State v. Orender
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket127739
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 127,739
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
JASON ORENDER,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Douglas District Court; STACEY DONOVAN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed.
Jason Orender, appellant pro se.
Jon Simpson, senior assistant district attorney, Dakota Loomis, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ARNOLD-BURGER, P.J., ATCHESON and CLINE, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Defendant Jason Orender contends the Douglas County District
Court imposed illegal sentences on him for two felony sex crimes and now appeals the
denial of his motion to correct those sentences. Orender argues that a statutory ambiguity
precluded the district court from ordering lifetime postrelease supervision. And he argues
the district court failed to order consecutive sentences, so he should serve the prison
terms concurrently. Neither claim has merit. We, therefore, affirm the district court's
denial of Orender's motion.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Orender with one count of rape of a child under 14 years of age
and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under 14 years of age—both
felonies—occurring between July 1, 2014, and February 20, 2015. In 2016, Orender
pleaded guilty to both charges. At a later hearing, the district court pronounced sentences
of 155 months in prison on the rape conviction and 59 months in prison on the aggravated
indecent liberties conviction for what the district court then described as "a controlling
sentence of 214 months." The district court did not explicitly declare the sentences to be
"consecutive." The district court also ordered lifetime postrelease supervision for
Orender.
After handling other matters related to the sentencing, the district court declared
the hearing "adjourned." The prosecutor immediately asked the district court to clarify
that Orender was to serve the sentences consecutively. The district court indicated it had
not done so using that terminology and explicitly said the sentences were consecutive.
The district court took up no other matters, and the hearing concluded.
In June 2023, Orender filed a motion and supporting memorandum he had
prepared to have his sentences and the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision
declared illegal. He asserted an array of grounds for relief in the initial filings and several
supplements. The State duly responded. After reviewing the written submissions and the
record, the district court declined to appoint a lawyer for Orender or to hold a hearing on
his motion. See K.S.A. 22-3504(a) (defendant entitled to appointed lawyer and hearing
on motion to correct illegal sentence if filings and record present colorable claim for
relief); State v. Swafford, 306 Kan. 537, 543, 394 P.3d 1188 (2017) (recognizing district
court's authority to summarily deny meritless motion to correct illegal sentence). In
March 2024, the district court issued a detailed written ruling denying Orender's motion.
Orender has appealed and continues to represent himself.
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ANALYSIS
On appeal, Orender has pared his claims for relief to two. Under K.S.A. 22-
3504(c)(1), a sentence is illegal if: (1) The district court lacked jurisdiction; (2) the
punishment does not conform to the applicable statutes; or (3) the terms are ambiguous as
to "the time and manner in which it is to be served." Because we can examine the
relevant materials just as well as the district court could and the appellate issues involve
no disputed facts, we make an independent review without deference to the district
court's determination. State v. Oathout, 65 Kan. App. 2d 851, 853-54, 573 P.3d 751
(2025).
For his first point, Orender contends that the version of K.S.A. 22-3717 in effect
when he committed his crimes, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3717, is ambiguous on whether the
appropriate term of postrelease supervision for defendants convicted of sexually violent
offenses was 36 months or life. Accordingly, he says the rule of lenity should apply, so
his term of postrelease supervision should be 36 months. See State v. Newman-Caddell,
317 Kan. 251, 259-60, 527 P.3d 911 (2023) (stating rule of lenity). This court considered
and rejected that ambiguity argument involving the same version of K.S.A. 22-3717 in
State v. Herrmann, 53 Kan. App. 2d 147, 153-54, 384 P.3d 1019 (2016) (rejecting
argument under the identical K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717). The Kansas Supreme Court
cited and quoted at length from Herrmann in rejecting that argument about a comparable
version of K.S.A. 22-3717. State v. Brook, 309 Kan. 780, 783-86, 440 P.3d 570 (2019)
(construing K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3717[d][1][D] and [d][1][G], unchanged in K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 22-3717 and K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717). Orender does not cite, let alone
discuss, either Herrmann or Brook. They are controlling and undermine his argument.
For his other point on appeal, Orender contends the district court pronounced the
sentences on the convictions without declaring they would run consecutively and then
adjourned the hearing. So, according to Orender, they must be treated as concurrent
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sentences under the statutory default in K.S.A. 21-6606(a). Orender says that the district
court effectively convened a new hearing when it responded to the prosecutor's request to
clarify the sentences and only then explicitly stated they were imposed consecutively,
rendering the clarification ineffective. We find the interlocking arguments to be a legally
empty exercise in wordplay.
As we have outlined, the district court pronounced a clear sentence for each crime
of conviction and then declared a "controlling" sentence that was the sum of the
individual sentences. That result could be achieved only if Orender served the sentences
consecutively. There was no ambiguity or uncertainty on that score. Although the record
would have been better served had the district court then explicitly stated that the
sentences were imposed consecutively, that precise terminology is not necessary. See
Oathout, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 861 ("magic words are not required" for district court to
impose extended term of probation).
A district court could have told Orender, "You will serve the sentence on the rape
first and then the sentence for aggravated indecent liberties with a child." That would
have been legally sufficient and really would be more descriptive than simply labeling
the sentences either concurrent or consecutive. Likewise, what the district court said here
was instructive and plainly described the effect of consecutive sentences. That is more
than good enough. Under K.S.A. 21-6606(a), if "the record is silent" on how two or more
sentences are to be served, then "they shall be served concurrently." The record here was
not silent, and Orender plainly should have understood the sentences being imposed and
how they would be served.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Orender's argument that the district court
irrevocably closed the sentencing hearing simply by saying "adjourned." If, at that point,
either a lawyer or a member of the court staff raised a question about the proceedings or
the scheduling of further hearings, we don't think the district court would initiate a new
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hearing in immediately responding. To say otherwise would allow form to triumph over
substance. Even if the district court did convene a new hearing, the result was simply a
clarification of—not a change in—the sentences that had already been pronounced. The
Kansas Supreme Court allowed that sort of sentencing clarification in State v. Howard,
287 Kan. 686, 695, 198 P.3d 146 (2008). We see nothing amiss with what the district
court did here and certainly nothing that amounts to an illegal sentence.
Affirmed.
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