People of Michigan v. Joel Delavara
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket375971
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:19 AM
v No. 375971
Oakland Circuit Court
JOEL DELAVARA, LC No. 2024-290916-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions following a jury trial of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (involving commission of any other felony);
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(c) (involving commission of
any other felony); and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). The trial court sentenced
defendant to 15 to 40 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-I conviction, 71 months to 15 years’
imprisonment for his CSC-II conviction, and 85 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for his first-
degree home invasion conviction, with the sentences for CSC-I and home invasion to be served
consecutively. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s convictions but in
order to facilitate meaningful appellate review, remand this matter for the trial court to fully
articulate its rationale for imposing consecutive sentences.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a sexual assault that occurred at a hotel. Defendant and the victim
met at a work-related convention. Defendant and the victim spent the day together, along with two
other individuals, attending the convention. In the evening, they spent time eating and drinking at
a restaurant and bar before returning to the hotel. The victim went to her hotel room alone, and she
believed that she was intoxicated. Defendant obtained a key to the victim’s room from the hotel
employee working at the front desk. This employee did not ask for defendant’s identification
before issuing the key. Defendant used the key to enter the victim’s room, and he sexually assaulted
her. The victim testified that she had never given anyone at the hotel front desk permission to enter
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her room or permission to make a key for her room. She never gave defendant or anyone else
permission to enter her room.
The jury convicted defendant, as previously stated, of CSC-I, CSC-II, and first-degree
home invasion. He was sentenced as stated. The trial court denied defendant’s post-judgment
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. Defendant’s
appeal is now before this Court.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his appeal, defendant contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
establish the element of first-degree home invasion requiring either a “breaking” or “entering
without permission.” He asserts that the hotel front desk employee, who was purportedly
authorized to do so, provided defendant with permission to enter the victim’s room by issuing him
a key. Hence, defendant maintains, his use of the key to access the room did not constitute a
“breaking.” On this basis, defendant argues that his convictions for first-degree home invasion and
for first-degree criminal sexual conduct—which was predicated on the home invasion as the
underlying felony—cannot stand, and that the trial court erred in denying his post-judgment
motion.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction are reviewed de novo
on appeal. People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). “In reviewing a
claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution
to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the elements of the offense
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d
272 (2008). “[C]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from th[e] evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” Harverson, 291 Mich App at 175
(quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). “Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements
of a crime,” and it “is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences
may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those
inferences.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks, citations,
and emphasis omitted).
As relevant to defendant’s appellate arguments, defendant was convicted of first-degree
home invasion and CSC-I. Pursuant to MCL 750.110a(2), a
person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony, larceny,
or assault in the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling without permission with
intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a person who breaks
and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while
he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a felony, larceny,
or assault is guilty of home invasion in the first degree if at any time while the
person is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling either of the following
circumstances exists:
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon.
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(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling.
Furthermore, under MCL 750.520b(1)(c), a “person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and . . . [s]exual
penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony.” The parties
agree that the first-degree home invasion was the predicate felony for purposes of the CSC-I
conviction.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the crime of first-degree home invasion may be
committed “in several different ways, each of which involves alternative elements necessary to
complete the crime.” People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 43; 780 NW2d 265 (2010). The Court listed
these alternative elements as follows:
Element One: The defendant either:
1. breaks and enters a dwelling or
2. enters a dwelling without permission.
Element Two: The defendant either:
1. intends when entering to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the
dwelling or
2. at any time while entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling commits a
felony, larceny, or assault.
Element Three: While the defendant is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling,
either:
1. the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon or
2. another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [Id.]
Defendant only challenges the first element on appeal. The jury was instructed on both
alternatives for element one.
Defendant first contends that he possessed permission to enter the victim’s hotel room
because a front desk employee provided him with a key. Under the home invasion statute, the
phrase “without permission” is defined as entry “without having obtained permission to enter from
the owner or lessee of the dwelling or from any other person lawfully in possession or control of
the dwelling.” MCL 750.110a(1)(c).
In his argument, defendant correctly observes that a hotel proprietor retains a measure of
control over guest rooms and that a hotel guest’s interest in those rooms is less substantial than
that of a tenant in leased premises. In Ann Arbor Tenants Union v Ann Arbor YMCA, 229 Mich
App 431, 432; 581 NW2d 794 (1998), this Court distinguished landlord-tenant relationships from
those of hotel-guest, emphasizing that the “characteristic of exclusive possession and control of
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the premises—one that lies in the character of the possession—is the fundamental criteria in
distinguishing between a tenant and a guest.” Id. at 443. While a tenant enjoys exclusive legal
possession and control of leased premises, a hotel guest is deemed a licensee with a right to use
the premises, subject to the proprietor’s retained control and right of access, typically for
housekeeping and maintenance purposes. Id. at 444; see also Brams v Briggs, 272 Mich 38, 43;
260 NW 785 (1935).
However, defendant’s argument overlooks the nature of the special relationship between
innkeeper and guest, as well as the corresponding legal duties imposed upon innkeepers. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that innkeepers have a special relationship with their guests, which
generally obligates innkeepers to protect their guests. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc,
429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). This duty constitutes an exception to the general rule
that there is no obligation to aid or protect another. Id.
The innkeeper’s duty of protection arises from the guest’s act of entrusting himself to the
innkeeper’s control, thereby relinquishing his own ability to ensure his safety. Id. At common law,
the innkeeper-guest relationship required that the guest be a transient, present for a temporary stay.
Brams, 272 Mich at 41. The duty to protect encompasses reasonable precautions, including the
prevention of unauthorized access to a guest’s room by third parties who may commit criminal
acts. Jenness v Sheraton-Cadillac Props, Inc, 48 Mich App 723, 725-726; 211 NW2d 106 (1973).
The rationale for imposing this duty is that the party in control is best positioned to provide safety.
Williams, 429 Mich at 499.
It is unnecessary for this Court to articulate the precise contours of an innkeeper’s duty to
safeguard guests from the criminal acts of third parties. It is sufficient to recognize that, under the
circumstances presented here, this duty within the innkeeper-guest relationship did not permit the
innkeeper to provide defendant with access to the victim’s room without her authorization. As the
Louisiana Court of Appeals explained, “[t]he motel had an affirmative duty, stemming from a
guest’s rights of privacy and peaceful possession, not to allow unregistered and unauthorized third
parties to gain access to the rooms of its guest.” Campbell v Womack, 345 So 2d 96, 98 (La App,
1977). We find this reasoning both persuasive and consistent with fundamental principles of
common sense.
Accordingly, because the front desk clerk lacked authority to confer permission for
defendant to enter the victim’s room, defendant’s argument fails to show that he entered with
permission. Entry into a dwelling1 without permission satisfies the first element of first-degree
home invasion. Wilder, 485 Mich at 43. Whether a breaking occurred is immaterial; nevertheless,
Michigan law recognizes that any force, however minimal, used to open a door or window to gain
entry constitutes a breaking. People v Toole, 227 Mich App 656, 659; 576 NW2d 441 (1998). The
record does not support defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions. See People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177 (2010).
1
For purposes of the home invasion statute, “dwelling” means “a structure or shelter that is used
permanently or temporarily as a place of abode, including an appurtenant structure attached to that
structure or shelter.” MCL 750.110a(1)(a).
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III. RESPONSE TO JURY QUESTION
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly answer the jury’s
question about the effect of alcohol on the matter of consent.
After the jury began deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking, “What is
the laws on alcohol voluntary verbal contracts?” and “Also, does being intoxicated mean you
cannot consent?” After a discussion on the record with both the prosecutor and defendant’s trial
counsel, the trial court determined that it would instruct the jurors to rely on their collective
memories and to refer to the jury instructions. The jury was brought in, and the trial court instructed
the jury accordingly. After the jury left the courtroom, the trial court asked the parties, “Everybody
satisfied with the answering of that question?” Both the prosecutor and defendant’s trial counsel
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
Defendant waived this challenge to the trial court’s instruction in response to the jury
question when his trial counsel expressed unequivocal approval of the trial court’s instruction after
it was given to the jury. In People v Miller, 326 Mich App 719, 726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019), this
Court explained:
A defendant may waive his or her challenge to jury instructions. Waiver
extinguishes any error, leaving nothing for this Court to review. A defendant waives
an issue by expressly approving of the trial court’s action. When the trial court asks
whether a party has any objections to the jury instructions and the party responds
negatively, it is an affirmative approval of the trial court’s instructions. [Citations
omitted.]
Here, defendant’s trial counsel responded with affirmative approval to the trial court’s
question whether the parties were satisfied with the court’s response to the jury’s questions. This
issue is therefore waived. Id.
To the extent defendant on appeal appears to suggest that this Court should review the
matter for plain error, defendant does not address the above facts demonstrating waiver and does
not explain why the issue should be treated as forfeited, and thus reviewed for plain error, rather
than treating it as waived. Defendant does not argue that his trial counsel’s attempt to belatedly
raise the issue in the trial court—after the jury had already reached a verdict—somehow had the
effect of resurrecting this claim and nullifying the earlier waiver. Accordingly, defendant has
abandoned any such arguments. “It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce
a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either
to sustain or reject his position.” Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406;
651 NW2d 756 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An appellant’s failure to properly
address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue.” People v Harris,
261 Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004).
Defendant further contends, in the alternative, that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish (1) that
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and (2)
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that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 228; 966 NW2d 437
(2020). A “reasonable probability” is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Here, defendant asserts that “[t]here is a reasonable probability that, if the jury had correctly
and fully understood the law of consent, the jury would have acquitted Mr. Delavara of the other
sex charge.” However, defendant fails to articulate what he means by “the law of consent,” and
cites no legal authority delineating the relevant legal standards. Defendant’s argument, limited to
a single paragraph, merely contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
trial court’s instruction in response to a jury question, speculating that the jury was too confused
to render a valid verdict. This Court is not obligated to act as defendant’s research assistant, and
defendant has abandoned his claim of ineffective assistance by failing to provide any legal basis
for appellate relief. See Yee, 251 Mich App at 406.
Additionally, defendant has not identified the specific jury instruction he contends should
have been given, nor has he explained how such an instruction would have altered the outcome of
the proceedings. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that, but for trial counsel’s alleged
deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Abcumby-
Blair, 335 Mich App at 228. Defendant has therefore not demonstrated entitlement to appellate
relief on his ineffective assistance claim.
IV. SENTENCING
Defendant raises several challenges to his sentence.
A trial court’s sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). Furthermore, “the decision to
impose a consecutive sentence when not mandated by statute is reviewable for an abuse of
discretion.” People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 664; 897 NW2d 195 (2016).
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s decision to
remain silent at the sentencing hearing as a factor in fashioning its sentence, 2 which rendered
defendant’s sentence invalid as a matter of law. Defendant relies on certain comments by the trial
judge that will be quoted below. At sentencing, defendant’s trial counsel stated as part of his
argument that
[i]f [defendant] doesn’t speak on his own behalf today it’s because he does have a
right to an appeal. It’s not because he hasn’t reflected on his actions or taken
responsibility for the choices that he’s made. I’ve had many conversations with
him. I know where he stands on this.
Subsequently, the following colloquy occurred:
2
Defendant testified in his own defense at trial.
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THE COURT: Okay. All right, [defendant], anything you’d like to tell the
Court before you’re sentenced?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: No, all right. And, so the position is that you’re not going to
make a statement because of your appellate rights. That’s news to me because I
don’t think any statement that you would make here in Court would somehow affect
your ability to appeal. You have an absolute right to appeal post a jury trial. So,
with that being said, with you not providing a statement to the Court, all I can kind
of rely on is what you told us here in court.
Defendant’s sentencing guidelines range for his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I) was 108 to 180 months, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 180 months to
40 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court penalized him for
exercising his right not to make a statement at sentencing. However, the trial court’s remarks do
not reflect any intent to impose a harsher sentence based on defendant’s silence. Rather, the court
clarified that it could only consider the information presented at trial and did not have the benefit
of any additional statement from defendant. The record does not support defendant’s assertion to
the contrary, and he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion or that
resentencing is warranted.
Defendant next argues that the trial court ignored his potential for rehabilitation and
ignored the fact that he did not have any prior criminal record. Our Supreme Court has stated:
Where the Legislature has assigned a range of sentencing outcomes for any
given conviction, the trial court has authority to sentence a defendant within that
range. Within that range, the sentence should be tailored to the particular
circumstances of the case and offender. It is the trial court’s duty to exercise
discretion in a way that ensures the individualized sentence conforms with the
principle of proportionality. An appropriate sentence should give consideration to
the reformation of the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the
offender, and the deterrence of others from committing the same offense. However,
these are not the only relevant sentencing criteria and trial courts are not required
to consider each of these factors when imposing a sentence. [People v Boykin, 510
Mich 171, 183-184; 987 NW2d 58 (2022) (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
Defendant principally contends that the trial court erred by failing to expressly state on the
record its consideration of his potential for rehabilitation. However, defendant cites no legal
authority requiring a trial court to specifically address, or make an express record of, its
consideration of rehabilitation as a prerequisite to a valid sentence. Indeed, Michigan law imposes
no such obligation. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 192; 987 NW2d 42 (2022). Sentencing courts
must impose sentences that are proportionate to the seriousness of both the offense and the offender
and must provide justification for the sentence to facilitate appellate review. Id. Nevertheless, in
Boykin, our Supreme Court made clear that sentencing courts are not required to provide detailed,
on-the-record explanations of any particular sentencing factor. Id. Accordingly, defendant has
failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on this ground.
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Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred by failing to articulate its reasoning for
ordering that defendant’s sentences for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) and first-
degree home invasion be served consecutively. The relevant statutory provision authorizes
consecutive sentencing in appropriate circumstances. See MCL 750.520b(3) (“The court may
order a term of imprisonment imposed under this section to be served consecutively to any term
of imprisonment imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same transaction.”).
Nevertheless, the exercise of such discretion requires the trial court to state, on the record, its
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences to enable meaningful appellate review. People v
Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 664-665; 897 NW2d 195 (2016). In this case, although the trial court
generally addressed the circumstances of the offense and the offender, it offered no specific
rationale for its decision to impose consecutive sentences. The court simply stated, “Count 1 and
Count 3 will run consecutive to one another,” without further explanation. In the absence of a
stated rationale, this Court is unable to perform meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, remand
is required for the trial court to articulate its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. Id. at
666.
Defendant also requests reassignment of the case to a different judge on remand, arguing
that the trial judge would have “substantial difficulty in putting out of her mind her own previously-
expressed views on this issue.” Defendant, however, offers no argument beyond this conclusory
assertion and appears to equate unfavorable rulings with judicial bias. Michigan law is clear that
judicial rulings and opinions formed during proceedings do not, standing alone, establish bias
absent evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would render fair judgment
impossible. People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 598; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Critical or hostile
comments toward counsel or the parties generally do not suffice to pierce the presumption of
impartiality. Id. Defendant’s unsupported and conclusory argument does not overcome the strong
presumption of judicial impartiality, and we find no basis to grant his request for reassignment on
remand.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
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