Spicuzza v. State

Brian S. Spicuzza v. State of Maryland, No. 25, September Term, 2025, Opinion by Booth, J. PRESERVATION – MD. RULE 4-323 – NECESSITY OF OBJECTIONS In this case, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence, which the circuit court denied. The State argued that the Supreme Court of Maryland should not consider the defendant’s contentions of error because defense counsel failed to make proper objections prior to the admission of the evidence at trial. The Supreme Court reiterated the requirements under Maryland Rule 4-323(a) for making contemporaneous objections at the time that evidence is being offered at trial. The Supreme Court also discussed the continuing objection rule, Maryland Rule 4-323(b), which permits a party to request a continuing objection, which is effective “only as to questions clearly within its scope.” Applying these rules to the record presented, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel made an adequate objection prior to the first witness who testified about the matter in question. However, the Supreme Court held that the objection to the first witness’s testimony was not broad enough to cover the testimony of another witness who testified the following day. Notwithstanding the waiver of a portion of the second witness’s testimony, the Supreme Court held that the ultimate issue before the Court—whether evidence of the defendant’s alleged misconduct and sexual abuse with the victim’s friends was admissible—was adequately preserved for appellate review. EVIDENCE – MD. RULE 5-404(b) – COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN EXCEPTION Under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or other acts (“other bad acts”) is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. The proffering party bears the burden of showing that the evidence is specially relevant to a contested issue in the case other than propensity. In this case, the defendant was on trial for raping and committing other sexual crimes against his minor daughter. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in admitting other bad acts evidence relating to sexual abuse of his daughter’s friends and his providing them with intoxicating substances under the “common scheme or plan” exception in Maryland Rule 5-404(b). “WHY-WOULD-SHE-LIE” QUESTION The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s objection to the “why-was-she-lying” question that the State asked the defendant during his cross- examination. Although the State asked the question in response to the defendant’s improper statement that his daughter made a “vile and false statement,” neither question was relevant nor competent. Maryland case law does not permit the admission of incompetent evidence under the “opening the door” doctrine. The appropriate way for the State to have handled the defendant’s unresponsive, improper, and inadmissible statement would have been to object and request that the court instruct the jury to disregard the statement. Although the State’s question was improper, the Court determined that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE FOR TRUTHFULNESS UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-608(a) The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to present character witnesses to attest to his honest character. The defendant was not charged with a veracity impeaching offense. Under the plain language and structure of Maryland Rule 5-608(a), a defendant is not permitted to introduce evidence of his general character trait for honesty simply because he or she testified and the State establishes inconsistencies between the defendant’s testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Unearthing inconsistencies as part of a cross-examination is different from establishing that a criminal defendant has a general character trait for dishonesty. Unless a criminal defendant is charged with a veracity impeaching offense, simply being subject to vigorous cross-examination is insufficient to make a criminal defendant’s character for truthfulness for purposes of introducing evidence of a general honest character. The Court further held that, even if the State had placed the defendant’s character for honesty in question, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the defendant’s witnesses to testify based upon the lack of specificity in the proffers. Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County Case No.: C-18-CR-22-000283 Argued: December 5, 2025 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 25 September Term, 2025 BRIAN S. SPICUZZA v. STATE OF MARYLAND Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Watts, Biran, Gould, and Eaves, J.J., concur and dissent. Killough, J., dissents. Filed: July 28, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.28 13:24:09 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  In Maryland, evidence of a defendant’s “crimes, wrongs, or other acts,” other than those for which the defendant is on trial (“other bad acts”), is generally inadmissible if offered for the purpose of proving the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal or wrongful acts. Md. Rule 5-404(b). Under our exclusionary approach, for other bad acts evidence to be admissible, it must, among other things, have special relevance to some contested issue in the case. Maryland Rule 5-404(b) provides a non- exhaustive list of examples of potential contested issues, such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intention, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or accident.” In this case, we are asked to consider whether evidence of other bad acts of sexual abuse was admissible under the “common scheme or plan” exception under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). Petitioner, Brian Spicuzza, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County on charges of sexual abuse of a minor, rape in the second degree, and sexual offense in the third degree. He appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Maryland. That court affirmed his convictions in an unreported opinion. We granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court erred by (1) admitting other bad acts evidence pursuant to the common scheme or plan exception, (2) allowing the State to erroneously ask Mr. Spicuzza why his daughter—the victim—would be lying about the sexual abuse, and (3) refusing to permit Mr. Spicuzza’s character witnesses to testify as to his honest character after Mr. Spicuzza testified and was subjected to cross-examination. In considering these questions, we also address the State’s assertion that Mr. Spicuzza failed to properly object to the introduction of other bad acts evidence at trial. The rape and sexual abuse for which Mr. Spicuzza was convicted involved his daughter, H., who was 15 years old at the time of trial. The trial took place over five days. The State called six witnesses in its case in chief. One of Mr. Spicuzza’s primary contentions on appeal involves the trial court’s ruling that permitted H.’s minor friends, A.L. and A.B., to testify about certain alleged crimes involving sexual abuse by Mr. Spicuzza against them, as well as Mr. Spicuzza’s conduct in allegedly providing the minors with alcohol, vapes, and marijuana when they visited his apartment. The State sought to admit this evidence pursuant to the “common scheme or plan” exception to Rule 5-404(b), and the trial court admitted this evidence pursuant to that exception. Mr. Spicuzza also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to ask him on cross-examination, “why is your daughter lying[,]” about the sexual abuse she alleged Mr. Spicuzza committed against her. Finally, Mr. Spicuzza contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to call character witnesses to attest to his character trait for honesty. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the trial court properly admitted the other bad acts evidence under the common scheme or plan exception because it had special relevance to show Mr. Spicuzza’s plan to sexually abuse H. and her friends in his apartment. As for Mr. Spicuzza’s other assertions of error, we hold that the circuit court erred in permitting the State to ask Mr. Spicuzza to opine on why a witness was “lying.” However, we determine that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 We also hold that the trial court did not err in excluding Mr. Spicuzza’s character evidence. Mr. Spicuzza was not on trial for a veracity impeaching offense, and the State’s cross-examination of Mr. Spicuzza did not place his character for honesty into question. Moreover, even assuming that Mr. Spicuzza’s character for honesty had been called into question, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the admission of Mr. Spicuzza’s character evidence based upon the insufficient proffers. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background1 On February 22, 2022, Detective Corporal James Bare of the St. Mary’s County Sheriff’s Office learned that two minor victims of reported sexual assaults were on their way to the child protective services center. He went there and watched in a separate room as a social worker, Nichole Moneymaker, interviewed the two young women, I.H., and A.L. The interview revealed another potential victim, H.S. (“H.”). Detective Bare then contacted H.’s mother, who brought her to the center. Ms. Moneymaker interviewed H., but H. had difficulty engaging, did not disclose anything to Ms. Moneymaker, and denied that her father, Mr. Spicuzza, had done anything improper with her. On February 23, 2022, Detective Bare obtained and executed search warrants for Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment and his person based on I.H.’s and A.L.’s interviews. Mr. 1 The facts presented in this section are based on the testimony and other evidence introduced at trial. 3 Spicuzza was arrested the next day. On the day of Mr. Spicuzza’s arrest, H. was interviewed again. In that interview, H. told Ms. Moneymaker that Mr. Spicuzza touched her breasts and vagina, licked her vagina, and asked her for fellatio. Ms. Moneymaker interviewed H. again on May 13, 2022. During that interview, H. revealed for the first time that her father had raped her. Mr. Spicuzza was indicted for four counts of second-degree rape, one count of third-degree sexual offense, and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor.2 Before trial, Mr. Spicuzza and the State filed preliminary motions that pertain to some of the evidentiary rulings that are the subject of his appeal. We discuss some of the pretrial proceedings that led to the circuit court’s rulings on the admissibility of A.L. and A.B.’s testimony, as well as Mr. Spicuzza’s efforts to introduce character witnesses. 2 The State charged Mr. Spicuzza under two of the second-degree rape modalities. These prohibit: (1) engaging “in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another . . . if the victim is . . . a physically helpless individual, and the person performing the act knows or reasonably should know that the victim is . . . a physically helpless individual,” and (2) engaging “in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another . . . if the victim is under the age of 14 years, and the person performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim.” Md. Code, Criminal Law (“CR”) § 3-304(a)(2), (3) (2021 Repl. Vol., 2024 Supp.). Sexual offense in the third degree prohibits, among other things, “engag[ing] in sexual contact with another if the victim is under the age of 14 years, and the person performing the sexual contact is at least 4 years older than the victim[.]” CR § 3-307(a)(3). It also prohibits engaging in a sexual act or “vaginal intercourse with another if the victim is 14 or 15 years old, and the person performing the act is at least 21 years old.” Id. § 3- 304(a)(4)(5). As to the offense of sexual abuse of a minor, the statute prohibits a “parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor [from causing] sexual abuse to the minor.” CR § 3-602(b)(1). 4  B. Procedural Matters 1. Mr. Spicuzza’s Character Witnesses Prior to trial, Mr. Spicuzza provided the State with notice that he intended to call several character witnesses to opine on his character for honesty, peacefulness, and appropriate interactions with children. The State moved to strike Mr. Spicuzza’s character witnesses. The court heard arguments on the State’s motion on September 27, 2022. At the hearing, in addition to the character traits already identified, Mr. Spicuzza argued that his witnesses should be able to testify to an additional trait—his law-abiding nature. Mr. Spicuzza informed the court that he intended to submit proffers that would describe the witnesses’ bases of knowledge, the relevant time frame in which they had known Mr. Spicuzza, the frequency of their contact with Mr. Spicuzza, and the quality of those contacts. The court asked for the proffers in writing, and the parties agreed to a second hearing on the character witness issue. On October 14, 2022, Mr. Spicuzza submitted a written proffer of his character witnesses’ opinions as they related to his honesty, peacefulness, appropriateness with children, and law-abiding nature. The proffer identified eight character witnesses. The court held a second hearing on December 16, 2022. At that hearing, Mr. Spicuzza asserted only two traits—honesty and peacefulness—and withdrew traits of appropriateness with children and his law-abiding nature. He argued that his honesty was relevant because he planned to testify at trial. He added that his proffer detailed the witnesses’ proposed testimony and reflected that each witness was qualified to testify. The prosecutor responded that the testimony proffered was not relevant to the charges, lacked specificity, 5 and that each witness’ proffer was identical and conclusory. Defense counsel responded that each witness had spent enough time with Mr. Spicuzza to form their proffered opinion. Counsel also outlined each witness’s connection to Mr. Spicuzza. After argument, the court concluded that, because there were no allegations of force as part of the charges against Mr. Spicuzza, his character for peacefulness was irrelevant. As to honesty, the court determined that the proffers were too conclusory. The bare-boned proffers, the trial court concluded, did not provide enough “details” or “information” to assess whether the witnesses’ testimony “would be appropriate or not” because it included “no information as to the basis for their opinion.” The court also recognized that the proffers seemed geared toward the traits of appropriateness with children and his law- abiding nature—traits that Mr. Spicuzza had abandoned. Accordingly, the court ruled that the proffers lacked an adequate basis, and thus granted the State’s motion to preclude the proffered witnesses from testifying about Mr. Spicuzza’s character for honesty. 2. The State’s “Common Scheme” Evidence During discovery, the State identified four friends of H., all minors, who were interviewed by Ms. Moneymaker in February 2022. Mr. Spicuzza filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence related to the four alleged victims under Maryland Rule 5- 404(b). Mr. Spicuzza argued that evidence of his alleged other bad acts with H.’s minor friends was inadmissible under the rule. Mr. Spicuzza asserted that the alleged other bad acts did not fall within one of the exceptions in Rule 5-404(b), the four witnesses would not be able to provide clear and convincing evidence of Mr. Spicuzza’s involvement in other crimes, and the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Spicuzza. Mr. 6 Spicuzza also argued that, with respect to the allegations concerning H., the witnesses were not present when the alleged abuse occurred, and the witnesses therefore lacked firsthand knowledge of any alleged abuse. The court heard arguments on Mr. Spicuzza’s motion in limine at the December 2022 hearing. The prosecutor argued that evidence of Mr. Spicuzza’s interactions with H.’s minor friends was admissible as evidence of a “common scheme or plan” under that exception in Rule 5-404(b). The prosecutor further asserted that the evidence reflected a “common plan” to groom the girls by offering them alcohol, marijuana, and vapes “to relax them.” The prosecutor summarized the evidence as “showing porn to all” of the alleged victims, “soliciting . . . sex,” and “soliciting to see breasts.” The prosecutor argued that “when you see the commonality of all the individual steps [Mr. Spicuzza] took with each victim, it shows the common scheme and plan[,]” which, according to the State, would be admissible evidence in its case in chief. In support of the common scheme theory, the prosecutor “reminded” the court that the State’s rape charges included the rape of H. while she was “physically helpless” because Mr. Spicuzza had provided her with vapes and alcohol. The vapes and alcohol, the State asserted, embodied the “commonality and the scheme.” That is, Mr. Spicuzza would “request different solicitations after he provided the alcohol and vapes and marijuana.” The court denied Mr. Spicuzza’s motion to exclude the witnesses. It reasoned that the proffered testimony fit within the common scheme or plan exception because the victims were similar in age; they all claimed that Mr. Spicuzza offered to exchange alcohol, vapes, and marijuana for sexual favors; and they asserted that Mr. Spicuzza showed them 7 pornography. Additionally, the court found the proffered evidence was clear and convincing and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. C. The Trial At the outset of the trial, Mr. Spicuzza moved to reconsider the court’s exclusion of his character evidence. He also indicated that he intended to renew his objection at the start of the defense’s case. The court reserved its ruling on his motion until then. Defense counsel also stated that he was “still asserting under [Rule 5-]404(b) that” A.L.’s “testimony as an alleged victim should not be allowed and we adopt all of the same arguments.” 1. The State’s Case in Chief The State called six witnesses in its principal case. Mr. Spicuzza testified in his own defense. We provide a general overview of the evidence, and some additional detail with respect to the evidentiary issues that are before us. a. H.’s testimony H. was 15 years old at the time of trial. Mr. Spicuzza and her mother divorced when she was 7. H.’s mother remarried, and H. lived with her mother and stepfather during the week and spent every weekend with Mr. Spicuzza. H. testified that her mother and stepfather had strict rules, but that her father did not. H. testified that her father had sexually abused her for two years. She stated that after her parents divorced, Mr. Spicuzza lived at his parents’ house, and the sexual abuse started while he was living there. She testified that during the period in which Mr. Spicuzza 8 was residing with his parents, he touched H.’s vagina on approximately three or four occasions. H. also testified that, when she was 12 years old and Mr. Spicuzza had not yet moved into his own apartment, Mr. Spicuzza told her he was “going to have sex with you one day whether you like it or not.” When H. was around 12 years old, Mr. Spicuzza moved into a one-bedroom apartment, and she continued to spend every weekend with him. H. testified that Mr. Spicuzza would buy her marijuana and alcohol, which she consumed in his apartment. During this period, according to H., the abuse continued—initially consisting of Mr. Spicuzza touching her vagina, licking her vagina on “too many” instances to estimate, and ultimately escalating to vaginal intercourse. She testified that he would try to lick her vagina, and that “[t]he first bunch of times,” she “refused and would not let him.” However, “in the end,” she “gave up because he was too pushy.” H. testified that he started to use sex toys on her when she was 12 years old, although she was “not a hundred percent sure” when it started. She did not testify as to when her father raped her for the first time. However, she testified that the last time that she had vaginal intercourse with Mr. Spicuzza was on the morning of February 22, 2022—the same day of her first interview at child protective services. H. testified that she had drunk rum and Coke and smoked marijuana. She stated that Mr. Spicuzza had bought the alcohol and that one of his friends had left the marijuana at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment. H. testified that Mr. Spicuzza had pulled out her tampon as he licked her vagina and had intercourse with her. H. described other sexual acts. She testified that, approximately “three times,” Mr. Spicuzza asked for oral sex in exchange for H. having friends over, or for providing her 9 with marijuana. H. also testified that Mr. Spicuzza would ask her to rub his penis with her hand and would not let her leave the room until she did so. H. testified that Mr. Spicuzza also bought a tan dildo, a purple sex toy, and vaginal plugs, which he used on her vagina. The State’s exhibits included photographs taken of Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment that showed the above-described sex toys that were photographed next to H.’s deodorant and AirPods. H. confirmed that the sex toys in the photographs were the ones used by Mr. Spicuzza on her, including “another vibrator” that he bought H. for her fourteenth birthday. After H. described the sexual abuse, the prosecutor asked H. about spending time with her friends while staying with Mr. Spicuzza. H. testified that she often had one or more of her four friends—A.L., A.B., C., and I.H.—with her when she stayed at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment. H. testified that Mr. Spicuzza had certain rules when she had friends over: (1) the girls were not permitted to tell their parents what happened at the house; and (2) they were not permitted to take videos with their phones. H. testified that when they were at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment, H. and her friends would smoke marijuana, drink, and party. According to H., Mr. Spicuzza would buy them marijuana, alcohol, and vape pods, and in exchange, would ask the girls to show him their “tits.” H. stated that Mr. Spicuzza made this request “too many” times “to count.” H. stated that Mr. Spicuzza showed pornographic videos to H. and her friends 20 to 30 times. H. warned her friends to “be careful” around her father because “he’s kind of creepy[.]” H. testified that on February 22, 2022, she learned that I.H. and A.L. had been interviewed by a social worker at child protective services, and that her mother was also taking her to child protective services to be interviewed. H. acknowledged that during the 10 February 22 interview with social worker Nichole Moneymaker, she did not disclose any sexual abuse or inappropriate behavior by Mr. Spicuzza. H. testified that she was scared her father would go to jail and that she would not be able to see him again. H. testified that the following day, she told her mother “almost everything” about what Mr. Spicuzza had done. On February 24, 2022, H. returned to child protective services for another interview with Ms. Moneymaker. According to H., during that interview, she disclosed a great deal of the sexual abuse that she had described to the jury, but she had “left out that he had raped” her. H. testified that she failed to disclose the rape because she knew it was a more serious charge, and she did “not want” her father “to go to jail or get into trouble.” H. was interviewed at child protective services a third time on May 13, 2022. Between the second interview on February 24 and the third interview on May 13, H. underwent counseling. H. testified that she ultimately disclosed to her mother that Mr. Spicuzza had vaginal intercourse with her and used sex toys on her. After telling her mother, H. told her counselor and Ms. Moneymaker. b. A.L.’s Testimony A.L., who was 13 years old at the time of trial, testified on the second day. She testified that, between New Year’s Eve in 2021 and for a period of two to three months thereafter, she spent every weekend with H. at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment. A.L. stated that she stopped spending time at Mr. Spicuzza’s because she “got uncomfortable” and told her mom. She testified that Mr. Spicuzza gave the girls alcohol, marijuana, and/or vapes 11 “[e]very time [she] went there[.]” A.L. explained that the vapes would give her “a buzz where … stuff kind of gets blurry[.]” At this point in A.L.’s direct examination, defense counsel asked to approach and made the following objection on the record: [Defense Counsel]: I’m just required to make the objection again. So with respect to all of her testimony that was subject to the 404(b) hearing with respect to sex, may I have a continuing objection based on all arguments in writing and verbal? After the court noted the continuing objection, the State continued A.L.’s direct examination. A.L. testified that Mr. Spicuzza would “try to put his hands on” her if she walked by him, “smack her butt[,]” and tell her that she had “a really nice body for her age,” and that she was “hot.” A.L. stated that Mr. Spicuzza made comments about her body every time she was at his apartment. A.L. testified that Mr. Spicuzza asked her for sexual favors in return for the marijuana, alcohol, and vapes. On one of those occasions, Mr. Spicuzza asked A.L. if she “would let him eat [her] out” in order to get vape pods for H. According to A.L., on one occasion after Mr. Spicuzza “had asked for a sexual favor for money, H. looked at [A.L.] and said, ‘Please, I really need the money.’ But [A.L.] told her no.” According to A.L., Mr. Spicuzza would buy alcohol for the girls, which they consumed “pretty much every time [they] were over there.” A.L. also testified that Mr. Spicuzza would show the girls pornography “every time” they were at his apartment. The videos were “different every time,” but they always depicted two people having sex or 12 doing “something sexual.” While showing A.L. such videos, Mr. Spicuzza would tell A.L., “This could be us.” A.L. described an incident in which H. and A.L. were “dancing around[,]” and Mr. Spicuzza tried to touch her, but H. stopped him and told him that A.L.’s body “was hers.” She also described an incident in which Mr. Spicuzza exposed himself to her and another friend by removing a blanket that was over his lap, standing up, and revealing that he was unclothed. Finally, A.L. described an incident that occurred on January 28, 2022, in which she had fallen asleep on Mr. Spicuzza’s bed while charging her phone. A.L. testified that she woke up “around like 2:00, maybe 3:00 a.m.,” to Mr. Spicuzza “trying to get his hands down [her] pants.” His “hand was going towards [her] vagina.” After she “kind of felt him like getting closer down, . . . [she] act[ed] like [she] woke up and [she] got up and . . . went into the living room.” Mr. Spicuzza followed A.L. out of the bedroom “and told [her] that he knew [she] was uncomfortable and asked [her] to come back to the room with him.” A.L. refused and stayed in the living room. A.L. stated that she told her mother “everything” in February. A.L. testified that after telling her mother, she was interviewed by the social worker, Ms. Moneymaker. c. Ms. Moneymaker’s Testimony After A.L.’s testimony concluded, the State called Nichole Moneymaker, a child protective services investigator with the St. Mary’s County Department of Social Services, who had interviewed H. and her friends. Ms. Moneymaker testified that, during her second interview of H. in February 2022, H. told her that Mr. Spicuzza “touched her 13 breasts and vagina, that he licked her vagina, asked her to give him a blow job,” and “asked H. and I.H. to have sex with him in exchange for drugs, alcohol.”3 Ms. Moneymaker also recalled H. telling her during the May 2022 interview that she was “very often or most of the time . . . either high or drunk when something bad was happening.” In addition, Ms. Moneymaker confirmed that, in her third interview of H. in May 2022, H. told Ms. Moneymaker “that her father had told her before he had ever moved into the apartment in February of 2020, ‘I’m going to have sex with you one day whether you like it or not[.]’” d. A.B.’s Testimony The day after A.L.’s testimony, the State called A.B., who was 14 years old at the time of trial. A.B. testified that she saw Mr. Spicuzza on a few days in summer 2021 while visiting with H. at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment. According to A.B., I.H. was also in the apartment “a few times” while A.B. was there. A.B. stated that Mr. Spicuzza took “advantage” of the girls by “grooming” them, and giving them “alcohol, [] weed[,] and nicotine.” A.B. described the rules that Mr. Spicuzza required when the girls were at his home, which were that they were not permitted to take any videos or “tell anyone about anything that happened there[.]” She testified that H. had “told [her] that her dad was into younger girls and that [she] should watch out,” but because H. had told her father not to “touch” A.B., “she shouldn’t have to worry.” 3 I.H. did not testify at Mr. Spicuzza’s trial. 14  When asked “what else was going on there when you were there” besides consumption of alcohol, marijuana, and nicotine, A.B. answered that Mr. Spicuzza “was making comments on us and telling us he wanted to do things to us.” She elaborated that “[h]e was talking about wanting to have sex with us and things he wanted to do to our bodies.” According to A.B., after she told Mr. Spicuzza that what he was saying “was wrong,” he replied that the government had “brainwashed us, that this was normal and that we were crazy.” Like A.L. and H., A.B. testified that Mr. Spicuzza showed H. and her pornography. She recalled one time when [h]e pulled us into his room . . . , he was underneath the covers, and his computer or his laptop was on his lap. And he said, “Hey, girls, come look at this.” And he pulled up a video of a girl giving oral sex to a guy. And almost instructing us that that’s what we should do and telling us to swallow and that she was doing really good. After A.B. provided the testimony described above, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and requested a “continuing objection to the 404(b) motion[,]” to which the court agreed. The prosecution then continued its direct examination. A.B. provided other testimony concerning her time spent at Mr. Spicuzza’s apartment, including consuming alcohol, smoking “weed,” and using “vapes.” She also testified that I.H. was present, drank alcohol, and “use[d] weed and the vapes.”4 4 In addition to H., A.L., Ms. Moneymaker, and A.B., in its case in chief, the State also called Detective Corporal Bare and Jessica Barnard, a lab technician with the Sheriff’s Office. Because the testimony of these witnesses is not germane to the evidentiary issues before us, we do not discuss their testimony. 15  2. Mr. Spicuzza’s Defense a. Mr. Spicuzza’s Testimony Mr. Spicuzza testified in his own defense. He vehemently denied abusing H. He also denied that he engaged in any of the criminal conduct alleged by H.’s friends. We touch upon the testimony that concerns the evidentiary issues that are before us. Mr. Spicuzza testified that prior to his arrest, he owned a small hauling company, and he was the only employee. He worked seven days per week, and his job required him to haul materials from the St. Mary’s County landfill to a landfill in Virginia. He testified that his schedule required him to go to sleep around 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. and to leave his apartment at around 3:00 a.m. or 3:30 a.m. Mr. Spicuzza stated that H. stayed with him on the weekends, and that he permitted her to have friends over as long as they did not leave the apartment once he went to bed or wake him up. Because he wanted H. to feel at home in his apartment, Mr. Spicuzza testified that he let H. and her friends have “the run of the mill[.]” Mr. Spicuzza testified that, after learning that H., A.L., and I.H. left the apartment late at night without his permission, he prohibited I.H. and A.L. from returning for overnight visits. After defense counsel asked Mr. Spicuzza whether H. complained about that decision, Mr. Spicuzza answered that H. did not protest initially but that she did so later. Mr. Spicuzza testified that he communicated with I.H.’s, A.L.’s, and A.B.’s parents “quite a bit,” including when they dropped their children off at his apartment. He also 16 testified that H.’s friends’ parents knew that he would often leave for work at 3:30 a.m. because he had told them. Mr. Spicuzza denied engaging in any sexual conduct with H. or any of her friends. He denied providing H. or her friends alcohol, marijuana, or vapes, and testified that he was unaware that they were consuming these substances because he slept with his bedroom door closed. He denied he had “rules” prohibiting the girls from taking videos or photographs in his apartment. He admitted that he watched pornographic videos in his bedroom, but not in the presence of H.’s friends. He testified that he had never deleted any photographs or videos from H.’s phone. He added that he did not know how to use an iPhone, or how an iPhone worked, and “d[id]n’t even think he could make a call with” an iPhone because he had a Samsung. Mr. Spicuzza described the events that occurred between February 22, 2022 and his arrest two days later, including (1) H.’s mother calling him and telling him that the police wanted to question H. about something, (2) the police arriving at his apartment on February 23 with a warrant and searching his apartment, (3) borrowing his mother’s phone because his phone had been seized by the police, and (4) a meeting that he had with H.’s mother at his request in a Walmart parking lot, in which he tried to obtain information. On this last point, Mr. Spicuzza testified that during the Walmart meeting, he and H.’s mother had a conversation from the driver’s side of their respective car windows. Mr. Spicuzza stated that H. was in the back seat taking care of his ex-wife’s eight-month-old, and that he could not see H. because the windows were tinted. 17  When asked by the prosecutor about the sex toys that were visible in the photograph exhibits that had been taken during the execution of the search warrant for his apartment, Mr. Spicuzza testified that he bought them for a former girlfriend in summer 2020. He denied that he ever saw his daughter touching them or seeing them in her possession. Mr. Spicuzza’s direct examination concluded with the following exchange with his attorney. [Defense counsel:] Did you – sir, I think this might be my last question, okay? When you heard your daughter tell this jury all of those things that she said you did to her sexually, how did you feel? Tell the truth. [Mr. Spicuzza:] I – it it’s indescribable. I don’t know if any of you have children, but I don’t even think you could imagine what that feels like to sit here and listen to that. That is disgusting to hear that vile, false statement come from your daughter. I can’t -- I can’t describe it. Nor would I want you to feel what I feel. I wouldn’t wish that upon anybody. [Defense counsel]: I don’t have any other questions. The prosecution immediately began its cross-examination by asking Mr. Spicuzza to tell the jury why H. was lying: [Prosecutor:] So, why is your daughter lying? [Mr. Spicuzza:] So I believe she feels that I have destroyed her social life. After Mr. Spicuzza answered the question, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and moved for a mistrial. Counsel stated that the question should be stricken because “it’s an inappropriate, inadmissible question to ask another witness to comment on the thought process of another witness.” The prosecutor responded that defense 18 counsel had opened the door with his last question. The court agreed with the prosecutor, denied defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial, and overruled the objection. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of Mr. Spicuzza resumed. The prosecutor asked Mr. Spicuzza questions about H.’s mother’s demeanor during their conversation in the Walmart parking lot, the name of th