State v. Trickle

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 127,217 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. COLBY TRICKLE, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. On the facts of this case, admitting expert testimony framed in terms of relative risk factors for suicide was not an abuse of discretion. 2. An objection to the admission of evidence must make clear the specific ground of the objection. 3. On the facts of this case, flippant statements about the truthfulness of the defendant during closing arguments strayed outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors. Appeal from Ellis District Court; GLENN R. BRAUN, judge. Oral argument held December 16, 2025. Opinion filed September 11, 2026. Affirmed. Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. 1  Tyler W. Winslow, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by STEGALL, J.: Was Kristen Trickle murdered in her sleep by her husband, Colby Trickle? Or did she commit suicide while her husband lay next to her unaware? A jury believed the former, convicting Trickle of murder in the first degree and interference with law enforcement. This is Trickle's direct appeal. BACKGROUND Kristen died on the morning of October 31, 2019. Trickle called 9-1-1, reporting that "my wife shot herself." When asked by the operator what happened and whether he and his wife had had a fight, Trickle, who was in hysterics the entire call, says something that sounds like "I didn't do anything." After officers arrived at the scene, Trickle said he had been asleep and woke up with his ears ringing. He also said he did not know where the gun was and that there was "blood all over" inside. But officers observed no blood on Trickle. Inside the Trickles' dwelling, Kristen was on the bed. There was a revolver on her abdomen. Emergency responders commenced CPR, but it was unsuccessful. The Ellis County coroner listed the manner of Kristen's death as a suicide. During his initial police interview, Trickle claimed that he had checked Kristen for a pulse when directed to by the 9-1-1 operator. He indicated, when asked where he checked for the pulse, that he checked Kristen's bleeding neck. But as indicated earlier, there was no evidence of blood on Trickle. Trickle admitted that he had purchased the 2 revolver, and Kristen did not own any guns. Trickle also claimed that he picked up the gun after he found Kristen with the gunshot wound to use it on himself before changing his mind. Trickle told law enforcement that Kristen did not have life insurance coverage. Trickle also made several other statements later found to be false during the investigation. For example, Trickle claimed he had deployed to Iraq and Central America with the military, but his records indicated that he had never been deployed overseas. Trickle also claimed that Kristen had been exchanging illicit photographs with another man. And though Trickle claimed he had not engaged in similar activity himself, Trickle's phone revealed that he had been doing just that with another woman online via Xbox and Snapchat since July. The investigation uncovered that on October 21, 2019, Trickle's phone was used to conduct a Google search for, "[W]hat is a spouse SGLI amount[?]" SGLI stands for service member's group life insurance. Trickle also received information on SGLI via text message from a military superior on October 20, 2019. Trickle claimed he did not conduct the search, and suggested Kristen had. But investigators found video footage from Walmart showing that Kristen was at work at the time of the Google search, and she was not using Trickle's phone. Trickle ultimately received $100,140.75 from the SGLI payout in February 2020. He also received a payout from Kristen's life insurance policy with her employment at Walmart in January 2020. At trial, the State relied heavily on the expert testimony of Dr. Ashley Christiansen, a forensic and clinical psychologist. The State presented her as "an expert in suicide," who had done extensive training in suicide risk factors, suicide risk assessments, and managing people with acute suicidology. As part of her practice, Dr. Christiansen conducts "psychological autopsies." These are retrospective evaluations by which a psychologist "recreate[s] the mental state or analyze[s] the mental state of an individual who is now deceased." 3  On appeal, Trickle asserts that Dr. Christiansen's testimony was improper and prejudicial, along with other alleged errors. We consider each of his claims in turn. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. ANALYSIS Expert Opinion and Testimony of Dr. Ashley Christiansen Prior to trial, the State proffered Dr. Christiansen's report and testimony. At the hearing, Trickle objected to the concluding sentence of the proffered opinion: "So it was my opinion that at the time of [Kristen's] passing she was relatively low risk for suicide." Defense counsel objected to this final statement of the opinion arguing that it "invades the jury's decision-making process. That invades the purview of the jury." Defense counsel added that it was not "objecting to her methodology or her information, but that final opinion." Defense counsel renewed the objection at trial but was overruled each time. Trickle attacks Dr. Christiansen's testimony in three ways on appeal. First, he argues the district court erred in allowing Dr. Christiansen to present opinion testimony on the likelihood that Kristen's death was a suicide because it was unnecessary and unreliable. Second, he claims the district court erred in allowing Dr. Christiansen to invade the province of the jury by testifying that it was unreasonable to conclude Kristen died by suicide. Trickle claims these errors both prejudiced his rights to a fair trial and violated his "inviolate" jury trial rights under sections 18 and 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Finally, Trickle asserts that during the State's questioning of Dr. Christiansen, the prosecutor diluted the State's burden of proof by equating reasonableness with guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that Trickle's only objection below was that the opinion invaded the province of the jury to determine 4 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State suggests Trickle failed to object and thus waived any arguments that psychological autopsies in general or Dr. Christiansen's application of the methodology rendered the opinion inadmissible. Furthermore, the State argues that there was no objection based on constitutional rights at trial—only statutory grounds. We first consider the preservation questions. Under our rules of appellate procedure, if an appellant raises an issue for the first time on appeal, he or she must invoke a preservation exception before we will consider the issue. Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). Schutt v. Foster, 320 Kan. 852, 857, 572 P.3d 770 (2025). Trickle claims no preservation exceptions, so he may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. There is a second, "hard" preservation requirement with respect to the admission of evidence. Under K.S.A. 60-404, "A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection." This contemporaneous objection requirement functions as a procedural bar to appellate review if it is not met. See State v. Crudo, 318 Kan. 32, 38, 541 P.3d 67 (2024). The record shows that defense counsel only objected that it would invade "the purview of the jury" if Dr. Christiansen was permitted to testify that Kristen was a low risk for suicide and that such an opinion would be shared by other reasonable professional psychologists. "[A] defendant may not object to the introduction of evidence on one ground at trial, and then assert a different objection on appeal." State v. Bryant, 5 272 Kan. 1204, 1208, 38 P.3d 661 (2002) (holding that arguing about the inapplicability of a hearsay exception did not preserve an objection based on the Confrontation Clause). See also State v. Horton, 300 Kan. 477, 492, 331 P.3d 752 (2014) ("It is not sufficient simply to lodge an objection in order to preserve an issue; the articulated basis of the objection must be specific to the error asserted on appeal."). Thus, any claim that Dr. Christiansen's opinion was unnecessary or unreliable is not properly before us. We thus consider whether the expert opinion invaded the province of the jury. For purposes of this appeal, we assume the objection preserves both statutory and constitutional challenges. We review admission of expert testimony under K.S.A. 60-456 for abuse of discretion. See State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 195-98, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). "'A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact.'" State v. Lyman, 311 Kan. 1, 21, 455 P.3d 393 (2020). Under K.S.A. 60-456, an expert witness may testify in the form of an opinion if the proponent shows that it is more likely than not that the expert's scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge "will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." K.S.A. 60-456(b). "Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences otherwise admissible under this article is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of the fact." K.S.A. 60-456(d). "An expert's opinion is admissible up to the point where expressing the opinion requires the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence." Horton, 300 Kan. at 487. Two of this court's past cases are especially relevant here. In State v. Lash, 237 Kan. 384, 699 P.2d 49 (1985), we affirmed the district court's ruling that "the psychologist could not testify before the jury as to his expert opinion that the alleged victim had been sexually molested by the defendant, his father." 237 Kan. at 386. We distinguished Lash in State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). 6 Smallwood held that an expert could testify that, in her medical experience, a child had died from child abuse. In Lash, "the prosecutor, in effect, was asking the expert for his opinion as to whether the son was telling the truth that his father was his molester." Smallwood, 264 Kan. at 81. And that was improper because it entailed passing judgment on the credibility of witnesses. 264 Kan. at 81. But in Smallwood, the expert's opinion that the victim had "died as a result of child abuse, either shaking or a blow to the skull," was not testimony as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. 264 Kan. at 81. Just so here. Dr. Christiansen made two statements at trial that Trickle now alleges invaded the province of the jury: (1) "based on all of the data available, that it is relatively less likely that [Kristen's] death was the results of suicide . . . [and] at the time of her death she was a low risk for suicide"; and (2) "any other professional reviewing the data available would not conclude that her death was the result of suicide." This case is more like the appropriate testimony in Smallwood than the impermissible testimony in Lash. Here, Dr. Christiansen testified based on her report, grounded in her expertise in suicidology. Expert testimony framed in terms of risk factors that leaves the ultimate question of guilt or innocence to the jury is not impermissible because it embraces an ultimate issue. There was no error in admitting the expert testimony here. And as to the burden of proof, Trickle claims the lower court erred by permitting the State to ask Dr. Christiansen whether "it is not reasonable to conclude that Kristen Trickle committed suicide." But defense counsel's objection at trial to this question was merely "[c]haracterization." That is not specific enough to preserve an objection regarding diluting the burden of proof under K.S.A. 60-404. K.S.A. 60-404 requires an objection "make clear the specific ground of objection." We thus decline to address this argument for the first time on appeal. See Horton, 300 Kan. at 492 ("[T]he articulated basis of the objection must be specific to the error asserted on appeal."). 7 Trickle's Lay Suicide Witness At trial, Trickle proffered the testimony of Irene Smith. Smith's testimony would have been that her stepson, Randall, committed suicide the day before he was to start a new job, despite seeming normal and excited about the job in the days prior. Trickle argues that the testimony was material and probative because it tended to show that Kristen could have committed suicide despite having a lack of suicidality indicators before her death. Trickle argues that his right to present a defense was violated by the exclusion of Smith's testimony. In determining admissibility of evidence, "'[A]ll relevant evidence is generally admissible.' K.S.A. 60-407(f). Relevant evidence is 'evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.' K.S.A. 60-401(b). Relevance has two components: materiality and probative value. 'A material fact is one that has some real bearing on the decision in the case,' and probative evidence tends to prove any material fact." State v. Hogan, 321 Kan. 27, 39, 573 P.3d 207 (2025). We generally review materiality determinations de novo and probative determinations for abuse of discretion. State v. Knox, 301 Kan. 671, 688, 347 P.3d 656 (2015). "When a criminal defendant claims that a district court interfered with his or her constitutional right to present a defense, this court reviews the issue de novo." State v. Seacat, 303 Kan. 622, 638, 366 P.3d 208 (2016). In Seacat, a husband was accused of shooting his wife in the head and attempting to burn their house down. We affirmed the exclusion of evidence that the wife had considered suicide three years prior. The evidence "was not probative because her past mental condition was not at issue." 303 Kan. at 640. Trickle argues that Seacat merely stands for the idea that three-year-old disclosures are too remote to prove state of mind. But Randall's mental condition and suicide are even more removed from the facts of this 8 case than the wife's suicidal ideation was from the crime in Seacat. Randall's tragic death is not a material fact in this case, nor does the fact of his untimely death have any tendency to prove a material fact. There is no logical connection between Randall's death and Kristen's. Allowing Smith's testimony would open the proverbial floodgates to layperson testimony about unrelated suicides any time suicide is the defense's main theory. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to admit the evidence. Sex Doll Purchase Evidence The district court allowed the State to admit into evidence that Trickle used the life insurance proceeds he received from his wife's death to purchase a life-sized sex doll. The defense did not object to listing where Trickle made purchases with the life insurance proceeds, it only objected to what Trickle purchased at "True Touch Dolls." At oral argument, the State conceded that admitting this evidence was error, but argued the error was harmless. Because the State concedes error, we assume error without deciding the issue. Because, as illustrated below, the State concedes other errors, we reserve our evaluation of harmlessness for cumulative error. State v. Bobian, 321 Kan. 169, 175, 574 P.3d 385 (2025). Best Evidence At trial, the prosecution moved to admit a portion of the audio recording taken from law enforcement's response to the emergency call by Trickle. Trickle conducted voir dire and elicited that the audio recording was only an excerpt and objected on that basis. The court overruled the objection because all the recording had been turned over to the defense. The next day, the prosecution moved to admit excerpts of 14 hours of video footage from the police interview of Trickle on October 31. The objection, based on lack of completeness, was again overruled. The district court also allowed the prosecution to alleviate potential juror concerns it was hiding evidence, despite not admitting all the 9 video evidence. The court further directed that any future objections deal with the "evidentiary rules," based on the court's understanding that the defense was not making a legitimate objection. The defense therefore did not object based on incompleteness to two more batches of recording excerpts. On the final day of trial, the district court noted that the prior objections could be considered "best evidence" objections. But the district court held that because the defense introduced portions of the recordings it believed were exculpatory, there was no prejudice. The court followed this conclusion by asking "I don't believe anybody is going to argue that there was any prejudice, correct?" Defense counsel stated, "Correct. I'm not." Trickle now argues that his objection should reach all recording excerpts because the district court explicitly told him he could not object based on completeness after the second objection. He also argues that K.S.A. 60-467(a), which provides that an original writing is generally required to prove its content, required admission of the entire recordings, that the district court improperly shifted the burden of production to the defendant, and that the district court trampled on his confrontation right by refusing to allow defense counsel to elicit truthful information about the recordings. The State takes the position that video excerpts are properly considered "original" under the statute, and it is proper for the district court to limit irrelevant and cumulative evidence. "An original writing, recording or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a statute provide otherwise." K.S.A. 60-467(a). And the recordings here are covered by the statute: "'Writing' means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form or communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof." K.S.A. 60-401(m). However,"[a] 10 duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate." K.S.A. 60-467(b). Furthermore, "(3) 'Original' of a writing or recording means the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by the person who executed or issued it. For electronically stored information, 'original' means any printout, or other output readable by sight, if it accurately reflects the information. An 'original' of a photograph includes the negative or a print from it. "(4) 'Duplicate' means a counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic or other equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original." K.S.A. 60-467(h). There is no best evidence issue here. The recordings are not indivisible wholes. Here, each recording submitted by the State was an "original" (or at the very least a duplicate) of what it purported to show—a law enforcement interaction with Trickle at a given time. The district court did not err in admitting the recordings. Did bias on the part of the district court deny Trickle his due process rights? Next, Trickle argues that a series of judicial rulings show the district court was biased against him. First, the district court excluded his lay suicide witness. Second, the district court rejected Trickle's best evidence objections. Third, the district court allowed the sex doll purchase evidence while disallowing Trickle from probing the relationship Trickle had online with another woman. Fourth, the district court made two "one-sided" rulings intertwined with allegedly hostile treatment towards defense counsel. The "one- sided" rulings involved allowing the prosecution to inquire into Kansas Bureau of Investigation Senior Special Agent David Unger's state of mind while disallowing the defense to ask a state of mind question of another prosecution witness, Kristen's 11 grandmother. In so doing, the district court said to defense counsel, "Don't start—let's not argue. We know the rules." The second allegedly one-sided ruling was when the district court disallowed further argument after sustaining the prosecution's objection to one of defense counsel's questions. While doing so, the district court tersely stated "[n]o" to defense counsel's request to argue the issue, and when defense counsel said it objected to the ruling, the court responded "[y]ou can." Trickle thus argues that his fundamental right to a fair trial under the state and federal Constitutions was violated, as well as his due process right to a neutral judge. He requests that the court vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial with a different district court judge. We have unlimited review over judicial misconduct claims. Lyman, 311 Kan. at 33. The party alleging judicial misconduct has the burden of establishing that the misconduct occurred and that it prejudiced the party's substantial rights. State v. Lemmie, 311 Kan. 439, 450, 462 P.3d 161 (2020). Here, as noted above, the district court was correct to exclude the witness and reject the best evidence arguments. The admission of the sex doll purchase may have been error because the State so concedes. Relatedly, Trickle argues that he should have been able to probe the relationship he had online with Heather Anderson. On direct examination, the prosecution elicited from Anderson that the nature of her correspondence with Trickle was "mostly sexting, flirting." On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to ask Anderson "have you had these kind of relationships with other people?" The district court sustained the prosecution's objection on relevance grounds. Thus, contrary to Trickle's current characterization, he was prohibited from probing Anderson's other relationships, not Trickle's relationship with Anderson. He does not explain how Anderson's other relationships are relevant to the case, and thus this ruling also was not error. See Hogan, 321 Kan. at 39. 12  Looking at the "one sided" rulings, Trickle cites the prosecution's examination of Agent Unger and defense counsel's cross-examination of DeAnn Guy, Kristen's grandmother. In examining Unger, the State played an exhibit where Trickle is confronted by law enforcement with the sexting between he and Anderson. The State asked Unger if, "in your mind," Trickle was "more involved" in the sexting than Trickle had indicated to law enforcement. The defense's objection based on speculation was overruled, and Unger answered, "Absolutely." Then, later during the trial, while defense counsel was cross-examining Guy, the following exchange occurred: "[Defense counsel:] So when you say there was a push or an argument, that was between [Kristen] and who? "[Guy:] I don't know. I assume between her and [Trickle] and [Kristen's aunt]. I think it was like a three-way argument or something. I have no idea, I wasn't here. . . . "[Defense counsel:] So she was crying about it and— "[Guy:] Yes. "[Defense counsel:] —you thought it might have involved your daughter? "[Prosecution:] Objection. Calls for speculation and lacks personal knowledge. "[Defense counsel:] She just said— "[District court:] Don't start—let's not argue. We know the rules. Sustained." Contrary to Trickle's argument, these rulings are not inconsistent. The prosecution asked Unger whether, in his mind, Trickle was more involved in the sexting than he had 13 initially claimed after Unger was able to review the exchanges. Unger answered based on his personal knowledge of the messages he saw. Guy, however, testified that she had "no idea" with whom Kristen had argued before she moved out of her aunt and uncle's home. There is no inconsistency here. This leaves the judge's "[w]e know the rules" comment and his terse rejection of defense counsel's efforts to argue a ruling further. That ruling involved correctly sustaining the prosecution's objection to facts not in evidence. Neither of these instances are judicial misconduct. We distinguish judicial misconduct from an "isolated comment or action." State v. Hayden, 281 Kan. 112, 125-26, 130 P.3d 24 (2006). And the stray statements here appear especially benign—they were made in the context of correct rulings. Thus, the only potential error here was the admission of the sex doll evidence. "An erroneous ruling by a judge, standing alone, will not establish judicial misconduct." State v. Kahler, 307 Kan. 374, 384, 410 P.3d 105 (2018), aff'd 589 U.S. 271, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 206 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2020). The district court judge did not commit misconduct. Trickle's due process rights were not violated. Did the prosecution reversibly err in closing argument? Finally, Trickle argues that the prosecution made seven errors during closing arguments warranting reversal: (1) eliciting the expert testimony on reasonableness complained of above and commenting on that testimony in closing argument; (2) informing the jury in closing argument that Dr. Christiansen had informed them that suicide was "not a reasonable explanation" and thus improperly equating reasonable doubt with a probability burden; (3) making a statement about what the gunshot residue report disclaimer would have said had it been admitted into evidence; (4) making a comment, after the district court sustained an objection to the gunshot residue statement, that "[n]ow defense counsel wants to keep what the evidence is out; convenient" and accusing the defense of failing to subpoena the laboratory technician; (5) misstating facts 14 that Trickle "got [Kristen] to move to Kansas City where she had no friends or family of her own"; (6) claiming that "most of the accounts" of Kristen leaving her aunt and uncle's house "came through the defendant whose own mother acknowledges has a tendency to embellish information"; and (7) effectively calling Trickle a liar by stating he gave "the performance of a lifetime" the morning Kristen died and that Trickle spun a "yarn" about coming home and taking out the trash. The State concedes that it was error to refer to the gunshot residue report because that fact was not in evidence. The State also concedes that the prosecution's "convenient" response to the district court sustaining the objection to this statement was error. The State argues that it was not error for the prosecutor to articulate that if the gunshot residue evidence was so important to Trickle, he could have subpoenaed a witness to ensure its admission. The State also argues that it was not error for the prosecution to take the position that Trickle used the move to Kansas City to isolate Kristen given that there was conflicting evidence as to the reason for the move. Similarly, the State maintains the theory that Kristen's uncle had "kicked" Kristen out came from Trickle's mom, so it was a reasonable inference that Trickle was the source of the theory. And the State further maintains that the single euphemism "spins a yarn" was not prosecutorial error. The State does not address the "performance of a lifetime" statement. The State argues any error here was harmless. Because the State concedes error as to the gunshot residue evidence report disclaimer and the "convenient" comment, we again reserve our analysis of those assumed errors for our cumulative error analysis. Turning to Trickle's other allegations, this court uses a two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error: error and prejudice. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). "To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the appellate court must decide whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded 15  prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt the traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman. In other words, prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). Taking the remaining allegations in order, the reference in closing argument to suicide not being "a reasonable explanation" was a fair comment directly referencing the expert opinion, which we have already concluded was properly admitted over the only contemporaneous objection lodged by the defense. This was not error. Turning to the comment by the prosecution that the defense failed to subpoena a technician to enter the gunshot residue report into evidence, we must consider the context of the arguments leading up to this statement in closing argument. The underlying evidentiary fight arises out of the testimony of Detective Joshua Burkholder. On direct examination, the defense attempted to admit the gunshot residue reports taken of Trickle and Kristen. The prosecution objected based on foundation and hearsay, which was sustained. On cross-examination, the prosecution inquired about the gunshot residue analysis, and Burkholder testified that in his experience, it is possible for there to be no gunshot residue present even when someone had fired a gun. He further testified that in this case it was possible for gunshot residue to be on everyone in the bed. Later, defense counsel made the following comments in closing: 16  "There's another real important piece of evidence the State of Kansas did not want you to see . . . . .... "Well, when defense attempted to introduce the GSR reports from the KBI lab, and I hadn't had any opposition from the State of Kansas in introducing any of their other evidence, they objected. I wasn't allowed to show you the gunshot residue reports from the Kansas Bureau of Investigation. The State didn't want those in. "I'm not asking you to guess, but I think it's important, very important evidence, that should have been before you that is not. And they blocked it. Not the defense; they stopped it. Hard evidence, real firm evidence that you could have seen." All of this led to the complained-of technician comment in the rebuttal portion of the State's closing argument: "And if this evidence was so critical to the defendant's case, it was so paramount of importance for you to hear, why didn't the defendant bother to subpoena the proper lab technician to introduce that evidence? The defendant had every opportunity to do that, and the defendant didn't take the opportunity, rather they insinuate and imply in closing argument that the State is hiding information from you, information that probably would have revealed information that you would assume, that a person who gets shot by a gun might have GSR on them." The prosecution's comment about subpoenaing the technician was appropriate because the defense opened the door. We have repeatedly allowed the prosecution to discuss the defense's failure to produce evidence when it is in rebuttal to a failure of production argument by the defense. See State v. Anderson, 318 Kan. 425, 438-39, 543 P.3d 1120 (2024) (examining cases). 17  "A prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by pointing out a lack of evidence to support a defense or to corroborate a defendant's argument regarding deficiencies in the State's case. Likewise, a prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof by posing a general question about the lack of evidence offered to rebut the State's witnesses. [Citations omitted]." State v. Watson, 313 Kan. 170, 176-77, 484 P.3d 877 (2021). In Anderson, we found (harmless) prosecutorial error because the prosecution "did not simply point out that Anderson had the power to present evidence favorable to the defense. Rather, the State's argument coupled the defense's subpoena power with the reasonable doubt standard. It argued: 'If there is a piece of evidence that would prove or would show that . . . there's a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the defendant has the same subpoena power that the State has.'" 318 Kan. at 438. Moreover, the defense in Anderson never faulted the State for failing to produce the letters that were the subject of the State's argument. "Nor did defense counsel ask the jury to infer the letters would have been favorable to the defense because the State failed to present them. Thus, the State's comment regarding Anderson's failure to produce the letters cannot be characterized as fair rebuttal to any suggested inference." 318 Kan. at 439. The opposite is true here. The State was responding to suggestions by the defense, and the argument did not go into the kind of impermissible burden shifting that was present in Anderson. The follow-up gunshot residue comment, grounded in testimony by Burkholder, was not error. Next are the arguments about Trickle using the move to Kansas City to isolate Kristen and the assertion that "most of the accounts" of Kristen leaving her aunt and uncle's house were from Trickle. "Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude in crafting closing 18 arguments. This latitude allows a prosecutor to argue reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the admitted evidence, but it does not extend so far as to permit arguing facts that are not in evidence. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Thurber, 308 Kan. 140, 162, 420 P.3d 389 (2018). Here, the prosecutor made fair comments on the evidence. There was evidence that Trickle used the move to Kansas City to isolate Kristen from her family. Kristen's uncle, Brant Rice, testified that the Rices offered to let Kristen move back in with them while Trickle was in basic training, but Kristen said that Trickle "wouldn't let her move back." And there were other times when the Rices were in Kansas City, but Kristen couldn't spend time with them because Trickle "'doesn't want me to come.'" Thus, the prosecution's inference was within reason and did not impermissibly argue facts not in evidence. Similarly, regarding the story of "most of the accounts" of Kristen getting "kicked out" of her aunt and uncle's home coming from Trickle, Trickle's mother testified that Trickle told her to go pick Kristen up because "she's been kicked out." After picking Kristen up from her aunt and uncle's house, Trickle's mother testified that Kristen said she was given "an ultimatum of choosing [Trickle] or choosing the family" and she chose Trickle. It is a reasonable inference to state that the gloss of Kristen getting "kicked out" was primarily derived from Trickle because Trickle's mother did not talk to the Rices when she picked Kristen up from their home. Again, the prosecutor did not exceed the wide latitude we afford. Finally, there are the references by the prosecution to Trickle giving a "performance" and spinning a "yarn." "Prosecutors may point out inconsistencies in a defendant's statements and argue the evidence reflecting poorly on the defendant's credibility. But in doing so, they may not accuse a defendant of lying." State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 776, 490 P.3d 1206 (2021). 19  Here, the "performance" comment came in the following context: "Just in time, Sergeant Hauptman emerges and informs the defendant that Kristen died, and here the defendant gives the performance of a lifetime, perhaps his or perhaps Kristen's. He cries and wails, and then asks, 'Are you sure? Are you sure?' After receiving a hug, he knows he's in the clear." And the "yarn" comment was made in this argument: "Members of the jury, the inconsistencies in this case amass. When asked initially . . . about what happened, instead of going directly to the action of Kristen's death, the defendant goes back and spins a yarn about coming home and taking out the trash. There's evidence to prove that wasn't correct." These comments were flippant statements about the truthfulness of the defendant and strayed outside what we permit prosecutors to argue. See State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 63, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) ("[The prosecution's] comments about [the defendant's] final version—a 'fabrication,' 'yarn,' 'final yarn,' and 'the yarn spun here, the four-part yarn'— are not based upon a later inconsistent statement, and were unquestionably outside the wide latitude allowed in discussing the evidence."). See also State v. Pribble, 304 Kan. 824, 835, 375 P.3d 966 (2016) ("Often, the propriety of a prosecutor's point in closing argument will hinge upon how the statement is phrased. For instance, the statement, 'The evidence contradicts the defendant's statement,' is acceptable, whereas, 'I don't believe the defendant's statement is credible,' crosses the line."); State v. Fis