State v. Spear
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket129695
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 129,695
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
JESSE TYLER SPEAR,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Ellsworth District Court; LISA BERAN, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed.
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.
Paul J. Kasper, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.
Before WARNER, C.J., ATCHESON and ISHERWOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Defendant Jesse Tyler Spear appeals the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence in this misdemeanor driving under the influence prosecution in
Ellsworth County District Court. Spear was convicted on stipulated facts and duly
sentenced, preserving for appellate review his challenge to the district court's ruling on
the motion. We find the district court correctly concluded that Kansas Highway Patrol
Trooper Steve Sneath had probable cause to arrest Spear before transporting him from the
scene of a one-car accident to the county law enforcement center to perform field sobriety
tests, thereby undercutting Spear's arguments for suppressing the resulting evidence,
including a blood draw.
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Shortly after midnight on April 23, 2022, Trooper Sneath was on patrol outside
Kanopolis when he saw skid marks across the roadway. Trooper Sneath followed the
marks to the aftermath of a single-car wreck. The vehicle had crossed the centerline, gone
off the road, collided with a county sign, traveled up an embankment into a barbed wire
fence, vaulted over piping, and came to rest in a pasture on the other side of a gateway.
Trooper Sneath helped Spear out of the car and had him lie on the ground until
emergency medical personnel arrived to determine if Spear had been injured. Trooper
Sneath noticed that Spear's speech was quite slurred, and Spear admitted he had been
drinking Everclear mixed with something else. Spear smelled heavily of alcohol. Trooper
Sneath did not find any alcohol in Spear's car.
After about 45 minutes, on-scene medical responders cleared Spear. Because of
the high winds, Trooper Sneath asked Spear if he would go to the law enforcement center
to perform the field sobriety tests inside the facility. Spear agreed. Spear was not
handcuffed and sat in the front seat of Trooper Sneath's patrol car. During the ride, Spear
called his brother on his cellphone. At the law enforcement center, Trooper Sneath had
Spear perform the tests in the enclosed garage with the door open. Spear did poorly, and
Sneath formally arrested him for driving under the influence. Spear consented to a blood
draw at a local hospital. The results showed Spear had a blood-alcohol level of 0.17.
The State charged Spear with a first-time DUI under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567.
Spear filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing Trooper Sneath lacked probable cause
to arrest him at the scene of the mishap and he was functionally—and unlawfully—
arrested when Trooper Sneath transported him to the law enforcement center. Trooper
Sneath was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. The district court
denied Spear's motion. Spear later had a bench trial on stipulated facts. He was convicted
and duly sentenced for the misdemeanor DUI violation.
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For his sole issue on appeal, Spear contends the district court erred in denying the
motion to suppress. We apply a bifurcated standard requiring us to credit the district
court's factual findings supported in the evidence and to make an independent
determination whether those findings warranted the district court's legal conclusion. State
v. Bates, 316 Kan. 174, 183-84, 513 P.3d 483 (2022). As Spear concedes, the material
facts are undisputed, so we address what amounts to a question of law and give no
particular deference to the district court's denial of the motion. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan.
718, 735-36, 559 P.3d 792 (2024) (appellate court exercises unlimited review over
question of law); State v. Mejia, 58 Kan. App. 2d 229, 231-32, 466 P.3d 1217 (2020)
(when material facts are undisputed, issue presents question of law; no deference given to
district court). At the hearing, the State bore the burden of proving the reasonableness of
any arrest of Spear by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Patterson, 304 Kan.
272, 274, 371 P.3d 893 (2016).
An arrest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and a government agent must have probable cause to believe the person
arrested has committed a crime. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). An arrest occurs when a reasonable person would not
feel free to disengage from the government agent and then depart. The person need not be
told they are under arrest. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112, 130 S. Ct. 1213,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010) (Suspects are in "Miranda custody" if they have been formally
arrested or their freedom of movement has been restrained to a degree equivalent to a
formal arrest.); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009)
(individual considered under arrest if, under the circumstances, reasonable person would
not feel free to leave); State v. Bramlett, No. 112,329, 2015 WL 3632572, at *2 (Kan.
App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) ("A person is in custody if he or she has been formally
arrested or has been deprived of his or her freedom in a significant way functionally
equivalent to an arrest."). The determination rests on the totality of the circumstances.
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See State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 552, 233 P.3d 246 (2010) (whether person seized
for Fourth Amendment purposes based on totality of the circumstances).
Probable cause to arrest "requires an officer to have knowledge of facts that would
lead a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime had been committed and the suspect
committed it." State v. Beltran, 48 Kan. App. 2d 857, 864, 300 P.3d 92 (2013); Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979) ("This Court
repeatedly has explained that 'probable cause' to justify an arrest means facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense."). The test is an
objective one based on what a reasonable officer would conclude—the actual officer's
subjective belief or understanding is irrelevant. Beltran, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 878-79.
In resolving this appeal, we find the district court correctly concluded a reasonable
law enforcement officer in Trooper Sneath's position had probable cause to arrest Spear
for DUI at the scene of the mishap before transporting him to the law enforcement center.
Spear smelled of alcohol and had heavily slurred speech—both indicators of intoxication.
Moreover, he admitted he had been drinking. And the rather extreme circumstances of
the mishap supported a conclusion that Spear was impaired. See State v. Younts, No.
124,581, 2023 WL 119913, at *3 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) ("We have
repeatedly recognized that a significant motor vehicle accident otherwise unexplained by
bad weather, an obstruction in the roadway, or similar external factors may be considered
evidence of impairment."). In short, the constellation of factors Trooper Sneath observed
at the scene established probable cause to arrest Spear for driving under the influence.
See 2023 WL 119913, at *3 (outlining "ample evidence" supporting "reasonable
conclusion" by jury that driver was legally intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt,
including slurred speech, odor of alcohol, admission of drinking, and serious driving
error resulting in single-vehicle accident). That is sufficient to affirm the district court's
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ruling denying the motion to suppress. We, therefore, need not engage in what would be a
largely abstract exercise in determining whether a reasonable person in Spear's position
would believe they had been functionally arrested when they were driven to the law
enforcement center.
On appeal, Spear argues that transporting him to the law enforcement center
without probable cause amounted to an unlawful seizure because the law enforcement
center was not a "neutral" location. And he argues that because Trooper Sneath asked him
to perform field sobriety tests at the law enforcement center, Trooper Sneath must have
believed he did not have probable cause for an arrest before then. As our discussion to
this point suggests, we are unpersuaded by those arguments.
Spear's position fractures the law. First, simply taking a suspect to a law
enforcement facility when they have consented to being transported there does not itself
amount to an illegal seizure or arrest. Moreover, Trooper Sneath had sufficient evidence
to arrest Spear and, thus, to transport him to the law enforcement center for further
processing on a DUI charge had he declined to go voluntarily. Second, even if Trooper
Sneath believed he lacked probable cause to arrest Spear at the accident scene, that's
irrelevant to the objective test for a constitutionally acceptable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. And, as we have explained, Spear's underlying contention that the
circumstances known to Trooper Sneath did not support probable cause for a DUI arrest
at the accident scene is mistaken.
Affirmed.
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