Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 127,796 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JERMEL LARAY GOINES, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(6) imposes a limit on the period of any sanctions imposed for a probation violation. The sanction period is limited to the amount of time remaining on the underlying prison sentence. Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 14, 2025. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER MAGANA, judge. Oral argument held September 15, 2026. Opinion filed October 30, 2026. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions. Kasper C. Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 1 The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, C.J.: Jermel Laray Goines argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation in 2024. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the revocation. Goines argues the panel erred. We agree, although we reach that conclusion through a different path than Goines has asserted. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court with directions to release Goines from serving the remaining consequences imposed as a result of the probation revocation. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2019, Goines pled guilty to aggravated domestic battery, a severity level 7 person felony, and criminal threat, a severity level 9 person felony in case number 19- CR-1940. At that time, Goines was on probation for felonies he committed in 2017. The court revoked the 2017 probation and ordered Goines serve a 72-hour prison sanction before probation would be reinstated. The district court sentenced Goines to 36 months' imprisonment for both 2019 counts, suspended the sentence, and placed Goines on probation for 24 months. He began serving probation terms in both cases concurrently. In February 2020, the district court held a probation violation hearing in which Goines admitted several new probation violations to the 2017 and 2019 probations. The court revoked probation in the 2017 case and imposed the underlying 38-month sentence. The court revoked the 2019 probation, and ordered Goines serve a 48-hour jail sanction and complete the sentence in the 2017 case before probation in the 2019 case would be reinstated. The court ordered Goines to report to Community Corrections within 24 hours of his release from custody. Goines completed his sentence for the 2017 case and was released in April 2022. He began the reinstated probation term for the 2019 case. 2 In May 2024, Goines admitted new probation violations on the 2019 case. The district court reviewed Goines' history and concluded that probation was not working. It revoked Goines' probation and imposed the underlying sentence, modifying the sentence from 36 to 24 months with 12 months' postrelease supervision. Goines completed his 24- month prison sentence sometime this year and is presently under postrelease supervision. Goines appealed. A split Court of Appeals panel affirmed the revocation. State v. Goines, No. 127,796, 2025 WL 3188310 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion). ANALYSIS We have a duty to question jurisdiction on our own initiative. State v. Marinelli, 307 Kan. 768, 769, 415 P.3d 405 (2018). When our review of a case reveals a lack of jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. Goines argues the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation in 2024 because the district court had no authority under K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(B) to stay his 2019 probation until he served the sentence in the 2017 case. Thus, he argues, he completed his 2019 probation in 2022 and was no longer on probation when he was charged for violating probation in 2024. We agree the district court lacked jurisdiction, but we reach this conclusion based on the limitation imposed by K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(6). Our analysis turns on the interpretation of K.S.A. 22-3716. Legislative intent controls our interpretation of statutes. We apply the statutory language as written when the language is plain and unambiguous. State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. 357, 372, 580 P.3d 20 (2025) (quoting State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 258-59, 527 P.3d 911 [2023]). 3 K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1) outlines the sanctions a district court may impose in most cases when, as here, a defendant violates probation and the underlying crime was a felony. Here, the district court opted to sanction Goines as provided by K.S.A. 22- 3716(c)(1)(B), which empowered the district court to impose "continuation or modification of the release conditions of [Goines'] probation" and "an intermediate sanction of confinement in a county jail to be imposed as a two-day or three-day consecutive period." The district court revoked the 24-month 2019 probation, imposed a 2-day intermediate sanction, and then continued or modified the release conditions when it delayed reinstatement pending completion of the prison sentence in the 2017 case. But K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(6) establishes an outer limit on the time period for sanctions: "A violation sanction imposed pursuant to subsection (c)(1) shall not be longer than the amount of time remaining on the offender's underlying prison sentence." The delayed reinstatement of the 2019 probation failed to comport with this subsection. Goines' underlying sentence in the 2019 case was 36 months. Based on the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(6), any sanction the district court imposed in February 2020 had to end no later than 36 months from the day the sanction began—here, that means sometime in February 2023. But when the district court delayed the reinstatement of Goines' probation term, it created a total sanction period that lasted up to 48 months if Goines served his full sentence on the 2017 case before beginning the 24 months of probation on the 2019 case (with some variation possible depending on Goines' behavior in prison or if Goines were later determined to have violated probation). Any sanction period beyond 36 months from February 2020 exceeded the district court's authority. Generally, a court maintains continuing jurisdiction over a probationer during the probation term. A court's jurisdiction to supervise probation ends when the probation term ends barring a lawful extension or a timely issued warrant. State v. Wilson, 319 Kan. 55, 60-61, 552 P.3d 1228 (2024) (whether a probation term exceeds the statutory limit "raises a question about the district court's jurisdiction to revoke it"); State v. Cisneros, 36 Kan. 4 App. 2d 901, 903, 147 P.3d 880 (2006); see also State v. Alonzo, 296 Kan. 1052, 1057-59, 297 P.3d 300 (2013). But see K.S.A. 21-6608(c)(8) (permitting modification or extension of probation in some circumstances); K.S.A. 22-3716(e) (providing up to 30 days to issue a warrant for probation violations occurring during probation period). In this case, the sanction imposed on Goines in February 2020 had to end in February 2023 unless the court lawfully extended it. But we find no extension in the record. Thus, the district court lost jurisdiction over Goines in February 2023. This means it had no jurisdiction over Goines when it purported to revoke his probation in 2024. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision affirming the district court's 2024 probation revocation and remand with directions to immediately discharge Goines from completing any remaining time on his postrelease supervision in the 2019 case. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions. 5