State v. Brown

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 128,178 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. RICO JERMAINE BROWN JR., Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. When considering a challenge to a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), an appellate court considers the record as a whole and reviews the district court's determinations of (1) whether prejudicial conduct occurred, and (2) whether curative measures mitigated the prejudice—i.e., rendered it harmless— for abuse of discretion. 2. Judicial discretion is abused if the court's action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; based on an error of law; or based on an error of fact. The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. 3. In assessing a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial or motion for new trial, past precedent discussing whether a "fundamental failure" has occurred is disapproved. 1 4. When reviewing claimed prosecutorial errors in opening statements and closing arguments, an appellate court applies a two-step framework. First, the court considers whether the prosecutor exceeded their wide latitude to conduct the State's case in a manner that does not offend a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The court does not consider any statement in isolation but rather looks to the context to determine whether error occurred. Second, if error exists, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the trial's outcome in light of the whole record, i.e., that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. 5. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. A material fact is one that has some real bearing on the decision in the case, and materiality presents a question of law that an appellate court considers de novo. Probative value flows from the tendency of the evidence to prove any material fact, and an appellate court reviews a district court's evaluation of probative value for abuse of discretion. 6. Where there is but a single error, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY SYRIOS, judge. Oral argument held December 16, 2025. Opinion filed August 14, 2026. Affirmed. Emily R. Brandt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Lindsay Kornegay, of the same office, was on the briefs for appellant. Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 2 The opinion of the court was delivered by WALSH, J.: In this direct appeal, Rico Jermaine Brown Jr. challenges his convictions for premeditated first-degree murder and felony first-degree murder, which arose from the shooting death of E.N. Featured among his many claims of error is the district court's ruling on his motion for a mistrial. Brown argues that significant prejudice resulted from various disturbances during his trial that were not cured by the court's responsive actions and that required the district court to declare a mistrial. We disagree with Brown's arguments, and we affirm the district court's denial of the mistrial motion. Along the way, we identify and prune back an unchecked overgrowth of precedent that has obscured the appropriate standard that guides our review: abuse of discretion. We specifically clarify that, when considering a challenge to a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), we consider the entire record and review the determinations of (1) whether prejudicial conduct occurred—which is the defendant's burden, and (2) whether the prejudicial conduct was rendered harmless, i.e., whether curative measures sufficiently mitigated the prejudice—which is the State's burden, for abuse of discretion. We reject our prior use of "fundamental failure" language in favor of the relevant statutory language of K.S.A. 22-3423(1). And we conclude that in this case the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, although prejudicial conduct occurred, its responsive actions mitigated or cured that prejudice and rendered it harmless. Brown also argues that the district court should have granted a new trial based on juror misconduct; he raises several claims of prosecutorial error; he argues that the district court erred by redacting a portion of a previously admitted exhibit; and he asks 3 this court to reverse his convictions based on the cumulative effect of these alleged errors. Because we conclude that Brown has established only one harmless prosecutorial error, we affirm his convictions and sentence. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Underlying facts At about 10:20 p.m. on July 3, 2023, two cars pulled up to a stop light. Someone from one car fired several shots at the other car, killing the driver, 16-year-old E.N. The shooter's car then sped away. Subsequent investigation determined that E.N. had been shot four times. Investigators found seven 9mm cartridge casings at the scene, all likely fired from the same gun. No witness saw the shooting itself, and police received many tips to locate the suspect's vehicle. Eventually, they zeroed in on Dougqualynn Patterson's car. Police arrested Patterson on July 6. In addition to four bullet holes on the driver's side of Patterson's car, police found a spent 9mm cartridge on the car's front cowl, near the base of the windshield wiper, which investigators determined was likely fired from the same gun that fired the cartridges found at the scene. Police also searched Patterson's cell phone. The phone contained no GPS data from 9:51 p.m. to about 10:22 p.m. on July 3. (The infotainment center of Patterson's car also had no location data between 9:35 p.m. and 11:25 p.m. that night.) But police found 4 several messages between Patterson's phone and a contact named "Rico" on July 3 and 4. Critically, at 4:09 a.m. on July 3—the morning before the shooting—Patterson sent "Rico" the message, "I almost fucking died bro Omm"; in a separate message sent moments later, Patterson said, "Dooterz is dead Omm." (As he would later tell police, Patterson knew the victim, E.N., as "Lil Dooterz.") And later, at about 1:38 a.m. on July 4—several hours after the shooting—"Rico" said "they don't know shiy" and then sent Patterson a screenshot of a news article describing E.N.'s shooting. Meanwhile, security cameras at a Valero gas station in Wichita documented that E.N. and Brown, Patterson, and Patterson's friend Kameron Solomon were all present at the gas station at overlapping times less than an hour before the shooting. Brown, Solomon, and Patterson were all in Patterson's car in the gas station parking lot, with Brown driving; when they noticed E.N., who arrived at about 9:40 p.m., they pulled away from the gas station. Brown then returned on foot, stood in line behind E.N. inside the store, and then—after getting his wallet out but apparently completing no transaction with the clerk—followed E.N. out of the store. At about 10:02 p.m., around 19 minutes later, E.N. returned to the same Valero in a different car; he left again at about 10:08 p.m. By 10:20 p.m., he was dead. Detectives interview Patterson, Brown, and Solomon Detectives spent more than eight hours interviewing Patterson after his arrest. Patterson presented several different versions of events involving "Grim" (his name for Brown) and Solomon. Although Patterson initially claimed that he did not know how his own car had gotten bullet holes, Patterson eventually agreed to tell detectives "the full story"—after they confronted him with security camera images from the Valero and, perhaps more significantly, after they threatened him with a first-degree murder conviction if he maintained that he knew nothing. 5  According to Patterson's final version of the story, E.N. (whom he identified as "Lil Dooterz"), along with two other men, had robbed him at about 4 a.m. on the morning of July 3 and then shot at him as he was leaving. (Patterson sent "Rico" the above-noted texts shortly after this time frame.) E.N. and his compatriots had relieved Patterson of his cash, his gun, and his Patek Philippe watch, which he described as a "$180,000 watch" that he claimed to have gotten "from a friend." (E.N.'s mother later found the watch in the back seat of E.N.'s car.) After the robbery, Patterson went to Brown's house and told him about it; according to Patterson, Brown said he would kill E.N. Patterson claimed that Brown was upset at Patterson for "letting [the robbery] happen and not shooting back" and for having "everything taken [from] me by some little kids." Patterson and Brown then went "looking for [E.N.] all day"; that evening, they "just happened to see him" at the Valero. After they saw E.N., they waited for him to leave the gas station, followed him to his house (where he changed cars), lost him, saw him again at the same gas station, and then followed him until he stopped at a red light. Patterson said that he was in the back seat, while Brown was driving; when they stopped beside E.N.'s car, Brown leaned out the window and fired "like ten times" with a black handgun. Patterson saw E.N. slump over and assumed he had died. The men split up shortly thereafter. Patterson also said that Solomon had also been in their car but had nothing to do with the shooting, and had essentially just been along for the ride. Police arrested Brown and interviewed him on July 8. Though Brown admitted he had briefly seen Patterson on the afternoon of July 3, he effectively denied any other involvement. 6  Police also arrested Solomon, who declined to make a statement at the time. At a later interview with detectives at his attorney's office, Solomon largely corroborated Patterson's account, albeit with minor differences; for instance, Solomon claimed Patterson was driving, while Patterson said that Brown had been behind the wheel. Critically, Solomon said that, when Patterson's car stopped alongside E.N.'s at the traffic light, Brown told Patterson to "pull up," then rolled down his window and fired at E.N. from the back seat. Solomon also claimed that he kept his head "straight" so he would not see anything. At trial, Solomon mostly stuck with his story. While he expressed some uncertainty as to how he knew Brown was the shooter (since he claimed he kept his head "down" or "straight") he ultimately testified that Brown fired the shots. District court proceedings The State initially charged Brown with one count of first-degree premeditated murder. The preliminary hearing spanned three separate dates. During the first portion of the preliminary hearing, Patterson told a different story than the final one he had given police. Patterson now said that he had lied about Brown's involvement because he was scared of the person who owned the watch E.N. had taken from him during the earlier robbery. By the final portion of the preliminary hearing, Patterson maintained that neither he nor Brown nor Solomon had anything to do with E.N.'s shooting. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court bound Brown over for trial, and permitted the State to add felony murder as an alternative charge. 7  The case went to jury trial. As we will discuss, several collateral problems cropped up during trial. The district court also initially admitted a defense audio exhibit, but later—after the State raised a concern about Solomon's attorney's comments in the first five minutes—the district court ordered that a redacted copy of the exhibit go back to the jury. The jury ultimately found Brown guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. After denying a subsequent motion for new trial following an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave Brown a life sentence without possibility of parole before 618 months and merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction. Brown timely appealed to this court. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4). ANALYSIS I. The district court did not err in denying Brown's motion for a mistrial. Brown first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for mistrial, which defense counsel made shortly before closing arguments based on "a cumulative standpoint." Brown argues that various distractions, outbursts, and interactions in the courtroom over the course of trial constituted multiple fundamental failures. Although we ultimately conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, Brown's argument offers us the opportunity to consider our precedent concerning mistrials. A. Standard of review and legal principles Although a district court enjoys inherent power to declare a mistrial "when justice so requires and there exists a manifest necessity to do so," K.S.A. 22-3423 also guides a 8 district court's exercise of its power to declare mistrials. State v. Folkerts, 229 Kan. 608, 614, 629 P.2d 173 (1981). Because Brown's motion arises under the "prejudicial conduct" subsection of that statute, our analysis implicates questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Scheuerman, 314 Kan. 583, 587, 502 P.3d 502 (2022). To the extent we must review our own precedent—which also poses a question of law subject to de novo review—we must also consider the doctrine of stare decisis. Zaragoza v. Board of Johnson County Commissioners, 320 Kan. 691, 707, 571 P.3d 545 (2025) (stare decisis); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Servs. Co., 296 Kan. 906, 918, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013) (questions involving consideration and application of prior caselaw are subject to de novo review). Under our well-established rules of statutory interpretation, the Legislature's intent remains our North Star, to the extent we can discern it. E.g., Roe v. Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. 1, 5, 522 P.3d 277 (2023). When that intent is plain from the statute's language, our analysis ends. But where a statute's language is ambiguous, we "'will consult our canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.'" Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. at 5 (quoting Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, 312 Kan. 597, 601, 478 P.3d 776 [2021]). We begin with K.S.A. 22-3423(1), which, since 1970, has provided that a district court may "terminate the trial and order a mistrial at any time that he finds termination is necessary because": "(a) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law; or "(b) there is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law and the defendant requests or consents to the declaration of a mistrial; or 9  "(c) prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution; or "(d) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or "(e) false statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial; or "(f) the trial has been interrupted pending a determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial." K.S.A. 22-3423(1). Brown's arguments focus on subsection (c). We have written that an appellate court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 134, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). Judicial discretion is abused if the court's action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; based on an error of law; or based on an error of fact. The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Valenciana, 322 Kan. __, __, 589 P.3d 599, 610 (2026). But we have also written that K.S.A. 22-3423 "creates a two-step process. First, the trial court must determine if there was some fundamental failure of the proceeding. If so, the trial court moves to the second step and assesses whether it is possible to continue without injustice. In other words, the trial court must decide if the prejudicial conduct's damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition, jury instruction, or other action. If not, the trial court must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial." State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 980, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). As McCullough summarized, the statutory framework poses two questions, which we have articulated as: "(1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding if there 10 was a fundamental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice?" McCullough, 293 Kan. at 981. But the words "fundamental failure" do not appear in the statute. This phrase first appeared in our jurisprudence in State v. Lewis, 238 Kan. 94, 97, 708 P.2d 196 (1985). There, the court considered the defendants' claim that the district court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial ostensibly based on K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(b), the "legal defect in the proceedings" subsection, based on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Lewis, 238 Kan. at 97. In describing the district court's discretionary power to declare a mistrial, Lewis declared, perhaps rhetorically, that: "The granting of a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. The judge's power to declare a mistrial is to be used only with great caution, under proper circumstances, to insure that all parties receive a fair trial. To insure that the trial judge has properly applied his discretion in granting or failing to grant a new trial, his actions are subject to review by appellate courts. "It is necessary when justice so requires to declare a mistrial where there is some fundamental failure of the proceeding. When an event of prejudicial misconduct, the damaging effect of which cannot be removed by admonition and instruction, is presented to the jury, the trial judge must declare a mistrial. In the present case, the State's introduction of evidence, of which the defendants' counsel were unaware and which destroyed the defense strategy, is such an event requiring a mistrial." (Emphasis added.) Lewis, 238 Kan. at 97. Once planted, the "fundamental failure" term went to seed. We began analyzing prosecutorial errors through the lens of "fundamental failures" in the context of requests 11 for mistrials. E.g., State v. Miller, 308 Kan. 1119, 1163-64, 427 P.3d 907 (2018) (prosecutor's error in violating district court's order in limine creates a "fundamental failure in the proceedings"). Like a noxious weed, the "fundamental failure" language spread into the modern multi-part standard for applying and reviewing any claim of error in failing to grant a mistrial under K.S.A. 22-3423, including the "prejudicial conduct" subsection at issue here. Our recent caselaw has summarized this supposedly "traditional rubric for considering a mistrial" this way: "'Applying [K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c)], a trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must decide if there is some fundamental failure of the proceeding. If so, in the second step of the analysis, the trial court must assess whether it is possible to continue the trial without an injustice. This means . . . that if there is prejudicial conduct, the trial court must determine if the damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition or instruction to the jury. If not, the trial court must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial.' "In deciding whether it is impossible to proceed without an injustice after a fundamental failure in the proceedings, a court 'must assess whether the fundamental failure affected a party's substantial rights, which means it will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record.' The applicable degree of certainty turns on whether the failure infringes on a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution—in which case the Chapman harmless error analysis applies. "On appeal, a district judge's decision denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when: (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court; (2) the ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) the exercise of discretion is based on an error of fact. 12  "'Applying the abuse of discretion standard of review [to a motion for mistrial], an appellate court focuses on the two questions analyzed by the trial court and asks: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding if there was a fundamental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice?' "'An appellate court reviewing the second step for an injustice will review the entire record and use the same analysis [as the district court], applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman, depending on the nature of the right allegedly affected.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Carr, 314 Kan. 744, 772-73, 502 P.3d 511 (2022) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 [2011]). See also In re Care & Treatment of Sigler, 310 Kan. 688, 706, 448 P.3d 368 (2019) (citing Ward, 292 Kan. at 550). Worse, the "fundamental failure"-based construct has begun to choke out the deferential abuse of discretion standard, exchanging it for a de novo review. We have written that, as to the second McCullough question—whether any failure resulted in injustice—we do "not review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion but consider[] the entire record and perform [our] own constitutional harmless error review." State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545, 556-57, 422 P.3d 72 (2018) (citing State v. Corey, 304 Kan. 721, 731, 374 P.3d 654 [2016]). We also articulated the basis for exercising an unlimited review over the second question, rather than confining our analysis to abuse of discretion: "We have an advantage over the district court in analyzing the second step—the damaging effect of the fundamental failure in the proceedings—because we can look at the entire record of the trial, including what transpired after the district court denied the mistrial motion. Waller, 299 Kan. at 726 ('Appellate courts reviewing the second part for an injustice may take a broader view than the trial court because appellate courts may 13  examine the entire record.'). From that entire record, we must assess whether the harm or prejudice rose to the level of causing injustice." State v. Moyer, 306 Kan. 342, 357, 410 P.3d 71 (2017). Prior to Ward and the proliferation of Lewis' fundamental failure language, our standard of review over a district court's mistrial rulings was decidedly simpler. For example, as State v. Dixon described the inquiry in 2009: "Declaration of a mistrial is a matter entrusted to the district court's discretion, and the judge's choice will not be set aside without an abuse of that discretion. An appellate court's inquiry should consider whether a limiting instruction was given, the degree of prejudice, and whether any evidence improperly admitted would affect the outcome of the trial. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 55, 209 P.3d 675 (2009). See also State v. Humphery, 267 Kan. 45, 57, 978 P.2d 264 (1999) ("Terminating a trial and declaring a mistrial is largely within the discretion of the trial court. . . . 'The general rule is that an admonition to the jury normally cures the prejudice from an improper admission of evidence.' . . . When an event of prejudicial misconduct, the damaging effect of which cannot be removed by admonition and instruction, is presented to the jury, the trial judge should declare a mistrial."); State v. Banks, 260 Kan. 918, 926, 927 P.2d 456 (1996) ("Declaration of a mistrial is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion."). Our subsequent caselaw has further entrenched "fundamental failures" and uprooted the abuse of discretion standard by frequently assuming, without deciding, that a fundamental failure exists, and then moving on to the harmlessness part of the analysis. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 321 Kan. 493, 507, 581 P.3d 1261 (2026) (in the absence of trial court findings, assuming without deciding that a fundamental failure occurred); State v. Owens, 314 Kan. 210, 232, 496 P.3d 902 (2021) ("We presume without deciding that the failure to disclose Detective Chisholm's [firearms] demonstration before trial was a 14 fundamental failure in the proceeding."); State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, 989, 399 P.3d 168 (2017) (assuming district court found a fundamental failure based on district court's offer to give the jury an admonishment or limiting instruction); State v. Kleypas, 305 Kan. 224, 283, 382 P.3d 373 (2016) (Kleypas II) ("While we question whether giving an admonishment necessarily means a fundamental failure occurred [especially given the court's comments], given the State's concession, we will proceed on the assumption the court found a fundamental failure occurred."); State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 119, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016) (declining to "grapple" with the question of whether a fundamental failure occurred "when, as here, there is clearly no possible showing of prejudice"). We end this practice today. The import of an undefined, unprovenanced, and unworkable "fundamental failure" standard warrants correction. Cf. State v. Moeller, 318 Kan. 860, 864, 549 P.3d 1106 (2024) (under principles of stare decisis, a court will generally follow its own precedent unless it is "clearly convinced" that the precedent was originally erroneous and that more good than harm will come by departing from the precedent). And the ultimate decision under K.S.A. 22-3423(1) of whether it is necessary to "terminate the trial and order a mistrial" due to any of the statutory circumstances is a decision best left to the discretion of the district court. As our difficulty in picking the appropriate noun reflects, we were not present in the courtroom when the fight, altercation, commotion, ruckus, etc. broke out. We did not hear the cell phones going off; we did not see the people coming and going from the courtroom; we did not see Solomon's mother gesturing or hear E.N.'s mother's "outburst" when the police body camera footage showed her child's body. While the district court and the parties made an admirable record of these matters for appellate review, that is all we can do here: review. Only the district court was seeing, hearing, and feeling the ambient pulse of the trial as it was happening. Its determination as to the severity of the disturbances and the impact of its responsive actions will not be reviewed de novo. 15  This deference is particularly appropriate here, where the motion for mistrial came at the conclusion of the evidence. We cannot say that our perspective is broader than the district court's: at the point the motion was submitted, the district court had practically all the information we have about the shape of the trial, and infinitely more organic information than we do about the atmosphere in the courtroom. We hold that, when considering a motion for mistrial, the district court should first consider whether the defense has carried its burden of establishing that at least one of the circumstances set out in K.S.A. 22-3423 exists—or, in light of the inherent authority district courts continue to possess, "when justice so requires and there exists a manifest necessity to do so." Folkerts, 229 Kan. at 614. See State v. Harris, 313 Kan. 579, 585, 486 P.3d 576 (2021) (defense bears the burden of establishing an error under the first part of the test). As before, we will review this decision for abuse of discretion considering the record as a whole, "recognizing that a district court faced with a motion for mistrial 'is in the best position to observe the demeanor of those present, and to determine whether the accused has sustained substantial prejudice.'" Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 280 (quoting State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 166, 643 P.2d 154 [1982]). Then, the district court must consider whether the State has carried its burden of proving harmlessness under the appropriate standard of certainty articulated by Ward. Harris, 313 Kan. at 585 (State bears the burden of proving that the prejudice can be removed or mitigated through curative measures). As to the "prejudicial conduct" subsection invoked here, that includes considering the impact of any curative or mitigating measures implemented. We also review this determination for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse where the court's action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; based on an error of law; or based on an error of fact. In so holding, we ground the inquiry in the language of the statute and confirm that both determinations remain firmly rooted in the discretion of the district court. 16  Having clarified the standard guiding our review, we turn to the incidents Brown cites in support of his mistrial claim. B. The altercation in the hallway outside the courtroom Towards the end of the second day of trial, the attorneys approached the bench for a conference. The district court excused the jury at the end of this conference, then—after the jury had left—made the following record: "[T]here was probably eight to ten deputies that walked through as we were having a conference and that alerted all of us here at the bench. We turned around. They were walking out. There was a commotion out there and then someone, one of the attorneys . . . said there was a fight or dispute outside. Then we could hear some things. "I immediately excused the jury from the courtroom. Well, I made the record to remember the admonitions. They did quickly leave. This commotion was in the direction that they were facing, the way that our courtroom is set up. Our blinds are closed. There's maybe one blind that is a little open, but we could hear some things in the courtroom." One of the deputies then told the court that "[a] group had left and went out. There was some yelling. I heard some cussing, didn't think much of it." Upon further investigation, "I heard another lady that was sitting somewhere here in the front row call somebody a bitch and told her she needed to relax and then that was when I called. I didn't see anybody throwing punches, but when I heard that they were fighting I just called [reinforcements]." The prosecutor later mentioned receiving information that one of the individuals "said something about Crips" which "probably provoked a reaction" that led to the altercation. 17  After a discussion with the attorneys, the district court brought the jurors back, admonished them not to do any independent investigation, and had deputies escort them to the parking garage. Among its other remarks, the district court told the jury, "We had a commotion out in the hall. I know everybody saw that." After the district court dismissed the jury for the night, defense counsel asked the district court to clarify to the jury that the altercation did not involve either Brown's family or E.N.'s family. The district court did so the following morning. The district court also told the jury that it had ordered the individual responsible to be kept out of the courtroom and, thus, that "[i]t really does appear to be a one-off situation that we have a handle on now." Without saying as much, the district court's behavior reflects that it appropriately recognized that the situation constituted prejudicial conduct that required corrective action. Cf. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 266-68, 275-82 (victim's father physically attacked defendant during the remand sentencing proceedings; district court correctly denied defense motion for mistrial after taking appropriate corrective actions, including immediately removing the jurors from the courtroom, questioning the jurors about their impartiality, and instructing the jurors to disregard the incident). The risk that the incident might have made the jury feel unsafe, or prejudiced it against one of the parties, was not de minimis, and the district court's actions sufficiently addressed both concerns. Moreover, while Brown now claims that the district court failed to sufficiently admonish the jury and failed to poll the jury, as occurred in Kleypas II, we cannot fault the district court for taking the actions defense counsel requested: it assured the jury that the individuals responsible for the fight had nothing to do with Brown's family or E.N.'s family. To do more would have risked placing undue emphasis on the incident which— from what the record suggests—appears to have largely occurred in the hallway outside the courtroom, even if it may have begun inside. Instead, by clarifying that the incident was unrelated to the families and addressing any potential safety concerns, the district 18 court adequately cured any prejudice caused by the altercation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial on this basis. C. Alleged witness coaching Brown next highlights what he describes as Solomon's mother's "attempt[] to coach him during his testimony." But the record does not support Brown's implicit argument that this incident involved prejudicial conduct, however. This matter came to the district court's attention on the final day of trial, when defense counsel told the district court that, during Solomon's testimony, Solomon's mother "was somehow making hand signals." Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel proffered the testimony of an investigator for the Sedgwick County Public Defender Office. The investigator testified that, during Solomon's testimony, she had been observing Solomon's mother, who was sitting in the gallery. According to the investigator, when defense counsel was questioning Solomon "about his cognitive abilities," Solomon's mother "put her hand up" and made a motion with four fingers and a thumb, which she interpreted as a talking motion. The investigator also noticed Solomon's mother move her hand in a circular motion, which she interpreted as a hurry up sign, when Solomon asked counsel to "call him Kameron instead of Kam." The prosecutor called an investigator for the DA's office. The DA's investigator was sitting behind Solomon's mother and testified that "she was trying to get somebody's attention in front of her." The investigator stepped around and asked if she was alright; "She said that's my son . . . and he takes some medications, when the medications start to run down he runs down, and I'm seeing what's going to happen and he is going to . . . lay over or slouch down or something." Perhaps a minute later, the investigator observed Solomon "slide down a little bit," at which point Solomon's mother said "I gotta get up there and I need to talk to my attorney, who was in front of her." The investigator told her 19 she could not get up. A minute later, she got the attorney's attention; "He said I'll be back there in a minute" and then Solomon "kind of sat up more, finished, and that was the end of it." The district court found that, "I don't think there is any evidence that Mr. Solomon saw any actions by his mom as well as any evidence that the jury saw anything." The district court also said "I don't think we're at a point where we're in agreement to poll [the jury]" over the matter. Brown cites State v. Dayhuff, 37 Kan. App. 2d 779, 158 P.3d 330 (2007), to support his claim. There, a child advocate was "nodding her head and making gestures" to a child witness on the stand and thus was "essentially coaching" the child's testimony. Dayhuff, 37 Kan. App. 2d at 796. But the district court refused to investigate, saying, inter alia, "We don't have the time to deal with this right now." 37 Kan. App. 2d at 796. On appeal, the panel chastised the district court for failing to investigate the matter at the time it occurred but, instead, for taking it up at a hearing seven months after trial—a delay that "[was] simply inadequate to investigate the matter as to how the child advocate's conduct may have impacted the child's testimony and affected the jury." 37 Kan. App. 2d at 801. But we find Dayhuff distinguishable. The district court here investigated the matter thoroughly. The record supports its conclusion that, however the parties' investigators interpreted Solomon's mother's actions, no one presented any evidence that either Solomon or the jury saw anything. See State v. Salazar-Moreno, No. 106,555, 2013 WL 5925894, at *10 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (no indication that the jury saw a gesture or could not recognize that the gesture was a reminder to sip water). Further, although the dist