State v. Cavitt

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 127,479 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. SHANNON BERRY CAVITT JR., Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. When reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or weigh witness credibility. 2. The sufficiency of the evidence inquiry for a felony murder count remains the same even when the jury acquits on the charged underlying inherently dangerous felony because the court cannot speculate that the verdict was reached as a result of insufficient evidence. 3. An appellate court only overturns precedent when it is clearly convinced a rule of law established in earlier cases was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent. 1 4. Kidnapping is the taking or confining of any person by force, threat, or deception, when committed with the requisite statutory intent. The holding of State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), that imposed additional requirements on the taking or confining, is overruled. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY GOERING, judge. Oral argument held January 26, 2026. Opinion filed August 28, 2026. Affirmed. Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant. Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, C.J.: Shannon Berry Cavitt Jr. participated in a robbery with Caviontay Conway and Robert "Nice" White. Four others were present in the apartment with the intended target, Dennis Haynes. During these events, Nice shot and killed Haynes. A jury found Cavitt guilty of one count of felony murder based on the underlying crime of aggravated robbery. It also convicted him of four counts of kidnapping and one count of aggravated burglary. But the jury found Cavitt not guilty of one count of aggravated robbery and a second count of felony murder based on aggravated burglary. Cavitt appeals his convictions. We affirm. 2  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Haynes lived in a small apartment building in Wichita. His building abutted a roughly rectangular-shaped gravel parking lot. Two similar apartment buildings also adjoined the parking lot. Haynes was known to sell drugs. He had camera surveillance around his apartment that provided video feeds to a monitor in his bedroom. Haynes generally did not answer the door unless he knew the person was someone he trusted. The night of August 14, 2022, Haynes was at home in his apartment with Ashley Hayes (who we will refer to as Ashley to distinguish her from the decedent, Haynes), Lalala Williams, Shaquan Brim, and Raphael or Ralph Godfrey. Williams slept in Haynes' bed. Haynes joined her there at some point, sleeping on the side of the bed nearest the door to the bedroom. Sometime on August 14 or early August 15, Caviontay Conway went to a house to sell marijuana to Nice. Cavitt, who Nice called "Wick," was there. Nice asked Conway to participate in a robbery. After Conway said no, Nice pulled a gun and threatened Conway's girlfriend and children. Cavitt told Nice that Haynes did not keep a gun and usually had money and drugs in his apartment. They planned for Cavitt to act as a decoy so Conway and Nice could enter the apartment to rob Haynes. Cavitt parked in the lot adjacent to Haynes' apartment building. Cavitt went up to Haynes' apartment, but no one answered the door. Cavitt went back to his car. A few minutes later, Cavitt went back to Haynes' apartment and knocked and waited again. Someone eventually let him in. Cavitt exited after a few minutes and returned to his car. Cavitt drove away and returned to the parking lot soon after. 3  At some point, Cavitt fell asleep. Conway and Nice approached Cavitt's car where they found Cavitt asleep. Nice wore a mask covering most of his face. They knocked on the car window. Nice told Cavitt to go back to the apartment. Nice told Cavitt he would grab him and push him in so it seemed like Cavitt was not involved in what followed. Cavitt went to Haynes' door while the other two went to the corner of the apartment building where they would not be seen by someone opening the door. One had a green bag wrapped around what may have been a weapon. The other held a semiautomatic firearm. After someone opened the door, Cavitt entered followed closely by the two men. Upon entering, one of the armed men told Cavitt to grab a phone from the counter. That same man told Brim and Godfrey to get on the floor, then pushed Cavitt on top of them. Ashley was in the apartment bathroom getting ready to shower when she heard a loud boom from the rear of the residence. Soon after the sound, two armed men forced Brim and Godfrey into the bathroom with her. The armed men demanded people turn over their phones and asked, "[W]here's the shit at?" Ashley tried to leave the bathroom. One of the men cocked a gun at her and told her to get back. She thought she saw someone in the second bedroom at that time. Ashley tried to get out of the bathroom at some other point, but the door would not open. It felt like someone was holding the door shut on the other side. Ashley heard two gunshots while she remained in the bathroom with Brim and Godfrey. Ashley told an officer that day that she believed there was a third person near the rear door. She heard the third person ask, "[W]here's the shit at?" While Ashley, Brim, and Godfrey remained in the bathroom, two men went into the bedroom. One woke up Williams, placing his gun in her face and his hand over her mouth. She felt in shock. Conway asked, "[W]here's the shit at?" Nice, masked and armed with a gun, spoke aggressively to Haynes. Haynes reached for the door, then Nice shot him. After being shot, Haynes pulled money out of his pockets to give to the men. 4 Haynes put money on the bed. Williams thought the man in the mask grabbed it. The men searched the closet. The men later ran from the apartment. Williams did not feel free to leave during these events. Cavitt left Haynes' apartment on his own about 10 minutes after entering. He went to his car and drove away. The other two men left shortly after Cavitt in a white SUV. Williams left the bedroom to see if anyone remained in the apartment. She found Ashley, Brim, and Godfrey. Williams told someone to call the police because Haynes had been shot. She then returned to the bedroom. The others fled the apartment. Officers responded shortly before 8 a.m. Responding officers found Haynes in apparent distress and unable to communicate well. Haynes later died from his injuries. Officers obtained Haynes' surveillance video, from which they identified Cavitt and Conway as potential suspects. Police arrested Conway later that day and released him on bond. Conway made multiple statements to federal and state law enforcement during the investigation. He referenced Donald Jackson, an uncle that he was not related to, who worked in the drug trade. Conway reported that Jackson called Haynes "the rat." Nice told Jackson that he shot Haynes. Cavitt's defense distanced him from Nice and Conway, arguing Cavitt was merely present and not an active participant. The defense argued the killing was a professional hit, not a drug house robbery. It characterized Cavitt's entry into the apartment as "two men bum-rush[ing] him into the house." It emphasized testimony pointing to two perpetrators, not three. It undermined Conway's credibility, pointing to Conway's statements that he had been in contact with Nice and Cavitt by phone, but his phone had 5 no evidence corroborating any contact. The defense also highlighted the benefit Conway received from his plea agreement in exchange for his testimony. The jury found Cavitt guilty of one count of felony murder based on aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and four counts of kidnapping. It found Cavitt not guilty of one count of felony murder based on aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated robbery. ANALYSIS Standard of review and preservation Cavitt raises four issues, each challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his various convictions. In a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we review "the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact- finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ballard, 320 Kan. 269, 285, 566 P.3d 1092 (2025). We do not "reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or weigh witness credibility." 320 Kan. at 285. Cavitt did not raise these issues below. But "[t]here is no requirement that a criminal defendant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court in order to preserve it for appeal." State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 545, 175 P.3d 221 (2008). Therefore, we may reach each of Cavitt's issues. Sufficient evidence supports Cavitt's felony murder conviction based on an underlying felony of aggravated robbery even though the jury acquitted Cavitt on the underlying crime. 6  The jury convicted Cavitt of felony murder based on the underlying inherently dangerous offense of aggravated robbery, but it acquitted him of aggravated robbery in a separate count. Cavitt argues this inconsistency shows the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction. We begin by noting a logical flaw in Cavitt's argument. Cavitt assumes the verdict here is inconsistent because the jury convicted him of felony murder based on an underlying aggravated robbery but acquitted him of aggravated robbery. While there may seem at first blush some tension between these determinations, they are not necessarily inconsistent when we look at the elements of felony murder. Our felony murder statute provides that an attempt to commit the underlying inherently dangerous felony suffices to establish felony murder, and the jury was instructed accordingly. See K.S.A. 21- 5402(a)(2). In other words, a felony murder may be completed even when the underlying crime is not, and the jury here was given the option to find Cavitt guilty based on such a theory. The verdict here may simply reflect the jury's findings that Cavitt, or someone he was working with, killed Haynes while trying (and failing) to rob Haynes. See State v. Gomez, 320 Kan. 3, 21-22, 561 P.3d 908 (2025) (sufficient evidence supported felony murder conviction where evidence sufficed to show attempted aggravated robbery). Felony murder did not require a completed underlying inherently dangerous felony here, let alone a conviction of the same. This verdict is not necessarily inconsistent. And the evidence to support the felony murder convictions suffices as long as it establishes an attempt or completed aggravated robbery, which, as we explain below, it does. We further reject Cavitt's argument that seemingly inconsistent verdicts have any bearing on our sufficiency of the evidence analysis. Our sufficiency inquiry remains the same even when the jury acquits on an underlying inherently dangerous felony because "the court cannot speculate that the verdict was reached as a result of insufficient evidence." Gomez, 320 Kan. at 20-21. 7  Thus, we apply our familiar sufficiency framework. We review the elements of felony murder, the elements of the underlying inherently dangerous felony the jury concluded supported the offense, and principles of accomplice liability to determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Felony murder is "the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony." K.S.A. 21- 5402(a)(2). Inherently dangerous felonies include aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, both of which the State charged as alternative bases to support felony murder. K.S.A. 21-5402(c)(1)(C), (J). And the jury was instructed on each alternative. Stated alternatively, we have explained that felony murder requires the State to prove two causation elements: "'First, the death must lie within the res gestae of the underlying crime, which is defined in this context as acts committed before, during, or after the happening of the principal occurrence, when those acts are so closely connected with the principal occurrence as to form, in reality, a part of the occurrence. Second, the felony and the homicide must have a direct causal connection, which exists unless an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death.'" State v. Palmer, 321 Kan. 302, 305, 578 P.3d 97 (2025) (quoting State v. Carter, 316 Kan. 427, 433, 516 P.3d 608 [2022]). The jury determined that the inherently dangerous crime that supported the felony murder conviction was aggravated robbery. Aggravated robbery is "knowingly taking property from the person or presence of another by force or by threat of bodily harm to any person" "committed by a person who . . . is armed with a dangerous weapon [or] inflicts bodily harm upon any person in the course of such robbery." K.S.A. 21-5420(a), (b). The jury instruction was consistent with the statutory definition of the offense. 8  And finally, the State argued Cavitt could be held liable as a principal or based on Nice and Conway's conduct. Kansas law permits a person to be held criminally responsible for another's crime if he "acting with the mental culpability" of the charged crime "advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime or intentionally aids the other in committing the conduct constituting the crime." K.S.A. 21-5210(a). The jury was instructed on this type of criminal liability. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact-finder could conclude Cavitt could be held accountable for the conduct underlying the aggravated robbery supporting the felony murder charge. There is evidence Cavitt agreed with Nice and Conway to participate in a robbery to take drugs, money, or both. Thus, a rational fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cavitt acted with the requisite mental culpability, i.e., to knowingly take Haynes' property by force of threat of bodily harm. There is evidence showing Cavitt then went to Haynes' apartment to execute the plan with Nice and Conway, i.e., he advised, hired, counseled, procured, or aided Nice and Conway in committing the agreed upon robbery. Turning next to the evidence of aggravated robbery, a rational fact-finder viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State could also conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cavitt was criminally responsible for aggravated robbery. Conway entered the apartment armed with a gun, and Nice appeared to be carrying a gun in a green bag. Nice shot Haynes after demanding "the shit." Williams testified Haynes emptied his pockets of property after being shot, and the masked man took the property off the bed. Conway also testified Nice took Haynes' property. A rational fact-finder could conclude robbery occurred based on these witnesses' testimony that the masked man took Haynes' property from him or in his presence. Video showing what appear to be guns and the fact that Haynes was shot supports a rational fact-finder concluding that Nice, Conway, or both were armed with a dangerous weapon. 9  Finally, this same evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supported a rational fact-finder's conclusion that Cavitt was guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence established Haynes was killed during the commission or attempted commission of an inherently dangerous felony—aggravated robbery. Cavitt suggests that the jury's acquittal on the aggravated robbery count means that the jury refused to find Cavitt responsible for Conway and Nice's conduct and thus the State has failed to prove an element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But, as we already explained, the acquittal could also suggest that the jury concluded aggravated robbery was in progress but not completed, in which case its verdict is consistent when it concluded that Cavitt was guilty of felony murder based on his participation in the underlying attempted aggravated robbery and not guilty of aggravated robbery. See Gomez, 320 Kan. at 20-21. Cavitt offers an alternative argument as to why the evidence was insufficient to support the felony murder verdict. Cavitt points to evidence he says shows he was not a full or willing participant in the robbery: he fell asleep in the car before the crimes, Nice threatened him to get his assistance in entering Haynes' apartment, Cavitt was not in Haynes' room where any drugs or property could have been taken from Haynes' person or in his presence, Cavitt left before Nice and Conway, and some evidence indicated that Conway and Nice killed Haynes for being a "rat" at the direction of another drug dealer. Cavitt's recitation presents a one-sided version of events viewed in the light most favorable to him. But our standard of review requires we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. While a jury might have drawn the conclusions Cavitt asks us to draw, it did not have to. Sufficient evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State supported the jury's conclusion that Cavitt was guilty of the crime of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 Sufficient evidence supports Cavitt's convictions for the kidnapping counts based on the three people held in the bathroom during the aggravated robbery and felony murder. Cavitt argues the evidence that he kidnapped Ashley, Brim, and Godfrey was insufficient. Cavitt says the only basis for concluding Cavitt was directly involved was testimony indicating someone held the bathroom door closed with three people inside. But this, he says, would not be a reasonable inference because the State did not ask when Ashley thought the door was being held shut. And other testimony suggests that Cavitt was in another bedroom at the time someone held the door shut. Thus, he argues, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cavitt's arguments fail. He cherry-picks the evidence to diminish his participation in these crimes. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, permitted a rational fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cavitt was guilty of these three kidnapping counts. The State charged Cavitt with kidnapping Ashley, Brim, and Godfrey to facilitate the commission of another crime. The district court instructed the jury consistent with this theory and on criminal responsibility for another's acts. Kidnapping as charged and argued here is "the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person . . . to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." K.S.A. 21-5408(a)(2). Sufficient evidence supports a finding that Cavitt directly participated in kidnapping Brim, Godfrey, and Ashley. Video shows Cavitt, Conway, and Nice talking shortly before entering Haynes' apartment. Soon after, all three entered, arguably in concert. Ashley testified that she was in the bathroom when Brim and Godfrey were forced into the bathroom by two men holding guns. She said she saw a third person in the 11 second bedroom while she was trapped in the bathroom. She also testified that someone prevented the door from opening while she was in there with Brim and Godfrey. Cavitt would have this court conclude the State's failure to pinpoint the precise moment the door was held shut precludes a finding that Cavitt was the person who held it. But a jury can rely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Thach, 305 Kan. 72, 82, 378 P.3d 522 (2016) ("[A] conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial evidence." [quoting State v. Graham, 247 Kan. 388, 398, 799 P.2d 1003 (1990)]). Circumstantial evidence supports a rational fact-finder concluding that Cavitt held the bathroom door while Conway and Nice threatened and attempted to take Haynes' possessions in the bedroom even if the State did not establish the precise moment the door was being held. Cavitt suggests that Conway's testimony forecloses the conclusion that a third person was involved, pointing to testimony that Conway did not see anyone holding the bathroom door. But Conway was in Haynes' bedroom at times during these events. A rational fact-finder could infer Conway did not have eyes on the bathroom the entire time he was in Haynes' place. Thus, a rational fact-finder could conclude that Cavitt participated in kidnapping by holding the door to prevent Ashley, Brim, and Godfrey from escaping while Conway and Nice attempted to rob Haynes in the bedroom. Our conclusion that sufficient evidence supports the jury's kidnapping convictions based on direct liability makes it unnecessary to consider Cavitt's argument that the evidence was also insufficient to hold him liable based on Nice and Conway's actions. A reasonable fact-finder could have found Cavitt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the three kidnappings when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. 12 Sufficient evidence supports the kidnapping conviction of Williams. For the first time on direct appeal, Cavitt argues the evidence was insufficient to show anyone kidnapped Williams because the evidence showed she did not move from the bed where she was first awakened and any confinement was incidental to the offense of aggravated robbery. He cites State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), for support. The State asks us to overturn Buggs and affirm the conviction or alternatively to affirm because the evidence suffices even under Buggs. The State suggests we must apply a preservation exception to consider its argument. But we need not apply any preservation exception. Cavitt raised the case in his sufficiency challenge, and a defendant does not need to raise a sufficiency challenge to the district court to preserve the issue for appellate review. The State's response was the first time it would have been appropriate for the State to argue this court should reverse Buggs. Given this procedural posture, we see no need to apply a preservation exception to reach the State's argument that we should overrule Buggs. In addition to our sufficiency inquiry, this issue involves questions of statutory interpretation and precedent. Interpretation of statutes and precedent involves questions of law subject to unlimited review. Johnson v. Brooks Plumbing, LLC, 281 Kan. 1212, 1213, 135 P.3d 1203 (2006). We now consider the kidnapping statute, Buggs' interpretation of that statute, and whether we should overturn Buggs. K.S.A. 21-5408 defines kidnapping as "taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person" done for one of four enumerated reasons. Here, the State charged the kidnapping was done "(2) to 13 facilitate flight or the commission of any crime," in this case, aggravated robbery. The jury was instructed accordingly. In Buggs, the court considered a predecessor kidnapping statute. 219 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶¶ 7-9, 213. The language at issue is identical to the language at issue here. See 219 Kan. at 213 (quoting K.S.A. 21-3420 [Weeks 1974]). Ultimately, Buggs appeared to add some language to the kidnapping statute. It held: "[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection." 219 Kan. at 216. The court revisited Buggs in State v. Couch, 317 Kan. 566, 586, 533 P.3d 630 (2023). The Couch majority acknowledged the continued viability of Buggs might be in doubt: "Some may question our continued adherence to Buggs given more recent developments in our multiplicity jurisprudence." Couch, 317 Kan. at 586. The Couch majority nevertheless applied Buggs, noting: "Neither party has asked us to overrule Buggs. Nor have they provided an argument justifying a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis in this case." 317 Kan. at 586. We have avoided addressing the continued viability of Buggs in other recent cases where the issue was not briefed. E.g., State v. Moore, 319 Kan. 557, 566, 556 P.3d 466 (2024); State v. Butler, 317 Kan. 605, 612, 533 P.3d 1022 (2023). Three justices would have overruled Buggs in Couch. A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stegall noted the Buggs' opinion was motivated by the court's concern that a defendant could be convicted of multiple offenses arising out of a single 14 occurrence. Couch, 317 Kan. at 599 (Stegall, J., joined by Luckert, C.J., and Wilson, J.). The dissenting opinion criticized the Buggs court for relying on tools outside those needed for statutory interpretation to get to its final interpretation of the statute. 317 Kan. at 601. Such tools are generally not needed when plain language suffices. Cf. State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 310, 566 P.3d 481 (2025) (criticizing panel for resorting to construction when statutory language was not unclear or ambiguous). The opinion would have abandoned the Buggs rule because it "was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and . . . more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Couch, 317 Kan. at 602-04. Here, the State expressly asked us to overrule Buggs, pointing to the dissenting opinion in Couch. Given the frequent recurrence of the issue in recent cases, and the potential for a different interpretation to impact our analysis here, we now consider whether to adhere to Buggs. In doing so, we are mindful of principles of stare decisis. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we generally follow points of law established in prior cases when the same legal issue is raised. State v. James, 319 Kan. 178, 188, 553 P.3d 308 (2024). We do not overturn precedent lightly. Adherence to precedent "ensures stability and continuity—demonstrating a continuing legitimacy of judicial review." State v. Showalter, 319 Kan. 147, 167, 553 P.3d 276 (2024). Thus, we only overturn precedent when "we are 'clearly convinced a rule of law established in [ ] earlier cases '"was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent."' State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 486 P.3d 591 (2021)." State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. 357, 371, 580 P.3d 20 (2025). But stare decisis is not an inexorable command, and we will overturn precedent when the rule was originally erroneous or changing conditions render the rule no longer sound and more good than harm results from departing from precedent. State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 304 Kan. 755, 766, 374 P.3d 680 (2016). 15  The State, echoing the dissent in Couch, argues Buggs erred in interpreting statutory terms and that conditions have changed since Buggs, pointing to legal developments in multiplicity that may address some of the concerns in Buggs. We first consider whether Buggs as decided was originally erroneous or is no longer sound due to changing conditions. We conclude that regardless of whether it was originally erroneous, it is no longer sound. To explain why, we first consider the criticism from the Couch dissent, echoed by the State, that Buggs erred by not performing a plain language statutory analysis of the kidnapping statute. To understand the criticism, it helps to understand the framework we now apply to statutory analysis, which has developed since Buggs. Under our current framework, we recognize that the touchstone of any statutory interpretation is that legislative intent controls. Johnson, 321 Kan. at 372. To discern that intent, we begin with the statute's language. "When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we apply the language as written." 321 Kan. at 372 (quoting State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 258-59, 527 P.3d 911 [2023]). However, when the language is susceptible to multiple interpretations, then the language is ambiguous. And when the statutory language is ambiguous, we turn to "other sources, such as legislative history, canons of construction, and background considerations" to discern legislative intent. 321 Kan. at 372 (quoting Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. at 259). Buggs did not utilize the plain language analysis we now use. It started down the plain language path when it considered dictionary definitions of the term "facilitate." 219 Kan. at 214-15 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary). Based on these definitions, it reasoned that, "[t]o be a kidnapping . . . the taking need not be necessary to the accomplishment of the underlying crime, but it must be aimed at making it at least 'easier.'" 219 Kan. at 215. 16  But Buggs went beyond this definition, using tools of statutory construction that we now only employ when the statutory language is not plain and unambiguous in an apparent effort to avoid multiplicity issues. Buggs held that a taking or confinement must not only make a crime easier, but that it "[m]ust not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime" that it "[m]ust not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and" that it "must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection." 219 Kan. at 216. To the extent Buggs' test was "designed to inoculate against multiplicity," perhaps it was not originally erroneous. See Butler, 317 Kan. at 612. Multiplicity doctrine has its foundations in constitutional double jeopardy, which guards against, among other things, "multiple punishments for the same offense." See State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 2, 462-505, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). Buggs appears to have implicitly incorporated in its analysis the principle of constitutional avoidance, seeking to interpret the statute in a way that would avoid encroaching on that constitutional limit while still giving effect to legislative intent. Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, 312 Kan. 597, 602, 478 P.3d 776 (2021) (defining constitutional avoidance). But even if Buggs may not have been erroneous at the time, it is no longer sound because conditions have changed. Couch, 317 Kan. at 599-600 (Stegall, J., dissenting) (citing Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453). Developments since Buggs clarify when the same underlying conduct may support the conviction of more than one offense without running afoul of constitutional double jeopardy protections. See Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶¶ 4, 6-8. We agree with the Couch dissent's point that Buggs' concern may be adequately addressed by our multiplicity jurisprudence, which supports a departure from Buggs. See Couch, 317 Kan. at 600-02. 17  Since we conclude changing conditions may warrant overruling Buggs, we must now consider whether we are firmly convinced that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent. Johnson, 321 Kan. at 371. We conclude more good would result from overruling Buggs' additional requirements imposed on kidnappings done to facilitate flight or commission of a crime. Those requirements, which are not grounded in the plain language of the statute, have proved difficult to apply. Courts have struggled to delineate when a taking or confining is not slight, inconsequential, or merely incidental to another crime, or not inherent in the nature of the other crime, or possessing some significance independent of another crime, making it substantially easier to commit the other crime or lessen the risk of that crime's detection. See Couch, 317 Kan. at 603 (Stegall, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). The time has come to remove these court- imposed modifiers and return to the plain language of the statute. Because we overrule the portion of Buggs intended to guard against double jeopardy violations, we will now consider whether any multiplicity concerns arise. The conduct at issue here occurred over a short space of time and in the same location, meaning the conduct is unitary and we need to consider whether that unitary conduct poses a double jeopardy issue. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 4. We apply the same- elements test to determine whether multiple convictions arising from the same conduct violate the double jeopardy protections in the federal or Kansas Constitutions. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 12. In this inquiry, we ask whether "one statute require[s] proof of an element not necessary to prove the other offense[.] If so, the statutes do not define the same conduct and there is not a double jeopardy violation." Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 498. Thus, to determine whether kidnapping would be multiplicitous with robbery or felony murder, we look to the elements of the offenses to determine whether one requires an element of proof not required of another. 18  Kansas defines kidnapping as "the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person . . . to facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." K.S.A. 21-5408(a)(2). Here, the State charged Cavitt with confining, so we focus our analysis on kidnapping by confining. Confining in its simplest form may simply mean restraining someone, as the Couch dissent defined the term. 317 Kan. at 601 (quoting Confinement, Black's Law Dictionary 373 [11th ed. 2019]). Other definitions provide a bit more detail, referencing a shutting in or keeping within bounds, a restriction on movement. E.g., Confine, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary; Confine, American Heritage Online Dictionary. As mentioned above, facilitate means "to make easier or less difficult: free from difficulty or impediment" or, "To render easier the performance of (an action) for the attainment of (a result)." Buggs, 219 Kan. at 214-15 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary); see also Couch, 317 Kan. at 601 (Stegall, J., dissenting) (defining facilitate). Aggravated robbery is "knowingly taking property from the person or presence of another by force or by threat of bodily harm to any person" "committed by a person who . . . [i]s armed with a dangerous weapon [or] inflicts bodily harm upon any person in the course of such robbery." K.S.A. 21-5420(a), (b). And felony murder is "the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony." K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2). Each of these offenses contains elements independent of the others. Kidnapping requires confining someone, which neither aggravated robbery nor felony murder require. Aggravated robbery requires taking property, which neither kidnapping nor felony murder require. And felony murder requires the killing of a person, which is not required 19 to complete kidnapping or aggravated robbery. The resulting felony murder and kidnapping convictions are thus not multiplicitous. Cavitt's sufficiency argument on this count turns on this court's continued adherence to Buggs. But we have overruled the portion of Buggs he relies on. Thus, Cavitt's argument that the evidence was insufficient based on Buggs fails. Sufficient evidence supported the aggravated burglary conviction. Finally, Cavitt argues there was insufficient evidence he entered the apartment without authority and thus insufficient evidence to support the aggravated burglary conviction. Cavitt's argument turns on whether he had consent to enter. Cavitt recognizes precedent establishes an entry may be unauthorized when the entry is based on consent obtained by fraud, deceit, or pretense, pointing to State v. Maxwell, 234 Kan. 393, 672 P.2d 590 (1983). He argues that even within that framework, the State's evidence falls short of establishing he entered without authority because someone in the residence opened the door for him. And the jury was not instructed on remaining in the residence, so that theory could not support his conviction. But our review of Maxwell and the evidence here shows sufficient evidence supports the aggravated burglary conviction even if remaining in the residence is not available as an alternative theory to support the conviction. In Maxwell, two men used deceit to gain entry to an antique dealer's home, telling the antique dealer's wife they wanted to discuss a watch. When the wife went to her bedroom, one of the men followed her. The antique dealer confronted the man who had remained with him. That man told the antique dealer, "This is a hold-up. If you scream or anything, I will kill you." He then forced the dealer to his bedroom, restrained the antique dealer and his wife, then ransacked the house with the other man, stealing various personal property. Maxwell, 324 Kan. at 394. 20  The court rejected appellant's argument that insufficient evidence supported his aggravated burglary conviction because the antique dealer and his wife voluntarily allowed Maxwell into their home. It held that when "the consent to enter [as u