State of Maine v. Duane D. Hanson

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 96 Docket: And-25-364 Argued: May 6, 2026 Decided: September 10, 2026 Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, LIPEZ, and TAUB, JJ. STATE OF MAINE v. DUANE D. HANSON LIPEZ, J. [¶1] Duane D. Hanson appeals from sixteen judgments of conviction—all stemming from a series of domestic-violence incidents involving a single victim—entered by the trial court (Androscoggin County, Archer, J.) after a jury trial. He contends that the court erred in excluding the proffered testimony of three of his witnesses that the victim told them she was assaulted by persons other than Hanson, in admitting evidence of his prior assaults of the victim, and in conducting the sentencing analysis. We conclude that the proffered testimony, which highlighted inconsistent statements made by the victim, should have been admitted as impeachment evidence, but that the court’s error in excluding the evidence was ultimately harmless. We are unpersuaded by 2 Hanson’s other arguments and discern no error in the court’s sentencing analysis. Accordingly, we affirm all sixteen judgments of conviction. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts [¶2] When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Aldrich, 2026 ME 8, ¶ 2, 353 A.3d 987. [¶3] Hanson and the victim met in May 2023 and began a romantic relationship the following month. During their relationship, they lived together in a tow-behind camper, which they parked at various locations, and sometimes stayed with members of Hanson’s family at an apartment in Livermore Falls. Both regularly used crack cocaine and suboxone pills during their relationship. [¶4] In June 2023, Hanson assaulted the victim for the first time, hitting her and strangling her until she lost consciousness. Hanson physically assaulted the victim on multiple other occasions that summer, resulting in her having black eyes throughout the entirety of their relationship. [¶5] On August 21, 2023, the victim and Hanson were at the Livermore Falls apartment when Hanson became angry because the victim fell asleep on the couch next to him. He hit her several times around her eyes, then strangled  3 her until she lost consciousness. When she came to, she convulsed and exhibited seizure-like symptoms. [¶6] A neighbor heard Hanson yelling and hitting the victim and called 9-1-1. The police officers who responded to the call observed that the victim had two black eyes, bruising on her nose, and a cut on her forehead. Hanson told the officers that the victim sustained the injuries when she tried to pull down the camper awning and it hit her in the face. The victim told the officers a different story—that she had injured herself playing softball with her children. She did not tell the officers the truth because she did not want to get Hanson in trouble. Hanson was not arrested after this incident. [¶7] On another day sometime after the August 21 assault, Hanson hit the victim very hard on the forehead, causing a large gash. [¶8] Around October 11, 2023, Hanson assaulted the victim in the camper, which was parked somewhere in Livermore Falls. Wielding a knife, he held the victim down and threatened to cut out her vagina and make sure she lived through the experience. He also held a machete to her forehead and made additional threats. He hit her and strangled her—using his hands and the strings of her bathing suit—until she passed out. The victim woke up convulsing and urinated on herself. 4 [¶9] The next day, the victim left the camper while Hanson was sleeping and went to her brother’s house in Livermore Falls. She told her brother and his wife that Hanson had assaulted her. Although her eyes were red and full of blood and she had two black eyes, a large cut on her forehead, and bruising around her neck and chin, she refused to go to the hospital or to the police. Instead, at the victim’s request, her brother and his wife took the victim to her mother’s house. [¶10] For a total of about nine days, the victim stayed first with her mother and then with other family members. While staying with her family, the victim began communicating with Hanson via email, and she eventually returned to the camper. [¶11] During a span of three days in late October 2023, Hanson attacked the victim numerous times in the camper, which was parked somewhere in Jay. The first assaults occurred on October 28—Hanson’s birthday—when he became angry that the victim was unable to have sex with him. Over the next three days, Hanson assaulted the victim repeatedly in a variety of ways—he punched her, bit her arms, cut her thigh with a piece of broken glass, and hit her in the face and on her back with the butt end of a machete. On multiple  5 occasions, he strangled her until she passed out. Between these violent outbursts, he cried and expressed remorse. [¶12] At times during this period, the victim’s eyes were so swollen that she could not see. She bled profusely from both eyes and from a cut on her head. Hanson forced her to clean the blood off the floor because the smell made him sick. Despite the ongoing abuse, the victim’s fear of Hanson kept her from trying to escape. Between October 28 and 31, she left the camper only with Hanson. When she did try to sneak out the back door on one occasion, Hanson grabbed her and strangled her until she lost consciousness. [¶13] On November 1, 2023, Hanson drove the victim to his grandmother’s apartment. She was reluctant to go because she did not want anyone to see her injuries. Hanson was insistent, however, and he and the victim concocted a story to explain her injuries—that she had been assaulted by two women and a man—if they got pulled over by police. Hanson left the victim at the grandmother’s apartment, where she told Hanson’s grandmother and several other members of his family that Hanson had caused her injuries. When Hanson returned, he spoke briefly with the victim, then left through the back door just as the victim’s daughter and stepmother arrived. 6 [¶14] Upon seeing the extent of her injuries, the victim’s daughter and stepmother took her from the apartment directly to the hospital, where she remained for about three weeks. Her injuries were severe: she had shattered bones in her face, damage to her eye sockets, a broken nose, a lacerated spleen, a collapsed lung and resultant infection in her chest cavity, and several broken ribs. Her face was also entirely purple with bruising, and she could not see out of her left eye. She had a large cut on her forehead, scabs on the sides of her face, bite marks on her arms and ear, bruising all over her torso, and a cut on her left thigh. [¶15] The victim was still suffering from the lasting effects of these injuries at the time of trial; she testified that she experiences migraine headaches, struggles with short-term memory loss, and often feels fearful and unable to trust people. She has visible scars and still has swelling and bruising around her left eye and discomfort in her forehead. She cannot scream due to damage to her neck. B. Procedure [¶16] Hanson was indicted in Androscoggin County in connection with the August 21 and October 11 incidents and in Franklin County in connection with the late October incident. He faced a series of charges, among them  7 kidnapping, domestic violence elevated aggravated assault, and domestic violence aggravated assault.1 He pleaded no contest to Counts 8 and 9 of the 1 The charges were as follows: Androscoggin County Indictment • Count 1: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(B) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. • Count 2: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 208-D(1)(D), 1604(5)(B) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. (Dismissed before trial.) • Count 3: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(D), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. • Count 4: domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about August 21, 2023. • Count 5: domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. • Count 6: domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(B)(1) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. • Count 7: domestic violence stalking (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C(1)(B)(1) (2026), alleged to have occurred on, about, or between August 21, 2023, and October 12, 2023. • Count 8: violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about August 21, 2023. • Count 9: violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A), alleged to have occurred on or about October 12, 2023. Franklin County Indictment • Count 1: domestic violence elevated aggravated assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-E(1) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 2: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 208-D(1)(D), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 3: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(B), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 4: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(A), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 5: domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)(C), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 6: kidnapping (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3) (2026), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 7: domestic violence stalking (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C(1)(B)(1), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. 8 Androscoggin County indictment and Count 10 of the Franklin County indictment—three charges of violation of condition of release 2—and pleaded not guilty to the remainder of the charges. [¶17] The indictments were joined for trial in Androscoggin County, and the court held an eight-day jury trial in May 2025. Testifying in his own defense, Hanson denied that he had ever assaulted the victim, claimed that he had broken up with her in late September 2023, and stated that he was with a friend in Millinocket from October 29 to November 3, 2023. Hanson’s grandmother, father, and brother each offered testimony in corroboration of Hanson’s alibi, specifically that when the victim came to the grandmother’s apartment around late October or early November, Hanson was not there. • Count 8: domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(B)(1), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 9: domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. • Count 10: violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A), alleged to have occurred on or about October 29, 2023. The statutes setting forth the offenses of domestic violence assault, domestic violence aggravated assault, domestic violence elevated aggravated assault, domestic violence criminal threatening, and domestic violence stalking were all amended in 2023. See P.L. 2023, ch. 465, §§ 2-5, 7-8, 11-12 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. §§ 207-A(1)(A), (B)(3)-(4), 208-D(1)(A)-(D), 208-E(1)(B), 209-A(1)(A), (B)(3)-(4), 210-C(1)(A), (B)(3)-(4)). The effect of these amendments was to expand the class of victims to whom the statutes apply to include “dating partners” as defined in 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(4) (2026) in addition to “family or household members” as defined in section 4102(6) of the same statute. Because the victim in this case was both a “dating partner” and a “family or household member,” these amendments had no effect on the substantive offenses with which Hanson was charged, and we accordingly cite the 2026 versions of these statutes. 2 These charges were therefore not presented to the jury.  9 [¶18] The jury found Hanson guilty of Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Androscoggin County indictment and Counts 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the Franklin County indictment. On the Franklin County indictment, the jury returned not guilty verdicts on Count 1, domestic violence elevated aggravated assault, and Count 6, kidnapping (although the jury found him guilty of criminal restraint (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 302(1)(B)(1) (2026), a lesser-included offense of kidnapping). [¶19] At the sentencing hearing in July 2025, the court concluded that the convictions for Counts 4 and 5 of the Androscoggin County indictment, both for domestic violence assault (Class C), merged with Count 1, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A), of the same indictment.3 It similarly concluded that Count 9, domestic violence assault (Class C), merged with Counts 2 and 3, both domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B and Class A, respectively), of the Franklin County indictment. The court chose Count 3, domestic violence aggravated assault, of the Franklin County indictment as the “primary count” 3 “If the jury could have found that the same conduct formed the basis for both verdicts, then convictions for both offenses violate double jeopardy, and merger is required.” State v. Ali, 2025 ME 30, ¶ 23, 334 A.3d 657. Merger of Count 4 with Count 1 was therefore an error because Count 1 was alleged to have occurred on October 12, 2023, while Count 4 was alleged to have occurred on August 21, 2023, and the jury accordingly could not have found that the same conduct formed the basis for both Count 1 and Count 4. The court acknowledged this error at a hearing on an unrelated motion to correct Hanson’s sentence, but the State chose not to move to correct the sentence to address it. 10 for the purpose of its sentencing analysis. It imposed a sentence of twenty-eight years’ imprisonment for this offense and concurrent sentences for the other offenses. 4 [¶20] Hanson subsequently moved for a reduction of his sentence, which the court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal from his convictions, see M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2)(D), and an application to allow appeal of his sentence, 4 The sentences were as follows: Androscoggin County Convictions • Count 1, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A): twenty-eight years’ imprisonment concurrent with the Franklin County convictions. • Count 3, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B): ten years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 1. • Count 6, domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C): five years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 1. • Count 7, domestic violence stalking (Class C): five years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 1. • Count 8, violation of condition of release (Class E): six months’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 1. • Count 9, violation of condition of release (Class E): six months’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 1. Franklin County Convictions • Count 2, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B): ten years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 3. • Count 3, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class A): twenty-eight years’ imprisonment. • Count 4, domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B): ten years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 3. • Count 6, criminal restraint (Class D): 364 days’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 3. • Count 7, domestic violence stalking (Class C): five years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 3. • Count 8, domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C): five years’ imprisonment concurrent with Count 3. • Count 10, violation of condition of release (Class E): six months’ imprisonment.  11 see M.R. App. P. 20, which we granted and which was automatically consolidated with the appeals from the convictions, see M.R. App. P. 20(g)-(h). II. DISCUSSION A. Excluded Testimony of Victim’s Prior Statements [¶21] Hanson first argues that the court erred by excluding testimony he sought to offer from his grandmother, father, and brother—all of whom testified at trial—that the victim, who also testified, had told them that she was attacked by two women and that an individual named “Casper” to whom she owed drugs hit her in the head with a shovel. Both during voir dire outside the presence of the jury and again when she was cross-examined in front of the jury, the victim denied making the statements, and the court ultimately concluded that extrinsic evidence of the statements was inadmissible. [¶22] On appeal, Hanson contends that the statements were admissible both for their truth—as substantive evidence of alternative suspects—and to impeach the victim’s testimony. He further argues that the court’s exclusion of this evidence violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. 1. Admissibility of the Proposed Testimony as Substantive Evidence of Alternative Suspects [¶23] We do not reach the merits of Hanson’s alternative-suspect argument because we conclude that Hanson waived the argument by 12 representing to the trial court that he did not seek to offer the testimony for its truth that alternative suspects existed. [¶24] “We do not review claims of error that result from a party’s choice of trial strategy.” State v. Woodard, 2013 ME 36, ¶ 31, 68 A.3d 1250. Here, Hanson repeatedly disclaimed any intent to offer the testimony for the truth of its content. See State v. Harding, 2024 ME 67, ¶ 21, 322 A.3d 1175. Before trial, the State, by written motion, sought a ruling excluding any evidence, including the disputed testimony, that someone other than Hanson assaulted the victim. Hanson responded in writing that the testimony was “relevant not for the truth of the matter asserted but to impeach any assertion made by [the victim] at trial that her injuries were caused by [Hanson].” At a hearing on the State’s motion, Hanson again asserted that the statements in question were “an impeachment issue” and that he was “not offering [the statements] for the truth of the matter” but rather “to impeach [the victim’s] testimony that it was Duane Hanson.” He emphasized that he was “not making an offer of proof for an alternative suspect.” [¶25] Later, before Hanson called his grandmother as a witness, he reiterated his position that “from an evidentiary . . . purpose, we are not offering [the statements] for the truth of the matter”; that “they are offered for  13 impeachment purposes”; and that “it is not alternative-suspect evidence.” His attorney stated, “I’ve never presented it as such.” (Emphasis added.) Hanson further proposed that the court admit the evidence subject to a limiting instruction that the jury consider the testimony solely for its bearing on the victim’s credibility. [¶26] By affirmatively stating that he did not seek to present substantive evidence of an alternative suspect and consistently offering the proffered testimony for impeachment purposes only, Hanson waived the issue of its substantive admissibility. See State v. Marin, 2026 ME 68, ¶ 24, --- A.3d --- (concluding that the defendant had waived an argument that evidence was inadmissible by failing to respond to the State’s motion in limine, “specifically stat[ing] that he did not object” to admission of the evidence at trial and agreeing to the court’s proposed jury instructions on the issue); State v. Foster, 2016 ME 154, ¶ 10, 149 A.3d 542 (“We will not review an issue—even for obvious error—when a party has, as a trial strategy, openly acquiesced to the process employed.”); see also State v. Reynolds, 2018 ME 124, ¶ 28, 193 A.3d 168 (“Because [the defendant], having been unsuccessful in his alternative argument before the trial court, has now changed his theory on appeal, we deem his current argument waived.”). 14 [¶27] Hanson counters that he preserved the issue by moving after the close of evidence “to allow an alternative-suspect case.” At the time, he explained that he did not “want the record to be reading like [he had] waived [the] alternative-suspect arguments.” We conclude that although the trial court generously deemed the issue “preserved” and provided a rationale for why the evidence was not substantively admissible, Hanson’s attempt to preserve this issue was in fact too late. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 51 (providing that to show opposition to a court order or action in a criminal matter, “it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which the party desires the court to take” (emphasis added)); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 531-32 (Me. 1978) (“The rule is well established that objections to evidence should be stated at the time it is offered, and with sufficient definiteness to apprise the court and the opposite party of the precise grounds of the objection; and all objections not thus specifically stated, should be held to be waived.” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Samson, 366 A.2d 854, 856 (Me. 1976) (“Failure to [timely object to the court’s action] must be considered as trial strategy and a waiver by the accused of any objection respecting the judicial action involved.”).  15 [¶28] Notably, Hanson did not make a concomitant motion to reopen the evidence.5 Cf. M.R.U. Crim. P. 26(c); State v. Fox, 2017 ME 52, ¶ 32, 157 A.3d 778. Thus, as a practical matter, if the court had agreed that the evidence was admissible under Hanson’s new, but previously disclaimed, legal theory, it is unclear what the court could have done at that point.6 [¶29] Because we conclude that Hanson waived any argument that the victim’s prior statements were admissible for their truth, as opposed to for 5 Such a motion would have posed thorny questions, like whether, in response to evidence suggesting that the victim’s drug associates assaulted her, the court would allow the State to offer competing evidence that it was Hanson, not the victim, who was actively involved in drug trafficking. See State v. White, 460 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Me. 1983) (explaining that in ruling on a motion to reopen, the court should consider several factors, among them “the potential prejudice to the opposing party, . . . the probative value of the proffered evidence, . . . and . . . the moving party’s excuse for the untimeliness of its offer”). For example, in opposing Hanson’s late attempt to preserve an alternative-suspect claim, the State noted that even though it had been “precluded from introducing evidence . . . of [Hanson’s] trafficking and scheduled drug conviction,” Hanson was now arguing that he should be allowed to “suggest to the jury that it was not [he] who [assaulted the victim], but that it was some drug dealer or someone who was upset with [the victim] for buying drugs from them.” 6 At the same time that Hanson sought to raise the waived argument, he also asked for permission to argue in closing that someone else had assaulted the victim. Although the court did not allow explicit argument that there was an alternative perpetrator, it did bless Hanson’s use of certain language attacking the victim’s credibility—specifically, as Hanson argued: [The victim] struggled deeply with addiction, and addiction . . . made [the victim] do things that are embarrassing, and unconscionable, things that led her to be estranged from her family, her daughter living with her dad and stepmom. Ties to her family cut off. If you’re trying to mend those bridges, is it easier to say that in the depths of your addiction, you were led to do things that you’re not proud of to get drugs. Angering other people involved with drugs and similarly dangerous people [or] was [it] easier to say that Duane Hanson did all of it. We know that [the victim’s] accounting of events is inaccurate . . . . (Emphasis added.) On appeal, Hanson argues solely that the court erred in excluding the proposed testimony of his family members regarding the identity of the victim’s assailant—he does not contend that the court erred in limiting the scope of his closing argument. Accordingly, we do not address this issue further. 16 impeachment, we decline to consider it. 7 See Marin, 2026 ME 68, ¶ 24, --- A.3d ---. 2. Admissibility of the Proposed Testimony as Impeachment Evidence [¶30] Hanson next contends that, at a minimum, the proffered evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the victim’s credibility with a prior inconsistent statement. On cross-examination, the victim denied telling Hanson’s family members that she was assaulted by two women and a man. Hanson sought to offer the contrary testimony of the three family members. We agree that the trial court should have admitted the statements 7If we were to reach the merits of Hanson’s argument, we would be unpersuaded that it was obvious error to exclude the statements for their truth. To be admitted, so-called “alternative-suspect evidence” must first be admissible under the Rules of Evidence. See State v. Daly, 2021 ME 37, ¶ 19, 254 A.3d 426. Hanson argues a theory of admissibility not asserted at trial—that the victim’s out-of-court statements that she was attacked by two women and a man named Casper were substantively admissible as statements identifying individuals the victim perceived earlier, see M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). Because this argument is unpreserved, even if we agreed that these were statements of prior identification under Rule 801(d)(1)(C)—an issue we do not decide—we would vacate only upon concluding that the test for obvious error had been met. See State v. Ouellette, 2024 ME 29, ¶¶ 12, 14, 314 A.3d 253. Obvious error is “an error that is plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the court did not obviously err in excluding the statements for their truth. Also unavailing is Hanson’s argument that exclusion of the evidence impaired his federal constitutional due process right to present a defense. We have previously rejected such an argument, holding in Daly that a court’s proper application of our evidentiary rules to exclude alternative-suspect evidence “did not violate [the defendant]’s rights to due process, to present a defense, and to a jury trial.” 2021 ME 37, ¶¶ 26-27, 254 A.3d 426. Hanson does not explain why his case differs from Daly or ask us to revisit our holding in that case, and we decline to do so.  17 as extrinsic impeachment evidence, but for reasons we explain below, infra ¶¶ 38-49, we ultimately conclude that the failure to do so was harmless. [¶31] A party may attempt to impeach a witness by asking the witness about a prior inconsistent statement; if the witness admits to the inconsistent statement, impeachment is complete. See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 607.4 at 291-92 (6th ed. 2007). Where, as here, the witness denies the prior inconsistent statement and a party seeks to prove that statement through the testimony of another witness or other extrinsic evidence, courts must analyze the admissibility of the inconsistent statement under the following framework: (1) [T]he out-of-court statement must truly be inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony, and (2) the impeachment must be on a matter that is ‘relevant’ as opposed to ‘collateral.’ Relevant evidence is that which relates logically to a fact or issue at hand. If the prior inconsistent statement satisfies the conditions for admissibility, the court must further ask whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. Cheney, 2012 ME 119, ¶ 23, 55 A.3d 473 (citations and quotation marks omitted). We review the trial court’s application of this analysis for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 22. [¶32] The proffered evidence satisfies each requirement of the framework. First, the victim’s alleged out-of-court statements—that she told the family members that she was assaulted by two women and a man named 18 Casper—were inconsistent with her trial testimony that Hanson assaulted her, that she reported this to Hanson’s grandmother, father, and brother, and that she did not tell them that she was assaulted by two women and a man. Second, the proffered testimony was relevant to the key issue at trial: whether Hanson was the individual who assaulted her. Third, the evidence was highly probative: when the State’s principal witness is the alleged victim of the crime, “evidence tending to impeach [the victim’s] credibility has greatly enhanced probative value.” State v. Thurlow, 1998 ME 139, ¶ 9, 712 A.2d 518 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90, ¶ 20, 3 A.3d 365 (reasoning that a witness’s credibility “was central to the outcome of the case” and therefore “the probative value of her motivation for potentially fabricating the allegations . . . was substantial”). Finally, we see little risk that the testimony would unfairly prejudice the State. See State v. Forbes, 445 A.2d 8, 12 (Me. 1982) (“[Unfair] prejudice . . . means more than simply damage to the opponent’s cause. . . . [It] is an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.” (quotation marks omitted)). We accordingly conclude that the trial court “exceeded the bounds of its discretion” in excluding the proffered impeachment evidence. See Thurlow, 1998 ME 139, ¶ 9, 712 A.2d 518 (holding that the court  19 should have permitted impeachment testimony regarding the victim’s “threat to fabricate a rape charge against” the defendant); State v. Allen, 462 A.2d 49, 51-52 (Me 1983) (concluding that the court erred in excluding a defense witness’s testimony that a testifying police officer made a prior inconsistent statement about the location of the alleged crime). [¶33] Before assessing the impact of this exclusion on the verdict, we pause briefly to clarify the interplay of our jurisprudence on inconsistent statements and alternative-suspect evidence, as it was that interplay that appears to have altered the court’s focus in ruling on the State’s objection. The court, at the urging of the State, reasoned that “the specific testimony that [Hanson was] seeking to elicit is only relevant and non-collateral if this is an alternative-suspect case. And this is not an alternative-suspect case.”8 The court’s analysis, perhaps reflecting its concern that Hanson was offering otherwise inadmissible substantive evidence under the guise of impeachment, seems to conflate the purposes of impeachment evidence and alternative-suspect evidence. 8 The State now concedes that the proffered testimony was not collateral, although it continues to maintain that if the testimony was inadmissible to show that an alternative suspect existed, then it was also inadmissible to impeach the victim. 20 [¶34] “It has long been the rule in Maine that a witness may be impeached by evidence that he made an earlier, out-of-court statement inconsistent with his trial testimony.” Allen, 462 A.2d at 51. As noted above, supra ¶ 31, a court may exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that is “collateral,” meaning it addresses an issue tangential to the case. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 607.4 at 292 (explaining that evidence is not collateral if “the fact as to which error is predicated [could] have been shown for any purpose independently of the contradiction”); see, e.g., State v. Rausch, 365 A.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Me. 1976) (affirming the court’s exclusion of “proffered testimony . . . tendered merely for impeachment purposes” because it “was unassociated with the crime charged and was unrelated to any conduct between the State’s witness and the [defendant]”); see also Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42, 53 (1831) (“[T]he true line of distinction is that which has been established between those questions which are merely collateral, and have no immediate connection with the cause, and those which intimately relate to the subject of the inquiry.”). While any inconsistent statement by a witness might arguably reflect on that person’s credibility, the rationale for excluding extrinsic evidence of statements that address only collateral matters is to avoid “undue consumption of time” on irrelevant matters that may distract from the critical  21 issues in the case. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 607:2 (10th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2025). [¶35] Here, the victim’s purported statement that someone other than Hanson assaulted her was decidedly not collateral. It went to the heart of the case. Importantly, the evidence, when offered to impeach, was admissible not to show that a specific person other than Hanson committed the crime but simply to show that the victim should not be believed when she said that Hanson did it. This distinction, while subtle, is not immaterial, and appears to have been the source of the confusion at trial. See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 607.4 at 291 (explaining that the relevance of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement “does not depend on whether the prior statement was true, but merely on whether it was made” and that “[s]uch statements logically support the inference that if the witness made a prior, different statement about the same subject matter, the witness’s in-court testimony may not be reliable”). [¶36] Rather than assessing the impeachment evidence for its own sake, the court interpreted our alternative-suspect case law to impose a limitation on proper impeachment. Our jurisprudence, however, imposes no such limitation. As the trial court correctly noted, courts must ensure that admitted 22 alternative-suspect evidence is “of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s culpability by establishing a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and the crime.” State v. Daly, 2021 ME 37, ¶ 19, 254 A.3d 426 (quotation marks omitted). But the focus in that context is whether the evidence can “support [a] contention that another is responsible for the crime with which [the defendant] is charged,” id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted)—that is, for its truth. Regardless of whether it was admissible for its truth, the evidence in this case was still admissible for the limited purpose of showing that, on some other occasion, the victim told a different story about what happened to her. Put another way, our jurisprudence allowing courts to exclude alternative-suspect evidence that “is too speculative or conjectural,” id. ¶ 24 (quotation marks omitted), may not be used to keep out otherwise admissible evidence offered for another proper purpose. [¶37] To mitigate the risk that the jury would use the evidence for an improper purpose, the court could have, as Hanson proposed at trial, instructed the jury that the proffered testimony was presented not for its truth but as evidence that the victim had told inconsistent stories about how she sustained her injuries. See M.R. Evid. 105 (requiring courts to “restrict . . . evidence to its  23 proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly”); State v. Bennett, 658 A.2d 1058, 1063 (Me. 1995) (“[U]nless there is evidence to the contrary, we assume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.”). Instead, the court concluded that if Hanson could not present substantive evidence of an alternative perpetrator, then testimony that the victim gave conflicting accounts about who harmed her went to a “collateral” issue, rather than the crux of the case. This was an abuse of discretion. We turn next to the effect of this error on the outcome of the trial. 3. Harmless-Error Analysis [¶38] The State argues that any error in excluding Hanson’s proffered evidence was harmless. We agree. [¶39] The nature of our harmless-error review depends upon the nature of the error. State v. Judkins, 2024 ME 45, ¶ 19, 319 A.3d 443. “There are two types of trial errors: (1) those that are structural, in which prejudice is presumed, triggering vacatur; and (2) those that are nonstructural, triggering an analysis as to the impact of the error in that specific case.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Hanson rightly does not contend that the trial court’s exclusion was a structural error. 9 The subset of nonstructural errors is 9 “Structural error is a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’” State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 27, 782 A.2d 319 (quoting 24 further divided into two categories, to which we apply differing standards of review to measure the effect of the error: general harmless error and constitutional harmless error. Id. ¶ 20. The general-harmless-error standard is less stringent and “applies to evidentiary errors, incorrect jury instructions, and improper prosecutorial comments that do not violate constitutional rights.” Id. ¶ 21. Alternatively, the constitutional-harmless-error standard applies to errors at trial that affect the defendant’s constitutional rights. See id. ¶¶ 20-21. [¶40] Hanson argues that the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of his proffered impeachment evidence violated his const