester decision since the State had not filed a cross-appeal. Id. at 1156-57 (¶¶8-9). In the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals’ decision (Winston-COA), Judge Southwick recognized that while “[a]n illegally high sentence may be challenged by an inmate even after an appeal under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, . . . the Act grants the State no converse privileges.” Winston-COA, 726 So. 2d at 208 (¶43) (Southwick, J., dissenting) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-1 et seq. (Rev. 1994)). “The State must ‘prosecute an appeal’ under [s]ection 99-35-103(c), which requires the State formally to present its issue. We cannot raise an unraised issue to assist a party not seeking assistance.” Id. at 209 (¶47) (emphasis added). ¶63. In other words, “a judgment not appealed from cannot be corrected by an appellate court no matter how blatantly and publicly the error appears on the face of the record.” Id. at (¶45) (quoting State v. Dawson, 792 P.2d 741, 743 (Ariz. 1990)). In reversing and rendering the majority’s decision in Winston-COA, the supreme court evidently agreed with Judge Southwick’s dissent in this regard. See Winston-SCT, 754 So. 2d at 1157 (¶9). 4 Winston v. State (Winston-COA), 726 So. 2d 197, 203-05 (¶¶21-26) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). 21 ¶64. Finally, this case is easily distinguishable from the case relied on by the majority in vacating Forte’s sentence in Count I and remanding for resentencing. In Shaheed v. State, 205 So. 3d 1105, 1114 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), the State filed a cross-appeal arguing the trial court lacked authority to suspend the defendant’s sentence. It was on this basis that we vacated and remanded the case. Id. ¶65. While the sentence in this case may be statutorily unauthorized, we cannot ignore the supreme court precedent in Lester and Winston-SCT, finding that we lack the authority to review that sentence based on the State’s failure to cross-appeal this issue. The majority’s attempted correction of the sentence with no cross-appeal is just as wrong as the illegal sentence itself. While I agree with the majority’s affirming Forte’s convictions, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate and remand for resentencing. CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., AND McCARTY, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. 22