Full Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A23-1606 A25-0334 Blue Earth County Procaccini, J. Dissenting, Hudson, C.J., Thissen, J. State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Filed: September 23, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Lee Wayne Young, Jr., Appellant. ________________________ Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota, for respondent. Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant. ________________________ SYLLABUS 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to admit a recording of a statement made by an alleged alternative perpetrator under Minnesota Rules of Evidence 807 (residual hearsay exception) and 613 (impeachment of prior statements of witness). 1 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a portion of a video exhibit under Minnesota Rules of Evidence 611 (scope of cross-examination) and 403 (unfair prejudice). 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the alleged alternative perpetrator’s internet searches as irrelevant under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). 4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the alleged alternative perpetrator’s prior methamphetamine possession convictions as irrelevant under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). 5. The district court’s exclusion of a learned treatise during cross-examination of a State expert witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 6. Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief based on the State’s introduction of undisclosed expert opinion testimony at trial when appellant did not object to the testimony at trial and did not show that the opinion testimony affected his substantial rights. 7. When considered cumulatively, the exclusion of a learned treatise and introduction of undisclosed expert opinion testimony did not deny appellant a fair trial. Affirmed. OPINION PROCACCINI, Justice. In this consolidated direct and postconviction appeal, appellant Lee Wayne Young, Jr., challenges his conviction for first-degree murder. Young’s appeal is based on 2 six alleged trial errors and the cumulative effect of those alleged errors. Young was indicted on several counts of first-degree murder for the killing of T.B., a two-year-old boy. T.B.’s mother had a relationship with Young’s father, L.Y. Young and L.Y. would sometimes spend time at the apartment where T.B. and his mother lived. At trial, the district court allowed Young to present an alternative perpetrator defense alleging that L.Y. had committed the crime. But the district court excluded some evidence related to Young’s alternative perpetrator defense. After Young was convicted, he filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based on undisclosed opinion testimony introduced at trial by the State’s expert witness. The district court denied postconviction relief. On appeal, Young argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the following evidence at trial: (1) a recording of L.Y. making a statement to police that L.Y. had touched the victim, T.B., “in his body”; (2) a police squad car video of Young and L.Y. being transported to the police station after T.B.’s body was found; (3) L.Y.’s internet search history for pornography; (4) L.Y.’s prior methamphetamine possession convictions; and (5) an article about confirmation bias in forensic science. Young further argues that each of these evidentiary rulings was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. He also challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the admission of undisclosed expert opinion testimony at trial was reversible error. Finally, Young argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. Young requests a new trial. Because Young has not shown reversible error, we affirm the conviction. 3 FACTS At approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 16, 2021, a woman at an apartment building in Mankato flagged down police officers, asking for help because her son was not breathing. When they approached the apartment building, the officers saw L.Y. carrying a small child, T.B., out of the apartment building. T.B. was stiff and lifeless. The officers observed bruises on T.B.’s face and body, as well as freshly dried blood. The officers also observed rigor mortis,1 which suggested that T.B. had died some time earlier. T.B. was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. Officers drove Young and L.Y. to the police station to be interviewed. Young and L.Y. rode in the same squad car, and while in the car, L.Y. made statements to Young that were recorded on squad video. After an investigation into T.B.’s death, including witness statements, cell phone location data, forensic testing, and the autopsy results, a grand jury indicted Young on 25 counts relating to T.B.’s death. The counts included first-degree murder committed in the course of criminal sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. Prior to trial, Young moved to present an alternative perpetrator defense, identifying L.Y. as the alleged alternative perpetrator. The district court allowed Young to present this alternative perpetrator defense but excluded some evidence Young offered related to this defense, including evidence of L.Y.’s internet searches for “anal teen” pornography and L.Y.’s prior convictions for methamphetamine possession. 1 Rigor mortis is the stiffening of the body’s joints and muscles after death. Rigor Mortis, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 4 The case proceeded to a jury trial on 24 of the 25 counts.2 At trial, the State offered testimony from police officers, doctors, the medical examiner, forensic scientists, experts on cell phone tracking data, and family members—including T.B.’s mother and T.B.’s sister. Around the time of the murder, Young’s father, L.Y., had a relationship with T.B.’s mother. Young and L.Y. would sometimes spend time at T.B.’s mother’s apartment. Police officers testified that, over the course of their investigation, they learned the following: L.Y. and T.B.’s mother left her Mankato apartment between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on April 16 with the stated intent to purchase a used car in Renville, a couple of hours away. They left Young and T.B.’s sister in the apartment with two-year-old T.B. T.B.’s sister, who was 11 years old at the time of the murder, testified about what happened after L.Y. and T.B.’s mother left the apartment on April 16. According to T.B.’s sister, both she and Young—who was 16 years old at the time—stayed in the apartment for most of the day and did not go to school. It is unclear whether anyone checked on T.B. before the afternoon of April 16. T.B.’s sister testified, however, that she received a text message from T.B.’s mother in the afternoon and then checked on T.B., who was in his bed in his room. She found that T.B. was “frozen” and “not moving.” She further testified that after she found T.B. in that condition, she called her mother, very upset. According to T.B.’s sister, Young told her not to call the police. L.Y. and T.B.’s mother returned to the apartment later that afternoon. 2 Prior to trial, the district court dismissed one count, first-degree murder committed in the course of domestic abuse, for lack of probable cause. 5 The medical examiner who performed T.B.’s autopsy testified that T.B. was covered in bruises that had been inflicted within the 24 hours before his death. The medical examiner noted significant injuries around T.B.’s head and mouth, including damage to T.B.’s mouth consistent with someone manipulating it, multiple bruises inside T.B.’s mouth and on T.B.’s head, and damage to T.B.’s upper frenulum—the tissue connecting T.B.’s upper lip to his jaw. The medical examiner determined that T.B. suffered brain and eye hemorrhages and had injuries to his anus that suggested a strong probability of sexual assault. The medical examiner testified that semen was found in T.B.’s rectum and within anal lacerations. The medical examiner further testified that toxicology testing indicated that there was a small amount of methamphetamine in T.B.’s body but that the methamphetamine did not cause T.B.’s death. Instead, the medical examiner testified that T.B.’s death was caused by “multiple traumatic injuries due to physical assault.” Although the medical examiner did not testify as to a precise time of death, he opined that T.B. had died approximately 8 to 12 hours before his body was discovered at 4:30 p.m. The State also presented evidence about L.Y.’s and Young’s whereabouts in the hours leading up to the discovery of T.B.’s body. The State presented tracking data related to Young’s cell phone. That data showed that Young’s cell phone remained at the apartment where T.B. was killed from midnight the night before the death until the next afternoon, when Young was transported to the police station. The State also presented photographs that Young had taken of himself that day in the apartment, evidence that Young logged into his Xbox account while in the apartment that day, and tracking data 6 related to L.Y.’s cell phone. L.Y.’s phone movement indicated that on the night before T.B. died, L.Y. had left the apartment shortly after midnight and arrived in Renville around 3:00 a.m. The State presented eyewitness testimony confirming that L.Y. purchased a used car in Renville. Cell phone tracking data suggested that L.Y. did not return to Mankato until approximately 2:40 p.m. on the day T.B. died. The tracking data also showed that L.Y. returned to the apartment at approximately 4:30 p.m., suggesting that he did not go straight to the apartment upon returning to Mankato. The State also presented forensic evidence related to several items collected from the apartment and DNA samples obtained from L.Y. and Young. Forensic scientists at the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) crime lab tested the items and compared the DNA found on the items to L.Y.’s, Young’s, and T.B.’s DNA. Some of the forensic testing appeared to inculpate Young. Testing of a towel collected from the apartment showed that it had Young’s semen and T.B.’s blood on it. Testing of a blanket from the apartment showed that it also had both T.B.’s blood and Young’s semen on it. Testing of Young’s underwear revealed a mixture that contained Young’s semen, and T.B.’s DNA could not be excluded from the mixture. And testing of Young’s shoes revealed both blood and T.B.’s DNA. Based on the evidence it presented at trial, the State’s theory of the case was that after L.Y. and T.B.’s mother left the apartment for Renville, Young, T.B.’s sister, and T.B. stayed in the apartment—and that at some point while L.Y. and T.B.’s mother were away, Young sexually assaulted and murdered T.B. 7 After the State presented its case-in-chief, Young called several witnesses— including L.Y., multiple police officers, and a forensic expert—to support his alternative perpetrator defense, which asserted that L.Y., not Young, had sexually assaulted and murdered T.B. L.Y. testified that he last saw T.B. alive before L.Y. and T.B.’s mother left for Renville. He testified that when he returned to the apartment at approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 16, he found T.B., performed mouth-to-mouth CPR on T.B., and spoke to police officers at the scene. L.Y. testified that, in his initial conversation with officers, he told the officers that he had “questions” about providing a DNA sample. L.Y. testified that, in this conversation, he had explained to the officers that T.B. was potty training and that he helped T.B. “wipe” when T.B. went to the bathroom. L.Y. also testified that when he spoke to officers at the scene, he admitted to “sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body.” Young’s attorney questioned L.Y. extensively about L.Y.’s statement to police officers that he had “touch[ed T.B.] in his body.” L.Y. appeared to both admit and deny making that statement. L.Y. further testified about his return to Mankato from Renville, admitting that he had “smashed” a video camera in the apartment upon his return. Young’s attorney questioned L.Y. about the statements L.Y. made to Young and to police the evening of April 16.3 L.Y. also admitted to having been convicted of multiple prior felonies, but—consistent with the district court’s prior ruling—he did not specify the crimes for which he had been convicted. 3 Young later argued in closing that L.Y. had lied to the police, attempted to distance himself from the scene of the crime, and tried to “pin” the blame for the crime on others. 8 The police officer who transported Young and L.Y. to the police station testified. During Young’s direct examination of the officer, Young attempted to publish a portion of the squad car video showing Young and L.Y. being driven to the station. The district court excluded the video, determining that it was cumulative of other evidence. Another police officer testified that he recovered a video camera in a nearby car. Young did not present the video footage recorded on that camera to the jury.4 But in closing arguments, Young argued that the camera found in the car was hidden by L.Y. to cover up evidence, and that L.Y. had lied to the police when he told the police that he smashed a camera. Young’s forensic expert witness testified, among other things, about rigor mortis and its relevance to the time of T.B.’s death and the locations where DNA could have been found on T.B.’s body. Referring to the evidence showing that L.Y’s DNA was found inside T.B.’s mouth, Young’s forensic expert witness testified that it would be “unusual to find another person’s DNA within … the closed mouth of a deceased individual.” The State attributed the presence of L.Y.’s DNA in T.B.’s mouth to the fact that L.Y. had attempted to administer mouth-to-mouth CPR when L.Y. arrived at the scene. But Young argued that the forensic evidence from T.B.’s mouth implicated L.Y. as T.B.’s killer. Referring to the testimony of his forensic expert witness, Young argued that T.B.’s mouth would have been opened had someone actually performed mouth-to-mouth CPR, but that 4 The video footage depicts the apartment living room the afternoon that T.B.’s body was discovered. It shows T.B.’s sister in the living room that afternoon, distraught. 9 T.B.’s mouth was closed, and it was therefore unlikely that L.Y. ever performed mouth- to-mouth CPR. In sum, Young’s alternative perpetrator theory at trial was that L.Y. killed T.B., fled to Renville, and then returned to Mankato the next afternoon, where he then attempted to destroy evidence, lie to police, and frame someone else for the crime. The jury found Young guilty of 20 of the 24 counts.5 The district court convicted Young of first-degree murder committed in the course of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Young filed a direct appeal to this court and a petition for postconviction relief in district court. We stayed Young’s direct appeal pending the resolution of his postconviction petition. The district court denied the petition without a hearing, and Young appealed. We consolidated Young’s direct and postconviction appeals, and we address both below. ANALYSIS In this appeal, Young raises five challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings at trial, a challenge to the district court’s denial of postconviction relief, and a claim that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors warrants a new trial. We begin with a discussion of the standard of review for Young’s five evidentiary challenges. We then address each issue in turn. 5 After the State rested, the district court granted Young’s motion for a judgment of acquittal only with respect to the two kidnapping-related charges. The jury found Young guilty of 20 of the remaining 22 counts. It found him not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder. 10 Because Young preserved his objections to the district court’s evidentiary rulings at issue here, we review each of those decisions for an abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In close cases, we defer to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court might have reasonably ruled differently. See State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004). Even if a district court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence, we will not reverse the district court if the error is harmless. State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 123 (Minn. 2024). Because the erroneous exclusion of evidence offered by a criminal defendant can deprive the defendant of their constitutional right to present a complete defense, we examine whether any erroneous exclusion of evidence here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 155 (Minn. 2024). “[E]xclusion of evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, assuming the potential damage of the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). I. We start with Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to offer into evidence the recording of L.Y.’s statement to officers that he had touched T.B. “in his body.” L.Y. made this statement after the police discovered T.B.’s body, when an officer asked L.Y. for a DNA sample. L.Y. was initially reluctant to give the sample, explaining that he had touched T.B. “in his body.” During L.Y.’s direct 11 examination, L.Y. acknowledged that on the day of the murder he told officers he had touched T.B. “in his body.” Although the State did not object to L.Y.’s testimony about his encounters with police following the murder, it did dispute the admissibility of a recording of this statement. Young twice moved to introduce the recording of this statement during L.Y.’s testimony—once on the grounds that it was admissible hearsay under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807 and once as impeachment evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613. The district court declined to admit the recording on either basis. We review the district court’s two evidentiary rulings in turn. A. Young moved to admit the recording of L.Y.’s statement as substantive evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807, which is one of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Hearsay is a statement made by a declarant, not while testifying at the current trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). “A hearsay statement is not admissible except as provided in the Minnesota Rules of Evidence or any other rules prescribed by our court or the Legislature.” Id. (citing Minn. R. Evid. 802). There is no dispute that the recording of L.Y.’s “in his body” statement contained hearsay. Rule 807 provides a “residual exception,” allowing for the admission of certain hearsay statements even if other exceptions to the hearsay rule do not apply: A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 12 evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 807. We have said that the decision to admit a hearsay statement under Rule 807 involves two steps. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 292. First, the district court must consider the totality of the circumstances to evaluate whether the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. Second, the district court must evaluate whether the statement satisfies prongs A, B, and C listed in the rule. Id. at 293. The statement is admissible only if it has sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and it satisfies all three prongs. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion, because it reasonably determined that the recording of the “in his body” statement did not satisfy prong B—the requirement that the statement be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.” Minn. R. Evid. 807. To the contrary, the district court determined that the recording was “not more probative than [L.Y.’s] testimony.” Before the district court made this determination, L.Y. had testified extensively. He testified that he performed CPR on T.B. and that his mouth “touched” T.B.’s. He testified that he told officers at the scene that T.B. had recently been potty trained, despite none of the officers asking about potty training. He explained that he had concerns about giving the officers a DNA sample, testifying, “My concern was that whatever had happened to him that day while I was 13 gone was going to somehow get implicated onto me for reasons I had no idea of.” He testified that he told the officers at the scene about helping T.B. wipe while T.B. was going to the bathroom. When defense counsel first asked L.Y. whether he had told police that he was “sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body,” L.Y. responded, “During CPR? I don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.” The district court noted that L.Y.’s testimony was not always clear. But the recorded statement was similarly unclear. When an officer in the recording first mentioned asking L.Y. for a DNA sample, L.Y. said, “I just gave [T.B.] mouth-to-mouth,” referring to CPR, and that L.Y. “bathe[s] him.” When asked whether his DNA would be on T.B.’s genitals, L.Y. said, “No. It shouldn’t be.” When asked whether his DNA would be on T.B.’s anus, L.Y. said, “I mean when you wipe him,” and he consistently expressed concerns about being implicated in the crime based on potty training T.B. Whether the recording of the statement was more probative than the testimony that L.Y. had already given is a close question, but we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. L.Y. testified extensively at trial. L.Y. testified that he performed CPR on T.B., including putting his mouth to T.B.’s mouth. He also testified that he told police officers that he helped wipe T.B. when T.B. went to the bathroom. He admitted to telling the police that he “touch[ed] [T.B.] in his body” when he performed CPR on T.B. Overall, L.Y. testified that he had touched T.B. and testified that he had told the police the same. Moreover, L.Y.’s testimony was consistent with the recording, which was a muddled exchange with police officers in which L.Y. expressed concerns about being implicated in the crime based on DNA evidence found on T.B. via CPR or potty training. 14 The district court’s conclusion—that the recording of L.Y.’s specific statement to police about “touching him in his body” is not more probative than the several instances at trial in which L.Y. admitted to touching T.B.—is reasonable based on the record. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the recording itself has probative value. The State argued that Young sexually assaulted and murdered a child, and L.Y.’s admission to touching that child “in his body” inculpates L.Y. and may cast doubt as to Young’s guilt. But Rule 807 does not require only that a statement be probative: The statement must be more probative than any other evidence Young could have reasonably obtained. See Minn. R. Evid. 807. As noted above, Young elicited testimony from L.Y. about the “in his body” statement, which Young’s attorney recited in full to L.Y. during his direct examination. This is a close call, and in close cases, we defer to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court could have ruled differently. See Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613. Accordingly, we defer to the district court’s exercise of its discretion and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the recording of the statement was not more probative than other evidence Young could have procured. B. We now turn to the district court’s denial of Young’s motion to admit the recording as impeachment evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 613. Under Rule 613(b), extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is generally inadmissible unless the witness is given a prior opportunity to explain or deny the evidence and the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the evidence. Minn. 15 R. Evid. 613(b). Additionally, to impeach a witness with evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, the proponent of the evidence must show that the witness’s statements are actually inconsistent. State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977). Here, Young sought to impeach L.Y. by admitting the recording of L.Y. stating that he had touched T.B. “in his body” as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. He sought to do so during his direct examination of L.Y. During the direct examination, L.Y. gave conflicting testimony, appearing to both admit and deny making the statement. Initially, L.Y. admitted to making the statement. On direct examination, L.Y. was asked, “Did you tell the police that you were sweating and touching [T.B.] in his body?” L.Y. answered, “During CPR? I don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.” L.Y. further testified that the statement was taken “out of context.” Young’s attorney attempted to refresh L.Y.’s recollection of the statement with a transcript of the police interview that included the statement. After L.Y. reviewed the transcript, Young’s attorney asked L.Y., “So you’re saying you never said ‘even though I was sweating and touching him in his body?’ ” L.Y. responded, “It might have sounded like that but that’s not what was said, never even once.” Eventually, Young’s attorney asked L.Y., “[D]id you say those words in that order?” to which L.Y. replied, “No.” Based on this muddled exchange, the district court determined that L.Y. did not deny making the statement. The district court reasoned that L.Y.’s testimony was that he was confused and under duress when he made the statement and that the statement was not what L.Y. meant. Having determined that Young had not met his burden to show that 16 the recording contained an inconsistent statement, the district court did not allow Young to admit the recording. A district court does not abuse its discretion in excluding an inconsistent statement if the witness admits to making the statement. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. 2017). When it is uncertain or ambiguous whether a statement satisfies Rule 613(b), the district court has the discretion to “weigh the matter,” and we will not reverse the district court’s decision “unless it is clearly shown that the [district] court abused its discretion.” Vance, 254 N.W.2d at 358. Here, reasonable minds could disagree. L.Y. appeared to both admit and deny making the statement. In light of the uncertainty and ambiguity in L.Y.’s testimony, the district court’s weighing of the matter was permissible under Vance. See id. And we cannot say that Young has clearly shown that the district court’s determination was inconsistent with the law or the facts in the record. See id. L.Y. expressly or impliedly admitted to making the statement at least four times. He admitted it when first asked about the statement, testifying, “I don’t know what you’re getting at but—yeah.” He admitted it again shortly thereafter, claiming that the officer was taking the statement “out of context.” When Young’s attorney and the district court judge were discussing refreshing L.Y.’s recollection, Young’s attorney told the judge that L.Y. “just said that’s not what he said,” at which point L.Y. interjected, “No, I said that’s not how it sounded.” (Emphasis added.) And at the end of the exchange, L.Y. testified that he “might have like said it like on accident or something.” 17 Even if these admissions were equivocal, so were Young’s possible denials. For example, L.Y. testified, “It might have sounded like that but that’s not what was said, never even once,” and “That’s not what was meant, no. Might have sounded like that.” (Emphasis added.) The district court determined that L.Y. did not deny making the statement but that L.Y. instead testified that he was confused and the statement was not what he meant. That determination is consistent with the exchange set forth above. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Young’s motion to admit the recording of L.Y.’s statement as impeachment evidence, because Young did not show that the statements were actually inconsistent. II. We next consider Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by excluding a portion of a video recording from an officer’s squad car. The first portion of the video shows a view of the crime scene outside the empty squad car’s windshield, and the second portion of the video shows a conversation in the squad car between Young and L.Y., in which L.Y. does most of the speaking. The State offered and published the first portion of the video during its direct examination of the police officer. Young moved to publish the second portion twice: first during his cross-examination of one of the responding officers in the State’s case-in-chief and then again during his direct examination of the same officer during Young’s case. The district court denied both motions, and we review each decision in turn. 18 A. We begin with the district court’s exclusion of the second portion of the video during Young’s cross-examination of the officer. The district court based its decision on Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611(b), which provides that “[c]ross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness” but that the district court may exercise its discretion to “permit inquiry into additional matters.” The scope of cross-examination is “largely left to the discretion of the [district] court,” and we will not overturn a district court’s ruling under Rule 611(b) “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d 398, 406 (Minn. 1998). The district court determined that the scope of the State’s direct examination of the police officer was limited to “presence at the scene, what happened there,” and that the scope ended with “the statement that [Young] went into [the officer’s] squad car, and they then went to the law enforcement center.” The district court determined that the scope did not include what was said or done during the ride to the police station. In evaluating the district court’s decision, our reasoning in State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d 398, is instructive. In Parker, we determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence as beyond the scope of direct examination in part because the defendant who sought to expand the scope of cross-examination could have called the witness as a defense witness. Id. at 406. Here, not only could Young have called the police officer as a witness, but he in fact did call the police officer as a witness. Just as in Parker, here we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 19 declining to allow Young to present the second portion of the video in his cross- examination of the police officer. B. We now turn to the district court’s decision to exclude the second portion of the squad car video during Young’s direct examination of the officer. At this stage, the district court excluded the video for two reasons. First, it determined that the video was cumulative under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403. Second, it determined that the video contained inadmissible hearsay. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence because it was cumulative, we do not reach the district court’s alternative ruling related to hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 244 n.7 (Minn. 2014) (declining to reach alternative ground for excluding a document when we determined that the district court excluded it on a proper ground). Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 permits the district court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence for a variety of reasons, including when such exclusion would avoid the “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” We have said that evidence is cumulative when it “merely duplicate[s] other evidence already presented.” State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988); see also State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. 2017) (explaining the same). But evidence is not cumulative when it is “probative of material facts in ways unique and distinct from the other evidence in the case.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Minn. 2005). 20 Here, the district court determined that the squad car video was cumulative when considered in light of L.Y.’s testimony during direct examination. We will reverse a district court’s Rule 403 decision for a “clear abuse” of discretion. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 477. And we “routinely affirm the exclusion of evidence on the ground that it would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” State v. Foster, 20 N.W.3d 6, 27 (Minn. 2025). Young argues that the excluded portion of the video contained the only evidence of the statements that L.Y. made in the squad car. But comparing the video with L.Y.’s testimony, we note that L.Y.’s statements in the squad car and his testimony at trial were largely the same: L.Y. left Mankato while T.B. was still alive; was in contact with Young, T.B.’s sister, and T.B. to some extent over the phone while he was gone; came back to the scene and panicked; gave T.B. mouth-to-mouth CPR; told Young to either call or speak to the police; and attempted to reassure Young. There are some minor discrepancies between the video and L.Y.’s trial testimony as to who had called to check up on T.B. and how often that happened. Despite these discrepancies, the second portion of the video is largely duplicative of other evidence. Young presented the information via his direct examination of L.Y., instead of via the squad car video. Accordingly, Young’s argument that the video presents the only evidence of what was said in the squad car is not persuasive, and the district court was within its discretion to conclude that the statements in the video are not “probative of material facts in ways unique and distinct from the other evidence in the case.” Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 479. 21 Young also argues that the video was not cumulative because it corroborates L.Y.’s testimony. Although we have said that corroboration evidence is not cumulative, see State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 203 (Minn. 2006), Young’s attempt to apply that principle to the circumstances here misses the mark. Evidence may corroborate some or all of a witness’s testimony when it “restore[s] confidence in the truth of” that testimony. State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 253 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Young did not seek to introduce the video to make L.Y.’s testimony at trial more credible. Instead, according to Young’s characterization of the evidence, Young attempted to introduce the video to undermine L.Y.’s credibility by showing that L.Y. lied and scapegoated Young. We defer to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, even if another court might have ruled differently. See Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613; Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it determined that the statements in the second portion of the squad car video were cumulative under Rule 403, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Young’s motion to admit the video. III. We next turn to Young’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of L.Y.’s internet search history. In pretrial motions, both the State and Young sought to introduce internet search history evidence at trial. The State sought to admit evidence that Young searched the Internet for pornography related to sex with a 22 younger stepbrother, and Young sought to admit evidence that L.Y. searched the Internet for “anal teen” pornography. In a pretrial order, the district