State v. Byers

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 129,400 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JERMELLE ANDRE-LAMONT BYERS, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT A plea cannot be deemed fairly and understandingly made under K.S.A. 22-3210 when the plea agreement and plea colloquy affirmatively and materially misstate when the defendant will become eligible for parole, the misinformation is never corrected before the plea is entered, and the record shows that the mistaken information bore directly on the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; COURTNEY MIKESIC, judge. Oral argument held September 16, 2026. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. Convictions reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded with directions. Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. Garett C. Relph, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 1 The opinion of the court was delivered by STANDRIDGE , J.: After the State charged Jermelle Andre-Lamont Byers with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and other lesser offenses, he pled guilty to two reduced counts of felony murder under K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2), an off-grid person felony carrying a life sentence. At the plea hearing, the district court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and written plea agreement all represented that Byers would become eligible for parole after 25 years on each count. But because of his criminal history, K.S.A. 21 - 6620(b)(2) required him to serve a longer mandatory minimum sentence determined by the sentencing guidelines before becoming eligible for parole. Before sentencing, Byers moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that he had been misinformed about when he could become eligible for parole. The district court denied the motion, finding that Byers had been adequately advised of the consequences of his pleas and had entered them freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. We conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying Byers' presentence motion to withdraw his pleas. The third factor identified in State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006)—whether the pleas were fairly and understandingly made— resolves this appeal. The undisputed record shows that Byers was repeatedly told he could become eligible for parole after 25 years, when in fact K.S.A. 21-6620(b)(2) required him to serve a substantially longer period. A defendant's confirmation that they understand inaccurate sentencing information does not establish that they understand the actual consequences of their plea. We therefore reverse the order denying Byers' motion, reverse his convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand the case with directions to permit Byers to withdraw his pleas. Because we vacate his sentences, we do not address Byers' separate challenge to the classification of a prior out-of-state conviction. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2019, the State charged Byers with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, an alternative count of first-degree felony murder, and one count each of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm. The district court appointed attorney David H. Matthews to represent Byers in this case. Jury selection began on August 23, 2021. Before the parties selected the jury, Matthews told the court that plea negotiations had occurred. He stated that Byers was willing to accept a "twenty-five-year offer," but the State had rejected it. Matthews added that he believed Byers fell into criminal history category A and that a conviction for second-degree murder or a more serious offense would result in a guidelines sentence exceeding 600 months. The district court confirmed with Byers that he would agree to "25 years" and that the State had rejected that proposal. The parties then selected a jury, and the court recessed for the evening. The next morning, before the jury was sworn, the parties told the court that they had reached a plea agreement. Byers would plead guilty to two reduced counts of first - degree felony murder, the State would dismiss the remaining charges, and the district court would decide whether the two sentences would run concurrent or consecutiv e. When the court asked about the expected sentence, the prosecutor stated that each count would carry "a 25 year and a life sentence with a 25[-]year eligibility date." Defense counsel agreed. The district court then contrasted the plea with the potential sentence for the original premeditated first-degree murder charges. It described the original charges as carrying "the Hard 50, 50 years no parole until you are eligible after 50 years." Turnin g to 3 the amended charges, the court told Byers: "[I]t would change it to [a] Hard 25, no parole for 25 years. You would be eligible after that 25 years." Byers said that matched his understanding. The court repeated the point when explaining concurrent and consecutive sentences. It told Byers there would be two hard 25 sentences and that consecutive sentences could create "the potential for a 50-year parole." The court added that it believed the Department of Corrections would consider parole on the first sentence after 25 years. Defense counsel agreed, and Byers again said he understood. The written plea petition conveyed the same understanding. It stated that Byers would "plead guilty to two Counts of first[-]degree felony murder, hard 25 open to concurrent, or consecutive[;] Remaining Counts dismissed." Byers confirmed that he had signed the petition. After completing the plea colloquy, the district court accepted the guilty pleas and set the case for sentencing. After the plea hearing, competency concerns delayed the proceedings. Byers was found incompetent to proceed, the case was stayed, and proceedings resumed after he was later found competent. The district court then appointed new counsel by agreement of the parties. In the interim, a presentence investigation report identified Byers' criminal history score as A and calculated his sentencing range for this severity level 1 offense as 592- 620-653, with a standard sentence of 620 months on the sentencing grid. This calculation revealed a sentencing consequence that no one had addressed at the plea hearing. K.S.A. 21-6620(b) provides that a felony murder conviction carries with it a life sentence plus a mandatory term of imprisonment of at least 25 years (300 months) before parole eligibility. But subsection (b)(2) requires defendants whose criminal history scores would result in a presumptive severity level 1 guidelines sentence exceeding 300 months to 4 serve that longer term before becoming eligible for parole. Because Byers fell within this exception, he would have to serve at least 592 months—depending on the sentence selected from the applicable grid range—rather than the 25 years repeatedly represented at the plea hearing. Before sentencing, Byers moved to withdraw his guilty plea under K.S.A. 22- 3210(d)(1) (for good cause and at district court discretion). Relevant here, Byers argued that he was not advised of the effect of K.S.A. 21-6620(b)(2) and had instead been told that he could become eligible for parole after 25 years. At the hearing on the motion, Byers testified that Matthews had told him a guilty plea would mean a hard 25—at least 25 years before parole eligibility. Byers explained that he accepted the agreement because the prospect of parole eligibility after 25 year s was preferable to the 50-year minimum he believed he faced if convicted of premeditated first-degree murder at trial. After learning that his criminal history prevented parole eligibility after 25 years even under the plea, Byers testified that he would have gone to trial had he known that consequence. Matthews' testimony at the hearing confirmed the advice reflected in the plea hearing and written petition. Matthews testified that he routinely discusses criminal history with his clients and would have done so with Byers. He recalled that, as trial approached, Byers initially did not want to accept the plea offer, which Matthews understood to require a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years on each murder count, with the sentences running either concurrent or consecutive. Before trial, however, Byers told Matthews he wanted to accept the offer. Matthews notified the prosecutor, and the parties prepared the plea petition and third amended information. 5  Although Matthews was familiar with K.S.A. 21-6620(b), he could not recall whether he explained its special sentencing provisions to Byers. When asked whether he had discussed the statute with Byers, Matthews testified, "I'm sure that I had gone over the statute with him. I don't have a real strong memory about our conversation." He also did not recall advising Byers that subsection (b)(2) could require a longer mandatory minimum sentence based on his criminal history. What Matthews did remember was telling Byers that he was "looking at 25" years before parole eligibility, with the remaining question being whether the sentences would run concurrent or consecutive. Matthews reiterated that he had advised Byers that felony murder carried a life sentence with parole eligibility after 25 years, consistent with the written plea petition. At the close of evidence, Byers' new defense counsel argued that good cause justified granting the motion to withdraw his pleas. Relevant here, counsel pointed to vague and confusing discussions regarding the mandatory minimum sentence Byers would face because of the plea. While acknowledging that the issue of whether the court must inform a defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence may be debatable, counsel asserted that once the issue is raised, the defendant ought to be advised properly, which did not occur here. Counsel cited Byers' testimony that if he had been properly informed, he would not have pleaded guilty and would instead have gone to trial in hope of getting a lesser sentence. In response, the State did not dispute that the sentencing information given at the plea hearing was incorrect. The State nevertheless argued that the misinformation did not justify withdrawal because Byers had been told that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment. The district court took the matter under advisement and later issued a written order concluding Byers had failed to establish good cause to withdraw his plea . Notably, the court did not acknowledge the discrepancy in the description of Byers' mandatory 6 minimum sentence based on his criminal history and application of K.S.A. 21- 6620(b)(2). As a result, the court did not consider this discrepancy in its good-cause analysis. Rather, it determined Byers was properly advised of the consequences of the plea. The court denied the motion and sentenced Byers to mandatory sentences of life in prison without the possibility for parole before 620 months for each felony -murder conviction, running concurrent. Byers timely appealed, challenging the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw his pleas and the scoring of a prior Missouri conviction for armed criminal action as a Kansas person felony. These claims are properly before this court on direct appeal. See K.S.A. 22 - 3601(b)(4) (direct appeal to Supreme Court from district court's final judgment when defendant convicted of off-grid crime); K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2), (b) (first-degree felony murder is an off-grid crime). Although K.S.A. 22-3602(a) generally limits appeals following a guilty plea, this court has made clear that the restriction does not apply here; the right to seek a plea withdrawal automatically carries a corresponding right to appeal its denial. State v. McDaniel, 255 Kan. 756, 760, 877 P.2d 961 (1994). And K.S.A. 21- 6820(e)(3) permits appellate review of an error claim involving the classification of a prior conviction. See also State v. Steinert, 317 Kan. 342, Syl. ¶ 3, 529 P.3d 778 (2023) ("A challenge to the classification of a prior conviction and the resulting criminal -history score presents an illegal-sentence claim that may be raised for the first time on appeal."). ANALYSIS Standard of Review Appellate courts review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw plea for an abuse of discretion. The defendant bears the burden to prove the court abused its 7 discretion, which occurs if the judicial action was (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) bas ed on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not support an underlying factual finding. State v. Bilbrey, 317 Kan. 57, 63, 523 P.3d 1078 (2023). In making this determination, appellate courts do not weigh conflicting evidence, assess witness credibility, or determine questions of fact. State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 862, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012); State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425 (2011). Legal Framework—Motion to Withdraw Plea K.S.A. 22-3210(d) permits the withdrawal of a guilty plea at "the discretion of the court." If the request is made before sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn for "good cause shown." K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(1). After sentencing, a plea may only be withdrawn "[t]o correct manifest injustice." K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(2). In this case, the good cause standard applies because Byers filed his motion before sentencing. In exercising its discretion under K.S.A. 22-3210(d), a district court considers the following nonexclusive factors, now known as the Edgar factors: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was freely, fairly, and understandingly made. Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36. Each factor need not weigh in the defendant's favor to justify withdrawal of the plea, and any other relevant circumstances may be considered in a particular case—including when a mutual mistake occurred in the context of a plea agreement. Bilbrey, 317 Kan. at 62-63; State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 513, 231 P.3d 563 (2010); State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529, Syl. ¶ 3, 197 P.3d 825 (2008). 8 Discussion We need not address the first two Edgar factors because the third resolves this case. The district court abused its discretion in finding that Byers entered his pleas fairly and understandingly despite the undisputed misinformation about when he would become eligible for parole. A guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. As we explained in Edgar, a plea and the accompanying waiver of constitutional rights must be made with "'sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'" 281 Kan. at 36-37 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 [1970]). As a statutory safeguard to protect a defendant's due process rights, K.S.A. 22- 3210(a) codifies a list of preconditions that must be met before a district court can accept a guilty plea in a felony case. Two provisions are particularly relevant here. Subsection (a)(2) provides that the court must inform the defendant of the consequences of the plea, including the specific sentencing guidelines level of any crime and the maximum penalty that may be imposed on acceptance of the plea. Further, subsection (a)(3) requires the court to address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is voluntarily made with understanding of the nature of the charge(s) and consequences of the plea. Not every deviation from K.S.A. 22-3210 requires reversal. A court's failure to strictly comply with these requirements can be remedied if a review of the entire record shows the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Trotter v. State, 218 Kan. 266, 269, 543 P.2d 1023 (1975). The question here is whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that Byers entered his pleas voluntarily and with an understanding of their consequences, despite having been misinformed about when he would become eligible for parole. 9  Byers argues that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because the district court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and written plea petition all incorrectly told him that he would be eligible for parole after 25 years. The State counters that the district court did not abuse its discretion because parole eligibility need not be explained during a plea hearing. See Edgar, 281 Kan. at 45-46; State v. Hicks, 220 Kan. 279, 282- 83, 552 P.2d 889 (1976). But failing to advise a defendant about parole eligibility is not the same as affirmatively misinforming them about it. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor represented that each felony-murder conviction carried a life sentence with "a 25[-]year eligibility date." Defense counsel agreed. The district court then told Byers that the amended charges changed his exposure from a hard 50 to a hard 25: "[N]o parole for 25 years. You would be eligible after that 25 years." The court reinforced that advice by explaining that, if the sentences were consecutive, there would be "the potential for a 50 -year parole." And the written plea petition described the charges as two counts of felony murder, "hard 25 open to concurrent, or consecutive." None of those statements accurately described Byers' parole eligibility. Because K.S.A. 21-6620(b)(2) applied, Byers had to serve the severity level 1 guidelines term before becoming eligible for parole. The district court ultimately imposed a mandatory minimum of 620 months—more than 51 years. The State concedes on appeal that the parties and the district court were operating under a mutual mistake about this consequence of the pleas. Although defense counsel had recognized that Byers' criminal history could result in a guidelines sentence exceeding 600 months on the original charges of premeditated murder or if the sentences on the reduced felony murder charges ran consecutive, neither counsel nor the district court accounted for the effect of K.S.A. 21-6620(b)(2) when explaining the consequences of the pleas. 10  The district court nevertheless relied on the plea colloquy to conclude that Byers understood the consequences of his pleas. But Byers' affirmative responses established only that he understood what the court told him: that he would be eligible for parole after 25 years on a concurrent sentence, with the possibility of a longer period if the sentences were consecutive. They did not establish that he understood the actual consequence imposed by K.S.A. 21-6620(b)(2)—that he would have to serve at least 592 months (nearly 50 years) on a single charge of first-degree felony murder, regardless of whether the sentences ran concurrent or consecutive. K.S.A. 22-3210's requirement that a defendant understand the consequences of the plea necessitates that the underlying information be accurate. Nor does Byers' knowledge that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment resolve the problem. The court expressly contrasted a hard 50 sentence on the original charges with a hard 25 sentence under the plea. Byers testified at the withdrawal hearing that this difference mattered to his decision: he accepted the plea because he believed it gave him the possibility of parole after 25 years rather than requiring him to serve approximately 50 years before that possibility arose. The record contains no evidence that the misinformation was corrected before the pleas were entered. In Schow, we recognized that a mutual mistake affecting a plea agreement is relevant to determining whether good cause exists. 287 Kan. 529, Syl. ¶ 3. Although no one deliberately misled Byers, the shared misunderstanding meant that neither his attorney nor the district court corrected the misinformation before he entered his pleas. The district court therefore abused its discretion in concluding that Byers entered his pleas fairly and understandingly. Because the undisputed record establishes that Byers entered his pleas based on materially incorrect information about parole eligibil ity, he established good cause under K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(1) to withdraw them. 11  Our holding is narrow. We do not hold that a district court must advise every defendant about parole eligibility before accepting a guilty plea. Edgar and Hicks address that broader proposition. See Edgar, 281 Kan. at 45-46; Hicks, 220 Kan. at 282-83. We hold only that, on the record here, a plea cannot be deemed fairly and understandingly made when the plea agreement and plea colloquy affirmatively and materially misstate when the defendant will become eligible for parole, the misinformation is never corrected before the plea, and the record shows that the mistaken information bore directly on the defendant's decision to plead guilty. CONCLUSION The district court abused its discretion in denying Byers' presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We reverse the district court's order denying Byers' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, reverse his convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand the case with directions to permit Byers to withdraw his pleas. Because the sentences are vacated, we do not reach Byers' challenge to the classification of his prior Missouri armed criminal action conviction for criminal-history purposes. Convictions reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded with directions. 12