State v. Palmer

State of Maryland v. Marconi Palmer, Jr., No. 50, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Eaves, J. ALCOHOL-RELATED DRIVING OFFENSES – SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE – “NO REASONABLE TRIER OF FACT” STANDARD The Supreme Court of Maryland reaffirmed its holding in Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174 (2010), that the proper standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in all criminal cases is the “no reasonable trier of fact” standard, announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Applying the appropriate “no reasonable trier of fact” standard, the Supreme Court held that a reasonable jury could find that the respondent committed the essential elements of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while impaired by alcohol. Specifically, the State produced evidence that the respondent negligently drove the vehicle involved in a single-vehicle accident, whereby the vehicle veered off a dry roadway and struck a speed-limit sign; and that the respondent exhibited signs of intoxication once law enforcement arrived on the scene, including bloodshot eyes, slurred and lethargic speech, repeatedly asking one police officer for his name, and inconsistently claiming that (1) he had called and was waiting for a tow truck and (2) all he needed to do was inflate a tire and would be on his way. Circuit Court for Somerset County Case No. C-19-CR-23-000067 Argued: April 8, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 50 September Term, 2025 STATE OF MARYLAND v. MARCONI PALMER, JR. Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. Opinion by Eaves, J. Gould, J., concurs. Filed: July 23, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.23 15:42:22 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  I INTRODUCTION In this case, a jury in the Circuit Court for Somerset County convicted the Respondent, Marconi Palmer, Jr., for, among other crimes, driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. Mr. Palmer appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain those convictions. The Appellate Court of Maryland agreed, noting that the State failed to present “specific evidence” that Mr. Palmer was intoxicated while he operated the motor vehicle.1 While the State presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Palmer (1) drove the vehicle in question—even negligently so—and (2) was intoxicated at the scene of the accident once law enforcement arrived, the Appellate Court nevertheless held that the State’s evidence was insufficient to bridge those two events to sustain the convictions.2 The State appealed, and we granted a writ of certiorari in this case3 to answer the following questions, which we slightly have rephrased: 1. Did the Appellate Court err by requiring the State to present “specific evidence” that Mr. Palmer was under the influence or impaired by alcohol at the time he was driving, rather than relying on rational inferences from the evidence? 1 Palmer v. State, 266 Md. App. 693, 722 (2025) (citation omitted). 2 Id. at 722–25. 3 State v. Palmer, 492 Md. 698 (2025).  2. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Palmer’s convictions for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol? For the reasons discussed more fully below, we hold that the standard for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction is the same for all criminal cases. To the extent that the Appellate Court’s opinion can be read to require a different standard for convictions for alcohol-related driving offenses, we reject that holding. Assessing the record in this case, we hold that the State produced sufficient evidence, so we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, reinstating Mr. Palmer’s convictions. II BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On September 17, 2022, Mr. Palmer spent the day with his girlfriend, Jessica Lukasz.4 Ms. Lukasz last saw Mr. Palmer that day around 8:00 p.m. after they parted ways from a barbecue. During their time together at the barbecue, Ms. Lukasz did not see 4 The transcript of the trial testimony contains various spellings of Ms. Lukasz’s last name. We settle on Ms. Lukasz because (1) that is how her name is written on various subpoenas throughout the record, (2) that is how her name is written on the State’s requested voir dire, listing Ms. Lukasz as a potential witness, and (3) that is how her name is spelled on the record at a September 2023 motions hearing. When Ms. Lukasz testified a trial, she did not spell her name for the record. To the extent we are incorrect about the spelling of Ms. Lukasz’s last name, it is unintentional. Additionally, although Ms. Lukasz testified that she and Mr. Palmer were, at least as of the time of her trial testimony, only dating, she referred to him as her “husband.” Ms. Lukasz nevertheless clarified that she and Mr. Palmer are “not legally married[.]” We describe their relationship accordingly. 2 Mr. Palmer consume alcohol. Later, at approximately 11:35 p.m., Maryland State Trooper Jacob Barfield responded to the scene of a single-vehicle accident in Somerset County, in the area of Somerset Avenue and Route 822.5 Maryland State Trooper Logan Bynum, as well as other law enforcement from the Princess Anne Police Department, arrived on scene approximately five minutes later.6 Upon his arrival, Trooper Barfield observed a silver Kia SUV “completely off the roadway[,]” by approximately 10 feet, in a grassy, wet ditch. A fog line separated the right side of the roadway, which was dry, from the grassy, wet area where the Kia rested. Trooper Barfield noticed that the Kia had struck a nearby speed limit sign, resulting in damage to the Kia and pulling the sign out of the ground. It is unknown what time the accident occurred or for how long the Kia was there prior to law enforcement’s arrival. Mr. Palmer, whose identity was not then known to law enforcement, stood approximately 15 feet from the Kia, and there were approximately four to five other people present at the scene, as well as another passenger vehicle parked on the road nearby. Trooper Barfield asked Mr. Palmer if he was injured or needed medical treatment, 5 Trooper Barfield testified that he arrived at the scene between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. In a stipulation filed after oral arguments in the Appellate Court of Maryland, the parties indicated that the evidence collectively revealed that Trooper Barfield, in fact, arrived around 11:35 p.m. Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 699 n.1. 6 Trooper Barfield’s encounter with Mr. Palmer was captured via a microphone on Trooper Barfield’s duty belt that recorded audio; Trooper Barfield also had a camera on the dashboard of his police cruiser. Trooper Bynum’s investigation and interactions with Mr. Palmer were recorded via his body-worn camera. Both devices noted the time of those recordings. 3 and Mr. Palmer confirmed that he did not. Trooper Barfield detected the smell of alcohol on Mr. Palmer’s breath and noticed that Mr. Palmer’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that he had slow and lethargic speech. During his encounter with law enforcement, Mr. Palmer stated “it was an accident[,] and everything is good, that’s how it happened . . . on the road.” Mr. Palmer also conveyed both that he planned to “pump up” his tire and depart the scene and that a tow truck was coming to assist him but refused to elaborate further. At one point during their interaction, however, an unidentified individual said, “Hey, Jerry . . . just call, just call a truck.” Trooper Barfield specifically noted that during their encounter, Mr. Palmer asked him what Trooper Barfield’s name was about four times. At certain points, when Trooper Barfield would explain that he was there to investigate a traffic accident, Mr. Palmer appeared to attempt to explain that he was not engaged in the act of “trafficking.” Whenever law enforcement asked Mr. Palmer to provide identification or answer questions, he would refuse and invoke the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. At some point, law enforcement learned that Ms. Lukasz was the owner of the Kia. Ms. Lukasz would later confirm that she did not have her car that night, owns only one set of keys to operate her vehicle, and that whoever had the keys would have been operating the vehicle. Mr. Palmer declined to participate in any standard field sobriety tests. Trooper Barfield subsequently placed Mr. Palmer under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Immediately following this arrest, Trooper Barfield searched Mr. Palmer and discovered a key fob to the Kia in Mr. Palmer’s pocket. Around the same 4 time, Trooper Bynum conducted an inventory search of the Kia, as the vehicle was going to be towed to a State storage facility.7 During that search, Trooper Bynum discovered a card that bore Mr. Palmer’s name. Trooper Bynum also discovered a miniature bottle of Fireball liquor outside of, but near, the Kia. Trooper Bynum did not see the bottle of Fireball come out of the Kia. Law enforcement continued to notice the odor of alcohol on Mr. Palmer as they transported him from the scene of the accident to a nearby barrack. After Mr. Palmer was eventually processed, he was released around 6:00 a.m. the following morning. B. Procedural History 1. The Circuit Court for Somerset County In September 2022, Mr. Palmer was charged in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Somerset County with a litany of traffic offenses, including driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. Mr. Palmer requested a trial by jury, and the case was subsequently transferred to the Circuit Court for Somerset County. Mr. Palmer’s jury trial took place in October 2023. At trial, the State called Troopers Barfield and Bynum and Ms. Lukasz. Through those individuals, the State elicited testimony consistent with the facts recounted above. 7 Excluding one person, law enforcement did not identify the other individuals present at the scene. As Trooper Barfield explained, because the owner of the vehicle, Ms. Lukasz, was, “to the best of [his] knowledge[,]” not on scene, and because he was “unable to identify [Mr. Palmer] or [Mr. Palmer’s] relation to [Ms. Lukasz], [he] had no way to contact or tell [Ms. Lukasz] where [her] vehicle was going.” 5  After the close of the State’s case, Mr. Palmer moved for judgment of acquittal as to all charges. The circuit court granted the motion as to certain counts not relevant here but denied the motion as to Counts II (driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol), III (driving or attempting to drive a vehicle while impaired by alcohol), IV (driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway without a required license), VIII (negligent driving), IX (failure of individual driving on a highway to display a license to a uniformed police officer upon demand), XIII (failure to control vehicle speed on a highway to avoid a collision), and XIV (failure to obey designated lane directions). For its case, the defense called a single witness, Antoinette Cosar, Mr. Palmer’s mother. Among other testimony, Ms. Cosar corroborated Ms. Lukasz’s testimony that there was only one key to the Kia. At the close of the defense’s case, Mr. Palmer, among other legal arguments, renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the circuit court denied. The jury subsequently convicted Mr. Palmer of all seven remaining counts. As to Count II, the circuit court sentenced Mr. Palmer to five months and twenty-nine days, with credit for thirty-eight days served. On Count IV, the court imposed sixty days consecutive to Count II. All other convictions were merged for purposes of sentencing. Mr. Palmer noted a timely appeal. 2. The Appellate Court of Maryland In a reported opinion, the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Palmer’s convictions. Palmer v. State, 266 6 Md. App. 693, 699 (2025). As relevant for this appeal, the court reversed Mr. Palmer’s convictions for Counts II and III for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of and impaired by alcohol, as well as for another count not relevant here, but affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in other respects, including a conviction for negligent driving. Id. Concerning the alcohol-related counts, the court unanimously agreed that the totality of evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficiently supported a reasonable inference that Mr. Palmer drove the Kia off the roadway and into the ditch where he first encountered law enforcement. Id. at 708–11. The court also unanimously agreed that no case has “directly explored how such a significant passage of time between the time of the violation and the time the officers arrived on the scene could affect the State’s burden to prove that the driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time he was driving the vehicle.” Id. at 711–12 (citation modified); see also id. at 726 (Zic, J., concurring and dissenting). But the panel split over whether the evidence admitted at trial was legally sufficient to sustain Mr. Palmer’s conviction of driving under the influence of or while impaired by alcohol. Contrast id. at 711–24 (majority opinion), with id. at 728–731 (Zic, J., concurring and dissenting). Concluding that it did not, the court held: The mere fact that [Mr. Palmer] was found under the influence of alcohol at the scene of a single-vehicle accident does not support a finding that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time he drove the vehicle. To prove a critical element of the crime, the State needed to offer specific evidence that [Mr. Palmer] was under the influence or impaired at the time [he] was driving. 7 Id. at 721–22 (majority opinion) (emphases added) (citation modified). In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on a previous opinion from this Court, Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314 (1976). Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 708–13. The court further examined case law from other jurisdictions, including State v. Sanford, 108 A.2d 516 (Vt. 1954), a case cited with approval by us in Thomas, as well as case law from Missouri and Texas. Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 713–22. The court ultimately embraced the approach adopted by Missouri, finding its approach “analytically more persuasive[]” because it focuses on “the ‘temporal connection between [a] defendant’s last operation of a motor vehicle and [their] observed intoxication.’” Id. at 721 (quoting State v. Hatfield, 351 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)). The Appellate Court concluded that the Missouri approach is “more consistent with the underpinnings of [this] Court’s decision in Thomas, particularly in light of the Thomas Court’s citation of Sanford with approval.” Id. at 721. In the Appellate Court’s view, the State “established only that [Mr. Palmer] drove the Kia and that he was under the influence of alcohol when the police arrived at the scene. The State failed to present any evidence as to when [Mr. Palmer] began drinking or how much alcohol he consumed[,]” failing to account for the 3.5-hour gap between the time Mr. Palmer was last seen and the time officers arrived on the scene of the accident. Id. at 722. The Honorable Terrence M. R. Zic saw the matter differently. He concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally infer that Mr. Palmer drove the Kia while under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 726–31 (Zic, J., concurring and dissenting). 8 Judge Zic reasoned that Thomas, and its reliance on the Supreme Court of Vermont’s opinion in Sanford, proved inapplicable to the facts in the case at hand. Id. at 728. Specifically, Judge Zic emphasized that a “significant difference in evidentiary standards” existed between the standard employed in Sanford, which, at the time we decided Thomas, was the same, and the current state of the law in Maryland. Id. at 727. Judge Zic instead turned to Maryland case law and believed that Mr. Palmer’s case was more analogous to, among other cases, Gore v. State, 74 Md. App. 143 (1988), Dukes v. State, 178 Md. App. 38 (2008), and Harding v. State, 223 Md. App. 289 (2015). Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 728–31 (Zic, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Zic concluded: Similarly to Gore and Dukes, there is no direct evidence in the record of when the vehicle [in Mr. Palmer’s case] had been driven. Unlike those cases, however, we do know that the accident occurred within an approximate window of three-and-a-half hours. While the time gap, and the bottle of Fireball whiskey found at the scene, make it possible that Mr. Palmer became intoxicated after the accident, . . . it is a question for the jury to resolve. If the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction when the State presented no evidence of a specific timeline, then certainly the evidence should be sufficient to permit the jury to consider the possibility that Mr. Palmer was driving under the influence of alcohol when the State presented evidence to support a time gap of, at most, three-and-a-half hours. The inference that Mr. Palmer was under the influence of alcohol while driving need only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or inescapable. Id. at 730–31 (citation modified). III STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland appellate courts apply a deferential standard when reviewing questions of evidentiary sufficiency that asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 9 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 (2010). We neither reweigh the record so as to engage in a retrial of the case nor answer whether the State has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nguyen v. State, 492 Md. 179, 197–98 (2025). IV ANALYSIS At trial, the State was required to present sufficient evidence—direct, circumstantial, or a combination of the two—for a rational jury to conclude that Mr. Palmer drove the Kia while intoxicated. The Appellate Court erred when it concluded that the State had not presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find the essential elements of the crimes for which Mr. Palmer was convicted, i.e., that Mr. Palmer drove the vehicle while (1) under the influence of alcohol and (2) impaired by alcohol. For the reasons articulated more fully below, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. A. The Standard Applicable to This Case Is the Same Standard Applicable in All Criminal Cases The State argues that, in the wake of the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), we adopted in Smith the Jackson standard—our current standard—for evaluating whether a criminal conviction rests on sufficient evidence. A standard, the State argues, that is equally applicable to cases that rest on direct or circumstantial evidence (or any combination thereof). The State interprets the Appellate Court to have deviated from that standard by requiring the State to come forth with “specific evidence” that Mr. Palmer drove while intoxicated. The 10 State argues that the Appellate Court adopted an “idiosyncratic, heightened standard of review that is irreconcilable with . . . Smith.” As the State sees it, the Appellate Court’s standard “is tantamount to a requirement that the State adduce direct evidence in DUI and DWI cases[]” and an attempt to resurrect a pre-Smith sufficiency standard. Mr. Palmer concedes that Smith’s adoption of the Jackson standard is controlling and circumstantial evidence holds just as much weight as direct evidence. And he argues that the Appellate Court here recognized both of those principles. After discussing the differences between permissible rational inferences and impermissible conjecture in cases involving circumstantial evidence, Mr. Palmer concludes that the Appellate Court’s opinion “simply recognizes that the State may not rely on an assumption that a person drove drunk in cases where police come upon an intoxicated person at the scene of an accident, when the accident may have happened hours prior.” Rather than a requirement that the State produce direct evidence that a defendant drove while intoxicated, Mr. Palmer reads the Appellate Court’s “specific evidence” language as simply saying that “the State need[ed] to offer evidence specific to the temporal connection” of the state of intoxication and the act of driving and that “the State need[ed] more circumstantial evidence.” We hold that the standard for sufficiency under Maryland law is no different for cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol, than for any other case. The Jackson-Smith framework applies and treats circumstantial evidence the same as direct evidence. We take this opportunity to clarify that the Jackson-Smith framework is applicable to this class of cases just as with others. 11 To the extent that the Appellate Court’s use of the phrase “specific evidence” could be interpreted to require the production of direct evidence, we also take this opportunity to clarify that there is no such requirement. 1. The Jackson-Smith framework and circumstantial evidence In Jackson, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that its prior decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” 443 U.S. at 316. The Court in Jackson held that, “[a]fter Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318. That task does not require a court to ask whether it “believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (citation omitted). Rather, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). In Smith, we clarified that the “any rational trier of fact” standard announced in Jackson “applie[d] to all criminal cases, regardless of whether the conviction rests upon direct evidence, a mixture of direct and circumstantial, or circumstantial evidence alone.” 415 Md. at 185. That clarification was necessary because, as our opinion noted, post- 12 Jackson decisions from this Court oscillated between the Jackson standard and an earlier iteration of the appropriate standard for sufficiency challenges in cases that rested entirely on circumstantial evidence: the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard. Contrast Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 76–77 (2007) (“[W]e review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial by determining whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the [State], supported the conviction of [the defendant], such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citation omitted)), with Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 120 (2006) (“[A] conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court had specifically rejected the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard even before Jackson. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139–40 (1954) (holding that an instruction to the jury “that where the Government’s evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt[]” is “confusing and incorrect[]” because “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence[]”). When reviewing the conclusion of a factfinder, we do not delineate between direct and circumstantial evidence because “generally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003) (citation omitted). Thus, no matter the offense, the State may secure a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence where it permits a factfinder’s rational inference of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 13 doubt. Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 458 (1997) (“A conviction can rest on circumstantial evidence alone.”). Where the evidence supports competing rational inferences, it is the role of the factfinder, not an appellate court, to decide which inference to draw. Smith, 415 Md. at 185 (“[W]e do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”). We have stated that “[a]n inference is a factual conclusion that can rationally be drawn from other facts.” Id. at 183 (alteration in original) (quoting Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 4:1 (7th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2009–2010)). In other words, “[i]f fact A rationally supports the conclusion that fact B is also true, then B may be inferred from A.” Id. (citation omitted). The key word is “rational.” Our cases have long acknowledged that circumstantial evidence permits a factfinder to make rational inferences—not impermissible conjecture. See Taylor, 346 Md. at 458 (noting that circumstantial evidence that “merely arouses suspicion or leaves room for conjecture is obviously insufficient. It must do more than raise the possibility or even the probability of guilt[]” (quoting 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 17, at 29 (6th ed. 1973))); Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 157 (2009) (“[W]hen the evidence equally supports two versions of events, and a finding of guilt requires speculation as to which of the two versions is correct, a conviction cannot be sustained.” (quoting Taylor, 346 Md. at 458)); cf. Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 55 (1898) (“Like any other fact, negligence may be established by the proof of circumstances from which its existence may be inferred. But this inference must, after all, be a legitimate inference and not a mere speculation or conjecture. There must be a logical relation and connection 14 between the circumstances proved and the conclusion sought to be adduced from them.”). And, as our case law has made clear, a rational inference does not become mere conjecture simply because it does not negate every conceivable innocent explanation. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 685–86 n.1, 690 (2012) (holding that the trial court’s use of the pattern jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof, which notes that the State is not “required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence[,]” in conjunction with the instruction that the State “must prove” each offense, was sufficient to adequately instruct the jury); Smith, 374 Md. at 534 (noting a factfinder’s “ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation” and that deference is owed “to the inferences a fact-finder may draw[]” (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). If that were so, then the State would need to prove criminal liability conclusively, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, resurrecting our now-abandoned “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard. See, e.g., Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 412 (1951) (“Before a verdict of guilty is justified, the circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with, or such as to exclude, every reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence.” (citations omitted)). With these principles in mind, we turn to the Appellate Court’s opinion. 2. A requirement to produce direct evidence would be at odds with the Jackson-Smith framework because it creates a heightened burden for the State in cases relying on circumstantial evidence Although we do not interpret the Appellate Court’s opinion, and its use of the phrase “specific evidence,” as the State does, we do not adopt that language, which could be interpreted to harken back to the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard, 15 which is at odds with the Jackson-Smith framework and our equal treatment of circumstantial evidence. The Appellate Court correctly cited the governing standards and principles in its opinion. Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 707–08. But its use of “specific evidence” to describe what the State is required to prove in cases like Mr. Palmer’s has led to the present dispute about what that phrase means in this context. We discuss the cases relied upon by the Appellate Court. In State v. Sanford, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 108 A.2d 516, 517 (Vt. 1954). There, law enforcement responded to a scene where a vehicle’s front wheels had driven off the left side of the road, with the rear left wheel in a ditch and where the right rear wheel “had gouged out the surface of the road to a depth of two or three inches[.]” Id. at 516. The defendant was found asleep in the front seat “with his buttocks under the steering wheel and his head on the seat near the right hand door[;]” police also found both full and empty beer bottles on the floor of the car. Id. at 517. Under Vermont’s standard at the time of Sanford, the State carried the burden of negating “every reasonable hypothesis except that the [defendant] is guilty” when relying solely on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 517 (citations omitted).8 Because there was no direct evidence that the defendant had consumed alcohol and then operated his vehicle, nor any evidence regarding the length of time he had been on the side of the road after the 8 See State v. Derouchie, 440 A.2d 146, 150 (Vt. 1981) (explaining that Vermont would “now join” the jurisdictions that have abandoned the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard). 16 vehicle stopped running, the evidence left “it a matter of conjecture as to whether he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he operated his car, and is not so cogent as to exclude every reasonable theory consistent with his innocence.” Id. Thus, reversal was required. Id. In Thomas, we held that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 277 Md. at 315. There, an officer happened upon the defendant, who appeared to be asleep or passed out in the front seat of his vehicle with the keys in the ignition but the vehicle off. Id. After the officer tapped on the defendant’s window, the defendant had trouble locating the window and door handles, smelled of alcohol, staggered once out of the vehicle, slurred his speech, and appeared disoriented. Id. at 316. To highlight what would satisfy the State’s burden of proof in a case such as this, we discussed various cases from other jurisdictions, including Sanford. Id. at 320–25. We held: All the evidence in this case proves is that [the defendant] was in a vehicle by the side of a road, possibly intoxicated, at an early hour in the morning. Left to conjecture is whether he drove the vehicle to that location after imbibing alcohol or whether he had parked it there, been picked up by some other individual, and then dropped off at the same spot as was done in Poling. We do not know how long [the defendant] had been at this location. Also left to conjecture is whether the vehicle was operable. We may suspect that [the defendant] did not drop down from outer space into the vehicle in question, that he drove the vehicle to that location, and that when he drove it he was under the influence of alcohol. . . . In this instance [the State] has utterly failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime, that [the defendant] drove the vehicle on a public highway while his driving ability was impaired by alcohol. In fact, [the State] has yet to prove that he drove the vehicle. Thus, the conviction must be reversed. 17 Id. at 325–26. To be sure, our citation to Sanford in Thomas emphasized the State’s need to provide evidence that established a defendant was intoxicated while driving and invoked the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard. Critically, however, at the time we decided Thomas, the relevant law prohibited driving, attempting to drive, or being in “actual physical control” of a vehicle while influenced by alcohol. Id. at 315. While the State argued that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle, we noted that the State had not charged the defendant with that act. Id. at 317. Thus, the conviction was reversed because there was no evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle at all. Id. at 325 (“All the evidence in this case proves is that [the defendant] was in a vehicle by the side of a road, possibly intoxicated, at an early hour in the morning.”). The Appellate Court next turned to two cases from the Missouri Court of Appeals: State v. Byron, 222 S.W.3d 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam), and State v. Hatfield, 351 S.W.3d 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). Palmer, 266 Md. App. at 715–19. We discuss those cases in turn. In Byron, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for driving while intoxicated. 222 S.W.3d at 339. There, law enforcement responded to a 9-1-1 call at 1:45 a.m., indicating that a single-car accident had occurred in a construction zone. Id. The responding officer had previously been patrolling that same area as early as 12:40 a.m. and did not report seeing any accident. Id. When police arrived, the vehicle was unoccupied, but it had been driven over several tall traffic cones, and part of the car was hanging over the edge of the road because there currently was no shoulder. Id. The individual who called 9-1-1 also inspected the vehicle and saw no 18 driver. Id. Police searched for the vehicle’s registration information and discovered that it belonged to the defendant. Id. Around 2:00 a.m., law enforcement went to the defendant’s home. Id. at 339–40. The defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, slurred his speech, exhibited trouble with balance, and had mud on his pants consistent with the area in which his vehicle was located. Id. at 340. The defendant denied knowing anything about the accident, claiming that his father had borrowed his vehicle. Id. The defendant’s father denied borrowing the car and informed officers that the defendant had called him asking him (the father) to pick up the defendant because he had just been in an accident. Id. The father indicated that he picked up the defendant at a “Food 4 Less” about one-quarter mile from the scene of the accident. Id. The father took the defendant home and told officers that he did not believe the defendant to be intoxicated at that time. Id. They were together about 20 minutes. Id. Law enforcement eventually arrested the defendant for leaving the scene of an accident; a search incident to arrest revealed the keys to the crashed vehicle and a pair of muddy shoes that matched a footprint at the scene of the accident. Id. The defendant subsequently performed and failed standard field sobriety tests. Id. On appeal challenging the sufficiency of his conviction, the Missouri Court of Appeals indicated that the standard of review was whether a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 340–41. The court began its analysis noting that, “[g]enerally, when there is a significant interval of time between the time of an accident and the time that the defendant is observed to be intoxicated, the 19 prosecution must offer specific evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time the defendant was driving.” Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Under preexisting case law, the court noted that “an interval of less than thirty minutes between the accident and the observation of the driv