Full Opinion

On April 7, 2025, at approximately 6:01 a.m., officers from the Lowell Police Department and the Northeastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (“NEMLEC”) executed a search warrant at 61 Pond Street #1 in Lowell, the home of defendant Clifford Lawrence. They recovered firearms, ammunition, crack cocaine, and a large amount of cash. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized and statements he allegedly made to police on the grounds that: (1) the police failed to knock and announce their presence at the locked common-entry door to the two-family dwelling; (2) the search was conducted at night despite that the warrant did not authorize a nighttime search; (3) the affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant did not establish a nexus between the premises searched and illegal drug activity; (4) the affidavit did not establish probable cause; and (5) the defendants statements were made during custodial questioning and without a warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The suppression motion raises a novel issue under Massachusetts law – whether police must knock and announce at the locked common door to a two-family home before entering the residence. Because I conclude that the officers were required to knock and announce their presence at the locked exterior door and did not do so, the -1- entry into the residence was impermissible. The execution of the search warrant was, therefore, invalid, and the evidence seized during the search must be suppressed. I further conclude that, by the time police executed the search warrant, there was no longer probable cause to believe that Oxycodone pills would be found in the residence. This is a separate and independent ground for suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Finally, I conclude that the Commonwealth has not met its burden of establishing that the defendant’s statements to police during the execution of the search warrant were voluntary. The statements, therefore, must be suppressed, both as fruits of the unlawful search and because the Commonwealth has not established that they were made voluntarily. The motion to suppress is, therefore, ALLOWED. The evidence recovered during the search and the defendant’s statements to police during the search warrant execution are, thus, ordered SUPPRESSED. BACKGROUND The facts supporting the application for the search warrant are taken from the Affidavit of Matthew J. Krug (Exhibit 9) in support of the application. The remaining facts are taken from the testimony of the witnesses at the July 8, 2026, hearing on the motion to suppress – which I credit fully – and exhibits introduced at the hearing. A. The Search Warrant Application On April 1, 2025, Detective Matthew J. Krug of the Lowell Police Department submitted an affidavit in support of his application for a warrant to search 61 Pond Street, #1, in Lowell. It recited that, in March 2025, Detective Krug met with a confidential informant, designated in the affidavit as “CIA.” Krug Aff. at 2, ¶ 3. CIA told Detective Krug that CIA was “aware of a male named Clifford Lawrence who [was] actively distributing pressed Oxycodone pills in the city of Lowell.” Id. CIA described Lawrence as “a black male, approximately 40 years old who is confined to a wheelchair.” Id. CIA told Detective Krug that Lawrence “live[d] at 61 Pond Street on the first floor with his girlfriend and children.” Id. When Detective Krug showed CIA a -2- photograph of Lawrence, CIA confirmed that the man in the photograph was, indeed, Lawrence. When Detective Krug consulted a past Lowell Police Department report dated September 8, 2021, he learned that, according to that report, Lawrence lived at 61 Pond Street Unit #1 with Jessica Brooks and their infant son. Also in March, Lowell detectives arranged with CIA to conduct a controlled purchase of pressed Oxycodone pills from Lawrence. Detectives instructed CIA – whom they had searched to confirm that he had neither contraband nor cash on his person – to contact Lawrence to arrange a purchase of pressed Oxycodone pills. CIA did so and was directed by Lawrence to a location to complete the purchase. Detectives then gave CIA cash to complete the transaction. CIA went to the location, followed by police, who confirmed that he made no stops and met no one on the way. At the same time, other officers were watching 61 Pond Street. After CIA called Lawrence to arrange the purchase, they saw a woman, later identified as Jessica Brooks, come out of the front door of 61 Pond Street and get into a white, 2020 BMW, later determined to be registered to the defendant at the 61 Pond Street address. Ms. Brooks then drove from 61 Pond Street to the location to which CIA had been directed by Lawrence to make the purchase. Ms. Brooks neither stopped nor met anyone along the way. When Ms. Brooks arrived at the arranged location, officers watched as CIA approached the front passenger door of the BMW, opened it, and leaned inside. After roughly ten seconds, CIA walked away from the BMW. Police followed Ms. Brooks as she then drove directly back to 61 Pond Street and parked in front. She left the BMW and re-entered 61 Pond Street by the front door. Meanwhile, CIA approached watching detectives and gave them “an end[-]tied bag containing an amount of blue, pressed Oxycodone pills.” Id. at 4, ¶ 4. CIA told detectives that CIA had met a woman, known to CIA as Lawrence’s girlfriend, at the arranged location and had exchanged the cash provided to CIA by the police for the -3- Oxycodone pills that CIA had turned over to them. Police then searched CIA, who was found to have neither cash nor contraband. Lowell detectives conducted two more controlled purchases of Oxycodone in March 2025, each of which proceeded along the same lines as the first, except that, on one occasion, after meeting CIA, Ms. Brooks stopped at a convenience store on the way back to 61 Pond Street. The third of these controlled purchases occurred within seventy- two hours of the filing of Detective Krug’s affidavit. On April 1, 2025, Detective Krug appeared before an assistant clerk of the Lowell District Court and applied for the search warrant that is the subject of this case. See Ex. 9. The assistant clerk issued the search warrant, 2511SW0054. The search warrant permitted the search of “61 Pond Street, Unit #1.” Id. The search warrant recited that “[a]ccess is gained to the target apartment by entering the front door which leads to a common hallway, followed by entering the door to unit #1 which is on the left.” Id. B. The Search Warrant Execution On April 7, 2025, officers from the NEMLEC SWAT Team,[1] along with detectives from the Lowell Police Department, went to 61 Pond Street to execute the warrant. After an early morning planning meeting, which the Lowell detectives did not attend, the officers arrived at 61 Pond Street and prepared to enter the premises. At 6:01 a.m., the SWAT officers used a “hydraulic spreader” to force open the locked front door to 61 Pond Street, which opened onto a common hallway. The door suffered substantial damage in the process. See Hearing Exs. 2-6. At the same time, SWAT officers at a back -------------------------------------------- [1] Although no witness identified the full name of the SWAT Team, “SWAT” is an acronym that can be used to denote “Special Weapons and Tactics.” See, e.g. www.fbi.gov/news/gallery/swat. Nothing turns on whether this acronym correctly characterizes NEMLEC’s SWAT team. -4- door used a battering ram to open the back door, after a “manual spreader” failed to open it.[2] Once SWAT team members had breached the outer door, they moved to the front door of Unit #1, which was to their left as they entered the hallway. At the door, Officer Scott Fitzemeyer knocked and announced that the police were there to serve a search warrant. Officer Fitzemeyer then called to the occupants of the apartment: “I need you to come to the door.” A female voice, later identified as Ms. Brooks, responded that she was “coming to the door.” Ten to fifteen seconds later, Ms. Brooks opened the door and left the apartment with her hands up. Through the open door, officers could see a man in a wheelchair, later identified as the defendant, and a child on a couch. As police entered the apartment, they saw a second child run into one of the bedrooms. Upon entering, Officer Fitzemeyer asked the defendant whether he had “any firearms that [police] should know about,” and the defendant replied, “no, I do not.” Shortly thereafter, the defendant told SWAT Team members that there were guns in a safe and thanked officers for “being respectful.” Deputy Sheriff Scott Sacco, of the NEMLEC SWAT team, did not remember officers asking the defendant any questions before he volunteered that there were guns in the apartment. [3] -------------------------------------------- [2] At the hearing on the motion to suppress, neither party developed extensive evidence as to the layout of the rear entrance to 61 Pond Street. The defendant’s argument for suppression under the knock-and-announce rule is based entirely on the officers’ failure to knock and announce their presence before breaching the locked, front door to the two-family home. The defendant makes no argument for suppression based on the failure of officers at the rear door to knock and announce their presence there. [3] The apparent conflict between Officer Fitzemeyer’s testimony that, upon entering the apartment, he asked the defendant whether he had firearms (which, according to Officer Fitzemeyer, the defendant denied) and Officer Sacco’s testimony that the defendant volunteered that there were guns in a safe does not cause me to doubt either officer’s testimony. The evidence presented at the hearing depicted a -5- Within moments – or, at most, minutes – of entering the apartment, the SWAT team had “cleared” it, meaning that they had identified all the occupants and determined that they were unarmed. At that point, the SWAT team handed the apartment over to Lowell Police detectives, who conducted the search pursuant to the warrant. As the Lowell detectives were entering the apartment and the SWAT team members were leaving, Deputy Sacco told Detective Krug that the defendant had said that there were guns in the safe in the bedroom. When he entered the apartment, Detective Krug asked the defendant to join him and Lowell Police Sergeant Burd[4] in the apartment’s kitchen. There, Detective Krug showed the defendant the search warrant and allowed him to read it. The detective then read the defendant a Miranda advisory from a printed card that the detective carries with him. See Ex. 8. Detective Krug asked the defendant if he would be willing to speak with the police, and he agreed. Detective Krug asked the defendant if there were drugs in the apartment, and the defendant said there were not. The detective then asked the defendant whether there were guns in the apartment, and he replied that there were – in a safe in one of the bedrooms. The defendant said that he kept the firearms to protect his family and acknowledged that he had neither a Firearms Identification (“FID”) Card nor a license to carry firearms. The defendant provided the police with the combination to the safe. -------------------------------------------- complex, fast-moving sequence of events, charged with apprehension by both police and the apartment’s residents. Under those circumstances, it is entirely plausible that Officer Sacco did not hear Officer Fitzemeyer ask the defendant about firearms or the defendant’s response. Officer Sacco testified that the defendant “told another officer that there were guns inside a safe.” No witness testified as to whether the defendant volunteered the statement about guns in a safe or, instead, made it in response to one or more questions. I analyze the significance of this series of events in Section IV of the “Discussion.” [4] Sergeant Burd’s first name does not appear in the record. -6- When police used the combination to open the safe, they found, among other items: two Glock semi-automatic pistols, two loaded Glock 9mm magazines, with 15 and 26 rounds of ammunition respectively, one empty Glock 9mm magazine, 97 Oxycodone pills, two end-tied bags of crack cocaine, and $3,759.00 in United States curency. They also found an assault-style rifle in a backpack on the bed in the same bedroom. The defendant was arrested and charged with firearms and narcotics offenses. The defendant was arraigned in this court on January 5, 2026. He filed his motion to suppress[5] on May 26, 2026, and I held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on July 8, 2026. After the parties filed post-hearing supplemental memoranda on July 15, 2026, I took the matter under advisement. DISCUSSION I. The Knock-and-Announce Requirement Unless authorized by a search warrant not to do so, police officers executing a search warrant “must ‘knock and announce’ their presence and purpose before” entering a premises. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 452 Mass. 573, 574 (2008), citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 215 (2002). Although its roots are in the common law, the knock-and-announce rule has “been incorporated into the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ” Id. The rule has a triple purpose: “to protect the privacy interests of individuals; to minimize the likelihood of property damage; and to reduce the possibility of violence after an unannounced entry.” Id., citing, inter alia, Richards v. Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 385 , 393 n.5 (1997). The failure of the police to knock and announce before entering a residence “does not automatically lead to suppression of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ortega, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 222 , citing Commonwealth v. Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 46 (1990). A -------------------------------------------- [5] Defendant’s Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence (“motion” or “motion to suppress,” Paper No. 11) -7- decision regarding suppression of evidence for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule “depend[s] upon (1) the degree to which the violation undermined the principles underlying the governing law; and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated.” Id. The defendant contends that the police were required to knock and announce their presence at the locked front door of 61 Pond Street that led into the common hallway shared by two units in the dwelling and that the failure to do so necessitates suppression of all evidence seized in the search. The Commonwealth responds that the police were not required to knock and announce until they did – at the front door to Unit #1 – and that, in any event, any violation of the knock-and-announce rule should not result in suppression. A. The Point at Which Police Were Required to Knock and Announce The parties have not drawn my attention to any Massachusetts case that establishes whether police must knock and announce at a locked door to a common hallway in a two-family dwelling. Indeed, there appear to be surprisingly few cases nationwide, at least among reported appellate decisions. The courts that have decided the question have not reached a consensus. See United States v. Smith, 941 F.2d 1210 , 1991 WL 158699 at *8 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) (“[T]he law is not well settled in this area, and courts disagree as to the applicability of the knock and announce rule in these situations.”) (citations omitted). Courts that have held that police officers need not knock and announce at common entrances to multi-unit dwellings generally have done so on the grounds that the defendant’s privacy interest in common entryways is insufficient to require police to knock and announce their presence there. See e.g. United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715-716 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The threshold inquiry is whether [the defendant] had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the common area entryway of the duplex, which would have required the officers to knock and announce their presence.”). Courts that have reached the opposite conclusion generally have -8- concluded that residents of multi-family units who lock common, exterior doors are demonstrating an intention to exclude non-residents that is protected by the knock-and- announce rule. See e.g. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716-717 (9th Cir. 1976) (“In light of the size of the building, then, we find significant the fact that the door to the hallway giving access to the two apartments was locked; the two lower-level tenants thus exercised considerably more control over access to that portion of the building than would be true in a multi-unit complex ”). The Commonwealth relies, almost exclusively, on cases that stand for the more general proposition that “tenants of multifamily dwellings have no legitimate expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.” Mendoza, 281 F.3d at 715 , citing United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977). Indeed, as a general statement of Fourth Amendment law, this appears to be the majority view. But see United States v. Rheault, 561 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2009) (dicta) (distinguishing third-floor landing, an area where second-floor tenant could not reasonably expect privacy, from “the entryways in Fluker and Drummond – which were immediately outside the respective apartment doors”); Fluker, 543 F.2d at 716 (defendant “had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ with respect to the corridor area separating the door of his apartment from the outer doorway of the [two-unit] apartment building”); United States v. Drummond, 98 F.Supp.2d 44, 53 (2000) (defendants had reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallway of two-unit building). That the majority view holds that residents in multi-unit buildings do not have an objectively reasonable privacy interest in common hallways, however, does not end the inquiry. In this case, the issue is not simply whether the residents of the two-family residence could reasonably expect privacy in their common hallway; rather, the issue is whether the police, armed with a warrant to search Unit 1, could force open the locked, exterior door without announcing their presence. That is, although a reasonable expectation of privacy is a factor to consider in determining whether the knock-and- -9- announce rule applies to the outer door, it is not the lone relevant consideration. The determination that I must make is whether, considering the purposes of the knock-and- announce rule – see Ortega, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 22 – it was permissible for police not to comply with it at the outer door. One area of general consensus among courts that have addressed this issue is that the analysis is intensely fact-specific. See e.g., Mendoza, 281 F.3d at 715 (“Several factors have been identified as relevant to this showing [of a reasonable expectation of privacy]: ‘whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises.’”), citing United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999); Fluker, 543 F.2d at 716-717 (court finds violation of knock and announce rule “under the narrow set of facts in this case” and expresses no opinion as to whether “a similar result would obtain in circumstances other than the one before us”). In this case, there is no dispute that: the defendant lived in Unit 1; there are two units in the residence, the defendant’s first-floor unit and a second apartment upstairs; only the residents of the two units and their landlord have access to the common hallway; the defendant uses the common hallway, at least in part, to store personal items; the outer, common door has a working lock that was engaged when police officers arrived on April 7, 2025, to execute the search warrant; the police did not knock and announce when they encountered the locked common door; and the police forced open the outer door, breaking it in the process.[6] The defendant has thus met his burden of establishing that he had a subjective expectation of privacy that members of the public, including police officers, would not -------------------------------------------- [6] Some of these facts are taken from the Affidavit of the Defendant (Paper No. 11.2), which was submitted in support of the motion to suppress. Others were taken from the testimony of the officers at the hearing on the motion. None is disputed. -10- enter the common hallway without the permission either of a member of his family or of a resident of the second-floor unit. Cases that have held that such an expectation of privacy is not objectively reasonable have generally done so on the ground that a resident in the defendant’s position cannot control who may be given access to the hallway, either by the residents of the second unit or by the landlord. See, e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The locks on the doors to the entrances of the apartment complex were to provide security to the occupants, not privacy in common hallways.”), quoting United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977). Although it is indisputable that the defendant did not have total control of who entered the hallway, it does not follow that he had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy there. See Drummond, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (“Defendants here would have ‘reasonably believed that [the common hallway] was not open to the world at large.’”), quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 325-326 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The fundamental weakness in the analysis of courts that have decided knock and announce cases based on a categorical characterization of common areas as unprotected by the rule is that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493 , 501 (2020), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, a categorical ruling that persons who live in multi- unit dwellings cannot have reasonable expectations of privacy in common areas – regardless of what precautions they take to maintain their privacy – entails an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that addresses only the nature of the place and disregards entirely the person’s expectations of privacy. Indeed, even in the lead case relied on by the Commonwealth, Mendoza, the Eighth Circuit conducted a factual inquiry before concluding that the police were not required to knock and announce their presence before entering the common vestibule at the entrance to the duplex. The Mendoza Court explained that -11- [i]n the instant case, Mendoza [the defendant] did nothing that would lead the officers to believe he had a protectable interest in the common area of his duplex. He made no efforts to secure the outer door. Moreover, because the door was not latched and there remained two mailboxes to its left, there was no signal to the officers that knocking on the outer door would have been necessary. 281 F.3d at 715-716 (emphasis added). Mendoza, therefore, is distinguishable from this case, in which the outer door was locked when police arrived and had to be forced open to allow the police to enter the common area.[7] Indeed, the Commonwealth has not presented me with a case in which a court has held that police with a search warrant were not required to knock and announce at the locked, common front door of a small multi-family residence, as distinguished from a large apartment building.[8] Further, the ---------------------------------------------- [7] In another case relied on by the Commonwealth, United States v. Acosta, which involved the execution of an arrest warrant, the Third Circuit observed that: [i]t is undisputed that one of the officers turned the doorknob [to the common side entrance of “a three story, multi-unit apartment building”] and found that the door was unlocked. Thus, the inner hallway was easily accessible to tenants, visitors, solicitors, workmen and other members of the public. 965 F.2d 1248 , 1252 (3rd Cir. 1992) (emphasis supplied). That, in Acosta, the common door was unlocked and, therefore, any member of the public could simply walk in distinguishes that case from this one. [8] Several cases address the situation of a large apartment complex with a locked front door. See, e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 8672 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1989). Such residences pose different issues with respect to the knock and announce requirement. See Fluker, 543 F.2d at 716 (“[T]he two lower-level tenants thus exercised considerably more control over access to that portion of the building than would be true in a multi-unit complex, and hence could reasonably be said to have a greater expectation of privacy than would be true of occupants of large apartment buildings.”), citing Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612 (1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976). As -12- rationale of Mendoza itself suggests that, had the residents of the apartment in that case locked the common, exterior door, the Court might have reached a different result. In this case, the undisputed facts establish that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy against intrusions into the common area of his two-family residence by members of the public.[9] This expectation was manifested, primarily, in the locked front door that the police encountered when they went to execute the search warrant. I, therefore, conclude that the police officers executing the search warrant were -------------------------------------------- this case involves a two-unit residence, I need not address how the outcome might be different had the defendant lived in a large apartment building. [9] In the Defendant’s Reply to the Commonwealth’s Supplemental Submission (Paper No. ), he argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (“Jardines”), provides an independent basis to suppress evidence produced by the search. This is incorrect. In Jardines, the Supreme Court held that police officers’ use of “a drug sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of a home is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 569 U.S. at 3 . Because the officers who brought the dog onto the porch did not have a warrant to do so, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court judge’s decision suppressing the resulting evidence. The defendant argues that, in doing so, the Supreme Court held that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis first set out in Katz is unnecessary to consider if police commit a trespass on a homeowner’s property. See id. at 11 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”), quoting United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400 , 409 n.3 (2012). Thus, the defendant argues that, because police officers committed a trespass when they forced open the outer door to his residence, it is unnecessary to consider whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway. This argument is unpersuasive because it is circular. As the officers had a warrant to search the defendant’s residence, their forcing open the outer, common door was not a trespass. If the breaking of the outer door was unlawful, it was only because police were required to knock and announce their presence before doing so and did not. Thus, the defendant’s argument under Jardine is entirely dependent on the analysis of whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway. -13- required to knock and announce at the common front door before breaking it open and entering the common hallway. B. Whether the Announcement at the Door to Unit 1 “Substantially Fulfilled” the Policies Underlying the Knock and Announce Rule As discussed, supra, the failure of the police to comply with the knock and announce requirement does not automatically dictate suppression of evidence seized during the ensuing search warrant execution. Suppression is not required “[i]f the policies underlying the [knock and announce] rule are substantially fulfilled in the circumstances in which the police enter premises to be searched . . . .” Ortega, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 222 . In making this decision, a court must consider: “(1) the degree to which the violation undermined the principles underlying the governing law; and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated.” Id. In this case, the officers’ entry into the common hallway without knocking and announcing their presence implicated all three interests protected by the knock and announce rule – protecting privacy, preventing property damage, and reducing the risk of violence following an unannounced entry. See Santiago, 452 Mass. at 574 , citing, inter alia, Richards, 529 U.S. at 393 n.5. For the reasons set out in Section I, A, supra, the officers’ entry into the common hallway by forcing open the door impinged on the defendant’s expectation that members of the public could not enter the common hallway without the permission of a resident or the landlord. Had the police knocked and announced at the common front door, it is possible that the door would not have been extensively damaged, as it was when the officers used the hydraulic spreader to pull the door apart from the jam. Finally, although there was no violence in connection with the officers’ execution of the search warrant, the possibility that residents of the units might have mistaken the officers’ forced entry – with no announcement – for a home invasion created or increased the risk that residents might have resorted to violence based on a misapprehension of the situation. See United States v. Smith, 386 -14- F.3d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The knock-and-announce rule . . . reduces ‘the potential violence to both the police officers and the occupants of the house into which entry is sought.’”), quoting United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2000).[10] The Commonwealth does not dispute that the officers’ decision not to knock and announce their presence at the exterior door implicated each of the interests protected by the rule. Instead, the Commonwealth seeks to portray as minimal the extent to which each of the interests is implicated. Although the Commonwealth’s arguments are not without substance, they are ultimately unpersuasive. The Commonwealth additionally contends that, because the officers knocked and announced at the interior door – the front door to Unit 1 – “the policies underlying the [knock-and-announce rule were] substantially fulfilled,” Ortega, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 222 , and that, therefore, there is no deterrent-based reason to exclude the evidence recovered during the search. The Commonwealth cites three cases in which the appellate courts of the Commonwealth have held that the failure of police to knock and -------------------------------------------- [10] The Commonwealth suggests that requiring the police to knock and announce at the exterior door would increase the risk of violence against either police officers or civilians. The Commonwealth does not, however, suggest why this is the case. Even if such a rule would require the police to knock and announce twice, once at the exterior door and once at the front door to the individual apartment (a question not presented in this case), it is not clear how that would increase the risk of violence. Moreover, to the extent that law enforcement has reason to be concerned that occupants of the premises to be searched have access to weapons, they can seek a ”no-knock” warrant. See Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 216 (2007) (police may seek “no-knock” warrant based on “concern for the safety of the officers executing the warrant or fear that a substantial portion of the evidence sought might be destroyed or secreted . . .”). Additionally, even if police do not have a “no-knock” warrant, their failure to knock and announce can be excused “if exigent circumstances arise at the threshold.” Id. “It is . . . well established that the failure of the police to knock and announce their presence may be justified in circumstances arise at the threshold of the search justifying both the unannounced entry and the failure to obtain judicial authorization.” Id. -15- announce did not require suppression of evidence because the interests underlying had been substantially vindicated. In the first of these cases, Commonwealth v. Wornum, 421 Mass. 220 (1995) the police notified the defendant’s brother – who was identified in the search warrant application as a resident of the premises to be searched – that they had a search warrant for the premises and intended to search them “directly.” 421 Mass. 220, 222 (1995). The Supreme Judicial Court in Wornum concluded that, “[i]n the special circumstances of [that] case, the objectives of the [knock-and-announce] rule were substantially achieved.” Id. The Court reasoned that the presence of the defendant’s brother with police both “lowered any privacy interests jeopardized by the entry” and “reduced the potential for violence.” Id. None of the “special circumstances” identified by the Wornum Court as fulfilling the policies underlying the knock-and-announce rule was present in this case, and Wornum, therefore, does not suggest that the purposes of the knock-and-announce rule were vindicated in this case. In Commonwealth v. Goggin, police with a search warrant entered the common hallway of a two-family house through a front door that “was unlocked and ajar.” 412 Mass. 200, 201 (1992). They then knocked on the front door to the apartment to be searched. Rather than identifying themselves as police, the officers used a ruse and identified themselves as associated with “Pop Warner.” Id. At that point, one of the residents – a target of the investigation – opened the door. When she saw that the persons at the door were police officers, she attempted to close the door. Id. One of the “officer[s] held his hand out across the threshold of the doorway and prevented the door from being closed.” Id. The officers then “announced their identity, authority, and purpose” before entering the apartment. Id. In Goggin, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the use of a ruse to cause the occupants to open the door was “not improper.” Id. Once one of the defendants opened the door, “[a]lthough . . . [she] may have been surprised to see a group outside, the identity of the police should have been -16- immediately obvious to her from the badges around their necks.” Id. The Goggin Court held that, “[s]ince the police did not force entry without appropriate identification and an announcement, the terms of the warrant were satisfied.” Id. at 203 . In this case, police forced entry through the locked exterior door without announcing their presence or identifying themselves. The rationale for denying the motion to suppress in Goggin, therefore, is absent in this case. Finally, the Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Siano, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 912 (2001). In that case, police opened an unlocked door to “a ‘breezeway,’ perhaps more appropriately described as an enclosed porch, which was furnished and used as a family room,” and “went to the kitchen door, which they found . . . ajar.” 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 914 . An officer knocked on the kitchen door, called out to the resident by the resident’s first name, and identified himself as an officer of “the Springfield Police Department.” Id. When the officer received no response, the officer said, Nicky, it’s the Springfield Police, it’s Jim Efantis. We have a search warrant for your house. Id. The defendant then invited the police into the home. Noting that the motion judge had found “a technical violation of the knock and announce rule,” the Siano Court held that the “policies underlying the rule were not violated.” Id. The Appeals Court reasoned that “[h]ere there was no forced entry (one officer may have had his weapon drawn), no invasion of privacy (the police knew the defendant and he invited them in), and no property damage.” Id. As each of the policies underlying the knock-and- announce rule that the Siano court found were vindicated in that case were infringed upon in this case, Siano offers no support for the proposition that the violation of the rule in this case should not result in suppression of the evidence seized during the search. The Commonwealth counters that my ruling would require police to knock and announce at every obstacle they encountered between entering a multi-unit residence -17- and reaching the front door of the residence that they had a warrant to search. The Commonwealth’s argument, however, is far too broad. My ruling is based on the key fact that the front common door to the residence was locked against the public. Thus, were police to encounter another door between the common front door and the front door of the target apartment, they would be required to knock and announce only if it were locked. Rejecting a similar argument, the judge in Drummond reasoned that, [w]here there are sufficient indicia that the inhabitants could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the entryway directly behind the outer door, the police then have at least two options. They can knock and announce their presence at the outer door, or they can seek additional information about the building to determine if the entryway is open to the public in such a way as would defeat a reasonable resident's expectation that “uninvited and unauthorized persons will not intrude into [it].” View more Negative Treatments Lyons, 706 F.2d at 325 . If these circumstances are present, forced entry may be warranted; if they are not, forced entry may not be warranted, absent exigent circumstances. In other search and seizure contexts, courts routinely charge law enforcement with the responsibility of obtaining enough information to act in a reasonable fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 , 1074–75 (D.C. Cir.1991) (stating that FBI agents did not have enough information on which to base their determination that the defendant's mother had authority to give consent to search the defendant's room and that the search was thus invalid). It is reasonable to require law enforcement to obtain additional information in these circumstances as well. 98 F.Supp.2d at 51 . In fact, the Commonwealth’s position – that police knocking and announcing at the door to Unit 1 satisfied the policies protected by the knock-and-announce rule – essentially would amount to a rule that police never would have to knock and announce at a common outer door, so long as they did so at the interior front door to the target unit. As I conclude, see Section I, A, supra, that the knock-and-announce rule required officers in this case to knock and announce their presence at the locked common front door, it would make no sense to conclude that, nonetheless, their -18- announcement at the front door to the defendant’s apartment excused their failure to do so at the common front door. Because I conclude that the police were required to knock and announce their presence at the common exterior door to the two-family residence and that their failure to do so was not cured by their knocking and announcing at the front door to the defendant’s apartment, I need not consider the defendant’s other arguments for suppression. I do so, however, to frame the additional issues in the event of an appeal of my ruling. II. The Time of Day of the