Angelo Majoreta v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0890-MR ANGELO MAJORETA APPELLANT APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MARY K. MOLLOY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CR-00645 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CETRULO, ECKERLE, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES. ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Angelo Majoreta (“Majoreta”), seeks reversal of a judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court sentencing him to a total of ten years’ imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of two counts of rape in the third degree. After careful review, we affirm.  I. Factual and Procedural History Majoreta immigrated to the United States from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At some point thereafter he began communicating via Instagram with “Regina” (the minor victim), who had immigrated to the United States from Brazil but whose mother was from the Congo.1 Majoreta told Regina that he knew her uncle, Manix. Majoreta was nearly 30; after initially telling him she was much older, Regina eventually told Majoreta her true age—14. Majoreta and Regina’s relationship became sexual, and Regina became pregnant. After Regina revealed her pregnancy to Manix, he went to the authorities. Kenton and Boone County law enforcement conducted a joint investigation, as Majoreta lived in Kenton County and Regina lived in Boone County. Regina was subjected to two interviews at a child advocacy center. In the first one, she denied that Majoreta had inappropriate contact with her; but in the second interview, she admitted that Majoreta had been sexually intimate with her. Eventually, Regina underwent an abortion. DNA testing of the fetus showed a 99.9999% likelihood that Majoreta was the father. A Kenton County grand jury indicted Majoreta for five counts of rape in the third degree. As it pertains here, a person is guilty of rape in the third degree 1 We shall refer to the minor victim with a pseudonym pursuant to our Supreme Court’s practice and Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 5(B)(2). -2- if he is at least 21 years of age and has sexual intercourse with a person less than 16 years old. See Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 510.050(1)(a). Majoreta eventually entered an Alford2 plea to four counts of rape in the third degree in Boone Circuit Court, for which he received a total sentence of five years’ imprisonment. While briefing in this appeal was ongoing, we affirmed the Boone Circuit Court’s denial of Majoreta’s motion to withdraw his Alford plea. Majoreta v. Commonwealth, No. 2024-CA-0448-MR, 2025 WL 3180585 (Ky. App. Nov. 14, 2025) (unpublished). The Kenton Circuit Court charges against Majoreta proceeded to a multi-day jury trial, which was held in April 2025. The guilt-phase witnesses included law enforcement officers who had investigated the case, DNA analysts, and Regina. We shall describe the crucial evidence presented in the guilt phase, and the Commonwealth’s closing argument, in more detail infra in our discussion of Majoreta’s claims for relief. The jury found Majoreta guilty of two counts of rape in the third degree but acquitted him of the remaining three counts. Majoreta and his sister each testified in the subsequent penalty phase, which we will also describe infra, 2 Based on North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), an Alford plea is “[a] guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea bargain without admitting guilt.” Alford Plea, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It is accorded the same treatment as a guilty plea. -3- adding crucial portions of their testimony. The jury recommended that Majoreta receive the maximum penalty—ten years’ imprisonment (five years on each count, to be served consecutively). The Trial Court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Majoreta in accordance with the jury’s verdict and suggested sentence, after which he filed this appeal. II. Analysis Majoreta raises three main issues. First, he argues that the Trial Court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Regina during the guilt phase. Second, he opines that the Commonwealth twice committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. Third, he contends that the Trial Court improperly allowed the Commonwealth to question his sister and himself in the penalty phase. Before we analyze those claims, we note that our analysis does not always precisely track that utilized by the Trial Court or urged upon us by the Commonwealth, but we may affirm the Trial Court on alternate grounds that are supported by the record and applicable law. Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co., 434 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Ky. 2014). As a final prefatory note, we have closely examined the parties’ briefs and have determined that any arguments therein which we do not address in this detailed Opinion are redundant, irrelevant, or otherwise without merit. Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). -4-  A. Limitation on Cross-Examination of Regina On direct examination during the guilt phase, the Commonwealth asked Regina to explain the reasons that she had lied during her first interview. Regina said that she had done so because she was trying to protect Majoreta, with whom she was in love. The following exchange occurred soon thereafter: Q. And did you tell them in that first interview, did you tell them that you had sex with someone else? A. Yes. Q. And did you tell them you were pregnant in the first interview? A. Yes. Q. Ok. And did you tell them about Angelo [Majoreta] at all? A. I did, but I was lying. Q. Oh, well, that first interview, did you tell them about Angelo? A. Yes. Q. And how . . . I’m confused now. If you told them about Angelo in the first interview, how were you lying? A. I don’t really remember what I said. Video Record (“VR”) 4/23/25, 11:46:40. On cross-examination, Majoreta asked Regina if she had said during the first interview that she had a relationship with someone else, and Regina -5- answered in the affirmative. Majoreta’s counsel then asked if Regina had “disclosed to them whether that other person was an adult,” after which the Commonwealth objected. Id. at 11:57:53 et seq. At the ensuing bench conference, the Commonwealth asserted that Majoreta’s questions were barred by Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 412, commonly known as Kentucky’s rape-shield law. Majoreta claimed that the Commonwealth had opened the door to questions about Regina’s sexual history; and the Commonwealth countered that the opening-the-door principle cannot overcome the exclusionary nature of KRE 412. The Trial Court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection. When the trial resumed after a lunch break, the Trial Court addressed a note that had been written by a juror asking if the jury was supposed to disregard the possibility that Regina had a sexual relationship with someone besides Majoreta. The Trial Court gave a detailed oral response in which it specifically cited KRE 412 for the principle that evidence about a victim’s sexual history is generally inadmissible except for limited exceptions which were not present. VR 4/23/25, 2:13:38. The question before us now is essentially the same one that was presented to the Trial Court. 1. KRE 412 and Our Standard of Review KRE 412 provides in relevant part: -6-  (a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c): (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition. (b) Exceptions: (1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules: (A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and (C) any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged. Our Supreme Court has held that KRE 412 is “primarily an exclusionary evidentiary rule” whose exceptions should be used “sparingly and carefully.” Powers v. Commonwealth, 626 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The rule’s purpose is to protect the victims -7- of sex crimes “from painful and embarrassing questions and disclosures about their private sexual activities” by excluding “irrelevant attacks on the victim’s character . . . .” Id. (block quote format and citation omitted). We review a Trial Court’s evidentiary decisions pursuant to the deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. 2. The Exceptions in KRE 412(b)(1) Before we examine the relationship between the opening-the-door principle and evidence excluded by KRE 412, we must ensure that the evidence at issue was inadmissible under KRE 412. At the outset, we discount the obvious by first noting that Majoreta could not claim consent, which is not a valid defense to rape in the third degree because a person under the age of 16 lacks the legal capacity to consent to sexual intercourse. See KRS 510.020(3)(a). Second, the exception for attempting to show that another person was the source of the semen or injury was inapplicable here, as there is neither an indication that Regina was physically injured nor a dispute about the source of any semen. And the DNA results overwhelmingly showed Majoreta to have been the father of the aborted child.3 3 Majoreta tersely states in his opening brief that allowing him to elicit testimony from Regina regarding another sexual partner would have “provided an alternate father to the aborted fetus . . . .” Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 14. But Majoreta does not provide any citation to the record claiming that he had informed the Trial Court that he had wanted to question Regina about her sexual history to raise an “alternate father” argument. In fact, Majoreta’s counsel admitted in closing argument that testimony about the DNA test results showed that Majoreta was the father. VR 4/24/25, 9:27:30 et seq. Majoreta’s fatal, proffered conclusion of an alternate father on appeal thus facially violates Kentucky’s “long-standing prohibition against -8-  Third, the line of questions Majoreta sought to pursue did not pertain directly to the charged offenses. The residual exception in KRE 412(b)(1)(C) for “evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged” only applies in “an exceptional or unforeseeable case which justifies an exception to the general rule of exclusion.” Ward v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.3d 824, 831 (Ky. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Majoreta does not explicitly argue that this exception is applicable, and, in any event, this case is not so extraordinary as to fall within the exception’s narrow bounds. Thus, we conclude that the evidence Majoreta sought to elicit was inadmissible under KRE 412’s listed exceptions. 3. Curative Admissions Nonetheless, Majoreta argues the evidence that he sought from Regina was admissible under the opening-the-door principle. That principle, also known as the rule of curative admissions, allows evidence that would otherwise be rendered inadmissible in certain circumstances. Under this standard, “when a witness makes an inadmissible assertion, the opposing party is then permitted to introduce evidence to the contrary that would otherwise be inadmissible.” Leach v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Ky. 2019). presenting a new theory of error at the appellate level—the overwrought but irresistibly descriptive prohibition against feeding a different can of worms” to an Appellate Court than was presented to the Trial Court. Henderson v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Ky. 2014). -9-  The parties have not cited, and we did not independently locate, published, Kentucky authority containing a detailed analysis of the relationship between curative admissions and KRE 412. However, our Supreme Court has, albeit succinctly and in dicta, held that the rule regarding curative admissions does not allow the admission of evidence otherwise barred by KRE 412. In Ward, the Commonwealth had presented evidence about the victim’s age at the time of the alleged sodomy; Ward sought to use the opening- the-door principle to introduce evidence that the victim had been a prostitute. Ward, 568 S.W.3d at 833-34. Our Supreme Court rejected Ward’s attempt for two reasons. First, the Court held that no curative admission was applicable because the age of the victim in Ward was “properly admissible evidence . . . .” Id. at 835. Similarly, in the case sub judice, Majoreta neither robustly focuses upon nor explains the manner by which any testimony elicited by the Commonwealth regarding Regina’s having lied to the child advocacy center was inadmissible. Regardless, we need not reach a definitive conclusion on that initial, inadmissibility question because the opening-the-door rule is inapplicable under subsequent language in Ward. Turning to the second reason for holding that the opening-the-door rule was inapplicable in Ward, the Supreme Court flatly stated that “even if it were -10- not admissible, the admission of her statement regarding prostitution would sacrifice [the] important value reflected in KRE 412.” Id. (brackets in Ward) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unfortunately, our Supreme Court has not subsequently explained in detail its language in Ward that applying the opening- the-door rule to allow introduction of evidence that KRE 412 otherwise excludes would impermissibly sacrifice bedrock juridical scruples. Nonetheless, Ward’s conclusion is directly on point and controlling here. The “important value” language in Ward was facially dicta. After all, our highest Court had already held that the opening-the-door rule was inapplicable on other grounds. The Court typically would have ended its analysis at that point. Yet our Supreme Court chose to expound, adding language regarding effect, i.e., that applying the opening-the-door rule to allow evidence otherwise barred by KRE 412 would sacrifice fundamental jurisprudential values. We will not ignore that language, even if it is fleeting, obiter dictum because “[d]icta may be persuasive or entitled to respect according to its reasoning and applicability and where it was intended to lay down a controlling principle.” Dunn v. Solomon Foundation, 723 S.W.3d 711, 730 n.29 (Ky. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, our Supreme Court must have intended to illuminate the bench and bar about the viability of the opening-the-door rule vis-à-vis KRE 412 because -11- it added strictly unnecessary language to Ward to address that topic. We construe the language in Ward holding that allowing evidence otherwise barred by KRE 412 to be admitted under the curative admissions doctrine would sacrifice KRE 412’s important values to mean that the curative admissions doctrine cannot overcome the principles embodied in KRE 412. That very evidentiary rule was enacted for the higher and noble purposes fundamental to notions of humanity and privacy, protecting sexual assault victims from reliving trauma and shielding them from the unnecessary embarrassment and intrusion of publicizing irrelevant past details of their personal lives. Consequently, we must reject Majoreta’s argument that the Commonwealth opened the door to allowing him to ask questions of Regina which were barred under KRE 412.4 4. Right to Present a Complete Defense Majoreta also argues that preventing him from pursuing questions about Regina’s sexual history with another person violated his right to confront witnesses against him or present a complete defense. Of course, as Professor Lawson notes in his esteemed treatise on Kentucky evidence, “[l]ike all evidence 4 But see, e.g., 75 C.J.S. Rape § 66 (Apr. 2026 update) (“The concept of ‘opening the door’ may provide a proper basis for asserting an offer of proof and overcoming the presumption of irrelevance of victim’s prior sexual conduct created by rape shield statute.”); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 505 (May 2026 update) (noting that, under the federal equivalent of KRE 412, a defendant’s constitutional right to confront his or her accusers may allow him or her to inquire about the alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct “where the government first opens the door on this line of cross-examination”). -12- rules, rape shield laws like KRE 412 must be used without offending the constitutional rights of criminal defendants . . . .” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.35[6][c] (2025 ed.). However, Regina’s sexual history had no bearing on the charges against Majoreta since any prior sexual activity by Regina with another person would not have been relevant to Majoreta’s sexual crimes with her when she was 14 years of age on or about the dates listed in the indictment. A defendant’s constitutional rights may not impinge upon those of others without limitations. Declining to allow a defendant to present irrelevant evidence whose only impact would be to embarrass a victim—especially a minor victim—on collateral matters does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. Powers, 626 S.W.3d at 568 (“KRE 412 constitutes a proper application of the principle that, in limited and specific situations, the right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine witnesses must yield to other legitimate state interests. In sexual assault cases, the Commonwealth’s interest is in protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims.”) (internal parenthetical quotation marks and citation omitted); Ward, 568 S.W.3d at 833 (“Even if S.R. had been a prostitute in the past, Ward’s sodomy charge was based on his use of forcible compulsion by means of a handgun to threaten S.R. into performing oral sex; her prior conduct was irrelevant to whether she consented to perform oral sex at gunpoint on the night in question. Employing the language -13- of KRE 412(b)(1)(C), S.R.’s past prostitution did not ‘directly’ pertain to the crime charged and indeed was irrelevant.”) (citations omitted); Howard v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.3d 607, 614 (Ky. App. 2010) (“KRE 412 was enacted to protect the interests of a victim from the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the crime charged.”); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 28, 39 (Ky. 2010) (holding that KRE 412 “is meant both to shield the victims of sex crimes from painful and embarrassing questions and disclosures about their private sexual activities as well as to preserve the fairness of the proceedings by excluding irrelevant attacks on the victim’s character and guarding against distracting the jury with collateral matters”). Here, Regina admitted on direct examination that she had lied during her first interview at the child advocacy center. Majoreta could have explored Regina’s credibility and veracity without delving into her sexual history. Powers, 626 S.W.3d at 568 (“Here, the trial court permitted Powers to extensively cross- examine Sarah to develop his defense and attack her credibility. The only topic the trial court prohibited inquiry into was the single consensual sexual act with another man. Exclusion of this topic was not arbitrary and was plainly within the bounds of the purpose of KRE 412. Powers had sufficient opportunities to develop his various theories of defense and his right to do so was not improperly abridged by the trial court’s ruling. There was no constitutional violation and Powers’ assertion -14- to the contrary is without merit.”). In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in its decision to forbid Majoreta to question the young Regina about her sexual history. B. Prosecutorial Misconduct In addition to his claims about the limitation of cross-examination of the victim, Majoreta also contends that the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct twice in its closing argument. “Prosecutorial misconduct is a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or assess an unjustified punishment, which includes making improper comments during closing arguments.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 826, 837 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). 1. Standard of Review The Commonwealth urges us to use the standards governing unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, under which we would provide relief only for “flagrant” misconduct which “render[ed] the trial fundamentally unfair.” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 49 (Ky. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, Majoreta’s counsel objected to both statements at issue. When, as here, “the [alleged] misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that ground if proof of the defendant’s guilt was not such as to -15- render the misconduct harmless, and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a sufficient admonition to the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In making that determination, we must “view that allegation [of prosecutorial misconduct] in the context of the overall fairness of the trial” because “[t]o justify reversal, the Commonwealth’s misconduct must be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[C]ounsel is granted wide latitude during closing argument” and “may comment on the evidence and make all legitimate inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Ky. 2022). In sum, “we will not reverse a conviction even for prosecutorial misconduct if, in the whole context, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, rendering the error harmless.” Id. at 144. 2. Purportedly Dishonest Defense Strategy Before we analyze the Commonwealth’s comment about a purportedly dishonest representation by defense counsel, we must place the comment in context by discussing that which preceded it. Regina testified that she had sometimes skipped school, going instead to Majoreta’s apartment in Kenton County, where the two engaged in sex. Regina had written her own school-excuse notes for those days and forged her mother’s signature thereto. -16-  In her closing argument, Majoreta’s counsel highlighted that some of those notes were undated, insinuating that the Commonwealth had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Majoreta had had sex with Regina in Kenton County on the dates alleged in the indictment. In response, the Commonwealth asserted in its closing argument that there were five school-excuse notes to which Regina had signed her mother’s name, one for each count of the indictment. Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth stated that “yes, two of them [the school-excuse notes] don’t have dates on them, but there’s dates here.” VR 4/24/25, 9:57:50. Immediately thereafter, the Commonwealth made the comment which Majoreta contends is prosecutorial misconduct: “When the defense tells you that there are no dates, and those notes can’t be matched up to the indictment dates, that’s just dishonest in the representation, to be sure.” Id. at 9:57:54. Majoreta objected. The Trial Court sustained the objection but denied Majoreta’s request to admonish the jury. Majoreta asserts that the Commonwealth’s remark about a dishonest representation was reversible, prosecutorial misconduct, especially because the Trial Court refused to admonish the jury. Precedent does generally encourage a Trial Court to admonish the jury upon request after sustaining an objection. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tramble, 409 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Ky. 2013) (“Once it became clear that an improper argument had been made, it was error for the trial -17- court to deny the request for an admonition. Delegating the task of correcting the mistake to the prosecutor was an unacceptable alternative. The judge is the neutral and detached authority upon whom the jury must depend for crucial guidance and instruction.”); Rankin v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 227, 235 (Ky. App. 2007) (“As to the Commonwealth’s misstatement of fact, during a bench conference, the trial court sustained Rankin’s objection to the Commonwealth’s factual assertion that Muir’s caller ID established that Rankin had been the caller. However, the trial court denied Rankin’s motion to admonish the jury but ordered the Commonwealth to restate the facts without repeating the misrepresentation . . . . After reviewing the facts, we conclude that the trial court erred by not giving an admonition.”) (paragraph break omitted). However, under longstanding, Kentucky precedent, the Commonwealth may “comment in a reasonable manner on how counsel for the defense conducts himself [or herself] during the course of the trial.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Ky. 1957). But the prosecution should not be permitted to “vilify and abuse a defendant on trial, nor counsel representing him [or her] . . . .” East v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 46, 60 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Ky. 1933). Here, the Commonwealth’s remark that Majoreta’s counsel’s representation to the jury about the school-excuse notes was dishonest does not -18- align precisely with the evidence or reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it. Two of the school-excuse notes were undated. The Commonwealth bore the burden to show that Majoreta had sexual intercourse with Regina in Kenton County on or about the dates in the indictment. Thus, defense counsel did nothing improper by urging the jury to construe the undated notes as indicating that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Majoreta was guilty on at least some counts in the indictment. Indeed, that strategy appears to have been successful because the jury only convicted Majoreta of two of the five counts contained in the indictment. In short, Majoreta’s counsel was not facially dishonest in her remarks to the jury regarding counsel’s interpretation of the evidence. Regardless, the comment at issue by the Commonwealth was not impermissible. Our Supreme Court has held that an even more direct, inflammatory accusation—that defense counsel was “pulling a ‘scam’”—was a remark “well within the proper bounds of a closing argument . . . .” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). The Court also found it permissible for the Commonwealth to “comment as to the falsity of a defense position.” Id. A scam is “a fraudulent or deceptive act or operation[.]” Scam, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- -19- webster.com/dictionary/scam (last visited Aug. 4, 2026). Thus, in Slaughter, our Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the Commonwealth to have directly accused defense counsel of trying to defraud or deceive the jury. Here, the Commonwealth’s statement characterizing the defense counsel’s interpretation of the evidence as being dishonest is much less unambiguously derogatory and accusatory. The statement at hand did not contain a direct, unmistakably vilifying accusation that defense counsel was intentionally lying to the jury. Arguing that the Commonwealth construed the evidence differently, and so defense counsel’s theory was dishonest, was suboptimal phrasing. The Trial Court rightly sustained the objection. However, implying dishonesty in defense counsel’s evaluation of the evidence is not reversible prosecutorial misconduct if it is “well within the proper bounds of a closing argument” for the Commonwealth to directly accuse defense counsel of committing a patently fraudulent act by “pulling a ‘scam . . . .’” Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 412. Moreover, the Commonwealth may opine that a defense position is false, which we construe to be the general tenor underlying the Commonwealth’s dishonesty remark. Also, even if we were to conclude that the dishonesty remark was improper, Majoreta would not be entitled to relief. The comment was fleeting as it occupied only a few seconds of a multi-day trial. The overall evidence of Majoreta’s guilt was strong (given Regina’s essentially unrebutted testimony that -20- she had had sex with Majoreta at his apartment and the DNA results showing an overwhelming probability that Majoreta was the father of the aborted child). Therefore, any error arising from the Commonwealth’s remark would be harmless. Robinson, 647 S.W.3d at 144. As the Commonwealth’s remark was permissible under binding Kentucky precedent, the Trial Court’s refusal to admonish the jury here does not entitle Majoreta to relief. However, we remind the Trial bench that requested admonitions are preferred when objections are sustained. Tramble, 409 S.W.3d at 339. 3. Purportedly Defining Reasonable Doubt The second, alleged, prosecutorial misconduct occurred roughly ten minutes after the first purported instance when, after remarking that Majoreta had conceded that he had had sex with Regina in Boone County but contested the Kenton County charges, the Commonwealth stated: “And here’s why—99.9999% that the defendant is guilty of rape. That’s what that [DNA] test means. So, they can’t deny that he’s guilty. They can only deny that he’s guilty in Kenton County.”5 VR 4/24/25, 10:09:37. 5 As the Commonwealth accurately notes in its brief, Majoreta’s insistence that the comment at issue began with “here’s the law” is incorrect. Our review shows that the comment began with “[a]nd here’s why.” Thus, we decline to address further Majoreta’s argument that the prejudice to him was amplified by the Commonwealth cloaking its argument as being an explanation of the applicable law. -21-  Majoreta’s counsel objected and insisted the Commonwealth had improperly defined reasonable doubt to the jury. The Trial Court disagreed and overruled the objection. On appeal, Majoreta repeats his argument. See, e.g., Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Ky. 2009) (noting the “well- settled prohibition of defining reasonable doubt to all points in a trial’s proceedings.”). The DNA results showed that Majoreta was 99.9999% likely to be the father of the aborted child, which in turn tends to prove that he had sex with Regina. But that DNA evidence did not show that the sex occurred in Kenton County on any of the dates listed in the indictment. The Commonwealth thus ventured into extrapolating too much purported information from the DNA results, damning though they certainly were. “[T]he Commonwealth must abide by the limitations of its own proof and not make claims that its DNA evidence is more probative than the expert’s testimony has shown it to be.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 93 (Ky. 2010). However, while no party is permitted to define reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth is permitted to emphasize the strength of the evidence presented and to urge the jury to find a defendant guilty. Though the DNA evidence alone does not show that Majoreta had intercourse with Regina in Kenton County on the dates listed in the indictment, that evidence conclusively showed that Majoreta had -22- engaged in sex with Regina. In closing argument, defense counsel even conceded that Majoreta fathered the aborted child, thereby admitting that Majoreta had sexual intercourse with Regina. And significantly, Regina’s testimony that she had sex with Majoreta in his apartment in Kenton County multiple times was not meaningfully rebutted. In sum, we agree with the limited point that the Commonwealth’s statement about the DNA test results did not mean that Majoreta was 99.9999% guilty of the charges in the indictment. However, the statement appears to be a merely hyperbolic emphasis of the general damning nature of the DNA test results more than an impermissible attempt to define the meaning of reasonable doubt. In any event, the fleeting remark did not render the trial as a whole fundamentally unfair when we consider the entire trial, and we find the statement to be a harmless error given the prodigious evidence of Majoreta’s guilt. Murphy, 509 S.W.3d at 49. C. Penalty Phase Testimony Majoreta’s final argument is that he is entitled to appellate relief because the Trial Court allowed the Commonwealth to ask improper questions of himself and his sister in the penalty phase. In Majoreta’s view, those improper questions caused the jury to recommend that he receive the maximum sentence. -23-  1. Majoreta’s Sister Majoreta asserts that the Commonwealth should not have been permitted to ask his sister about text messages of which she had no personal knowledge. We must relate the immediately preceding testimony to put those questions in context. Majoreta’s sister testified on direct examination in the penalty phase that Majoreta was a good person and “couldn’t do something like this [the charged crimes].” VR 4/24/25, 2:05:40. She also opined that Majoreta “doesn’t deserve to, to be in prison.” Id. at 2:07:28. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth’s first question was whether it was correct that Majoreta had impregnated a 14-year-old girl; Majoreta’s sister answered “of course, it is.” Id. at 2:09:43. Soon thereafter the Commonwealth asked if Majoreta had told her that he was in a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old child. Majoreta’s sister asserted in her response: “Angelo [Majoreta] didn’t know that. The girl [Regina] told me that Angelo didn’t know that she was 14 before [presumably referring to before their relationship became sexual].” Id. at 2:10:54. The Commonwealth then asked if Majoreta had told her about texts he had exchanged with Regina. The sister answered “no.” Id. at 2:11:07. -24-  The Commonwealth then asked the sister to read a text message between Majoreta and Regina. Majoreta’s counsel objected, but the Trial Court overruled the objection. The Commonwealth then directed Majoreta’s sister to read aloud more text messages between Regina and Majoreta. Those messages showed Regina had disclosed her age to Majoreta. The Commonwealth then asked: “So, obviously he [Majoreta] did know in those messages that she [Regina] was 14, correct?” Majoreta’s sister simply responded “correct.” Id. at 2:14:47. Majoreta contends that questions to his sister about those texts were improper because she had not testified about them on direct examination and had no personal knowledge of them. Majoreta cites no precedent with similar facts to support his brief argument. “As a general rule, a competent witness may testify concerning matters of which he has personal knowledge, including events he has personally observed and perceived.” Ruiz v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 675, 683 (Ky. 2015). Indeed, “KRE 602 limits testimony to matters within the personal knowledge of the witness . . . .” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Ky. 2014). However, credibility is always an issue, and Majoreta placed his own directly in issue by calling his sister to testify and asking her questions designed to elicit her opinion of his good character. See KRS 532.055(2)(b) (permitting a -25- defendant to present evidence in the penalty phase “in mitigation or in support of leniency[.]”). We discern no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth was entitled to rebut Majoreta’s sister’s testimony regarding Majoreta’s supposedly good, moral character. We also do not find any abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence to Majoreta’s sister showing that she was mistaken as to the facts supporting her opinion when she testified that Regina had not disclosed her age to Majoreta. Though not cited by the parties, KRE 405(b) expressly provides that “[o]n cross-examination of a character witness, it is proper to inquire if the witness has heard of or knows about relevant specific instances of conduct.” Under that Rule, as one leading Kentucky treatise puts it, “[t]he prosecutor may also cross- examine the defense character witnesses so as to test their knowledge of the defendant by asking whether the witness has heard of specific unsavory things about the defendant that relate to the trait of his or her character that is in question.” Leslie W. Abramson, 9 Ky. Prac. Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 27:132 (6th ed. Nov. 2025 Update). The Commonwealth’s questions to Majoreta’s sister ostensi