State of Louisiana v. Hezekiah K. Bellard
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket57,143-KA
JudgeMarcotte
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Judgment rendered November 18, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 57,143-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
HEZEKIAH K. BELLARD Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Eighth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Winn, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 45,905
Honorable Don C. Burns, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant
WRIT SERVICE
By: Remy V. Starns
Waukeshia Jackson
RICHARD CHRISTOPHER NEVILS Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney
MATTHEW S. KELLEY
SHELBY KATE TERRELL
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
MARCOTTE, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the Eighth Judicial District Court,
Parish of Winn, the Honorable Don C. Burns presiding. Defendant
Hezekiah Bellard was convicted of simple burglary and possession of a
Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous Substance: methamphetamine. Bellard
was sentenced, respectively, to nine years at hard labor and two years at hard
labor, to be served concurrently. For the following reasons, we affirm
Bellard’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 17, 2025, Bellard was charged by amended bill of
information with one count of simple burglary, in violation of La. R.S.
14:62, and one count of possession of a Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous
Substance (“CDS”): methamphetamine, in violation of La. R.S.
40:967(C)(1). The offenses occurred on November 8, 2024. Bellard pled
not guilty, and a trial was held where the following evidence was adduced.
Carroll Funk, Jr. (“Funk”) identified the office building where the
offense occurred as 101 West Boundary Ave., Winnfield, Louisiana, and
stated that he walked past that building often. Funk testified that he was
walking past 101 West Boundary late on November 8, 2024, and noticed a
screen door ajar, which was unusual. Funk stated that he saw a flashlight
flickering inside and heard a loud noise, like someone knocking something
over. Funk said he shined a flashlight at the building, and the person inside
turned his flashlight off. Funk went to the EZ Mart, about two minutes’
walk away, and told the police there what he saw.
Winnfield City Police Department (“WCPD”) patrol officer Deontray
Means (“Ofc. Means”) testified that he was on duty in the early hours of
November 8, 2024. Funk approached him at the EZ Mart and reported what
he saw at 101 West Boundary Ave. Ofc. Means and other officers left to
investigate the disturbance.
At 101 West Boundary, he observed a door to the building open,
which he said was atypical. The door appeared tampered with, like someone
had pried it open. Ofc. Means and his partner identified themselves as
police and entered the building to clear it; no one responded to their
announcement. An internal door had a broken glass pane and there were
glass shards on the floor, which caused Ofc. Means to believe someone had
broken the glass to reach inside and unlock the door. Ofc. Means’ body
camera captured footage of the incident; it was admitted, along with still
images from his body camera video. The images showed the doors along
with a desk, drawers, and cabinets that appeared to have been rifled through.
There were documents and deposit slips strewn about the office.
Ofc. Means found Bellard hiding in a closet; the officer identified
defendant in court. Ofc. Means searched Bellard’s backpack, finding a
broken handcuff and a coin. Ofc. Means stated that a search of Bellard’s
person revealed a flashlight, knife, and rubber gloves in his pocket. Bellard
said on the body camera video that he believed the office to be abandoned.
Ofc. Means arrested and transported Bellard to the Winn Parish
Detention Center; his body camera continued to record while he was
transporting defendant. Ofc. Means placed Bellard in the back seat of his
patrol car, behind the front seat. Ofc. Means advised Bellard to make sure
he did not have anything concealed on him because, if he did when they
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arrived at the detention center, he would be charged with introduction of
contraband. Bellard then asked Ofc. Means if he did have something on
him, would he receive another charge. Ofc. Means said that Bellard at one
point said that he had methamphetamine in his underwear, but the audio
from the body camera video is not clear.
Ofc. Means testified that Bellard began fidgeting in the back of the
patrol unit, which prompted him to ask defendant if he had anything else
concealed on him. Ofc. Means said that Bellard’s behavior led him to
believe he was attempting to destroy evidence while he was transporting
him. Ofc. Means stated that when he exited his patrol unit and looked in the
rear area of the car, he saw what he believed to be a “plastic baggy” of
methamphetamine on the floorboard of the patrol car, near Bellard’s foot.
The discovery was captured on Ofc. Means’ body camera. Ofc. Means
retrieved the suspected CDS and tested it for methamphetamine; it tested
positive. Ofc. Means collected and documented the bag to send to the crime
lab for further testing.
Ofc. Means stated that it was police policy to search his patrol unit at
the beginning and end of each shift and in between transporting people. He
testified that he searched the vehicle at the beginning of his shift on the date
of the offense, and he did not find anything suspicious during that search.
Ofc. Means advised defendant of his rights, and Bellard signed a Miranda
form, waving his rights. Bellard gave a statement in which “he said he was
bored as fuck, and he was at home and he just started walking.” In the body
camera video, Bellard said that the screen door to 101 West Boundary was
open and he walked in.
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Jim Wiley (“Jim”) testified that he and his wife owned the property at
101 West Boundary, and his law firm was located there. His three children
also practiced law off and on at that address. Jim said it was not customary
for anyone to be in the building without him or his children accompanying
them. Jim said he did not know Bellard and did not give him permission to
be at the property. Barbara Wiley, Jim’s wife, and Kathryn Wiley
(“Kathryn”) and Anastasia Wiley (“Anastasia”), their daughters and both
attorneys, testified to the same. Kathryn and Anastasia said that the law
firm’s doors were always kept locked.
WCPD Assistant Chief Charles Curry (“A.C. Curry”) testified that he
was responsible for logging and sending evidence to the crime lab.
Evidence was kept locked in a storage locker to which only he had the key.
He identified the plastic bag of suspected methamphetamine that Ofc. Means
collected from the floorboard of his patrol car. A.C. Curry took that
evidence to the crime lab, and he retrieved it from the lab once it had
processed the suspected CDS.
Carly Desselle (“Deselle”) testified that she worked at the North
Louisiana Crime Lab as a drug chemist; she tested submitted evidence to
determine if it contained CDS. She was accepted as an expert witness in
forensic chemistry. Deselle tested the bag of suspected methamphetamine
Ofc. Means retrieved from his patrol car; the test results were positive for
methamphetamine. Her lab report was admitted.
The state rested. Following a colloquy, Bellard elected not to testify
in his own defense. The defense rested. The jury returned a unanimous
verdict of guilty as charged for both offenses. The court ordered that a
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presentencing investigation report (“PSI”) be prepared. Bellard filed a
motion for a new trial, which was denied on January 12, 2026.
On February 2, 2026, Bellard was sentenced. The court said that it
reviewed his PSI and noted that Bellard committed his instant offenses while
on probation. The court noted his history of substance abuse and referred to
several factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court sentenced Bellard
to nine years at hard labor for the simple burglary offense and two years at
hard labor for the possession of CDS offense. The court ordered that the
sentences be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to any
other sentence. Bellard was advised of his post-conviction relief time
constraints. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Assignment of Error No. One: Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered the law office with the
intent to commit a felony within.
Bellard argues that simple burglary requires proof of unauthorized
entry and entry with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. He
contends that the state cannot show that he had the intent to commit a felony
or theft at the Wileys’ law office. Bellard states that Ofc. Means never said
that he admitted that he planned to steal anything, and no victim reported
that anything was missing or misplaced or provided bills or receipts proving
that there was damage to the property. He contends that the items attributed
to him at booking, a cell phone, knife, flashlight, backpack, broken handcuff
piece, and coin may support a suspicion of wrongdoing, but did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the building with the intent
required for simple burglary. Bellard argues that the record supports, at best,
unauthorized entry. He asks that this court vacate his simple burglary
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conviction and sentence, enter a judgment for the responsive verdict of
unauthorized entry, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the case in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Leger, 17-2084
(La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609; State v. Myrick, 54,606 (La. App. 2 Cir.
9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 92. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.
C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder.
State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ
denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or
reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),
775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d
62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d
442; State v. Myrick, supra. A reviewing court affords great deference to a
trial court’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole
or in part. Id.
In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with
the physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of
fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. Id. The Jackson, supra,
standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial
evidence. State v. Myrick, supra. An appellate court reviewing the
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sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct
evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. Id. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts
established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances
established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every
essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983);
State v. Myrick, supra. To convict a defendant based upon circumstantial
evidence, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded. La.
R.S. 15:438; State v. Johnston, 53,981 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 326 So. 3d
970.
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:62(A)(1) defines simple burglary as
“[t]he unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other
structure, movable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the intent to commit
a felony or any theft therein, other than as set forth in R.S. 14:60.”
To satisfy the unauthorized entry element, the state must prove that
the defendant did not have permission to enter the premises. State v. Myrick,
supra. Simple burglary occurs when a person enters a structure without
authority and with the specific intent to commit a felony or theft therein. Id.
Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).
The trier of fact determines whether the requisite specific intent is present in
a case. State v. Myrick, supra. Specific intent may be inferred from the
circumstances, and a taking is not required to prove the offender’s specific
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intent. Id. So long as the intent is present, the theft need not be
consummated to satisfy the elements of the offense. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we find that the state presented sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable
jury to convict Bellard of simple burglary. The office at 101 West Boundary
is a structure, and defendant gained unauthorized entry into the structure by
forcing the door open. The evidence established that defendant did not have
permission to enter the premises, and the owners did not know him.
Defendant broke a glass windowpane inside the office and searched the
premises, spreading papers around the property. The jury could reasonably
infer that the defendant had the necessary intent to commit a felony or theft
therein when he forced the door open late at night and vandalized the office.
That inference is especially reasonable because Bellard entered the office
with a mostly empty backpack, a flashlight, and a knife; that shows he had
the requisite intent to break into something.
Those facts are consistent with Funk’s testimony that, from outside
the office, he saw someone shine a flashlight inside the building and make a
loud noise consistent with knocking something over. There was a very short
period from when Funk noticed the light inside the law office, walked to the
EZ Mart, notified the officers there, to when the officers found Bellard
inside the building. Furthermore, the jury heard Ofc. Means’ testimony that
Bellard was discovered hiding inside the office and later told the officer that
he was bored and started walking. The officer’s body camera video
confirms his testimony.
A rational trier of fact could conclude that the evidence established
that Bellard had the specific intent to commit a felony inside the office, and
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he did not have to be found with stolen items on his person to fulfill the
elements of the offense. This assignment of error lacks merit, and Bellard’s
conviction for simple burglary is affirmed.
Assignment of Error No. Two: Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine recovered from the officer’s patrol unit.
Bellard contends that the state was unable to prove that he exercised
dominion or control over the methamphetamine. Bellard states that two
officers patted him down at the scene, and the bag of CDS was found on the
floorboard of the patrol car. While Ofc. Means testified that Bellard said
while he was being transported that he had methamphetamine and was trying
to destroy it, the alleged statement was not independently clear on the body
camera audio. Bellard reiterates that the substance was not found on his
person, and the state’s proof of possession depended on Ofc. Means’
interpretation of the encounter. He asks that this court reverse his possession
conviction.
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a
controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II of the Uniform
Controlled Dangerous Substances Law. La. R.S. 40:967(C).
Methamphetamine is a controlled dangerous substance classified in
Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964.
To convict a defendant of possession of CDS, the state must prove
that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug. State v. Grant,
54,847 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/22), 352 So. 3d 179. Possession may be
established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or
constructive possession of the controlled dangerous substance. Id. Actual
possession means having an object in one’s possession or on one’s person in
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such a way as to have direct physical contact with and control of the object.
Id. The state need not prove the defendant actually possessed the drugs, as
evidence of constructive possession is sufficient. Id. Constructive
possession is established by evidence that the drugs were within the
defendant’s dominion and control and that the defendant had knowledge of
its presence. Id.
Guilty knowledge is an essential element of possession of contraband
and can be inferred from the circumstances. Id. A defendant’s mere
presence in area where drugs are located or association with one possessing
drugs does not constitute constructive possession. Id. However, proximity
to the drug or association with the possessor, may establish a prima facie
case of possession when colored by other evidence. Id.
Viewing the evidence using the standard found in Jackson v. Virginia,
supra, we find that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bellard possessed the methamphetamine that
Ofc. Means found near his foot on the floorboard of the patrol unit. Ofc.
Means described Bellard as fidgeting in the backseat of his patrol car, which
prompted the officer to ask if he was in possession of contraband. Bellard
asked Ofc. Means if he would receive another charge if he had something
concealed on his person. Ofc. Means testified that Bellard said he had
methamphetamine in his underwear, and his behavior led the officer to
believe he was trying to destroy evidence in the patrol unit.
A bag of something can be seen on the floorboard of the Ofc. Means’
patrol car in his body camera video; Ofc. Means field tested the substance.
It tested positive for methamphetamine, and the crime lab confirmed that
result through its own testing. Ofc. Means stated that he searched his patrol
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unit at the beginning of his shift and that nothing suspicious was present in
his patrol vehicle. The evidence is sufficient to find that Bellard was in
constructive possession of CDS. This assignment of error lacks merit, and
Bellard’s conviction for possession of a Schedule II, Controlled Dangerous
Substance: methamphetamine is affirmed.
Error Patent Review
We have reviewed the record for errors patent and found the
following. The record reveals a conflict between the transcript and the
“State of Louisiana Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order,” which states
that Bellard pled guilty to the instant offenses. The record shows that
Bellard’s convictions are the result of a jury verdict. Therefore, we remand
this case for correction of the commitment order error regarding Bellard’s
verdict.
In addition, we further direct the Clerk of Court to transmit the
corrected commitment order to the officer in charge of the institution to
which defendant has been sentenced, as well as to the legal department of
the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Hezekiah K. Bellard’s convictions and sentences are
affirmed. The case is remanded for corrections in compliance with this
opinion.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED; REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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