Harrison v. State

Gerrard Luke Harrison v. State of Maryland, No. 2390, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Nazarian, J. SEVERANCE AND JOINDER – MUTUAL ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE To determine whether three criminal charges against the accused should be severed or joined and, accordingly, whether evidence of the offenses would be mutually admissible in separate trials for each individual offense, a circuit court must make six one-directional admissibility determinations. The circuit court erred when it decided the mutual admissibility of evidence as to only one of the criminal offenses for which appellant was accused, instead of all three. SEVERANCE AND JOINDER – JOINDER BALANCING TEST In deciding whether to join or sever charges for trial after a finding of mutual admissibility has been made, the analyses required for joinder and admissibility of other crimes evidence diverge and each calls for distinct balancing tests. A court’s assessment of unfair prejudice under the other crimes doctrine can’t substitute for the required balancing of judicial economy against the prejudice arising from joinder. The circuit court abused its discretion when it rejoined appellant’s previously severed cases without considering the likelihood of prejudice that could arise from trying the charges together or weighing that prejudice against judicial economy. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. C–15–CR–23–000396 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 2390 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ GERRARD LUKE HARRISON v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Nazarian, J. ______________________________________ Filed: September 30, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 18:00:35 2026.09.30 '00'04- Gregory Hilton, Clerk  Gerrard Luke Harrison was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with five counts of armed robbery, two counts of attempted armed robbery, and one count each of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and theft between $100 and $1,500. The charges arose from five separate incidents that occurred on different days in February 2023. Mr. Harrison filed a pretrial motion to sever the charges by incident and the court granted that motion. At the first of the severed trials, the State moved to introduce evidence about the other four incidents. At a hearing on that motion, the circuit court granted the motion and then, on its own initiative, re-joined the charges arising from three of those incidents for trial. Mr. Harrison pleaded not guilty to those charges and the parties proceeded on an agreed statement of facts. After a bench trial, the court convicted Mr. Harrison of four counts of armed robbery and two counts of attempted armed robbery and sentenced him to a total term of twenty years’ imprisonment.1 On appeal, he contends that the court erred in re-joining those charges for trial. We reverse the judgments and remand for further proceedings. 1 Mr. Harrison later entered guilty pleas to the remaining armed robbery and theft counts, and the State nol prossed the conspiracy charge. For those convictions, the court imposed a total term of twenty years’ incarceration, suspending all but seven and one-half years, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in the consolidated case.  I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Because Mr. Harrison challenges the circuit court’s joinder decision, we base our recitation of the facts on the evidence adduced at the hearing that led to that ruling and the three incidents underlying the charges that the court re-joined for trial. On the evening of February 21, 2023, Detective Bradley Schmidt of the Montgomery County Police Department’s Major Crimes Unit responded to a report of an attempted armed robbery at a Smoothie King located in the Fallsgrove Shopping Center on Shady Grove Road. At the scene, Detective Schmidt interviewed two Smoothie King employees. According to those employees, when the suspect first entered the establishment, he asked whether they could make change for a $100 bill and inquired about obtaining a job. The employees responded that they couldn’t break the bill and directed him to a nearby grocery store. The suspect left the Smoothie King but returned shortly after. He then told the employees, “I don’t want the change, I want the money.” He unzipped his jacket, revealing what appeared to be a long-barreled gun, but no property was ultimately taken from the store. The employees reported that the suspect exited the restaurant and proceeded on foot toward Sandy Spring Bank. They described him as thin and approximately 5’10” tall. A police canine tracked the suspect’s scent to the area of Fallsgrove Drive and Blackwell Road, where the trail was lost. In addition to interviewing witnesses, Detective Schmidt reviewed video footage from a Smoothie King surveillance camera but was unable to obtain a copy at first. One or two days later, he returned with an evidence technician and 2 downloaded the recording. The footage—which was admitted into evidence at the motion hearing and played for the court—showed the suspect entering the Smoothie King at approximately 8:30 p.m. Detective Schmidt testified that the footage depicted the suspect wearing “a black jacket with the hood up, [a] ski mask, gray sweatpants[] with [a] white triangular logo on the front, and black sneakers.” The footage also showed “an orangish-reddish colored cellphone” in the suspect’s hand, as well as the apparent firearm. Based on the object’s length, Detective Schmidt opined that it was likely either “a shotgun or a rifle . . . .”2 At or around 11:48 p.m. on February 25, 2023, police received a 911 call reporting a robbery in progress at a Wingstop located in the same Fallsgrove Shopping Center, within a one-minute walk of the Smoothie King. Although the investigation was initially assigned to another Montgomery County detective, Detective Schmidt assumed responsibility for the case after learning that the robbery involved a rifle. Like the Smoothie King incident, the Wingstop robbery was captured by a surveillance camera. The footage showed the suspect entering the restaurant, removing a rifle from his pants, and jumping the counter with the weapon in hand. The robbery occurred shortly before the restaurant was scheduled to close at 2 Statements in the record use the term “rifle” to describe the dangerous weapon that the suspect was alleged to have used in the robberies. It appears, however, that the weapon found at Mr. Harrison’s apartment during the execution of the search warrant was a BB gun, a weapon similar to those used in the alleged robberies. The police didn’t recover a rifle as that term is defined by Md. Code (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.), § 4-201(e) of the Criminal Law Article. Our use of “rifle” in this opinion reflects only what was stated in the record. 3 midnight, when the employees had just completed or were preparing to conduct their end-of-day “money count.” The safe was propped open with two money bags visible. After “announcing the robbery[,]” the suspect stole both money bags and a Guess purse belonging to a female clerk. Two employees present during the robbery described the suspect to Detective Schmidt as between 5’9” and 5’10” tall and weighing between 150 and 160 pounds. Detective Schmidt testified that the suspect was dressed in all black and wore a “full face mask.” On February 28, 2023, Detective Schmidt responded to a report of another armed robbery at a 7-Eleven on Darnestown Road, less than a mile from the Fallsgrove Shopping Center. That incident, too, was captured on video. At 1:52 p.m., the footage showed the suspect drawing a rifle from his pants and pointing it at the clerk. Detective Schmidt testified that the suspect wore a black hoodie or jacket and black pants. The gunman took cash from the register and a customer’s camouflage-colored wallet before leaving the store. The clerk and customer described the gunman as being in his 20s or 30s and between 5’5” and 5’7” tall. On March 2, 2023, a local resident provided Detective Schmidt with a brief video and photographs taken at the intersection of Fallsgrove Drive and Blackwell Road—the same area where the police canine had lost the Smoothie King suspect’s trail. The photos depicted a man whom Detective Schmidt identified at the motion hearing as Mr. Harrison. The man wore a black hoodie and gray sweatpants with what appeared to be a white logo on the left pant leg and a “reddish orange cellphone” protruding from his right pocket. The similarities between the cellphone and clothing in the photos and those shown in the 4 Smoothie King surveillance footage led Detective Schmidt to believe that the same individual appeared in both. After developing Mr. Harrison as a suspect, the police executed a search warrant at his residence on or about March 3, 2023. The search yielded gray sweatpants bearing a white triangular logo, two black hoodies, a “reddish” iPhone, and a BB rifle. B. The Indictment and Motion to Sever On April 6, 2023, the State filed a nine-count indictment against Mr. Harrison. Counts 2 and 3 alleged attempted armed robbery at the Smoothie King; Counts 4 and 5, armed robbery at the Wingstop; and Counts 6 and 7, armed robbery at the 7-Eleven. The indictment also included one count each of armed robbery (Count 1) and conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Count 8), both stemming from conduct alleged to have occurred on or about February 18, 2023. Finally, Count 9 charged Mr. Harrison with theft between $100 and $1,500 based on a separate episode alleged to have occurred on or about February 12, 2023. On August 4, 2023, Mr. Harrison filed a motion to sever the counts into five trials, one for each incident. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion in an Opinion and Order entered on April 2, 2024. In severing the charges, the court noted that “[t]he offenses occurred in the same general geographic area . . . near [Mr. Harrison’s] residence” during a sixteen-day period in February 2023. It reasoned, however, that “[t]he proximity and timing of the incidents . . . [were] not so close to each other as to strongly suggest the commonality required for joinder in this case.” Although the suspect was described as “wearing black and/or grey clothing” in each incident and a black mask in four of the five, 5 the court determined that this attire was not unusual in the commission of such crimes. With regard to the Smoothie King, Wingstop, and 7-Eleven incidents, the court observed that the suspect had “show[n] or brandished what appeared to be a black rifle” in each and that police had found evidence in Mr. Harrison’s home implicating him in those crimes. The court reasoned, however, that evidence relating to any one of those incidents wouldn’t necessarily be admissible in a trial on each of the others. Although the court didn’t foreclose entirely the possibility that some of the evidence might be cross-admissible, it concluded that joinder of all nine charges would be “unduly prejudicial.” At a status hearing on April 15, 2024, the circuit court scheduled five separate trials on the severed charges. At the State’s request, it scheduled the Wingstop armed robbery counts to proceed first, with trial to commence on October 28, 2024. The court allotted three days for that trial and a total of ten days for the remaining four. C. Motion In Limine On May 30, 2024, the State moved in limine to introduce certain “other crimes” evidence of the other four incidents at Mr. Harrison’s trial on the Wingstop armed robbery charges. In that motion, the State argued that the proffered evidence was admissible to establish Mr. Harrison’s identity as the Wingstop gunman and to demonstrate that the offenses were committed as “part of a common scheme to rob businesses in and nearby the Shady Grove Shopping Center.” Among other things, the State sought to introduce surveillance footage from the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven robberies that depicted a suspect with Mr. Harrison’s “basic physical characteristics” who wore clothing similar to items recovered from his residence 6 later. The State also sought to admit evidence that the gunman in those incidents had used “a slim black rifle” resembling the weapon wielded during the Wingstop robbery, which, in turn, matched the rifle recovered from Mr. Harrison’s residence. The State proffered further that a detective would testify that he saw Mr. Harrison return to the 7-Eleven three days after it was robbed, retrieve the rifle, and conceal it in the same manner as had the gunman during the Smoothie King, 7-Eleven, and Wingstop incidents—with the “barrel tucked down a pant leg and the stock covered by his jacket.” D. The Motion Hearing On June 28, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s motion. At the outset, the State narrowed its request and advised the court that it sought to introduce other crimes evidence only from the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven incidents. It then called Detective Schmidt as its sole witness and elicited the testimony summarized above. After Detective Schmidt had finished testifying, the court heard argument from both parties. For its part, the State maintained that evidence pertaining to the Smoothie King, 7-Eleven, and Wingstop offenses was mutually admissible as identity evidence to prove that the same suspect had committed all of them. The State asserted further that the court’s severance of the charges by incident—coupled with the narrowed scope of the State’s motion—sufficiently mitigated any danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Harrison. In other words, the State relied on the earlier severance ruling to support its in limine argument. Defense counsel responded that evidence suggesting “that the same person committed the crimes” did not satisfy the identity exception to the rule against other crimes evidence. Counsel argued that to satisfy that exception, the offenses must have been 7 committed in so “unusual and distinctive” a manner “as to be like a signature . . . .” Counsel maintained that the asserted similarities among the offenses did not meet that requirement. Although defense counsel acknowledged that the court was not bound by the earlier decision to sever the counts, she stressed that the standard the State had invoked in opposing severance required a different analysis than the standard governing the admissibility of other crimes evidence. In rebuttal, the State addressed the court’s initial severance ruling. It asserted that although the prior judge had found the evidence not mutually admissible as to all five incidents, that ruling did not preclude the admission at one trial of other crimes evidence concerning some, but not all, of the other incidents. The State emphasized further that evidence from the Smoothie King, 7-Eleven, and Wingstop incidents indicated that each involved a suspect of similar build who wore a black jacket and carried what appeared to be a long black firearm in his pants. Turning to its alternative theory that the other crimes evidence was admissible to show a common scheme, the State reiterated that the suspect “sought to rob commercial businesses near where he resided.” E. The Court’s Ruling After hearing argument, the circuit court announced its ruling from the bench. It began by setting forth the three-part test governing the admissibility of other crimes evidence: The [c]ourt engages in a three-step process to determine if other crimes evidence is admissible: [O]ne, I must determine if the evidence fits within an established exception to [the rule against] other crimes evidence, those being motive[,] intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, identity, 8  opportunity, preparation and knowledge; two, if there is an exception which applies, I then must decide if the defendant’s involvement is established by clear[] [and] convincing evidence; finally, the [c]ourt must weigh the necessity for and the probative value of the other crimes evidence against any undue prejudice likely to result from the evidence’s admission. The court then made factual findings about each of the three incidents at issue. The court found that the Smoothie King surveillance footage showed a suspect wearing gray sweatpants and carrying “a reddish phone” walk into the establishment at approximately 8:30 p.m. on February 21, 2023, and draw “a long gun” from his waist area. The suspect was described as 5’10” tall, thin, and wearing a “black mask.” Turning to the Wingstop robbery, which occurred four days later at around midnight, the court found that video footage depicted the suspect entering the restaurant, “jump[ing] onto the counter,” and pointing a rifle at employees. Witnesses described the assailant as 5’9” to 5’10” tall, weighing between 150 and 160 pounds, and “wearing all black and a black face mask.” The court also found that two money bags and a Guess purse were taken from the restaurant. Finally, the court addressed the 7-Eleven robbery, which occurred three days later at 2:20 p.m., less than a mile from the Fallsgrove Shopping Center, where the first two incidents had occurred. It found that surveillance footage showed the suspect pacing inside the store before approaching the counter, “brandish[ing] a rifle directly at the clerk[,]” and taking cash from the register and a “camo wallet” from a customer. In summarizing the ensuing investigation, the court recounted that the police had executed a search warrant at Mr. Harrison’s residence a few days after the final robbery. 9 The court observed that the search yielded a red iPhone, a BB rifle resembling the weapon used in all three incidents, “black hoodie jackets” like the one the suspect had worn at each establishment, and a pair of gray sweatpants bearing a triangular logo similar to that described by the Smoothie King employees. In applying the first prong of the other crimes analysis, the circuit court concluded that the proffered evidence fell within the identity exception to the exclusionary rule. The court determined that the attire and “camo wallet” recovered from Mr. Harrison’s residence resembled the clothing worn by the suspect in the surveillance footage and the wallet taken from the 7-Eleven customer. The court noted that in assessing the admissibility of other crimes evidence, each item need not “be in each and every one of the offenses, but when it ties together, that is where the evidence does become relevant and admissible.” At the second step of its other crimes analysis, the court found that Mr. Harrison’s involvement in each incident had been “established by clear and convincing evidence[,]” citing the close geographic and temporal proximity of the crimes. Finally, the court balanced the necessity for and probative value of the proffered evidence against the danger of undue prejudice and concluded that the former outweighed the latter. In so doing, it reasoned that when viewed separately, the evidence pertaining to each incident provided little basis for identifying the gunman. After balancing the probative value and danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven evidence in a trial on the Wingstop charges, the circuit court found that the “common scheme” exception to the other crimes rule also applied. It based that conclusion on the close proximity of the incidents, their occurrence at commercial 10 establishments, and the use of a rifle in each offense, which the court described as “an unusual weapon to be displayed . . . .” The court then—on its own, without a motion or any sort of request from the State, and notwithstanding Maryland Rule 4-253’s direction that “either party may move for a joint trial of the charges”—took its prior bad acts ruling and (re)joined the Smoothie King, Wingstop, and 7-Eleven cases for trial: [N]ow that I find that all of the evidence is mutually admissible, it makes no sense whatsoever to have three different trials, and although it is certainly not anyone’s desire to routinely engage in reconsidering evidentiary rulings, the [c]ourt is free to do so. It is time for courts to reconsider rulings made earlier in the stage of the trial preceding the motions hearing and so the [c]ourt will join for trial the three cases involving Smoothie King, Wingstop[,] and the 7-Eleven. The court memorialized that oral ruling in a written order entered on July 2, 2024. Mr. Harrison pleaded not guilty to the charges arising from the Smoothie King, Wingstop, and 7-Eleven incidents, which included two counts of attempted armed robbery (Counts 2 and 3) and four counts of armed robbery (Counts 4 through 7). On January 21, 2025, the consolidated cases proceeded to a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the court found Mr. Harrison guilty on all counts. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION In deciding whether to join or sever charges for trial, Maryland courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine “whether evidence as to each of the accused’s individual offenses would be ‘mutually admissible’ at separate trials concerning the 11 offenses[.]” Cortez v. State, 220 Md. App. 688, 694 (2014). If the evidence is mutually admissible, the court considers second “whether ‘the interest in judicial economy outweighs any other arguments favoring severance[.]’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 553 (1997)). In challenging the joinder of the Smoothie King, Wingstop, and 7-Eleven charges, Mr. Harrison contends that the court failed to apply either prong of the governing analysis properly. He advances two principal arguments. First, Mr. Harrison asserts that the court failed to conduct a complete mutual admissibility analysis of the evidence relating to all three incidents. Second, he claims that the court abused its discretion by applying the “other crimes admissibility weighing analysis” rather than the joinder balancing test. As a result, Mr. Harrison argues, the court both “failed to give the prejudice to . . . [him] its due weight” and balanced that potential prejudice improperly against the probative value of the evidence rather than against the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. With respect to Mr. Harrison’s mutual admissibility argument, the State responds that the court “was not required to spell out every step of its decision-making,” but was entitled instead simply to “announce its conclusion that the evidence was mutually admissible based upon the extensive record before it.” As to Mr. Harrison’s assertion that the court failed to afford sufficient weight to the danger of unfair prejudice, the State counters that “the case law does not support his claim that prejudice weighs ‘significantly more heavily’ in the case of joinder” than under an other crimes admissibility analysis. Finally, the State maintains that the court’s statement that “‘it makes no sense whatsoever to have three different trials . . . demonstrate[d] that [it] properly considered judicial 12 economy against any potential prejudice to [Mr. Harrison].” A. The Circuit Court Erred By Failing To Conduct A Complete Mutual Admissibility Analysis. In challenging the adequacy of the circuit court’s mutual admissibility analysis, Mr. Harrison acknowledges that the court addressed “the admissibility of the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven [evidence] at trial for the Wingstop [charges].” He maintains, however, that those were only two of the “six assessments of one-directional admissibility” that the court was required to make. He asserts that the court failed to consider whether (1) the Smoothie King and Wingstop evidence would have been admissible at a trial on the 7-Eleven charges; and (2) the 7-Eleven and Wingstop evidence would have been admissible at a trial on the Smoothie King charges. The State doesn’t dispute that the mutual admissibility determination required six one-directional admissibility analyses, nor does it deny that the circuit court expressly conducted only two of them. The State maintains, however, that the court was not required to “state[] six times how the evidence of each crime would be mutually admissible at a trial for each of the other offenses.” Rather, the State asserts that the court’s statement that “all of the evidence is mutually admissible[,]” coupled with the presumption that the court knew and properly applied the law, establishes sufficiently that it conducted the requisite analyses. We agree with Mr. Harrison. Whether evidence is mutually admissible is a question of law that we review de novo. See Hart v. State, 260 Md. App. 491, 527 (2024) (explaining that the question of mutual admissibility “involves a legal determination, which we review without deference 13 to the trial court”). “‘Mutual admissibility’ means that ‘evidence of each crime would be admissible in a trial for the other.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Bussie v. State, 115 Md. App. 324, 333 (1997)). As Mr. Harrison observes correctly, “‘[m]utual admissibility’ consists of multiple unidirectional determinations of admissibility.” Bussie, 115 Md. App. at 333. A determination of whether evidence of two offenses is mutually admissible “consists of two determinations of one-directional admissibility.” Solomon v. State, 101 Md. App. 331, 341 (1994). Where, as here, the joined charges arise from three separate incidents, the court must conduct six unidirectional admissibility analyses. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 549 n.1 (“When there are three offenses, . . . there will be six analyses of admissibility . . . .”). In making each one-directional admissibility determination, “a trial court conducts the same analysis that it would conduct in determining whether evidence of other crimes or wrongs would be admissible under Rule 5-404(b).” Hart, 260 Md. App. at 527. Although presumptively inadmissible in a criminal trial, “other crimes” evidence “‘may be admitted . . . if it is substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and if it is not offered to prove the defendant’s guilt based on propensity to commit crime or his character as a criminal.’” Harper v. State, 162 Md. App. 55, 89 (2005) (quoting State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634 (1989)). Maryland Rule 5-404(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of permissible purposes for which other crimes evidence may be properly admitted, including “as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, 14 identity, absence of mistake or accident, or in conformity with Rule 5-413.”3 Against this backdrop, the circuit court erred when it made only two one-directional admissibility determinations as it announced its initial ruling on the State’s motion in limine. The court was answering a different question at the time of its ruling—it was deciding whether to admit other crimes evidence at the trial of the Wingstop charges, not whether to re-join the cases (again, without a motion). The court considered and concluded only that the evidence concerning both the Smoothie King and the 7-Eleven incidents was admissible at trial on the Wingstop charges under the identity exception to the rule against other crimes evidence. After supplementing that conclusion with a determination that the “common scheme or plan” exception also applied, the court stated: “[N]ow that I find that all of the evidence is mutually admissible, it makes no sense whatsoever to have three different trials . . . .” Read in context, we understand that statement as incorporating by reference the Rule 5-404(b) determinations the court had just made. But because those determinations exclusively addressed the admissibility of the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven evidence at a separate trial on the Wingstop charges, they resolved only two of the six one-directional inquiries the court would have had to make if it had been performing the re-joinder analysis at the time, which it wasn’t. In insisting that the circuit court “consider[ed] the mutual admissibility of all the 3 Rule 5-413 states that “[i]n prosecutions for sexually assaultive behavior as defined in Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 10-923(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), evidence of other sexually assaultive behavior by the defendant occurring before or after the offense for which the defendant is on trial may be admitted in accordance with CJ § 10-923.” 15 evidence to the three offenses[,]” the State invokes the “strong presumption that judges properly perform their duties.” Colkley v. State, 251 Md. App. 243, 275 (2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Although “not rebutted by silence,” the presumption that a court knows and properly applies the law “may very well be rebutted by what the [court] says or, depending upon the circumstances or the context, by what [it] does not say.” Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 80 (1986), superseded on other grounds by Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 531–32 (2008). Here, the court’s stated reasoning reveals the scope of the analysis it performed, and we decline to stretch the presumption as far as the State would, especially in light of the earlier decision to sever these cases. Although the circuit court wasn’t required to articulate every step of its mutual admissibility analysis, we can’t disregard the reasoning that the court offered initially and then incorporated by reference into its joinder ruling. That rationale addressed only the admissibility of the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven evidence at the Wingstop trial and didn’t include the other four one-directional admissibility determinations required to establish mutual admissibility. Nor did the court supplement its earlier analysis with those determinations when it made its joinder decision.4 We hold that the court didn’t perform a complete mutual admissibility analysis when it re-joined the Wingstop case with the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven cases for trial. 4 We don’t read the court’s reference to “all of the evidence” as making four additional mutual admissibility determinations that were neither addressed nor otherwise reflected in the rationale the court articulated. 16  B. The Circuit Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Perform The Joinder Balancing Test. That conclusion doesn’t, however, require automatically that we reverse all six convictions arising from the joint trial in this case. In addressing whether misjoinder warrants reversal, this Court has “consistently determined that ‘the remedy for a misjoinder need be no broader than the harm.’” Bussie, 115 Md. App. at 339 (quoting Wieland v. State, 101 Md. App. 1, 19 (1994)). “A one-directional inadmissibility only calls for a one-directional reversal and remand.” Wieland, 101 Md. App. at 19. See also Kearney v. State, 86 Md. App. 247, 253–55 (1991) (holding that an erroneous mutual admissibility determination required reversal of a kidnapping conviction tainted by inadmissible murder evidence, but not of the murder conviction because evidence of the kidnapping would have been admissible in a separate trial on that charge). Relief from misjoinder extends only to the convictions affected by the error. Although the record doesn’t reflect that the court conducted a complete mutual admissibility analysis, it does reflect the express conclusion that the Smoothie King and 7-Eleven evidence was admissible at a trial on the Wingstop charges. Because Mr. Harrison doesn’t challenge the court’s analysis or conclusion in that regard, his convictions on those charges are not subject to reversal solely for the failure to make the remaining four one-directional determinations. Whether the joinder ruling requires reversal of those convictions depends on whether the court properly performed the second step of the joinder analysis. Mr. Harrison argues that the court didn’t perform the second step properly, and that 17 the circuit court abused its discretion by applying the “other crimes admissibility weighing analysis” rather than the joinder balancing test. Although both inquiries require courts to consider the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, Mr. Harrison asserts that prejudice “weighs significantly more heavily” under the latter framework than the former. Accordingly, he claims, the court “failed to give the prejudice to [him] its due weight.” He further argues that the court balanced the wrong considerations by weighing prejudice against probative value rather than against judicial economy and efficiency. The State acknowledges “the difference between an ‘other crimes’ and a ‘joinder’ analysis . . . .” It maintains, however, that “the case law does not support [Mr. Harrison’s] claim that prejudice weighs ‘significantly more heavily’ in the case of joinder” than under an other crimes admissibility analysis. The State also disputes Mr. Harrison’s contention that the court failed to consider judicial economy. It argues that the court’s statement that “‘it makes no sense whatsoever to have three different trials’ . . . demonstrate[d] that the court properly considered judicial economy against any potential prejudice to [Mr. Harrison].” The joinder and other crimes doctrines overlap only at the mutual admissibility stage, when the court must “ascertain if evidence of each crime would be admissible in a trial for the other . . . .” Bussie, 115 Md. App. at 333. See also Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 342 (“The two different bodies of law, however, only overlap to this limited extent.”). From there, the analyses diverge and the joinder and other crimes analyses call for distinct balancing tests. See Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 345 (“There is . . . a vast qualitative difference between the two weighing operations.”). In the joinder context, a court doesn’t 18 weigh prejudice against “probative value and need as one might in the evidentiary context.” Id. at 373. See also Conyers, 345 Md. at 556 (“[T]he balancing test required by Faulkner has no part in a joinder analysis.”). Conversely, “[i]n ‘other crimes’ determinations, judicial economy is not an issue.” Bussie, 115 Md. App. at 332. See also Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 346 (“[T]he interest of judicial economy . . . is not any part of [the other crimes] weighing process.”). At the final step of the other crimes analysis, a court “must . . . weigh the necessity for and probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice that would result from its admission.” Browne v. State, 486 Md. 169, 193 (2023). In the joinder context, by contrast, a court must determine whether “the interest in judicial economy outweigh[s] any other arguments favoring severance[.]” Conyers, 345 Md. at 553. The court balances “the ‘likely prejudice’ to the defendant if the charges are tried together, against ‘considerations of judicial economy and efficiency, including the time and resources of both the court and the witnesses.’” Hart, 260 Md. App. at 531 (quoting Cortez, 220 Md. App. at 694). In assessing the likely prejudice to the accused, a trial court should consider whether and to what extent joinder causes confusion, guilt by association, or conflation: “First, [the defendant] may become embarrassed, or confounded in presenting separate defenses. . . . Secondly, the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if the offenses were considered separately, it would not do so. At the very least, the joinder of multiple charges may produce a latent hostility, which by itself may cause prejudice to the defendant’s case. Thirdly, the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged, or a connected group of them, to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which he may also be found guilty of other crimes charged.” 19 Graves v. State, 298 Md. 542, 545 (1984) (quoting McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 609 (1977)). When balanced against such potential prejudice, “‘judicial economy is a heavy counterweight on the joinder/severance scales.’” Cortez, 220 Md. App. at 697 (quoting Solomon, 101 Md. App. at 346). A court’s assessment of unfair prejudice under the other crimes doctrine can’t substitute for the required balancing of judicial economy against the prejudice arising from joinder. The process of weighing prejudice against judicial economy is committed to the circuit court’s sound discretion, see Conyers,