State v. West

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 127,290 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. LAROY M. WEST, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Appellate courts review joinder issues in three steps: whether joinder was statutorily permitted, whether the district court abused its discretion in granting or denying joinder, and whether any error prejudiced a party's substantial rights. 2. K.S.A. 22-3202(1) permits joinder of crimes that are of the same or similar character, arise from the same act or transaction, or arise from acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Whether a statutory basis for joinder exists presents a mixed question of fact and law, with factual findings reviewed for substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusion reviewed de novo. 3. Crimes need not be identical to be of the same or similar character for purposes of joinder. Nevertheless, joinder must be supported by multiple commonalities between the offenses and not merely by broad similarities or a shared classification. 1 4. Joinder under K.S.A. 22-3202(1) does not depend on whether evidence of the joined crimes would be independently admissible as other-crimes evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. 5. Claims of instructional error are reviewed under a three-step framework: whether the issue is reviewable, whether the challenged instruction was legally and factually appropriate, and, if error occurred, whether the error requires reversal. In determining whether an instruction was legally and factually appropriate, an appellate court exercises unlimited review of the entire record and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party. 6. An instruction is legally appropriate when it fairly and accurately states the applicable law. An instruction is factually appropriate when sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, would support giving the instruction. 7. Whether an evidentiary ruling violated a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense is subject to unlimited appellate review. The right to present a defense is subject to the rules of evidence and procedure and is violated only when relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise admissible evidence supporting the defense theory is excluded. 2  Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE BROWN, judge. Oral argument held April 9, 2026. Opinion filed July 24, 2026. Affirmed. Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by STANDRIDGE, J.: This is Laroy West's direct appeal following his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and two counts each of aggravated assault and criminal possession of a weapon resulting from two separate incidents. West raises several claims of trial error, alleging the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges, in instructing the jury in several respects, and in excluding evidence relevant to his claim of self-defense. West also argues for relief under the cumulative error doctrine. We affirm West's convictions. The district court correctly denied severance because the charges from each incident were of the same or similar character under K.S.A. 22-3202(1), the alleged instructional errors each lack merit, and the district court properly excluded irrelevant evidence. In the absence of errors to accumulate, West's cumulative error argument necessarily fails. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Around 10 p.m. on May 5, 2021, a Black man wearing a blue baseball cap and carrying a backpack entered a Wichita QuikTrip on North Broadway, blaring music on a Bluetooth speaker. Will Robinson, a QuikTrip security guard, confronted him about the 3 loud music, and the two men argued as Robinson escorted the man outside. The men continued to exchange words as Robinson walked the man through the QuikTrip parking lot to the edge of the street. Robinson watched as the man crossed the street into an alley. A witness who was getting gas at the QuikTrip heard the man call Robinson a coward and say, "[Y]ou wanna come say that over here[?]" and, "[Y]ou won't come over here, you ain't gonna do nothing." Robinson then ran across the street into the alley, where the two men began wrestling. Another witness who was driving out of the QuikTrip parking lot saw Robinson moving his hands with his palms out in an apparent attempt to get the man to "chill" or calm down. The witness then saw the man pull out a gun and shoot Robinson. After the shooting, the man fled in the opposite direction of the QuikTrip. Law enforcement responded to the scene, where they discovered Robinson unresponsive with blood covering his face. Robinson was wearing a gun belt with a firearm and a taser. The pistol was still in its holster, and there were no weapons in Robinson's hands. Robinson was transported to the hospital, where he later died from injuries sustained as a result of the gunshot wound. Law enforcement's investigation led them to review surveillance video inside and outside the QuikTrip. Attempting to identify the suspected shooter, investigators circulated still shots from the QuikTrip video to other law enforcement officers in the area. A detective recognized the shooting suspect as matching the description of the suspect in an unsolved aggravated assault case that also occurred on North Broadway a few weeks before the shooting. In that case, Edward Sebastian, an owner of La Chinita Mexican restaurant reported that he went to the restaurant with his stepson, Fernando David Mendez, on the afternoon of March 28, 2021. The restaurant was closed to the public because it was a Sunday, but Sebastian and Mendez were there to work on a catering order. Upon arrival 4 in the parking lot behind the restaurant, Sebastian saw a Black man wearing a blue baseball cap and carrying a backpack walk through the parking lot. When Sebastian asked if he needed something, the man responded with profanity. After Sebastian warned the man that he was on private property and needed to leave, the man began arguing with Mendez and it appeared the situation might turn physical. The man pulled up his shirt to reveal a firearm tucked in his waistband, and Mendez ran for cover behind the restaurant. The man continued to argue with Sebastian, who pointed out a nearby surveillance camera. Sebastian then reached for his phone to call 911, and the man began walking away. While on his phone, Sebastian followed the man to the edge of the parking lot. The man was in the street when he turned around and ran back toward Sebastian with his gun out, aiming it at Sebastian. After Sebastian started backing away, the man left the scene. On both occasions, the Black male suspect was carrying a backpack and was wearing a blue baseball cap, jeans, and boots. Based on the suspect's description, law enforcement identified and arrested West. The State charged him in a single complaint with six crimes between the two incidents. For the March incident at La Chinita, the State charged West with two counts of aggravated assault and a single count of criminal possession of a weapon. For the May incident outside QuikTrip, the State charged him with first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. West moved to sever the March and May charges. At a hearing on the motion, the district court considered evidence and oral argument from the parties before denying West's request to sever the charges. 5  The case proceeded to trial, where the State presented the evidence outlined above. West testified in his defense, asserting his actions in both cases were justified by self-defense. West said that when he arrived at QuikTrip on the night of May 5, Robinson came outside, "approached [him] in a very aggressive manner," and accused West of interfering with his drug customer clientele. West testified that he had previously encountered Robinson, who he claimed had a reputation as a bully. Once inside the store, West said Robinson was angry and aggressive, telling him to turn his music down and leave. When West tried to leave, Robinson walked next to him saying, "[Y]ou always wanna fight," and threatening to "beat [West's] ass to death." West alleged that Robinson continued to threaten him after West crossed the street to get away. He said that Robinson became enraged and followed him across the street. According to West, Robinson punched him, yelling that he was "gonna beat [West's] ass" and beat West "to death" while West begged Robinson to let him go. West said that Robinson shoved him, put something on his hands, and then moved toward him again with his hands up in a "fight stance." Claiming he was in fear for his life, West unzipped his backpack, pulled out his gun, and fired once. West said he fled the scene because he did not want to explain to the police that he had just shot an officer for attacking him. West denied punching, taunting, or calling Robinson a coward. West admitted that Robinson never pulled out a gun during the encounter. West similarly maintained that he was forced to defend himself during the March incident at La Chinita. West testified that he was walking through the parking lot, trying to avoid any interaction with Sebastian and Mendez, when Mendez threatened to "stomp [West's] head down on the concrete." West said that both men moved towards him; fearing for his safety, he lifted his shirt up to show his gun. West claimed that when he started to leave, he believed Sebastian had a firearm, so he drew his gun to defend himself. 6  The jury acquitted West of the May aggravated assault charge and convicted him of the five remaining charges. The district court sentenced West to life without the possibility of parole for 618 months for first-degree murder, consecutive to a controlling 62-month sentence for the other crimes. West directly appealed his convictions to this court. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court jurisdiction over direct appeals governed by K.S.A. 22-3601); K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4) (life sentence and off-grid crime cases permitted to be directly taken to Supreme Court); K.S.A. 21-5402(b) (first-degree murder is off-grid person felony). ANALYSIS West makes several arguments on appeal that may be combined into the following issues: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the March and May charges; (2) the district court erred in issuing an initial aggressor instruction and in instructing or failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses; (3) the district court erroneously granted the State's motion in limine, which prevented admission of evidence relevant to West's claim of self-defense; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in an unfair trial. We address each issue in turn. I. Motion to sever West argues the district court erred in denying his motion to sever, claiming that improper joinder of the March and May charges prejudiced his substantial rights and deprived him of a fair trial. The State responds that the district court correctly denied severance of the charges. 7  Standard of review An appellate court reviews potential joinder errors using a three-step analysis, applying a different standard of review at each step. First, the court determines whether K.S.A. 22-3203 permits joinder. Under that statute, multiple complaints against a defendant may be tried together if the State could have brought the charges in a single complaint. K.S.A. 22-3202(1) sets forth the three conditions permitting the joinder of multiple crimes in a single complaint: (1) the charges must be of the "same or similar character"; (2) the charges are part of the "same act or transaction"; or (3) the charges result from "two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." Whether one of these conditions is satisfied is a fact-specific inquiry, meaning the appellate court will review the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence. We review de novo the legal conclusion that one of the conditions is met. State v. Ritz, 305 Kan. 956, 961, 389 P.3d 969 (2017); see State v. Smith, 312 Kan. 876, 887, 482 P.3d 586 (2021) (Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion.). Second, because K.S.A. 22-3202(1) provides that charges "may" be joined, a district court has discretion to deny a joinder request even if a statutory condition is met. We review this decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Hurd, 298 Kan. 555, 561, 316 P.3d 696 (2013). Third, if an error occurred in the preceding steps, we determine whether the error resulted in prejudice, i.e., whether the error affected a party's substantial rights. See K.S.A. 60-261; State v. Carter, 311 Kan. 783, 793, 466 P.3d 1180 (2020). On appeal from a denial of a motion to sever, the party benefitting from the error is responsible for 8 demonstrating there is no reasonable probability the error affected the trial's outcome considering the entire record. Hurd, 298 Kan. at 564. Discussion A. Step one: fact-specific statutory conditions that permit joinder We begin our analysis by engaging in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the March and May crimes were properly joined in a single complaint. At a hearing on West's motion to sever, the State presented testimonial evidence from Wichita Police Detective Donald Moore. He testified about his response to the scene of the May shooting, the collection of evidence at the scene, and law enforcement's investigation to identify a suspect. This investigation included taking still shots of the suspect from the QuikTrip surveillance video and emailing them to the law enforcement community in Sedgwick County. In response, another Wichita police detective contacted Moore and advised that the suspect was likely involved in one of his cases—the March La Chinita incident that had occurred about five weeks before the shooting and just a few blocks away from the QuikTrip. Detective Moore also testified that when he presented the May case to the district attorney's office for potential charges, he presented the March case alongside it because evidence from both cases helped to identify West as the suspect in each case. Detective Moore noted that the suspect in both cases had the same physical appearance, wore the same hat and similar clothing, and used a firearm. Finally, Detective Moore testified that after West's arrest, one of the La Chinita victims identified him as the suspect in that case. 9  After considering this evidence and arguments from the parties, the district court judge found that the alleged crimes were properly joined under the first condition of K.S.A. 22-3202(1) because they were of the same or similar character: "[B]oth of these incidents occur in public areas, businesses, dealing with employees of businesses, LaChinita on the one hand, Quik Trip on the other. Both on North Broadway area, within a few blocks of each other. Additionally, they both involve, initially anyway, aggravated assault type allegations, they are these confrontations, verbal confrontations initially, in these public areas, outside of these businesses. In both cases there is a firearm and there's evidence to believe the same firearm in each of these offenses that is alleged to be a part of the crime. "So it's a situation where there's an angry interchange that escalates, allegedly, to criminal conduct, aggravated assault, murder, death. So when you look at these what's going on, what's being charged, it is crimes—or allegations, let me say that, that are the same or similar character. This is the same type of scenario, very similar, very close in time, five weeks." The judge also found joinder was proper under the third condition of K.S.A. 22- 3202(1) because the alleged crimes constituted parts of a common scheme or plan: "I also am going to find that the third basis for joinder is here, as well, that two or more acts constituting a common scheme or plan. And again, I think what is going on here is a situation where the State—the common scheme here, the common plan is a confrontation with a business owner or business employee, on the North Broadway area, that gets escalated and allegedly involves threats and a firearm used or brandished as a part of it. "So it seems like it falls into that, it's this common—allegedly common scheme, common plan, common way that is being alleged that Mr. West relates or ways that he behaves in these public areas, on North Broadway, when there is disagreement or 10  disharmony or miscommunication, or bad exchange, an angry or hostile exchange or encounter. So I think it constitutes a common scheme or plan." Finally, the judge discussed the difficulty in separating the March and May crimes, given the overlapping evidence between the two sets of crimes in proving West's identity: "So one of the other difficult things with this identity is on multiple levels. One is the LaChinita case, March case, the identity comes out of the investigation in the May case, the Quik Trip case. And so just for the jury to understand and be able to follow the evidence and not be confused as to oh, that's how this happened, because otherwise it may look like, really identify? I mean, that doesn't make sense, or what context, all of that, I think, requires that. "We also have the same hat, same clothing, the DNA evidence that's on the hat that's seen being worn by Mr. West in the March case, that needs to—the State needs to be able to present that for identity to hey, this hat where we've got DNA, it is associated with Mr. West and it looks like it—in this video from the May case, it looks like it might be from the March case. And again, the evidence gets—the type of evidence, the common scheme or plan, similar character—same or similar character, it gets mixed together. So for those reasons, I'll deny the motion to sever." 1. Condition one: same or similar character West first challenges the district court's ruling that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character. He does not contest the court's factual findings on this factor, so the issue before us is whether those facts support consolidation. In discussing whether crimes are of the same or similar character to permit joinder, this court has said: "'Several separate and distinct felonies may be charged in separate counts of one and the same information, where all of the offenses charged are of the same 11 general character, requiring the same mode of trial, the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of punishment.'" State v. Barksdale, 266 Kan. 498, 507, 973 P.2d 165 (1999) (quoting State v. Hodges, 45 Kan. 389, 392, 26 P. 676 [1891]). This is not a particularly onerous standard. "The 'same or similar character' language of K.S.A. 22-3202(1) does not limit joinder to only those crimes that are clones of each other. Such a narrow interpretation would frustrate the very purpose of the joinder statute." State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 403, 133 P.3d 14 (2006), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Flynn, 299 Kan. 1052, 329 P.3d 429 (2014). But courts should not rely solely on generalities when considering whether joinder was proper; consolidation or joinder is generally appropriate when crimes have "multiple commonalities, not merely the same classification of one of the crimes charged." State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 157, 340 P.3d 485 (2014). West contends that the district court's stated reasons for finding the crimes were of the same or similar character were not sufficient to warrant joinder. He focuses on the differences between the March aggravated assault charges (use of force in threatening with a gun, a severity level 7 felony) and the May premeditated murder charges (use of deadly force in shooting a gun, an off-grid crime). Other than the fact that both incidents involved a firearm, West claims the crimes are not of the same or similar character because they differ both in conduct and in the intended result and also require different evidence to establish each crime. But West's arguments ignore the many commonalities between the two sets of crimes. On both occasions, which took place approximately five weeks apart, West was on private business property on North Broadway in Wichita when he became involved in a verbal altercation with an employee. Each time, West was asked or told to leave the premises. Rather than comply, West continued to argue with the employee. West was armed and displayed the same firearm on both occasions. Although West shot no one 12 during the March incident, he threatened violence with his gun. The State charged West with aggravated assault and criminal possession of a weapon in both incidents. The two events are further connected by the evidence used to identify West as the suspect in both cases. West was carrying a backpack and wearing the same baseball cap on both days. The detective working the March case recognized West when he saw the still photographs from the QuikTrip surveillance cameras. And Sebastian identified West as the man he encountered in the La Chinita parking lot after West was arrested for the May shooting. In addition to the crimes requiring at least some of the same evidence, both sets of crimes require the same mode of trial (trial by jury) and punishment (incarceration). Indeed, this court has regularly upheld similar "commonalities" as sufficient to permit joinder under K.S.A. 22-3202(1). See, e.g., Ritz, 305 Kan. at 963-64 (finding two sets of crimes involving fleeing law enforcement to be same or similar, despite factual differences in underlying theft charges and addition of felony-murder charge in only one case); State v. Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1050-53, 1055-56, 307 P.3d 199 (2013) (crimes same or similar where both victims were leaving nightclub at closing time; both accosted before reaching vehicle; both had little warning before shot repeatedly; same gun used; defendant identified in both cases; both cases charged first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm); State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 687, 156 P.3d 602 (2007) (crimes same or similar where both victims were drug dealers; defendant on quest for drugs during both; both victims shot with 9 mm handgun; both occurred in private dwellings in a five-day time span); Barksdale, 266 Kan. at 506-10 (crimes same or similar where both crimes were murder; victims killed in similar manner; robbery was common motive in both cases). Based on the uncontested facts set forth above, we find substantial competent evidence supports the district court's legal conclusion that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character. 13  2. Condition three: common scheme or plan West also challenges the district court's ruling that the March and May crimes were part of a common scheme or plan. Because the March and May crimes were properly joined as offenses of the same or similar character under K.S.A. 22-3202(1), we need not address West's argument that the district court also erred in finding the crimes constituted parts of a common scheme or plan. B. Step two: abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever Having found a statutory basis for joinder, we must next determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever. See K.S.A. 22-3202(1) (providing that charges "may" be joined). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). On appeal from the denial of a motion to sever, the party claiming error has the burden to establish a clear abuse of discretion. See Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. at 161. To that end, West argues the district court committed an error of law by failing to consider whether joinder of the crimes would be prejudicial. He claims that allowing the March and May incidents to be tried together lowered the State's burden to disprove his claims of self-defense and led to the prejudicial admission of other-crimes evidence under K.S.A. 60-455 that would otherwise have been inadmissible. But this court has routinely rejected West's argument that failure to sever resulted in the prejudicial admission of other-crimes evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. See Smith- Parker, 301 Kan. at 161. "'Kansas case law and the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3202(1) 14 make it clear that joinder is not dependent upon the other crimes being joined meeting the admissibility test set forth in K.S.A. 60-455.'" 301 Kan. at 161 (quoting Gaither, 283 Kan. at 688). C. Step three: prejudice Absent any error, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different as the result of an error. Hurd, 298 Kan. at 564. And even if this court were to agree that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the prejudicial effect of the joinder, we may readily conclude that no prejudice occurred as a result. The jury was instructed that each crime charged against West was a separate and distinct offense and that it "must decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other charge." We have routinely held that such an instruction negates any jury confusion or prejudicial effect of trying a person on multiple counts. See, e.g., Cruz, 297 Kan. at 1057-58; Gaither, 283 Kan. at 687; Barksdale, 266 Kan. at 510. We presume that juries follow the instructions given. State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655, 672, 396 P.3d 78 (2017). And it appears the jury did so here, given that it acquitted West of the May aggravated assault charge. See Cruz, 297 Kan. at 1058 ("Sometimes, we view acquittals as compelling evidence of a jury's ability to differentiate between charges joined for trial."); Bunyard, 281 Kan. at 401-02 (rejecting defendant's argument related to "jumbling defenses"; such a claim was "inscrutable" when jury acquitted defendant of two of three counts). D. Conclusion In sum, we conclude substantial competent evidence supports the district court's legal conclusion that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character under K.S.A. 22-3202(1). We also conclude West failed to demonstrate that the court 15 abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever or that he was prejudiced by the court's decision. II. Jury instructions At trial, the district court instructed the jury on West's claim of self-defense. Over West's objection, the court also issued a related instruction that limited West's ability to claim self-defense if the jury found he was the initial aggressor. In addition, the court instructed the jury on three lesser included offenses of premeditated first-degree murder, including intentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter under the "unreasonable but honest belief" theory of that offense, and involuntary manslaughter committed as the result of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. The court declined West's request to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, West raises three claims of instructional error: (1) the initial aggressor instruction was legally and factually inappropriate, (2) the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and (3) the involuntary manslaughter instruction was legally deficient. We follow a multi-step framework when addressing claims of instructional error. First, we consider whether the issue is reviewable; in other words, whether there is appellate jurisdiction and whether the issue is sufficiently preserved for our review. Second, we decide whether the challenged instruction was legally and factually appropriate. In doing so, we exercise unlimited review of the entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party. Third, upon a finding of 16 error, we determine whether that error requires reversal or can be considered harmless. State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 253, 485 P.3d 614 (2021). A. Initial aggressor instruction At trial, the district court instructed the jury on West's claim of self-defense: "Defendant claims his use of force was permitted as self-defense. Defendant is permitted to use physical force against another person, including using a weapon, or threaten by words or actions to use physical force against another person, including a threat to cause death or great bodily harm, or display to another person a firearm, when and to the extent that it appears to him and he reasonably believes such physical force, threat, or display is necessary to defend himself against the other person's imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief. Defendant is permitted to use against another person physical force that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when and to the extent that it appears to him and he reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself from the other person's imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief. When use of force is permitted as self-defense, there is no requirement to retreat." At the State's request, the court also issued a related instruction on provocation, referred to as an initial aggressor instruction: "A person is not permitted to provoke an attack on himself with the specific intention to use such attack as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person he provoked and then claim self-defense as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person he provoked." 17  At the instructions conference, defense counsel objected to the initial aggressor instruction, pointing to a lack of evidence that West intended to provoke an attack. In the event the instruction was given, counsel asked the district court to include a sentence stating that "mere words or gestures by the defendant, however insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation." The court overruled defense counsel's objection to the instruction and declined to include the additional language requested by defendant, noting it was neither referenced in the pattern instructions nor required by caselaw. On appeal, West renews his objection to the initial aggressor instruction, claiming it was not legally or factually appropriate. At the first step of our framework for jury instruction issues, West objected to the instruction and requested the additional language, thus preserving the issue for review. At the second step of our framework, we consider the legal and factual appropriateness of the instruction, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record. See Holley, 313 Kan. at 254. 1. Legal appropriateness To be legally appropriate, a jury instruction must fairly and accurately state the applicable law. State v. Broxton, 311 Kan. 357, 361, 461 P.3d 54 (2020); see State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 161, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (An instruction that does not fairly and accurately state the law is legally infirm.). This court exercises unlimited review in deciding the legal appropriateness of an instruction. State v. Wimbley, 313 Kan. 1029, 1034, 493 P.3d 951 (2021). 18  The instruction at issue based on K.S.A. 21-5226(b), is consistent with the language of that statute, and is taken from the pattern instruction for Provocation of First Force as Excuse for Retaliation, PIK Crim. 4th 52.240. This instruction is generally given in situations where a factual dispute exists regarding whether the defendant was the aggressor. See PIK Crim. 4th 52.240 Comment ("It is not error to give initial aggressor instructions where the question whether defendant was an aggressor is one of fact for the jury. See State v. Hunt, 257 Kan. 388, 894 P.2d 178 [1995]."). The pattern instruction does not define what constitutes adequate provocation. See PIK Crim. 4th 52.240. This court "'strongly recommend[s] the use of PIK instructions, which knowledgeable committees develop to bring accuracy, clarity, and uniformity to instructions.'" State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 244, 564 P.3d 778 (2025) (quoting State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 353, 515 P.3d 736 [2022]). When a court follows the PIK instructions, "more than likely the instruction will be legally correct, not because of any independent legal significance of the pattern instruction, but because the committee usually writes an instruction that accurately reflects the law." Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1031. But a district court may modify or add language to a pattern instruction if warranted by the circumstances of a particular case. Hollins, 320 Kan. at 244; Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1031. West argues that, without his requested definition of provocation, the initial- aggressor instruction failed to accurately state the law because it did not tell the jury that the provocation must be legally sufficient—that is, sufficient to objectively warrant the victim's attack. And he contends the instruction misled the jury, allowing it to disregard his claim of self-defense and the lesser included offenses. In reviewing a district court's denial of a request to modify a pattern instruction, an appellate court does not view the added language in isolation. "Rather, the appellate court 19 considers all the jury instructions as a whole and decides whether, even without language requested by a party, the instructions properly and fairly stated the applicable law or whether it is reasonable to conclude the instructions could have misled the jury." Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1039; see State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. 357, 363, 580 P.3d 20 (2025) ("When a party argues an instruction was incomplete or unclear because it lacked a definition, we look beyond whether the omitted definition would have been legally accurate to whether the given instruction needed that definition to accurately or clearly reflect the law."); Hollins, 320 Kan. at 244 (Appellate courts consider jury instructions as a whole without isolating any one instruction.); State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 95, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979) ("The trial court need not define every word or phrase in the instructions. It is only when the instructions as a whole would mislead the jury, or cause them to speculate, that additional terms should be defined."). This court has long held that an initial aggressor instruction is a correct statement of the law. See Hunt, 257 Kan. at 391-94 (affirming district court's decision to give self- defense and initial aggressor instructions; reasoning that instructions correctly stated the law, question of whether defendant was initial aggressor was for jury and, if jury found defendant was not initial aggressor, jury was free to "disregard the limit on the defendant's right to use self-defense"); State v. Beard, 220 Kan. 580, 581-82, 552 P.2d 900 (1976) (initial aggressor instruction was correct statement of law; informed jury of law related to limits on asserting self-defense). Contrary to West's argument, the initial aggressor instruction did not undermine his theory of defense because the district court separately provided a self-defense instruction that correctly stated the law governing his self-defense claim. See K.S.A. 21- 5222. However, a defendant's right to invoke self-defense is limited under K.S.A. 21- 5226, and the initial aggressor instruction simply sets forth one such limitation on a defendant's ability to claim self-defense. See K.S.A. 21-5226(b). The instruction did not 20 tell the jury that West was the initial aggressor or require the jury to find that he was; the determination of whether West was the initial aggressor remained with the jury. See Hunt, 257 Kan. at 394. Indeed, the jury could have considered the initial aggressor instruction and, concluding the instruction did not apply to its view of the facts, embraced West's theory of self-defense. Because the instructions issued by the district court properly and fairly stated the applicable law on self-defense, the initial aggressor instruction given in this case was legally appropriate. 2. Factual appropriateness In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 727, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). West argues the initial aggressor instruction was factually inappropriate because the evidence did not show that he intended to provoke Robinson. West contends that the evidence that he taunted Robinson and called him a coward did not constitute adequate provocation to warrant the instruction. West suggests that an initial aggressor instruction is only appropriate in circumstances where the defendant first makes physical cont