Commonwealth v. Pappadis-Torres
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketAC 25-P-209
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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25-P-209 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. YIANNISIVETTE PAPPADIS-TORRES.1
No. 25-P-209.
Middlesex. January 16, 2026. - November 18, 2026.
Present: Rubin, Grant, & Hodgens, JJ.
Constitutional law, Reasonable suspicion, Search and seizure.
Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Container,
Protective frisk. Practice Criminal, Motion to suppress,
Findings by judge. Firearms.
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 1, 2024.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Brent
A. Tingle, J., and the case was tried before Catherine Ham, J.
Joseph R. Smith for the defendant.
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
1 Although our practice generally is to spell the
defendant's name as it appears in the indictment, here we
instead spell it as the defendant has indicated in her
affidavit.
2
RUBIN, J. Convicted by a Superior Court jury of unlawful
possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, ยง 10 (a), the defendant
appeals. She argues that the motion judge erred in denying her
motion to suppress the firearm, which police found during a
search of the backpack she was carrying. We conclude that the
Commonwealth did not prove that the police had reasonable
suspicion adequate to justify a patfrisk of the defendant or her
backpack, and accordingly we vacate the order denying the motion
to suppress, reverse the judgment, and set aside the verdict.
Background. "In reviewing a decision on a motion to
suppress, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error "but conduct an independent review of [the]
ultimate findings and conclusions of law."'" Commonwealth v.
Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 742 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon,
449 Mass. 207, 214, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007). We "may
supplement a motion judge's subsidiary findings with evidence
from the record that 'is uncontroverted and undisputed and where
the judge explicitly or implicitly credited the witness's
testimony.'" Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).
In the early morning hours of February 15, 2022, the
Cambridge police department received a telephone call from a
person (victim) who identified himself by name and "reported
3
being shot at and robbed in close proximity" to a hotel in
Cambridge. He said that he had been "hanging out" in hotel room
213. Somewhere near the hotel (at an unspecified time), two
Black men who were staying in room 213 robbed him, stripped him
of his clothing, and shot at him as he ran.
Officers Kristen Cokely and Robert Reardon responded to the
hotel along with other officers. They spoke with hotel staff
and learned that no disturbances had been reported in room 213,
but a significant number of people had been coming and going
from that room that evening. The name of the registered guest
for room 213, which they learned from hotel staff, was familiar
to the officers as that of someone with a criminal record for
firearms offenses. From a criminal records database, Officer
Reardon confirmed that the registered guest had a conviction for
armed robbery.
The security guard agreed to go to room 213 with Officers
Cokely and Reardon and other members of the Cambridge police
department who were present. From outside the door of room 213,
Officers Cokely and Reardon heard loud talking and smelled burnt
marijuana. Officer Reardon heard a male voice say, "I'm almost
17," and, "I'm strapped," which the officer understood as slang
for carrying a firearm.
By this point, hotel security decided to eject the
occupants of room 213 from the hotel. A security guard then
4
knocked on the door, and it opened. Approximately ten to
fifteen people were inside and were clearly having a party. The
registered guest for room 213 was not present. The Commonwealth
did not present evidence that anyone meeting the description of
either of the two alleged shooters was in the room. Nor did the
Commonwealth present evidence that the initial observations of
the police contributed to reasonable suspicion of the presence
of a firearm (e.g., a bulge under clothing), or of any movement
from any occupant, or any other evidence, that suggested an
attempt to hide a weapon. The security guard told the occupants
that they had to leave the hotel.
The police decided to take the names, pat frisk, and search
the bags and belongings "that would be big enough to hold a
firearm or a weapon" of every occupant of the room. The police
instructed the occupants to file out of the room one by one. As
each one left the room, officers obtained his or her name and
conducted the searches as described. Officer Cokely pat frisked
the females. The defendant was one of the last to leave the
room. She tried to push past the police officers, saying that
she had already been pat frisked, but the officers knew that was
untrue as Officer Cokely, the only female officer present, had
not yet pat frisked her.
The defendant was carrying two or three shoeboxes and a
backpack that she was holding by its top handle. While Officer
5
Cokely pat frisked the defendant, Officer Reardon took the
shoeboxes and the backpack. Officer Reardon opened each shoebox
and found sneakers. Then, without first conducting a patfrisk
of the backpack, Officer Reardon unzipped the backpack and saw
another pair of sneakers; he removed them and found a .40
caliber handgun.
A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's motion to
suppress, concluding that the police had reasonable suspicion to
pat frisk the defendant's backpack.2 After trial before a
different judge, a jury convicted the defendant of unlawful
possession of a firearm. The defendant appeals.
Discussion. The defendant argues under both art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution that the order denying the motion
to suppress must be reversed because the police lacked the
requisite reasonable suspicion to pat frisk her or the backpack.
By contrast, the Commonwealth argues, and the judge concluded,
that the police had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
the patfrisk of all ten to fifteen occupants as they filed out
of the hotel room, including the defendant. We disagree.
2 The judge also concluded that the full search of the
backpack was permissible because a patfrisk would have been
futile. The defendant argues that this was error, but in light
of our conclusion we need not address the questions the judge's
conclusion raises. See note 3, infra.
6
Ordinarily, of course, a warrant based on probable cause is
necessary to justify any governmental seizure or search, and
here there was neither. There are exceptions to this rule,
however, including the exceptions for an investigatory stop and
a patfrisk. A police officer may engage in a "Terry-type" brief
investigatory stop of an individual "where an officer has a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is
about to be committed." Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass.
612, 616 (2018). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The
officer may then conduct a patfrisk if there is reasonable
suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous. "The
purpose behind the [patfrisk] allowed by Terry is to enable an
officer to confirm or dispel reasonable suspicions that the
stopped suspect may be armed with a weapon . . . ."
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 Mass. 62, 68 (2003). If a person
lawfully subject to a patfrisk under Terry is carrying a
backpack and there is reasonable suspicion it "may contain a
weapon" that the person could retrieve, id., the police may
conduct a patfrisk of the exterior of the backpack if such a
"patfrisk can establish whether a possible weapon is present or
not," id. at 69.3 Reasonable suspicion "must be grounded in
3 The defendant argues that the method of the search of the
backpack went beyond the scope of a permissible patfrisk, see
Pagan, 440 Mass. at 68-73. As described above, see note 2,
7
specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences [drawn]
therefrom." (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 371 (2007).
It is a bedrock rule that a determination of reasonable
suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous must be
particularized and individual. See Commonwealth v. Wing Ng, 420
Mass. 236, 237 (1995) (under Fourth Amendment and independently
under art. 14, "the frisk of a person is constitutionally
permissible if the arresting officer can point to specific,
articulable facts that warrant a reasonable suspicion that the
particular individual might be armed and a potential threat to
the safety of the officer or others"); Commonwealth v. Narcisse,
457 Mass. 1, 10-13 (2010). See also Terry, 392 U.S., at 27
("there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual"). Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court long ago held that even with a warrant and
supra, the motion judge concluded that the police did not have
to pat frisk the backpack before searching it because doing so
would have been futile. In light of our conclusion that there
was no reasonable suspicion justifying even a patfrisk, we need
not reach the question whether the search here went beyond the
lawful limits of what would have been permitted had there been.
8
probable cause to search a tavern and its bartender, police
could not search patrons in the tavern:
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person. . . . This
requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply
pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
probable cause to search or seize another or to search the
premises where the person may happen to be."
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
In this case, the Commonwealth did not establish that, at
the time of the decision to stop and search all of the occupants
of the hotel room, the police had reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was armed and dangerous. As there was no
particularized and individual reasonable suspicion with respect
to the defendant, the searches of her and, consequently, her
backpack were unlawful. Without such individualized reasonable
suspicion, the police could not simply search every occupant of
the room and his or her bags and belongings. See Wing Ng, 420
Mass. at 237 (reasonable suspicion for patfrisk must exist as to
"particular individual"). The motion to suppress therefore
should have been allowed.
We agree with the Commonwealth that "police officers need
not 'gamble with their personal safety.'" Commonwealth v.
Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 76 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187
(2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 794
(2003). That general, unassailable proposition is the reason
9
warrantless searches are permitted when there is reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts that someone lawfully
stopped is armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 33
(Harlan, J., concurring) (Terry's stop and frisk rules are
justified so police should not "have to ask one question and
take the risk that the answer might be a bullet"). The rule
operates properly only in conjunction with our duty to "engage
in an objective, fact-specific inquiry considering the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the patfrisk." Commonwealth v.
Demos D., 497 Mass. 78, 85 (2026). As previously stated, the
totality of the circumstances presented by this record did not
justify the patfrisk of the defendant or her backpack.
Contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, this is not a
case like Commonwealth v. San, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 193
(2005). In that case, we determined that a patfrisk of all van
occupants was reasonable where specific facts supported the
suspicion that all the occupants "were acting in concert" in an
earlier housebreak. Id. at 192-193. Even putting aside the
significant distinction between a roadside stop of a suspected
getaway van and the removal of occupants from a hotel room, the
record here evinces no evidence that the defendant had been
involved in the earlier alleged shooting and robbery -- her mere
presence in room 213 was not enough to justify a patfrisk.
Further, San did not apply the Terry test whether there was
10
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed
and dangerous. Rather, it used the lower "reasonable
apprehension of danger" formulation then utilized in the
Commonwealth for roadside automobile exit orders in determining
that "the protective sweep of the vehicle and exit order and the
frisk of the van's occupants" were justified. Id. at 193. We
have subsequently clarified that "[t]he test for a patfrisk is
more stringent than for an exit order." Commonwealth v. Monell,
99 Mass. App. Ct. 487, 490 (2021). In Commonwealth v. Torres-
Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2020), the court clarified the
distinction between the standard required for a passenger exit
order during a traffic stop and that required for a patfrisk. A
lawful patfrisk "requires more" than an exit order; "that is,
police must have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific
articulable facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous."
Id.
Conclusion. The order denying the defendant's motion to
suppress is vacated, the judgment is reversed, the verdict is
set aside, and judgment shall enter for the defendant.
So ordered.