State of Louisiana v. Gregtazone Burks
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
Date FiledJuly 15, 2026
Docket56,979-KA
JudgePITMAN; STONE; HUNTER
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,979-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
GREGTAZONE BURKS Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Jackson, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 53,292
Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant
By: Desiree M. Valenti
DANIEL W. NEWELL Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney
PERRIN NELSON SMITH, JR.
Assistant District Attorney
*****
Before PITMAN, STONE, and HUNTER, JJ.
STONE, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the Second Judicial District Court,
Honorable Judge Rick Warren presiding. The defendant-appellant is
Gregtazone Burks (the “defendant”). On January 24, 2024, a grand jury
indicted the defendant with charges of: (1) second degree murder, La. R.S.
14:30.1; (2) aggravated kidnapping, La. R.S. 14:44; and (3) home invasion,
La. R.S. 14:62.8. On August 18, 2025, he pled guilty to second degree
kidnapping and home invasion in exchange for the state dropping the second
degree murder charge, reducing the kidnapping charge from aggravated to
second degree, and promising not to multi-bill the defendant pursuant to La.
R.S. 15:529.1. Sentencing was left to the court’s discretion. On November
4, 2025, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of 40 years
on the kidnapping charge and 30 years on the home invasion charge; these
sentences are the statutory maximum for both crimes. La. R.S. 14:44.1 and
14:62.8. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is
constitutionally excessive. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the
defendant’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant and his two accomplices saw their victim, O’Ryon
Atkins (“Atkins”), flaunting cash on social media and plotted to rob him of it
at his home. The operation did not go well. During the late-night hours of
October 17, 2023, two members of the trio, both armed with firearms,
invaded Atkins’s home – while he, his girlfriend, Allison Wells (“Ms.
Wells”), and children were present. When Atkins did not hand over the cash,
they shot him to death in the front yard. Then – because they still did not
have the coveted loot – the defendant kidnapped Ms. Wells at gunpoint and
tried to force her into a car and coerce her to show them where the money
was hidden. Meanwhile, police arrived in response to the multiple gunshots,
which caused the criminal trio to scatter on foot and drop at least one of their
firearms. All three have since been arrested and have pled guilty, including
Gregtazone Burks, the defendant herein. He was not arrested until nearly six
weeks after the instant offenses.
After receiving the defendant’s plea of guilty to kidnapping and home
invasion (which the defendant gave in exchange for the prosecution waiving
the murder charge and habitual offender enhancement), the trial court
ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”). The defendant, born May 18,
2004, was only 19 years old at the time he committed these crimes.
However, he already had an extensive RAP1 sheet before he committed the
instant crimes, including at least two multiple-felony arrests: (1) August 17,
2022, aggravated assault with a firearm and illegal carrying of weapons; (2)
February 7, 2023, violation of uniform controlled dangerous substance law
and possession of CDS on school property and remaining after being
forbidden; (3) On July 5, 2023, possession of Schedule I, less than two and a
half pounds; illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of CDS and
possession of Schedule II with intent to distribute less than 28 grams.
On September 13th, 2023, the defendant pled guilty to the felony of
attempted illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of CDS and was
sentenced to serve three years at hard labor, suspended, with three years of
supervised probation. The defendant’s felony probation began on September
13, 2023, and less than a month later, he committed the instant offenses.
1
The acronym stands for record of arrests and prosecutions.
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LAW
Here we examine the definitions and penalties of the crimes with
which the defendant was charged and of those to which he pled guilty
pursuant to the plea deal. Then we turn to constitutional limitations on
sentencing.
Principals; second degree murder. “All persons concerned in the
commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly
commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or
directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are
principals.” La. R.S. 14:24.
Second degree murder includes killing a human being: (1) with the
specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm; and/or (2) when the
offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any
grade of the offense of robbery. La. R.S. 14:30.1. The punishment for this
offense is mandatory lifetime incarceration. Id. The defendant was initially
charged with this offense but pursuant to the plea agreement the prosecution
waived this charge.
“Under the law of principals, a person may be convicted of…[second
degree murder] even if he has not personally fired the fatal shot.” State v.
Jones, 49,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So. 3d 406, writ not cons., 15-
1524 (La. 3/14/16), 188 So. 3d 1061. Likewise, it is unnecessary to have
specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to be a principal to second
degree felony murder. State v. Gurganus, 03-992 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03),
864 So.2d 771, 775, writ denied, 04-0254 (La. 6/4/04), 876 So.2d 75.
Rather, under the felony murder doctrine, the state need only prove the
commission of the underlying felony or the attempt thereof. State v.
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Southall, 22-0746 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So. 3d 925, writ denied, 23-
00875 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So. 3d 750.
Kidnapping. Aggravated kidnapping includes “the forcible seizing
and carrying of any person from one place to another…with the intent
thereby to force the victim, or some other person, to give up anything of
apparent present or prospective value…in order to secure a release of the
person under the offender’s actual or apparent control.” La. R.S. 14:44.
This crime also carries a sentence of mandatory lifetime incarceration. The
prosecution reduced this charge to second degree kidnapping as part of the
plea deal.
Second degree kidnapping carries a penalty range of 5 to 40 years of
imprisonment at hard labor; at least 2 of those years must be served without
possibility of parole. La. R.S. 14:44.1(C).
Home invasion. Home invasion includes “the unauthorized entering
of any inhabited dwelling…where a person is present, with the intent to use
force or violence upon the person of another.” La. R.S. 14:62.8. The
sentencing range for this crime is 1 to 30 years of incarceration at hard labor.
Habitual Offender Law. The defendant, as a second felony offender,
would have been exposed to an 80-year maximum sentence for second
degree kidnapping and a 60-year maximum for home invasion. La. R.S.
15:529.1(A)(1). The plea deal eliminated these risks for the defendant.
Excessive sentence. La. Const. art. I, § 20 provides: “No law shall
subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual
punishment.”
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
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purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21),
310 So. 3d 307. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when
the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it
shocks the (appellate court’s) sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La.
1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.
Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. On review, an
appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been
more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Bell, supra.
ANALYSIS
The defense argues that the defendant’s effective 40-year sentence is a
violation of his constitutional rights because: (1) he is young; (2) he grew up
without a father; (3) he dropped out of school after the eighth grade; (4) his
brother was murdered; and (5) he is the biological father of two one-year-
old children with different mothers; (6) he expressed remorse at sentencing;
and (7) the trial court “failed to consider the likelihood of rehabilitation.”
In so arguing, the defense brief fails to account for the fact that the
defendant and his principals (joint venturers) murdered O’Ryon Atkins – and
the defendant was originally so charged. The penalty for second degree
murder is a mandatory life sentence. If the defendant was not the shooter
who killed Atkins, he is, nonetheless, guilty as a principal under the felony
murder doctrine – and, thus, still would owe a life sentence according to our
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law. As part of the plea deal, the prosecution waived this charge. Likewise,
the original charge of aggravated kidnapping carries a mandatory life
sentence. The prosecution also waived this in exchange for the defendant’s
plea to the lesser charge of second degree kidnapping, which has a 30-year
maximum sentence.
The defendant is also a second-time felon subject to enhanced
sentencing under the Habitual Offender Law. The prosecution was quite
gracious in waiving the murder charge, the aggravated kidnapping charge,
and the habitual offender enhancement and agreeing to leave sentencing to
the court. The defendant received a substantial and unmerited benefit from
his plea deal. He is among the worst of home invaders and kidnappers –i.e.,
those who murder their victims.
Finally, we point out the fallacies in the defense argument’s list of
factors claimed to make the sentence unconstitutional. The defendant, at age
19, knew plenty well that murder, home invasion, and kidnapping are major
crimes and are morally detestable. The defendant’s lack of a father may
have contributed to his pathological behavior; regardless, however, he has
free will and is responsible for his own decisions. Certainly, there are
multitudes of people raised without a father who never commit violent
felonies, to say the very least. The defendant – given the opportunity for a
publicly-funded education – chose to drop out of school in the eighth grade.
The defendant created two babies with two different mothers while pursuing
his criminal endeavors as outlined in the PSI, then escalated from getting
caught with drugs and guns to murdering someone for cash – while he could
and should have been acting responsibly for his two babies. This suggests
indifference toward his duty as a father. Perhaps even more to the point,
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O’Ryon Atkins had children as well – in fact, they were in the house when
the defendant and his accomplices conducted their armed invasion, murder,
and kidnapping. Because of the defendant, those children have no chance of
having their father providing for or protecting them, or ever seeing their
father again. O’Ryon Atkins’s family will, collectively, suffer from his death
for far more than 40 years. The defendant’s expression of remorse came
only after he was caught (i.e., after six weeks in hiding). If the defendant
was truly remorseful at sentencing, was it because he knew he had
committed heinous crimes, or because he would have to face the
consequences? His conduct after the offense suggests the latter. The murder
of the defendant’s brother would seem to cause him to have a deep and
personal understanding of the pain that the family of a murder victim suffers.
Even that, apparently, did not sufficiently matter to the defendant when he
made his choices in committing the instant offenses.
As to the defendant’s “likelihood of rehabilitation” – such must be
weighed against the substantial risk that he will commit more murders,
violent crimes, and/or drug trafficking if released earlier. Moreover, there
are no particular facts in the record suggesting that the defendant’s
individual likelihood of reform is more than a theoretical possibility. The
defendant’s disregard for the sanctity of human life – including the safety of
O’Ryon Atkins’s children – shows a dangerous capacity that makes it unsafe
to entrust the defendant with further opportunity to harm people. The
sentences are not excessive and are adequately supported by the record.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the defendant’s
convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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