Commonwealth v. Thomson

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-13856 COMMONWEALTH vs. MIKAI THOMSON. Suffolk. March 2, 2026. - October 20, 2026. Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, Standing to question constitutionality. Evidence, Firearm, Age, Expert opinion. Practice, Criminal, Standing. License. Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on December 27, 2021. The case was tried before Samir Zaganjori, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Elizabeth C. Lazar for the defendant. Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Charles Marshall, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. K. Hayne Barnwell, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Joseph N. Schneiderman, for E.V., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.  2 WOLOHOJIAN, J. A police officer stopped a car after it went through a red light. The defendant was seated in the front passenger seat; a lit marijuana "blunt" was in the center console;1 and a plastic bag containing a pound of marijuana was on the back seat.2 The officer asked for identification from all three occupants of the car, none of whom was wearing a seat belt.3 The officer also asked whether anyone in the car had a weapon. The defendant (unlike his companions) did not answer, and the officer asked him to get out of the car. The defendant complied, and then pushed the officer and ran away. Along his flight, he discarded a loaded nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of carrying a firearm without a license, under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 1 "'Blunt' is a term used to describe a cigar from which the tobacco has been removed and replaced with marijuana." Commonwealth v. Cotto, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 590 n.1 (2007). 2 All three occupants were under the age of twenty-one and thus prohibited from possessing marijuana. G. L. c. 94G, § 2 (b). In any event, the amount of marijuana in the car exceeded the amount for which possession has been decriminalized even for those over twenty-one. G. L. c. 94G, § 7 (a) (1). 3 An officer may ask for identification in order to write a citation for a seat belt infraction, G. L. c. 90, § 13A. Commonwealth v. Elysee, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 833, 844 (2010). Commonwealth v. Goewey, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 433-434 (2007), S.C., 452 Mass. 399 (2008).  3 It is undisputed that the defendant neither possessed, nor had ever applied for, a license to carry a firearm. At the time these events occurred in December 2021, the defendant was twenty years old, and our firearm licensing scheme did not (and still does not) permit persons under twenty-one years of age to obtain a license to carry (hereinafter, licensing age restriction). G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 48. G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), as appearing in St. 2024, c. 135, § 49. In this direct appeal from his convictions, the defendant challenges this licensing age restriction as violating the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because restriction of firearm possession by those deemed too young to handle them safely outside of supervised settings is consistent with the nation's regulatory tradition, we affirm.4 Background. No further recitation of the background facts being necessary, we proceed directly to the case's procedural history. The defendant was charged by way of a criminal complaint on December 27, 2021, with assault and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D, and unlawful possession of a firearm 4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and by E.V., a juvenile.  4 without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The defendant was convicted by a jury of both charges. He timely appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own initiative. The defendant raises no issue in this appeal concerning his assault and battery conviction, and it is accordingly affirmed without further discussion. This appeal concerns only the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm without a license. Discussion. The defendant was convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which makes it a crime to possess or carry a firearm except as otherwise provided or exempted by statute. As pertinent here, one of those exemptions is if a person has "in effect a license to carry firearms issued under [G. L. c. 140, § 131]." G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (2). At the time these events occurred in December 2021, the defendant was twenty years old, and our firearm licensing scheme did not permit persons under twenty-one to apply for a license to carry. G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 48. The evidence showed that the defendant was under twenty-one years old, and the jury were instructed that persons under twenty-one are ineligible for a license to carry and that they could use that fact to find that the Commonwealth met its burden to prove that the defendant did not have a license to carry. See Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690, S.C., 493 Mass. 1  5 (2023), cert. denied, 602 U.S. 1039 (2024) ("failure to obtain a license is a 'fact necessary to constitute' the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm"). The defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the statute of his conviction. Rather, he challenges the constitutionality of the licensing age restriction. He argues that the minimum age requirement for obtaining a license to carry violates the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him.5 He did not raise these claims below. The standard of review for unpreserved errors in noncapital cases is whether there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Desiderio, 491 Mass. 809, 815-816 (2023). Our discussion proceeds as follows. First, we address the defendant's standing. Second, we set out the United States Supreme Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence, which frames and controls the analysis of the constitutional question presented. Third, we assess whether the defendant's conduct falls within 5 In his opening brief, the defendant also raised a facial challenge to the "may issue" language of G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 48, which he subsequently withdrew in light of our decision in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627, 642 n.8 (2025). We note that that language has been removed from the current version of the statute. See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), as appearing in St. 2024, c. 135, § 49.  6 the text of the Second Amendment. Fourth, we describe our contemporary regulatory scheme for firearms, focusing particularly on those aspects concerning minors. Fifth, we identify the "why" and "how" of that regulatory scheme. Sixth, we assess whether the licensing age restriction is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulations for minors and use analogical reasoning to evaluate the current regulatory scheme against the historical one and conclude that they are strongly analogous. Finally, we address the dissent's proposal that the case be remanded to the Boston Municipal Court for an evidentiary hearing. 1. Standing. The defendant does not dispute that he has never applied for a license to carry a firearm. We have "long held that standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the Commonwealth's firearm licensing scheme requires having applied for (and been denied) a license or [firearm identification (FID)] card pursuant to that scheme."6 Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627, 640 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. 6 This principle "is not premised on any substantive position, one way or the other, about the constitutional validity of th[e] particular [licensing] scheme. Rather, it simply reflects the more general principle that one may not challenge a licensing scheme if one has 'never applied for a license, was never denied a hearing, and in no way was ever refused a license.'" Commonwealth v. Marquis, 495 Mass. 434, 440 (2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1445 (2026), quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 354 Mass. 722, 724-725 (1968).  7 Marquis, 495 Mass. 434, 439 (2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1445 (2026). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 58 (2011); Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 460 Mass. 723, 725 (2011); Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 344 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1219 (2016). And we have hewed to this principle even in a case, such as this one, involving a defendant's license ineligibility due to age, explaining that where a defendant has not applied for or been denied a license, "the defendant has not demonstrated that a denial of the issuance of a § 131 license to him would have been rendered on account of his age alone." Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 590 (2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Commonwealth v. Crowder, 495 Mass. 552, 557-558 (2025). It is significant here that the defendant does not even contend, let alone establish, that only his age stood between him and obtaining a license to carry. Moreover, there is no factual record upon which to make such a determination, and the defendant may have been ineligible for a license on one or more other grounds. Nonetheless, the defendant points to Lara v. Commissioner Pa. State Police, 91 F.4th 122, 138-140 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 604 U.S. 904 (2024), for the proposition that eighteen to twenty year olds have standing to pursue an as- applied challenge to a firearm licensing scheme even when they  8 have not applied for a license if such an application would have been futile. Lara (a civil case seeking injunctive relief) does not mention, let alone rest on, the concept of futility. Setting that aside, Lara involved a question of standing under art. III of the United States Constitution, which is not implicated here. "[B]ecause Federal limitations on justiciability are grounded in the case or controversy limitation in art. III of the United States Constitution, and because art. III does not apply to State courts, State courts remain free to define their own jurisdictional limits even when adjudicating Federal claims." LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 771 n.14 (2016). Lara, accordingly, does not persuade us to abandon our traditional standing requirement for as-applied challenges to the Commonwealth's firearm licensing scheme in the context of a criminal conviction. That said, we have previously acknowledged the "possibility of standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the firearm licensing scheme absent license denial where the defendant can show that applying would have been futile." Marquis, 495 Mass. at 439 n.5, citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 771 n.5 (2019). We do not now foreclose that possibility in an appropriate case on an adequate record. But this is not that case. As we have already said, the defendant has not attempted  9 to show, let alone succeeded in showing, that age alone was the basis for his ineligibility to obtain a license to carry. For all that appears, the defendant was ineligible on some other, independent ground raising no constitutional or other concern –- such as having been convicted of or adjudicated a youthful offender or delinquent child for the commission of, for example, a violent crime. See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 48; G. L. c. 140, § 121F (j) (i), inserted by St. 2024, c. 135, § 32 (current firearm licensing statute).7 In these circumstances, there is no reason for us to explore the possibility of standing based on futility. But the defendant's failure to apply for a license does not deprive him of standing to raise a facial challenge to the licensing age restriction. "[I]n a prosecution for violation of a licensing statute which is unconstitutional on its face, the issue of its validity is presented even in the absence of an application for a license." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 354 Mass. 7 "Violent crime" for purposes of the firearm licensing scheme is "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or possession of a deadly weapon that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a deadly weapon against the person of another; (ii) is burglary, extortion, arson or kidnapping; (iii) involves the use of explosives; or (iv) otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another." G. L. c. 140, § 121.  10 722, 725 (1968). Because the defendant has standing to raise a facial challenge to the licensing age restriction, we consider his arguments on that footing, while noting that the substance of his as-applied challenge as a twenty year old will be encompassed in our discussion of his facial challenge in any event. 2. Supreme Court Second Amendment jurisprudence. The Second Amendment provides, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." This text has been the subject of several important Supreme Court opinions over the past twenty years, beginning with the Court's 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). We trace that history now. In Heller, the Court conducted a textual analysis of the Second Amendment and concluded that its prefatory clause does not limit its operative clause. Id. at 577-578. Although the Court closely examined the text of both clauses, we need only concentrate here on the Court's explication of the operative clause. As to "the people," the Court said that the phrase "unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset." Id. at 580. Put otherwise, it "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national  11 community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community." Id., quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). It is these people who are the "holder[s]" of the Second Amendment right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. Turning to the phrase "keep and bear Arms," the Court concluded that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." Id. at 582. And it determined that "'[k]eep[ing] arms' was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms," id. at 583, and that to "bear" arms means to carry them, id. at 584. "Putting all of these textual elements together, [the Court found] that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." Id. at 592. Although Heller concluded that the Second Amendment codified a preexisting natural "right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence," id. at 593-594, quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *140, the Court also determined that the right is "not unlimited," Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626-628. The Second Amendment does not protect "the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation." Id. at 595. Nor is it "a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." Id. at 626.  12 Furthermore, the Court expressly noted that it did not intend "to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms," and provided nonexhaustive examples of such regulations. Id. at 626-627. In summary, Heller announced an individual right under the Second Amendment, but not an unlimited one, and one that is subject to regulations of long standing. In McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment right as against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While doing so, the Court recognized that "[t]he right to keep and bear arms . . . has controversial public safety implications" of concern to the States. Id. at 783. But the Court reassured that "[S]tate and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment," id. at 785, and repeated that Heller "did not cast doubt on . . . longstanding regulatory measures," id. at 786. Neither Heller nor McDonald explained how courts were to determine whether any particular firearm regulation passed constitutional muster. Eventually, the Federal Courts of Appeals coalesced around a two-step framework that combined history with means-end scrutiny. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022) (Bruen). This  13 approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bruen. Instead of that two-step framework, the Court held "that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'" Id., quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961). This test "requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical understanding," Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26, by engaging in "analogical reasoning" to determine "whether the two regulations are 'relevantly similar,'" id. at 28-29, quoting Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993). The Court did not attempt in Bruen to "provide an exhaustive survey of the features that render regulations relevantly similar," but it expressed the view that "Heller and McDonald point toward at least two metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self- defense." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. The Court further explained that "analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check." Id.  14 at 30. It "requires only that the government identify a well- established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster." Id. The Court returned to these topics in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), where it reiterated that the Second Amendment "secures for Americans a means of self-defense" and that the right is not unlimited. Id. at 690. Because the Second Amendment is not "a law trapped in amber," id. at 691, and "permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791," id. at 691-692, "the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition" in order to determine whether the modern firearm regulation is "relevantly similar" to that historical tradition, id. at 692. Central to this inquiry are how and why the regulation burdens the Second Amendment right. Id. The Court reiterated that, while a modern firearm regulation "must comport with the principle underlying the Second Amendment, . . . it need not be a 'dead ringer' or a 'historical twin.'" Id., quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30. Thus, even when a challenged regulation does not "precisely match its historical precursors, 'it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional  15 muster.'" Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30. Rahimi is instructive in its application of analogical reasoning to examine a modern firearm regulation against historical ones. At issue was a Federal law criminalizing the possession of a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Among other things, the Federal statute required the existence of a restraining order containing a finding that "the defendant 'represents a credible threat to the physical safety' of his intimate partner or his or his partner's child, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or 'by its terms explicitly prohibit[ing] the use,' attempted use, or threatened use of 'physical force' against those individuals, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)." Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 688. The Court found that this Federal law was "relevantly similar" to Massachusetts's (and other States') historical surety and going armed laws "in both why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right." Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. More specifically, the Court identified the following points of similarity: (i) the Federal law and the historical ones both "involved judicial determinations of whether a particular defendant likely would threaten or had threatened another with a weapon"; (ii) they both imposed only temporary restrictions of limited duration; and (iii) they both provided for penal  16 punishment. Id. at 698-699. The Court was satisfied that "[s]ince the founding, our Nation's firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms." Id. at 690. It is important to observe that no single historical regulation matched the Federal statute in all respects, but a combination of pertinent historical regulations matched the "how" and "why" of the current Federal statute. And the Court concluded that that was enough, using analogical reasoning, to satisfy the Second Amendment. The Court next demonstrated application of the analogical reasoning process in United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772, 779- 783 (2026), which involved a Federal statute that automatically banned anyone who is an "unlawful user of" or "addicted to" a "controlled substance" from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The defendant admitted that he used marijuana a few times a week, but there was no evidence that the defendant's "drug use had ever led him to pose a danger to himself or others." Hemani, 608 U.S. at 779. Nor was there any evidence that the defendant had done anything with his firearm other than to keep it in his home. Id. In these circumstances, the Court rejected the government's reliance on historical laws concerning habitual drunkards as historical analogues satisfying the "how" and "why" of the modern statute. Id. at 782-783. The  17 historical laws fell into three categories: vagrancy laws, which permitted drunkards to be confined to workhouses or jailed, civil commitment statutes, which allowed courts to appoint guardians or commit the drunkard to an asylum, and surety laws, which allowed judges to compel habitual drunkards to post bonds to ensure their good behavior. Id. at 781-782. The Court found that the historical laws differed dramatically from the current one because they "targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways." Id. at 783. Because the comparison failed on all of these metrics taken cumulatively, the Federal statute violated the Second Amendment. The Court left open the question whether "any one of these problems taken in isolation would prove fatal to the government's cause." Id. In addition, the Court reiterated that its decision "should not be taken to suggest 'that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.'" Id. at 791 n.6, quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. Shortly after it decided Hemani, the Court supplied another example of analogic reasoning in Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. 185 (2026), where the Court concluded that historical laws were not sufficiently analogous to a contemporary Hawaii statute prohibiting a person carrying a firearm from entering private  18 property without express authorization "by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." Id. at 201, citing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5(a). The Court concluded that historical laws prohibiting unauthorized hunting of deer or small game on someone else's private property, Wolford, 609 U.S. at 208-210, an Oregon law prohibiting armed persons from trespassing on "enclosed premises or land," id. at 210-211, and a Nineteenth Century Louisiana law restricting the carrying of firearms on "the premises or plantations of any citizen" without the consent of the owner unless pursuant to a military or civil order, id. at 211, were not sufficiently analogous to the current Hawaii law. 3. Conduct protected by Second Amendment. "[W]hen the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. As we have already discussed above, there are two components of the text that must be examined: "the people" and "keep and bear Arms." As to the latter, "'keep[ing] arms' was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms," Heller, 554 U.S. at 583, and "bear[ing]" arms means to carry them, id. at 584. It requires no discussion to conclude that the defendant's carrying of a semiautomatic handgun falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment. See id. at 582 ("the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that  19 constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding"). What remains is whether the twenty year old defendant is part of "the people" despite his age. Whether someone under the age of twenty-one is a member of "the people" has been a matter of disagreement. Compare, e.g., Lara, 91 F.4th at 141-147 (Restrepo, J., dissenting), with Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 592-593 (5th Cir. 2025), and Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 114-116 (10th Cir. 2024). We do not need to wade into this debate, but instead proceed on the assumption, without deciding the issue, that the defendant, despite his age, is a member of "the people." See McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 F.4th 568, 575 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2808 (2026); National Rifle Ass'n v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1130 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2811 (2026) (Bondi). We accordingly move to the next step of the Bruen analysis, which is to determine whether the Commonwealth has met its burden to establish that the licensing age restriction is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 24. 4. Firearm age restrictions. Our Legislature has created a licensing scheme that gives progressively greater unsupervised access to the possession and use of firearms by young people as  20 they mature in age. The scheme reflects calibrated legislative determinations regarding the ages at which young people may be entrusted with deadly weapons in supervised and unsupervised settings. We now lay out that graduated scheme as it was in effect at the time of the defendant's offenses.8 See Commonwealth v. Bellard, 494 Mass. 446, 448 n.4 (2024); Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 580 n.4 (2018). The licensing scheme has two intersecting permitting components: FID cards, see G. L. c. 140, § 129B, as amended through St. 2018, c. 123, §§ 9, 10; G. L. c. 140, § 129C, as amended through St. 2014, c. 284, §§ 40-41, and licenses to carry (license or license to carry), G. L. c. 140, § 131, as amended through St. 2018, c. 123, §§ 11, 12. An FID card entitles its holder to possess a nonlarge capacity rifle or shotgun. An FID card holder is also allowed to possess 8 We note that the firearm licensing scheme was significantly reorganized and revised after the time of the defendant's offenses in December 2021. The citations in this opinion are to the statutes as they existed at the time of the offenses except as otherwise noted; although the substantive provisions are largely the same in the current scheme, they may not appear in the same place.  21 firearms,9 large capacity rifles, and large capacity shotguns,10 under the license of a shooting range or club or under "the direct supervision of a holder of a license issued under [G. L. 9 At the time of offenses, "firearm" was defined as "a stun gun or a pistol, revolver or other weapon of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can be discharged and of which the length of the barrel or barrels is less than 16 inches or 18 inches in the case of a shotgun as originally manufactured; provided, however, that the term firearm shall not include any weapon that is: (i) constructed in a shape that does not resemble a handgun, short-barreled rifle or short-barreled shotgun including, but not limited to, covert weapons that resemble key-chains, pens, cigarette- lighters or cigarette-packages; or (ii) not detectable as a weapon or potential weapon by x-ray machines commonly used at airports or walk-through metal detectors." G. L. c. 140, § 121, as amended through St. 2018, c. 123. 10 At the time of offenses, "large capacity weapon" was defined as "any firearm, rifle or shotgun: (i) that is semiautomatic with a fixed large capacity feeding device; (ii) that is semiautomatic and capable of accepting, or readily modifiable to accept, any detachable large capacity feeding device; (iii) that employs a rotating cylinder capable of accepting more than ten rounds of ammunition in a rifle or firearm and more than five shotgun shells in the case of a shotgun or firearm; or (iv) that is an assault weapon. The term 'large capacity weapon' shall be a secondary designation and shall apply to a weapon in addition to its primary designation as a firearm, rifle or shotgun and shall not include: (i) any weapon that was manufactured in or prior to the year 1899; (ii) any weapon that operates by manual bolt, pump, lever or slide action; (iii) any weapon that is a single-shot weapon; (iv) any weapon that has been modified so as to render it permanently inoperable or otherwise rendered permanently unable to be designated a large capacity weapon; or (v) any weapon that is an antique or relic, theatrical prop or other weapon that is not capable of firing a projectile and which is not intended for use as a functional weapon and cannot be readily modified through a combination of available parts into an operable large capacity weapon." G. L. c. 140, § 121, as amended through St. 2018, c. 123.  22 c. 140, § 131]," while at an "incorporated shooting club or licensed shooting range." G. L. c. 140, § 129B (6), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 33. A license to carry entitles its holder to "purchase, rent, lease, borrow, possess and carry" firearms, rifles, shotguns, large capacity weapons, and feeding devices and ammunition therefor. G. L. c. 140, § 131 (a), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 47. In addition, a license to carry entitles its holder to "own, possess, purchase and transfer non-large capacity rifles and shotguns, consistent with the entitlements conferred by [an FID] card." G. L. c. 140, § 131 (c), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 47. Rather than structuring our discussion of the regulatory scheme according to these two types of permits (i.e., FID cards and licenses to carry), however, we structure our discussion according to the age distinctions made by the scheme. We begin with the youngest ages and work our way up to age twenty-one, which is the age the Legislature has set for a qualified person to obtain a license to carry a firearm. a. Any age. A person under the age of twenty-one (young person) -- even while he or she is an infant, toddler, or child -- is permitted to hold, handle, and fire firearms for examination, trial, or instruction in the presence of a license holder and is permitted to do the same with respect to rifles  23 and shotguns in the presence of an FID card holder. G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m), as appearing in St. 1969, c. 799, § 8. Provided the young person is supervised in this manner, the young person is not him- or herself required to have either an FID card or a license in order to hold, handle, or fire a firearm, rifle, or shotgun. See id. In addition, a young person not having an FID card or license may use large capacity weapons, ammunition, and feeding devices at a licensed club or facility with an on-site shooting range or gallery "while under the direct supervision of a certified firearms safety instructor or club member who . . . possesses a license to carry."11 G. L. c. 140, § 131 (b), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 47. b. Under age fifteen. Without themselves holding an FID card or license to carry, young persons under the age of fifteen are permitted to use a rifle or a shotgun in hunting or target 11Also without needing an FID card or license to carry, a young person may possess firearms for the purpose of firing at duly licensed target concessions at amusement parks, "provided that the firearms, rifles or shotguns to be so used are firmly chained or affixed to the counter and that the proprietor is in possession of a firearm identification card or license to carry firearms." G. L. c. 140, § 129C (e), as appearing in St. 1969, c. 799, § 8. They may also possess and utilize any rifle or shotgun during the course of theatrical productions, provided such possession or use is "under the immediate possession of a holder of [an FID] card or a license to carry firearms." G. L. c. 140, § 129C (l), as appearing in St. 1969, c. 799, § 8.  24 shooting if under the "immediate supervision of a person holding [an FID] card or a license to carry firearms, or a duly commissioned officer, noncommissioned officer or enlisted member of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force or Coast Guard, or the National Guard or military service of the commonwealth or reserve components thereof, while in the performance of his duty." G. L. c. 140, § 129C (k), as appearing in St. 1969, c. 799, § 8. c. Age fifteen. A young person who is at least fifteen years old, and not otherwise prohibited, is entitled to an FID card. See G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) (iv), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 30. Until the young person reaches the age of eighteen, the young person's application for an FID card must include a certificate from a parent or guardian.12 G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) (v), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 30. Because we have already set them out above, we do not repeat here the entitlements that come with holding an FID card. d. Age seventeen and above. A young person "in the military or other service of any state or of the United States, and police officers and other peace officers of any 12Starting at age fourteen, a young person, unless otherwise prohibited, may apply for an FID card, to be issued once the person reaches age fifteen. G. L. c. 140, § 129B (iv), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 30.  25 jurisdiction, in the performance of their official duty or when duly authorized to possess them" is exempt from the need to obtain an FID card and may possess and use firearms, rifles, and pistols. Although this statutory provision does not itself identify a minimum age, the minimum ages are set elsewhere at age seventeen for members of the United States military and twenty-one for State and local law police and law enforcement officers.13,14 G. L. c. 140, § 129C (o), as appearing in St. 1975, c. 378, § 1. e. Age eighteen and above. Once a young person reaches the age of eighteen, he or she may apply for, and obtain, an FID card without parental or guardian certification. See G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) (v), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 30. f. Age twenty-one. Unless otherwise prohibited, a person who attains the age of twenty-one may apply for, and obtain, a license to carry. See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), as appearing in St. 2014, c. 284, § 48. g. Summary. In summary, the Legislature has created a graduated firearm licensing scheme tied to three primary 13Currently, a person must be at least seventeen years old to be eligible to serve in the United States military, and parenta