Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 129,695 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JESSE TYLER SPEAR, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Ellsworth District Court; LISA BERAN, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant. Paul J. Kasper, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before WARNER, C.J., ATCHESON and ISHERWOOD, JJ. PER CURIAM: Defendant Jesse Tyler Spear appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in this misdemeanor driving under the influence prosecution in Ellsworth County District Court. Spear was convicted on stipulated facts and duly sentenced, preserving for appellate review his challenge to the district court's ruling on the motion. We find the district court correctly concluded that Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Steve Sneath had probable cause to arrest Spear before transporting him from the scene of a one-car accident to the county law enforcement center to perform field sobriety tests, thereby undercutting Spear's arguments for suppressing the resulting evidence, including a blood draw. 1 Shortly after midnight on April 23, 2022, Trooper Sneath was on patrol outside Kanopolis when he saw skid marks across the roadway. Trooper Sneath followed the marks to the aftermath of a single-car wreck. The vehicle had crossed the centerline, gone off the road, collided with a county sign, traveled up an embankment into a barbed wire fence, vaulted over piping, and came to rest in a pasture on the other side of a gateway. Trooper Sneath helped Spear out of the car and had him lie on the ground until emergency medical personnel arrived to determine if Spear had been injured. Trooper Sneath noticed that Spear's speech was quite slurred, and Spear admitted he had been drinking Everclear mixed with something else. Spear smelled heavily of alcohol. Trooper Sneath did not find any alcohol in Spear's car. After about 45 minutes, on-scene medical responders cleared Spear. Because of the high winds, Trooper Sneath asked Spear if he would go to the law enforcement center to perform the field sobriety tests inside the facility. Spear agreed. Spear was not handcuffed and sat in the front seat of Trooper Sneath's patrol car. During the ride, Spear called his brother on his cellphone. At the law enforcement center, Trooper Sneath had Spear perform the tests in the enclosed garage with the door open. Spear did poorly, and Sneath formally arrested him for driving under the influence. Spear consented to a blood draw at a local hospital. The results showed Spear had a blood-alcohol level of 0.17. The State charged Spear with a first-time DUI under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567. Spear filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing Trooper Sneath lacked probable cause to arrest him at the scene of the mishap and he was functionally—and unlawfully— arrested when Trooper Sneath transported him to the law enforcement center. Trooper Sneath was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. The district court denied Spear's motion. Spear later had a bench trial on stipulated facts. He was convicted and duly sentenced for the misdemeanor DUI violation. 2 For his sole issue on appeal, Spear contends the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We apply a bifurcated standard requiring us to credit the district court's factual findings supported in the evidence and to make an independent determination whether those findings warranted the district court's legal conclusion. State v. Bates, 316 Kan. 174, 183-84, 513 P.3d 483 (2022). As Spear concedes, the material facts are undisputed, so we address what amounts to a question of law and give no particular deference to the district court's denial of the motion. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 735-36, 559 P.3d 792 (2024) (appellate court exercises unlimited review over question of law); State v. Mejia, 58 Kan. App. 2d 229, 231-32, 466 P.3d 1217 (2020) (when material facts are undisputed, issue presents question of law; no deference given to district court). At the hearing, the State bore the burden of proving the reasonableness of any arrest of Spear by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Patterson, 304 Kan. 272, 274, 371 P.3d 893 (2016). An arrest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a government agent must have probable cause to believe the person arrested has committed a crime. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). An arrest occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to disengage from the government agent and then depart. The person need not be told they are under arrest. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010) (Suspects are in "Miranda custody" if they have been formally arrested or their freedom of movement has been restrained to a degree equivalent to a formal arrest.); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (individual considered under arrest if, under the circumstances, reasonable person would not feel free to leave); State v. Bramlett, No. 112,329, 2015 WL 3632572, at *2 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) ("A person is in custody if he or she has been formally arrested or has been deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way functionally equivalent to an arrest."). The determination rests on the totality of the circumstances. 3 See State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 552, 233 P.3d 246 (2010) (whether person seized for Fourth Amendment purposes based on totality of the circumstances). Probable cause to arrest "requires an officer to have knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime had been committed and the suspect committed it." State v. Beltran, 48 Kan. App. 2d 857, 864, 300 P.3d 92 (2013); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979) ("This Court repeatedly has explained that 'probable cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense."). The test is an objective one based on what a reasonable officer would conclude—the actual officer's subjective belief or understanding is irrelevant. Beltran, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 878-79. In resolving this appeal, we find the district court correctly concluded a reasonable law enforcement officer in Trooper Sneath's position had probable cause to arrest Spear for DUI at the scene of the mishap before transporting him to the law enforcement center. Spear smelled of alcohol and had heavily slurred speech—both indicators of intoxication. Moreover, he admitted he had been drinking. And the rather extreme circumstances of the mishap supported a conclusion that Spear was impaired. See State v. Younts, No. 124,581, 2023 WL 119913, at *3 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) ("We have repeatedly recognized that a significant motor vehicle accident otherwise unexplained by bad weather, an obstruction in the roadway, or similar external factors may be considered evidence of impairment."). In short, the constellation of factors Trooper Sneath observed at the scene established probable cause to arrest Spear for driving under the influence. See 2023 WL 119913, at *3 (outlining "ample evidence" supporting "reasonable conclusion" by jury that driver was legally intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt, including slurred speech, odor of alcohol, admission of drinking, and serious driving error resulting in single-vehicle accident). That is sufficient to affirm the district court's 4 ruling denying the motion to suppress. We, therefore, need not engage in what would be a largely abstract exercise in determining whether a reasonable person in Spear's position would believe they had been functionally arrested when they were driven to the law enforcement center. On appeal, Spear argues that transporting him to the law enforcement center without probable cause amounted to an unlawful seizure because the law enforcement center was not a "neutral" location. And he argues that because Trooper Sneath asked him to perform field sobriety tests at the law enforcement center, Trooper Sneath must have believed he did not have probable cause for an arrest before then. As our discussion to this point suggests, we are unpersuaded by those arguments. Spear's position fractures the law. First, simply taking a suspect to a law enforcement facility when they have consented to being transported there does not itself amount to an illegal seizure or arrest. Moreover, Trooper Sneath had sufficient evidence to arrest Spear and, thus, to transport him to the law enforcement center for further processing on a DUI charge had he declined to go voluntarily. Second, even if Trooper Sneath believed he lacked probable cause to arrest Spear at the accident scene, that's irrelevant to the objective test for a constitutionally acceptable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And, as we have explained, Spear's underlying contention that the circumstances known to Trooper Sneath did not support probable cause for a DUI arrest at the accident scene is mistaken. Affirmed. 5