Elijah K. Atkisson a/k/a Elijah Atkisson a/k/a Elijah Kane Atkisson v. State of Mississippi
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2025-KA-00567-COA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00567-COA
ELIJAH K. ATKISSON A/K/A ELIJAH APPELLANT
ATKISSON A/K/A ELIJAH KANE ATKISSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/17/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ADRIENNE ANNETT HOOPER-
WOOTEN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES RICHARD MULLINS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JULIANNE KAY BAILEY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/17/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.
McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Elijah Atkisson appeals his conviction of aggravated driving under the influence and
the twenty-year sentence imposed by the Hinds County Circuit Court after he drove the
wrong way on Interstate 20 and collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by Marcel Walker,
who died in the crash. On appeal, Atkisson raises two issues: (1) whether the circuit court
erred in allowing the State to call an undisclosed rebuttal witness to testify concerning prior
bad acts, and (2) whether the circuit court erred in failing to convene a hearing to question
jurors of possible prejudicial misconduct. Having considered the record, the arguments of
counsel, and the relevant caselaw, we find no reversible error, and we affirm Atkisson’s
conviction and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In the early morning hours of October 3, 2020, Atkisson headed home to Brandon,
Mississippi, after spending time with friends at the Eclipse, a club in Jackson, Mississippi.
Atkisson erroneously drove up an exit ramp from I-20 to access the interstate and proceeded
to travel the wrong way. He collided with Walker’s vehicle, which was traveling in the
correct direction. Atkisson’s airbag deployed, and other travelers on the road, Eric Levison,
Isaac Evans, Jason Register, and Caleb Lewis stopped and helped him get out of his SUV.
However, these Good Samaritans were not able to get Walker out of his vehicle.
Professional first responders who arrived shortly thereafter declared Walker dead at the
scene.
¶3. Jackson Police Officer Robert Alexander spoke to Atkisson at the scene. Alexander
said he smelled alcohol on Atkisson’s breath and asked if he had been drinking. Atkisson
told him that he had been at a party at a friend’s house and had consumed four to five drinks.1
Alexander called for back-up assistance, including DUI Officer Lakeith Williams.
1
It is illegal for someone under age 21 to purchase or possess alcohol. Specifically,
in pertinent part, Mississippi Code Annotated section 67-1-81 provides,
(2) Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years who purchases,
receives, or has in his or her possession in any public place, any alcoholic
beverages, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine
of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200) nor more than Five Hundred
Dollars ($500) . . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 67-1-81(2) (Rev. 2021).
2
Alexander also observed that Atkisson “stumbled and swayed” as he walked to the patrol car.
Williams confirmed this and said that Atkisson’s eyes were watery, bloodshot, dilated, and
glossy and that his speech was slurred. Williams said that Atkisson told him he had drunk
only one “White Claw,” an alcoholic beverage.
¶4. Alexander transported Atkisson to the police station. There, Williams offered
Atkisson an Intoxilyzer test that Atkisson at first refused, but then agreed to. The accident
occurred at 1:30 a.m., but the testing was not done until after 4:00 a.m. At 4:07 a.m., the
Intoxilyzer registered a blood-alcohol-content (BAC) level of .234, and at 4:10 a.m., the
BAC level was .217. The legal limit for Atkisson, who was eighteen, was .02.2
Indictment
¶5. Atkisson was indicted by a Hinds County grand jury on February 22, 2021. He was
charged with one count of aggravated DUI in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated
2
Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-11-30 provides,
(1) It is unlawful for a person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within
this state if the person: . . .
(a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; [or]
....
(d) [h]as an alcohol concentration in the person’s blood . . . of
....
(ii) Two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more for a
person who is below the legal age to purchase alcoholic
beverages under state law[.]
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a) (Supp. 2017).
3
section 63-11-30(5), when he
did knowingly, feloniously, and negligently, drive or otherwise operate a
vehicle, a black in color Mazda CX-9, within this state while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, on Interstate 20 West in Jackson, MS, thereby
causing the death of another, Marcel Walker, by driving his eastbound vehicle
into the westbound lane of traffic, at a time in which he was found to have a
breath alcohol concentration of .21%, said breath alcohol concentration being
over the legal limit, causing a head on collision with the vehicle being operated
by Marcel Walker.
Trial
¶6. The circuit court tried the case from November 18-22, 25, and 27, 2024. The State’s
witnesses included the lay witnesses who stopped at the scene—Eric Levison, Isaac Evans,
Jason Register, and Caleb Lewis. The law enforcement officers who responded also
testified, including Andrew Harris, Robert Alexander, and Lakeith Williams. Williams
testified to Atkisson’s Intoxilyzer test results after Mason Boone of the Mississippi Forensics
Laboratory testified that the machine used to test Atkisson had been calibrated on September
1, 2020, and again on October 1, 2020. In his testimony, Williams admitted that the airbag
may have caused injuries to Atkisson’s face and the redness of his eyes. Williams also said
he was unaware that Atkisson was later diagnosed with a broken foot, which could have
contributed to his stumbling and swaying.
¶7. Investigator Michael Outland, who was accepted as an expert in accident
reconstruction, testified that he went to the scene that night and noted tire marks (or the lack
thereof), the resting places of the vehicles, the damage to the vehicles, et cetera. From this
information, Outland concluded that Atkisson was driving the wrong way on I-20 and caused
the accident. Deputy Coroner/Medical Examiner Marcus Buffington also went to the scene
4
that night and confirmed that Walker, who was still seat-belted in his vehicle, died at the
scene as a result of blunt force trauma from the motor vehicle accident.
¶8. Atkisson testified in his own defense, as well as his mother, Olivia Boone, friends
Caitlin Hudson and Alexis Little who had seen him that night at the club, and an expert, Dr.
James O’Donnell, who testified about Atkisson’s BAC test results.
¶9. Hudson was nineteen years old and said she had known Atkisson for seven years. She
said that when she arrived at the Eclipse at 11:30 p.m., Atkisson was already there. She said
he was acting his normal self (soft-spoken) and did not have anything to drink before she left
at 12:30 a.m. When Hudson had seen Atkisson intoxicated at other times, he would be “loud,
chatty, over the top, silly and goofy.” She said he was not intoxicated that night. Hudson
also testified that she worked at the club and that this was her first time seeing Atkisson
there. Alexis Little, age twenty-two, testified she had known Atkisson since the fourth grade.
She was at the Eclipse that night and said Atkisson was his normal self (“funny, talkative,
light spirited”). Little identified two photographs of her, Atkisson, and another friend taken
at the club at 12:06 a.m. and 12:46 a.m. on that night. She testified that she did not see
Atkisson drink anything. She, too, had seen Atkisson intoxicated three or four times in the
past, but she maintained Atkisson was not drunk that night. On cross-examination, however,
Little admitted that she had been at the club for four hours and that she was drunk that night.
¶10. Dr. O’Donnell, who had a doctorate in pharmacy and a master’s degree in clinical
nutrition, was accepted as an expert in pharmacology and alcohol testing.3 He was familiar
3
He had written eight books, authored over 300 journal articles, held government
appointments, taught at the university level, and had testified as an expert 450 times in his
5
with Intoxilyzer machines and blood alcohol metabolism. He opined that the Intoxilyzer test
results had to be wrong, saying:
Well, the first is in looking at the toxicology test there is a substantial
difference in the reading for the first Intoxilyzer level at 4:07 a.m. that reported
a .234. Then at 4:10 a.m., the result was a .217. That’s 17 milligrams percent
difference which is a substantial amount for that extremely short interval. And
in considering that, if we’re to accept both of these as valid, then we would
calculate a metabolic rate which is the rate or the time it takes for the body to
inactivate alcohol per hour. We would calculate the metabolic rate of ten times
the upper limit that’s been reported for alcohol metabolism. And so based on
the difference between those two and what and that—and the fact that we have
such a substantial—it’s scientifically, physiologically and metabolically
impossible for those two numbers to be accurate. So one of them have has to
be wrong, and not knowing which one is wrong, a reasonable scientist would
reject the intoxilyzer results.
Dr. O’Donnell also viewed the body camera footage of Atkisson from that night. O’Donnell
testified that Atkisson’s movements were not consistent with someone who had a BAC level
of .21. Atkisson was alert, awake, asking and answering questions, and did not appear to be
intoxicated, according to Dr. O’Donnell. On cross-examination, Dr. O’Donnell testified he
was paid $12,000 for his work on the case.
¶11. Olivia Boone, Atkisson’s mother, testified that her son helped her paint that day until
9:45 p.m. Atkisson then gave his brother with special needs a bath and then showered, and
left around 10:10 p.m. to meet friends. She received a coherent text from him at 11:45 p.m.,
and after being called about the accident at 1:30 a.m., she spoke to her son while she drove
to the scene. She said he was upset but clear and coherent. She did not see him until his
arraignment on October 6, though police gave her his phone, on which she found three Cash
forty-two-year career.
6
App transactions from that night. When her son was released, she took him to the hospital,
where he was diagnosed with a broken foot.
¶12. Atkisson testified that he went to the Eclipse for the first time that night. He said he
drank one White Claw, which is the equivalent of one beer. Although there was testimony
that he was seen holding a beer, he said he was holding it for a friend who went to the
bathroom. Someone knocked the beer out of his hand, and the bottle fell to the floor and
broke. On cross-examination, Atkisson said he paid $20 in two separate Cash App
transactions ($17 and $3) to get into the club and then $10 for the White Claw. The State
entered the Cash App receipts for these transactions into evidence. Atkisson said he paid the
admission fee to “Shelby,” who he thought was the owner. He said the $10 for the drink was
really a tip to the waitress who gave him the drink with Shelby’s permission.4 Atkisson also
said that he only had $17 in the account and had to move the other $3 from another account
to pay the admission fee.
¶13. During a break in Atkisson’s cross-examination on Friday afternoon, the court
inquired how much longer the parties anticipated presenting testimony. The State said it
would be calling a rebuttal witness. Atkisson’s cross-examination continued when the court
reconvened on Monday morning. The State called Shelby McCoy as a rebuttal witness.
Atkisson objected because the State had not disclosed McCoy as a potential witness and
because Atkisson had not had an opportunity to interview him, but Atkisson did not
4
On his second day of cross-examination, Atkisson was unsure whether Shelby was
a man or a woman, but Atkisson clarified that a woman gave the waitress permission to give
him a drink.
7
specifically request to do so. The State responded that it did not have to provide notice of
rebuttal witnesses and that McCoy’s involvement only surfaced when Atkisson testified that
he paid McCoy for admission to the Eclipse through Cash App. The State said it had just met
with McCoy an hour before. The court overruled Atkisson’s objection and allowed McCoy
to testify.
¶14. McCoy testified that he worked at Club Eclipse as security, i.e., “the pat down man,”
and that he did not collect admission. McCoy confirmed his Cash App name and that
Atkisson paid him $17 via Cash App, but not for admission. When asked what Atkisson
bought, McCoy replied, “marijuana.” Atkisson objected, arguing that this testimony was an
admission of bad acts and improper under Rule 404(b). The State responded that this
testimony was being presented for impeachment purposes and not as character evidence
under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). Moreover, the State said Atkisson opened the
door for this impeachment testimony when he testified that the $17 payment was his cover
charge to enter the Eclipse and that the cover was paid by two separate payments. But
Atkisson still vigorously argued that he should have received notice of this rebuttal witness,
and defense counsel argued the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the
bad acts testimony should be admitted. The court stated, “The State is saying that they put
this witness on to show that he [(Atkisson)] was dishonest about what his testimony had been
which they have a right to refute if, in fact, what he said was not truthful.” After further
discussion, the court ruled that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial and allowed
McCoy to continue.
8
¶15. McCoy stated that the first time he met Atkisson was that October night. He said
Atkisson smelled like marijuana, so he sold him some from his personal stash. He normally
charged $20; but $17 was close enough, so he went forward with the sale despite Atkisson
being short three dollars. When the State asked McCoy to describe Atkisson, McCoy
responded, “Young pothead. His eyes were red. That’s the only reason I would sell it to him.
And I’m not very trusting, but he was already bloodshot in the eyeball.” Atkisson did not
object to this line of questioning. On cross-examination, when the defense showed McCoy
a picture of Atkisson that night, McCoy stated, “based off of the eyes in that photo I would
say he was pretty intoxicated. Not with marijuana, but it’s more of an alcohol glow.”
McCoy confirmed that he never witnessed Atkisson smoke the marijuana. McCoy testified
that he was first contacted by the State that morning and met with them at 11:30 a.m., when
he told the State about selling Atkisson the marijuana. The State finally rested.
¶16. The court allowed Atkisson to call Little as a surrebuttal witness. Little explained that
the cover charge at the Eclipse for people over the age of twenty-one was $25, but for people
under the age of twenty-one, it was $20. She also testified that she did not arrive when
Atkisson did, so she could not definitively say how much he paid for his cover charge.
¶17. At the close of all the evidence, Atkisson moved for a directed verdict, which the
court denied. After being instructed and hearing closing arguments, the jury deliberated and
found Atkisson guilty of aggravated DUI.
Sentencing Hearing
¶18. On December 16, 2024, the court reviewed the pre-sentencing investigative report and
9
heard testimony from witnesses for the defense, after which the court sentenced Atkisson to
serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
¶19. At the close of the hearing, Atkisson’s attorneys raised the issue of possible juror
misconduct to the court. The court heard testimony from Chris Boone, Atkisson’s stepfather,
who stated that on the day of the verdict, Atkisson’s family and friends remained in the
courtroom while the victim’s family exited first. Atkisson’s supporters were then escorted
downstairs and out of the garage to leave the building and go to their cars. Boone said he
recognized the foreman of the jury (Juror 12) by the distinctive suit he wore, as well as Juror
8 standing in a group with others across the street. Boone said they were hollering, “[H]ow
did y’all’s $12,000 specialist do? Y’all can take y’all white asses back [to] Rankin County.
We stand on business in Hinds County.” He did not see who was talking; “it was multiple
people that were hollering at us, kind of as a group.”
¶20. A close friend of Atkisson’s, Janai Mason, testified as well, saying that she exited the
building in tears, with her friend, Grace, and Grace’s fiancé trying to calm her down. A
bailiff kept a homeless man from approaching them. She sat with her friends in her car in
the parking lot for about ten minutes and they saw the jury members exit the building in a
group. She said she could tell it was the jury because they had Chick-fil-A bags and were
being escorted to their vehicles. They were talking in a celebratory way (with “snickers” and
“smiles”). She said she heard someone say, “‘F’ that white boy,” referring to Atkisson. Not
all of the jurors were there, but a lot of them were, Mason said. She did not hear anything
else or see any water bottles. On cross-examination, the State asked if she observed any
10
misconduct during the trial, and Mason responded that jurors were snickering and smiling,
and one with gray hair was laughing a lot. Questioning from the court established that
Mason did not see anything that would indicate the jurors were discussing the case during
breaks in violation of the court’s admonition of it.
¶21. Atkisson’s grandmother, Karen Pellicano, told the court that she was “uncontrollable,”
and her husband was holding her. There were people yelling “stuff” across the street, but she
could not hear what they said. All of a sudden, a water bottle crashed between her and her
husband’s feet. She did not see who threw it. She believed it was the jurors because they
were holding Chick-fil-A bags. In the court’s questioning, the court noted that she usually
has jurors’ lunches put in black carry-out bags. Pellicano also confirmed for the court that
this happened after the verdict, not during the trial.
¶22. Bailiff Matthew Canada testified that he did not help the jury outside but, instead, got
the family out of the courthouse. He waited until the coast was clear. Then, he took the
Atkisson group down the steps to the sally port and then out towards the chancery court
building. Canada saw a vagrant there, and he went to him. The Atkisson group was very
distraught and upset, and Canada accompanied them to the parking lot. He asked one young
lady if she needed AMR and if she could drive. She was on the telephone and said she was
fine. Canada said he stood there for maybe seven or eight minutes. He then turned and left.
He did not witness any obscenity or throwing of anything. He did not see any jurors, but his
focus was on the Atkisson family. It was 5:45 p.m. and dark, and Canada said he was paying
more attention to the vagrants to make sure that the family got out safe. He did not hear any
11
group yelling that “in Hinds County, they stand on business” or “to take your white, you-
know-what, back to Brandon.” Canada said he only heard the family consoling each other,
and his focus was on making sure the vagrants did not bother them.
¶23. Atkisson’s counsel told the court that the family did not ask him to bring up all these
details, but Canada overheard them talking about it, and Canada felt it was necessary to bring
it before the court. Thereafter, the court ruled that based on the testimony, there was no
proof that anything improper had occurred during the process leading up to the jury’s verdict.
The defense requested a Remmer hearing, where jurors would be called back and
questioned.5 The court stated that Atkisson could file a motion for that if he desired.
Post-trial Motion and Hearing
¶24. On December 23, 2024, Atkisson filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the law and the weight of the
evidence, that the State had not proven the elements of aggravated driving under the
influence, and that there was improper conduct by the jurors when they interacted with
Atkisson’s family.
¶25. On April 14, 2025, the court heard the motion for JNOV as well as a motion for bond
pending appeal. At the hearing, the defense entered the transcript of the testimony from the
sentencing hearing. The defense’s only other witness was Atkisson’s mother, Olivia, who
testified that the bailiff accompanied them to the parking lot and left before the encounter
5
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954), held that a defendant was
entitled to a hearing to determine the effect of a remark a juror made during the trial that he
could profit by returning a verdict favorable to the defendant.
12
with the group that “hollered” at them and threw the water bottle. She was with her husband,
her mother, Janai Mason, Olivia Johnson, one of her older sons, and a man called Mr. Sal—
“quite a few of us.” They were in the parking lot on the north side of the chancery court
building, and this other group crossed the street to the parking lot across Pascagoula Street.
Besides the water bottle being thrown, Olivia said someone said, “[H]ow did that $12,000
scientist work out for you?” The same individual said that they “needed to carry y’all’s white
asses back to Rankin County. We stand on business around here.” She said she recognized
three jurors in the group; one whom she recognized from the juror’s clothing and her hair sat
in the front row. Olivia also recognized the jury foreman “by his clothing,” a blue jeans suit.
The third juror she recognized was a young lady who wore her hair on top of her head.
Olivia said she had no problem seeing them because they were walking under a street light.
¶26. Olivia further testified that during the trial, the juror at the end was “quite hostile,”
“snickering back and forth like the whole thing was a joke.” She told her son’s attorney
about this during the trial. When they came back at a later date for the sentencing, the bailiff
overheard her and her mother speaking about what had happened, and “he just laughed it off
like it just didn’t matter.” Olivia said the three jurors she identified were in a group of six
people. She said the “$12,000 expert” comment came from a female and the “we stand on
business” comment came from the foreman. On further examination, Olivia admitted that
after the verdict was read, there was an outburst in the courtroom. Although she initially said
she did not remember what was said, she admitted that the outburst came from her and that
she said, “[W]e’re going to fix this.” She said she meant by appealing. However, the district
13
attorney argued that he was in the courtroom and heard the outburst, and to him, it did not
sound like she was referring to an appeal.
¶27. Olivia also presented letters in support of Atkisson’s motion for bond. The court ruled
that the evidence presented did not indicate that the verdict was based on race, that the
evidence was sufficient to convict Atkisson, and that Atkisson was not entitled to bond
pending appeal. The court denied both of Atkisson’s post-trial motions, and Atkisson
appealed.
¶28. On appeal, Atkisson raises two issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in allowing
Shelby McCoy, the State’s undisclosed rebuttal witness, to testify, and (2) whether the circuit
court erred in failing to convene a hearing to question jurors about potential misconduct.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶29. The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Dukes v. State,
369 So. 3d 553, 558 (¶13) (Miss. 2023). “The reviewing court on an evidentiary matter
should only overturn the trial court’s decision if it abused its discretion, meaning the decision
was arbitrary and clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Denham v. Holmes ex rel. Holmes, 60 So.
3d 773, 783 (Miss. 2011)). “Abuse of discretion is found when the reviewing court has a
‘definite and firm conviction’ that the court below committed a clear error of judgment [in]
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. “The decision
whether to allow rebuttal testimony is committed to the discretion of the trial judge, and we
will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.” Thompson v. State, 230 So. 3d 1044, 1050
(¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
14
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State’s undisclosed
rebuttal witness to testify.
¶30. In this case, the State called McCoy as a witness allegedly to rebut Atkisson’s
testimony that he paid McCoy $20 for admission to the club. McCoy testified that Atkisson
did not pay him the $20 for admission but, rather, to purchase marijuana. Atkisson objected
to this testimony, but his objection was overruled. McCoy further testified that Atkisson was
a pothead and visibly drunk; however, Atkisson did not object to this testimony. On appeal,
Atkisson argues that the admission of McCoy’s testimony was unlawful because McCoy was
not disclosed as a potential witness and that his testimony was irrelevant and constituted
improper prior bad acts testimony.
A. Should McCoy have been barred because he was an undisclosed
rebuttal witness?
¶31. First, Atkisson contends that the circuit court should have excluded McCoy because
the State had not disclosed him as a witness before trial. The Mississippi Rules of Criminal
Procedure require mutual pre-trial disclosure of information by both the defense and the
prosecution. Rule 17.3 requires that defendants who request discovery must also disclose to
the State information they have, including witnesses and evidence. MRCrP 17.3. Under
Rule 17.2, the prosecution must disclose the names and addresses of all witnesses it intends
to call in its case in chief. MRCrP 17.2. However, the prosecution is not required to identify
any witnesses to be called in rebuttal unless that witness is called to rebut a defendant’s alibi
witness. See MRCrP 17.4(a)(1) (Upon a demand from the State, a defendant must disclose
15
any alibi witness, and the State in response must identify any witness it intends to present to
rebut that alibi witness.).6
¶32. We have held that “the State has no duty to disclose the names of possible rebuttal
witnesses unless the State has requested a notice of alibi defense.” Jackson v. State, 52 So.
3d 1203, 1208 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Burnside v. State, 912 So. 2d 1018, 1026
(¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). Further, we have stated that “the State is entitled to present
rebuttal testimony . . . to explain, repel, counteract or disprove evidence offered by the
defense.” Thompson, 230 So. 3d at 1050 (¶18) (citing Williams v. State, 539 So. 2d 1049,
6
Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4 provides in part:
(a) Alibi Defense.
(1) In General. Upon the written demand of the prosecuting attorney stating
the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the
defendant shall serve within ten (10) days, or at such other time as the court
may direct, upon the prosecuting attorney, a written notice of the intention to
offer a defense of alibi, which notice shall state the specific place(s) at which
the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to
rely to establish such alibi.
Within ten (10) days thereafter, but in no event less than ten (10) days before
the trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the prosecuting attorney shall serve
upon the defendant or the defendant’s attorney a written notice stating the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the State intends to rely to
establish the defendant’s presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any
other witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant’s
alibi witnesses.
If, prior to or during trial, a party learns of an additional witness whose
identity, if known, should have been included in the information previously
furnished, the party shall promptly notify the other party or the other party’s
attorney of the name and address of such additional witness.
16
1051 (Miss. 1989)).
¶33. In light of the Rules and precedent, the State had no duty to disclose McCoy as a
rebuttal witness before trial, and McCoy was not barred from testifying for that reason.
B. Did McCoy testify to other bad acts in violation of Mississippi
Rule of Evidence 404(b) and did the court abuse its discretion
in applying the Rule 403 balancing test?
¶34. More troublesome is the content and extent of McCoy’s testimony. It is one thing to
impeach Atkisson about whether he spent $20 on admission to the club; it is another for the
State to knowingly elicit testimony that Atkisson spent the $20 on marijuana without prior
notice to the court or the defense. Atkisson argues that through McCoy’s testimony, the State
presented inadmissible evidence of a prior bad act.
¶35. Rule 404(b) specifically prohibits admission of prior bad acts to prove the defendant
acted in accordance with his character and addresses the limited instances when such
evidence may be admissible, providing:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
MRE 404(b)(1)-(2). Further, Rule 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove
instances of a witness’s misconduct in order to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness,
providing:
17
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack
or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on
cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined
has testified about.
MRE 608(b).
¶36. In Brown v. State, 402 So. 3d 765, 771-72 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), we addressed
the parameters of Rule 608(b) and cited the advisory committee note to the Rule, stating:
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 608 terms this an “absolute prohibition
on extrinsic evidence” but makes clear it “applies only when the sole reason
for proffering that evidence is to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness.” Crucially, “[t]he extrinsic evidence prohibition of Rule 608(b)
bars the use of any kind of evidence, including documents or the testimony of
other witnesses, except a direct admission by the witness being
cross-examined.”
We further stated that a party may not introduce evidence of a witness’s other misconduct
“at a whim.” Id. at 772 (¶32). We noted:
Our Supreme Court has established that “[p]rocedurally, before counsel
attempts an inquiry on cross-examination as to specific acts of past conduct not
resulting in a conviction[,] he should inform the trial judge that he intends to
do so,” at which point the trial court can “conduct a hearing outside the
presence of the jury.” Brent v. State, 632 So. 2d 936, 945 (Miss. 1994). The
rule “does not authorize a fishing license, but counsel must have specific
instances of past conduct about which he proposes to cross-examine the
witness, and inform the trial judge of them.” Id. At that point, “the trial judge
can determine first if the conduct reflects upon the witness’s honesty,” a
required predicate before admission, and then perform a balancing test “under
Rule 403 and also determine whether admission of the evidence will advance
the ascertainment of the truth in the case.” Id.
18
Id. “Although a judge has broad discretion in admitting evidence, evidence of a crime other
than the one for which the accused is being tried generally will not be admissible.” Hargett
v. State, 62 So. 3d 950, 953 (¶8) (Miss. 2011).
¶37. In the case at hand, the State knew that McCoy would testify to what was clearly a bad
act under Rule 404(b), i.e., Atkisson’s purchase of marijuana. The State clearly failed to
disclose this to the defense or the court prior to McCoy’s taking the stand so that the court
could engage in the proper balancing test required by Rule 403 before the jury heard it.7
However, after the fact, the circuit court did consider the arguments of counsel and ultimately
conducted the probative/prejudicial analysis required by Rule 403, stating:
[T]he Court’s belief is that this deals with the voracity (sic) or the truthfulness
of the witnesses’s [Atkisson’s] testimony. This witness [McCoy] is being
brought in to rebut prior testimony at this point which is considered to be an
inconsistent statement, and it goes to the truthfulness of the testimony. You’re
honing in on character when I’m of the mindset that you should be looking at
the prior acts which is in 404(b). So I’ve ruled. It is more probative in value
than it is prejudicial. It is relevant, and we’re going to move forward.
The circuit court further stated that even if the State had filed a motion in limine, the court
would have found the testimony admissible. Given the discretion afforded to the circuit court
under Rule 403 and Rule 608(b), we find no clear error in the court’s judgment.
¶38. Atkisson argues in the alternative that even if there were no error in allowing McCoy
to testify that Atkisson purchased marijuana, McCoy’s other testimony concerning the
7
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
19
reasons why he sold Atkisson the marijuana and his observations of Atkisson’s appearance
and demeanor were inadmissible under Slaughter v. State, 752 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999). In that case, we noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that rebuttal questioning of a
witness who impeaches a defendant’s statement may not go into the details of the act
surrounding the rebuttal.” Id. at 1095 (¶12) (citing Stewart v. State, 596 So. 2d 851, 853
(Miss. 1992)). However, in this case, after his initial objection to McCoy’s response that
Atkisson bought marijuana with the Cash App payments, Atkisson failed to object to the
substance of any of McCoy’s testimony thereafter.8 “In order to preserve an issue for appeal,
counsel must object. The failure to object acts as a waiver.” Fox v. State, 412 So. 3d 426,
446 (¶69) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 791 (¶34) (Miss.
2006)). Accordingly, we find Atkisson waived the issue of McCoy’s subsequent testimony.
We also note that on cross-examination, it was Atkisson who elicited other damaging
testimony. For example, Atkisson’s counsel showed McCoy a photograph taken of Atkisson
that night and asked, “And are those [Atkisson’s] red bloodshot eyes?” McCoy replied:
“Based off of the eyes in that photo I would say he was pretty intoxicated. Not with
marijuana, but it’s more of an alcohol glow.”
¶39. Even if there were error in the admission of McCoy’s testimony, the error would have
been harmless. “Errors in the admission of evidence are subject to a harmless-error
analysis.” Pittman v. State, 385 So. 3d 1205, 1208 (¶13) (Miss. 2024) (citing Smith v. State,
136 So. 3d 424, 435 (Miss. 2014)). “Harmless-error analysis prevents setting aside
8
Atkisson objected once for leading the witness.
20
convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed
the result of the trial.” Id. In Pittman, the defendant was charged with breaking into a trailer,
and during his trial, testimony was admitted that he had allegedly stolen power tools in
another incident. Id. at 1205-06 (¶1). The Mississippi Supreme Court examined the
evidence presented against Pittman and stated, “This Court need not analyze whether the
admission of evidence of other bad acts was error in this case because even if it was, any
alleged error would be harmless.” Id. at 1208 (¶13). The Court found the evidence against
Pittman overwhelmingly showed that Pittman was guilty of the crime charged. Id. at 1208-
09 (¶14).
¶40. In Taylor v. State, 374 So. 3d 617, 628-29 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), we held that
“[a]n error is considered harmless when the weight of the evidence against the defendant was
suff