State v. Elliott

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,791 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM LOUIS ELLIOTT, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS M. SUTHERLAND, judge. Opinion filed October 23, 2026. Affirmed. Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Kendall Kaut, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before WARNER, C.J., BOLTON FLEMING, J., and TERESA L. WATSON, District Judge, assigned. PER CURIAM: William Louis Elliott appeals his convictions, arguing that the district court erred in admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant compelling him to unlock his cell phone using his fingerprint, the prosecutor erred in making "we know" statements during closing argument, and the district court improperly engaged in judicial factfinding in order to impose lifetime postrelease supervision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 1  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2018, over the course of five days, three separate women in Shawnee, Kansas, reported that a man broke into their homes and assaulted them. Pursuant to Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.043(c)(2) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 50), the alleged victims will each be referred to by a pseudonym. Incident 1 — September 27, 2018 — "Holly" Holly was a woman in her early 20s. She lived alone in the Fox Run Apartments in Shawnee, Kansas. She lived in a ground floor studio apartment, with her bed in the main living area. On the evening of the attack, she left her sliding patio door cracked so that paintings she had done that night could dry. She did not intend to leave the door open all night but fell asleep before shutting it. Holly was awakened by pressure on her body and realized that she was face down and her head was being pushed into the pillow. She said she was scared. She yelled for help and pushed herself up, causing the intruder to fall off to the side. Holly tried to crawl away from the intruder, but he grabbed her ankles and pulled her back while saying "Suck my dick and it will be okay." When she continued to fight and slipped from his control, he ran out of her apartment through the sliding door and out through the patio gate. During the struggle, Holly said the intruder attempted to pull down her pants, but she was able to fight back and keep them up. Because she was able to fight him off, Holly said that the intruder was not a large person. Holly also noted that the intruder was dark- skinned, with moles or freckles on his face, and a loose afro. After the intruder fled, Holly called 911. Investigators photographed the scene, collected fingerprints from the patio door and screen door, and swabbed various areas for DNA. 2  Incident 2 — September 29, 2018 — "Nancy" Nancy returned home to Shawnee, Kansas, on the evening of September 29, 2018, after attending her children's high school football game. At the time, she lived with her daughter and her sister. Nancy's sister was already asleep in her room. Nancy's daughter was spending the night at a friend's house, so Nancy slept in her daughter's room because she had a more comfortable bed. After smoking a cigarette outside, Nancy went inside and got in bed. Sometime later, Nancy awoke to something heavy on top of her, and then she heard someone saying, "Cooperate with me, suck my dick, cooperate with me, I have a gun, I am going to shoot you if you don't cooperate with me." The intruder was holding down her shoulder and her leg and attempting to remove Nancy's pants. He then put his hand down her pants and stuck his fingers inside her vagina. Nancy said she was very scared. Nancy could not see her intruder because it was too dark, but she felt a sweatshirt that was wet from the rain, and silky shorts. While struggling in the dark, she felt her hand graze his penis and began screaming her sister's name. The intruder pulled away when she began screaming, and she kicked him in the groin. He ran out of the room and out the back door. Nancy closed the open door from the garage to the house, met her sister in the living room, and they called 911. Nancy described the intruder as weak and small because she was able to push him off. At the scene, police took photographs, collected fingerprints, and swabbed for DNA. They located an open window and displaced screen in the garage and determined this to be the point of entry. The police recommended that Nancy get a Sexual Assault Nurse Examination done, so Nancy went to the Shawnee Mission Medical Center where they collected swabs and her clothing to be tested for DNA. 3  Incident 3 — October 1, 2018 — "Anna" Anna was a woman in her early 20s. She lived in a ground floor one bedroom apartment at the Fox Run Apartments in Shawnee, Kansas. She lived alone but let her brother stay at her apartment on occasion. Because her brother did not have a key, she would leave her balcony door unlocked so her brother could get in. On the night of the attack, she was lying in her bed, scrolling on social media, when she saw her bedroom door open and a flashlight shining in. Initially, Anna thought it was her brother, but then the flashlight turned off and the intruder charged and jumped on top of her. The intruder tried to pull Anna's clothes off and was touching around her genitals, but she kicked and screamed, knocking him off her. The intruder tried to flee but got stuck in the space behind her bedroom door. Eventually, he was able to make his way out of the front door of the apartment, at which point Anna got up, turned on all the lights, locked the doors, and grabbed a knife. Anna first called her grandmother because she was scared. While on the phone with her grandmother, Anna heard someone banging on her kitchen window, then the balcony door, and the front door, telling her he wanted his phone back. She looked outside and saw that it was Elliott banging on her front door. Anna recognized Elliott because he was a coworker and roommate of Anna's boyfriend, "Martin". Anna did not open her door to Elliott when he came back for the phone. Instead, she called her boyfriend to ask if he knew why Elliott would be at her apartment. Martin said that he did not know why Elliott would be there. After talking to Martin, Anna called the police. 4  Elliott went to Martin's place of employment and asked him to get Anna to give him his phone back. Martin was confused about what was going on and said that Elliott had blood on his shirt. At this point, Anna did not know there was a phone left behind in her apartment. She eventually located a cellphone sitting by her bedroom wall. Anna recognized the phone based on the case, because she had tried it on her own phone when she was spending time with her boyfriend, Martin, and Elliott at their apartment. When the police arrived at Anna's apartment, Anna explained what happened, and they instructed her to call Elliott's number if she had it, and when she did, the phone found in her apartment displayed her contact information. The police photographed the scene, collected fingerprints, swabbed for DNA, and seized the cellphone found in the apartment. At trial, Anna testified that the intruder fled through the front door, leaving it wide open, but this was not conveyed to investigators on scene, so the front door was never processed. Anna went to the hospital where health care providers collected swabs and clothing to be tested for DNA. On October 2, 2018, Elliott turned himself in to police and was placed in custody. Unlocking the cellphone After seizing the cellphone found at the scene, the police applied for and received a search warrant to unlock the device using biometrics. The detective showed the warrant to Elliott, who then placed his thumb on the fingerprint scanner of the iPhone, which unlocked the device. The detective submitted the unlocked phone to a forensics lab for data extraction. 5  Forensic evidence Regarding the DNA swabs taken from Holly's apartment, the swab from the exterior patio gate handle and lever found Elliott 125 times more likely to be a contributor than an unknown individual. Elliott's fingerprints were also found on the exterior patio door frame. GPS data from Elliott's cellphone showed Elliott in the area of Holly's apartment at 12:32 a.m., 12:35 a.m., 12:40 a.m., 12:44 a.m., 12:45 a.m., and 12:49 a.m. By 1:00 a.m., the GPS showed Elliott to be back at his own apartment. The DNA swabs taken from Nancy's home produced additional results. Through initial testing, the swab from the wood frame of the garage window determined to be the point of entry was 1.48 trillion times more likely to be from Elliott than an unknown contributor. The DNA on the swab from the window frame itself was 37,700 times more likely to be from Elliott than an unknown contributor. In 2023, newer technology for interpreting DNA data was implemented, and testing updated those likelihoods to 414 sextillion and 23,200, respectively. Under the new method, DNA pulled from the window screen was determined to be 44 times more likely to be from Elliott than an unknown contributor. Notably, swabs from the waistband of Nancy's pants from the night of the attack produced DNA that was 7.61 million times more likely to be from Elliott than an unknown contributor. The latent fingerprints lifted from the wood window frame identified as the point of entry were Elliott's. In addition, GPS data from Elliott's cellphone showed Elliott in the area of Nancy's home at 12:36 a.m., 12:53 a.m., 12:55 a.m., and 12:57 a.m. At 1:10 a.m., Nancy called the police, and then at 1:37 a.m., Elliott's phone pinged back at his apartment. None of the latent fingerprints lifted from Anna's apartment matched Elliott's fingerprints. However, several DNA swabs, when analyzed under the newer method 6 discussed above, identified Elliott as a contributor. The swab of Anna's right wrist contained DNA 74 times more likely to belong to Elliott than an unknown individual. The swab of Anna's left hand contained DNA 8,630 times more likely to belong to Elliott than an unknown individual. The swab of Anna's left wrist contained DNA 290 quadrillion times more likely to belong to Elliott than an unknown individual. The swab of Anna's left fingernails contained DNA 8,500 times more likely to belong to Elliott than an unknown individual. Finally, the swab from Anna's acrylic nail that had been broken off contained DNA 142 million times more likely to belong to Elliott than an unknown individual. As for the GPS data from the seized cellphone, at 12:04 a.m. the cellphone pinged in the parking lot of Anna's apartment complex. The phone did not ping again until 2:34 a.m., likely due to inactivity, but this ping showed the phone at the building where Anna lived. Procedural history Elliott was charged with three counts of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of attempted aggravated criminal sodomy, and one count of rape. Before trial, Elliott moved to suppress all evidence derived from his cellphone, claiming that admitting such evidence violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court denied the motion to suppress on the basis that there was probable cause to support the warrant, and compelling a person to unlock a cell phone is not a testimonial act and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 7  Elliott did not testify or present any evidence in his defense. The jury convicted Elliott on all counts. The district court sentenced Elliott to 269 months in prison, followed by lifetime postrelease supervision. Elliott appealed. ANALYSIS The Fifth Amendment issue is not preserved. Elliott first argues that the district court erred in admitting GPS data retrieved from his cellphone because it was obtained pursuant to a warrant compelling him to unlock it using his fingerprint. Elliott asserts that this violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the forced use of his fingerprint was testimonial in nature—without words, it revealed that he was the owner of the cellphone and its data. While we are intrigued by the Fifth Amendment issue Elliott presents, we cannot reach it. Elliott filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone prior to trial. The district court denied the motion. Elliott admits he failed to object to admission of the evidence at trial. Because Elliott failed to object to the admission of any evidence derived from the cellphone at trial, he has not preserved the issue for appeal. "The contemporaneous objection rule is set forth in K.S.A. 60-404, which generally precludes an appellate court from reviewing an evidentiary challenge absent a timely and specific objection made on the record." State v. Showalter, 318 Kan. 338, 345, 543 P.3d 508 (2024). K.S.A. 60-404's contemporaneous objection requirement is a procedural bar to appellate review. State v. Crudo, 318 Kan. 32, 38, 541 P.3d 67 (2024); see also State v. 8 Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 956, 270 P.3d 1165 (2012) (characterizing contemporaneous objection rule as a "prudential rather than jurisdictional obstacle to appellate review"). "A pretrial objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence must be preserved by contemporaneously objecting at trial, which can be accomplished through a standing objection." Crudo, 318 Kan. at 38. Elliott argues that Kansas appellate courts have, under certain circumstances, considered the merits of an unpreserved issue where the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule has been met. Here, Elliott reasons that because he raised the Fifth Amendment issue in a motion to suppress, it was fully litigated, and the motion was denied, the issue was adequately preserved and need not have been raised again at trial. The same argument was made in a concurring opinion in State v. White, No. 109,953, 2014 WL 5312873, at *12 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., concurring), where a majority panel of this court refused to consider a constitutional issue raised and rejected in a motion to suppress because there was no contemporaneous objection to the admission of the evidence at trial. The Kansas Supreme Court has since confirmed in the strongest of terms that K.S.A. 60-404 means what it says, even where the district court has considered and ruled on the issue in the context of a motion to suppress. "[W]e take this opportunity to reiterate an important principle. When a party moves to suppress evidence and the court denies the motion, the party must timely and specifically renew this objection when the opposing party moves to admit the evidence during trial. Failure to do so results in a failure to preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, 973, 399 P.3d 168 (2017). Sean dictates the result here. The issue was not preserved. 9  Alternatively, Elliott argues that a new legal theory may be asserted for the first time on appeal, when: (1) The newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court was right for the wrong reason. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). Elliott asserts his claim is a question of law implicating his fundamental rights and therefore meets two of the exceptions for issues raised for the first time on appeal. But the Kansas Supreme Court has declined to use an exception to "bypass the clear statutory guidelines provided in K.S.A. 60-404." Sean, 306 Kan. at 973. We follow the court's lead in Sean to conclude that Elliott has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. There was no reversible prosecutorial error. Elliott claims the State committed reversible prosecutorial error during closing arguments by using inflammatory language and "we know" statements when discussing contested evidence. The State argues that the picturesque language was within the wide latitude afforded the prosecutor and did not extend beyond discussing facts supported by the evidence. As for the "we know" statements, one was permissible due to the uncontroverted nature of the evidence discussed, while others were in error but were harmless in the wider context of closing argument. Standard of review Challenges to prosecutorial error during closing argument need not be preserved by a contemporaneous objection at trial. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021) ("[W]e will review a claim of prosecutorial error based on comments made 10 during voir dire, opening statement, or closing argument even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection."). When considering a claim of prosecutorial error, an appellate court first determines whether an error occurred—that is, whether the prosecutor's actions or statements "[fall] outside the wide latitude afforded the prosecutor in conducting the State's case in a way that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial." 313 Kan. at 406. "The wide latitude afforded prosecutors to present the State's case encompasses argument and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented at trial so long as the argument or inferences accurately reflect the evidence and correctly state the governing law. As such, argument may not be designed to inflame the passions of the jury or to otherwise divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the controlling law as applied to the evidence admitted at trial. In considering whether comments exceeded the scope of permissible argument, the court considers the context in which the comments were made, not in isolation." State v. Keim, No. 127,684, 2026 WL 184339, at *5 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion) (citing Bodine, 313 Kan. at 406-07). If the court discovers error, then it considers whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Bodine, 313 Kan. at 406. Under these facts, the use of the word "predator" was based on evidence at trial and did not constitute prosecutorial error. Elliott argues that the prosecutor erred by referring to him as a "predator" that "broke into their homes and shattered the safety and sanctity of those homes and violated their bodies," and in repeating that he was a predator before asking the jury to find him guilty. A prosecutor crosses the line of appropriate argument when that argument is intended to inflame the jury's passions or prejudices or when the argument diverts the 11 jury's attention from its duty to decide the case on the evidence and controlling law. State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 992, 336 P.3d 312 (2014). Elliott relies on State v. Maybin, 27 Kan. App. 2d 189, 199, 2 P.3d 179 (2000), for the proposition that referring to a defendant as a predator is prosecutorial misconduct designed to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury. In Maybin, the defendant was convicted of a single robbery. The court determined that the use of the word predator in this context was error, but it was harmless because it had little likelihood of changing the result of the trial. 27 Kan. App. 2d at 199-200. Unlike Maybin, Elliott was convicted of a string of three home invasions culminating in sexual assault on female occupants. The evidence showed that the women did not invite the intruder into their homes, he entered their homes at night, he attacked them in bed, and the contact was not consensual. The intruder physically restrained the women. He tried to pull down Holly's pants; he put his fingers in Nancy's vagina; and he groped Anna's genitals. There was no dispute as to these conditions. The jury was charged only with determining whether the State carried its burden to prove that the perpetrator was Elliott. Thus, under these facts, the use of the word predator and references to shattering safety and sanctity and violating their bodies are fair comments on the evidence and do not constitute prosecutorial error. Even if the comments were considered prosecutorial error, they are harmless. As in Maybin, the comments here had little likelihood of changing the outcome of the trial given the weight of the evidence against Elliott, including the DNA evidence, the fingerprint evidence, the GPS location evidence, and Anna's identification of Elliott when he returned to her apartment seeking to retrieve his cell phone. 12  The use of "we know" statements, where the statements amount to error, was harmless in the context of closing argument. Elliott takes issue with several "we know" statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument: 1. "So how do we know it's the defendant? What do we know? Well we know it was the defendant because [Anna] told you it was." 2. "And you can look at the circumstances where it's in the parking lot and then again with that later hit when we know that phone is there while the police are there and it's showing on top of the building." 3. "How do we know it was him? And again, uncontroverted—a man breaks into the home, it is without her authority, she is present in the home. His intent is to commit a sexual assault." 4. "How do we know it's William Elliott? Well, again, his GPS data detail tells us." 5. "You have that GPS data information. You have his fingerprints. His fingerprint is present on her patio door which we know is the point of entry." 6. "That man that came in was William Elliott. And again, how do we know it was him? Again, GPS data places him there." A prosecutor may say "we know" something during closing argument if it is based on uncontroverted evidence presented at trial. State v. Douglas, 313 Kan. 704, 714, 490 P.3d 34 (2021). A prosecutor's use of "we know" statements is improper when based on inferences drawn from controverted evidence, even if the inference is reasonable. State v. Blevins, 313 Kan. 413, 432-33, 485 P.3d 1175 (2021). However, "prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). "We may consider the district court's jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against the defendant in determining whether any prosecutorial error is harmless." State v. Bobian, 321 Kan. 169, 182, 574 P.3d 385 (2025). 13  Even if the prosecutor erred here in making these statements, when taken in context, the statements were harmless. As to the first statement, the full context is as follows: "So how do we know it's the defendant? What do we know? Well we know it was the defendant because [Anna] told you it was. And the reason that she knew that it was, was because he left his phone behind. "Now, remember [Anna] is actually the third in line of the victims. He left his phone. Not only did he leave his phone though, he came back. Tried to get the phone back from [Anna] and she saw him. She recognized him. She recognized his voice. Heard [Martin] say that he came to his work and told him, hey, I'm sorry for what I did to [Anna]. I need my phone back. That corroborates [Anna's] story." While the initial "we know" statements alone were errors, the prosecutor's statements in context clarify that she was not imbuing personal opinions, because she directs the jury to review evidence that corroborates Anna's claims. Thus, the wider context rendered the error, if any, harmless because it recentered the decision as one for the jury to make based on the evidence. The second statement does not constitute error. The full context of the second contested statement was: "And you can look at the circumstances where it's in the parking lot and then again with that later hit when we know that phone is there while the police are there and it's showing on top of the building." For the "we know" statement to be error, it must be based on inferences drawn from controverted evidence. It is uncontroverted that the phone was present when the police were at Anna's apartment, because it was recovered by the police and taken into evidence. The third and fourth statements happen back-to-back in the following manner: 14  "So with [Holly], again, aggravated burglary. He breaks into the home. How do we know it was him? And again, uncontroverted—a man breaks into the home, it is without her authority, she is present in the home. His intent is to commit a sexual assault. "How do we know it's William Elliott? Well, again, his GPS data detail tells us. You have multiple hits in that area in the timeframe right before her 911 call leaving that area. Then—and then you can see him back in the area of his apartment. "And again, I know the Judge told you in those instructions but you are allowed to go back and look at pictures and anything that was pulled up digitally, you have that available to you, too, so you can look at those things for yourself." Again, the "we know" statements are error, but the prosecutor remediates the error by directing the jury to review the evidence. The full context of the fifth statement is: "And again, I know the Judge told you in those instructions but you are allowed to go back and look at pictures and anything that was pulled up digitally, you have that available to you, too, so you can look at those things for yourself. "You have that GPS data information. You have his fingerprints. His fingerprint is present on her patio door which we know is the point of entry. She tells you that. You saw pictures of that room where her mattress is and it's quite near that patio door. He entered and his fingerprint is left there. He is the man that entered." The statement Elliott "is the man that entered" is error. The identity of the perpetrator was the pivotal question in this case. Even so, when viewed in the wider context of the closing argument, the statement regarding Elliott's identity was harmless because it followed the prosecutor's statement that the jury had the right to take another look at all the evidence cited by the prosecutor in making its decision. Finally, the sixth statement in context is as follows: 15  "That man that came in was William Elliott. And again, how do we know it was him? Again, GPS data places him there. You have multiple hits. You can go back and look at those again. And again, look at the timeline. The timeline of those 911 calls— where they're looking in getting those GPS hits in the timeframe after. "And you heard that the defendant's home was not very far away. "Again, he's left his fingerprints. His fingerprints tell us it was him. His fingerprints are present on the window frame in the garage. His DNA tells us so. He's also left his DNA profile. His DNA profile is present on the wood window frame in the garage also. It is also present on the window screen. That was the point of entry. "It's also present on the waistband of [Nancy's] gray sweatpants. Think about that. Because she tells you that during her attack, he is pulling at her sweatpants repeatedly trying to get them down. And in fact, that is when the rape occurs as well. DNA on the waistband of her sweatpants. "He doesn't know her. She doesn't know him. There is no explanation for that other than it was the defendant that did it." While the use of "we know" when referencing the identity of the perpetrator is error, it is harmless error when—in context—the jury is reminded to independently review the evidence and reach the conclusion on their own. Here, the prosecutor directs the jury to all the evidence that could support the finding that the perpetrator and the defendant are one in the same and even tells the jury: "You can go back and look at those again." This renders the error harmless because it mitigates any pressure to simply agree with the prosecutor's opinion and instead directs the jury to review each piece of evidence regarding the perpetrator's identity. The effect of a jury admonition attempting to remedy a prosecutor's error must be considered in determining whether the erroneous conduct prejudiced the jury. The district court also instructed the jury on the use of attorney's statements during deliberations. Jury Instruction No. 1 said: "Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and in applying the law, 16 but they are not evidence. If any statements are made that are not supported by the evidence, they should be disregarded." A jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 521, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). The prosecutor's "we know" statements regarding the identity of the perpetrator, where error, are neutralized here based on 1) the jury's ability to consider the information independently, 2) the prosecutor's reminder that the jurors could review every piece of evidence she mentioned, and 3) the district court's instruction that remarks of counsel are not evidence, and if not supported by evidence, should be disregarded. In addition, there was an abundance of evidence demonstrating Elliott's culpability apart from the prosecutor's statements, including his fingerprints at Holly's and Nancy's residences, his DNA found at Nancy's home and on Nancy's sweatpants, the GPS data from his phone placing him at all three residences during the crimes, and his return to Anna's apartment to retrieve his phone after the attack. The State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's statements did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, and as such, were harmless error. Elliott failed to preserve his Apprendi argument regarding lifetime postrelease supervision. Elliott asserts that the district court violated his right to a jury trial when it imposed lifetime postrelease supervision, which required a jury finding that he was 18 years of age or older at the time the offense was committed. See K.S.A. 22- 3717(d)(1)(G)(i). Elliott's argument is based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 17  Elliott did not raise his Apprendi challenge at sentencing or otherwise inform the district court that he was contesting his supervision term. Appellate courts generally do not consider new issues raised for the first time on appeal, including constitutional challenges. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 730, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). Elliott insists that he should nonetheless be allowed to raise this issue pursuant to exceptions to the general rule, including: (1) The theory involves a legal question arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; and (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights. Allen, 314 Kan. at 283. An appellate court's decision to review an unpreserved claim under an exception is prudential; even if an exception applies, the appellate court is not obligated to review it or explain the denial. Mendez, 319 Kan. at 730-31; State v. Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 500, 501 P.3d 368 (2021). Here, we need not determine whether an exception applies because we exercise our discretion and decline to consider Elliott's claim. Our court has previously declined review of Apprendi challenges to lifetime postrelease supervision made for the first time on appeal. In State v. Jelinek, 66 Kan. App. 2d 158, 577 P.3d 662 (2025), petition for rev. filed October 8, 2025, a panel of this court stated: "Even though the Supreme Court has addressed Apprendi challenges to lifetime postrelease supervision terms based on the offender's age for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and more recently stressed that Kansas appellate courts generally do not address legal theories raised for the first time on appeal, even those of a constitutional dimension. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 730, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). And even if a recognized exception to this general rule may apply, we are under no obligation to review the new claim and we need to provide no reason for the denial. 319 Kan. at 730. 18  "There is a good reason for this rule. Appellate courts are designed to review decisions made by the trial courts, not to serve as forums for introducing new arguments or evidence. This principle ensures that trial courts have the first opportunity to address and resolve issues, promotes judicial efficiency, and prevents unfair surprises to the opposing party." 66 Kan. App. 2d at 163. See also State v. Skidmore, No. 127,668, 2025 WL 2682404, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion) ("But more recently, our Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that Kansas appellate courts generally do not address legal theories raised for the first time on appeal, even when those issues allege constitutional violations."); State v. Bednarz, No. 126,821, 2025 WL 2265714, at *3 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion) ("There is a good reason for this rule. Appellate courts are designed to review decisions made by the trial courts, not to serve as forums for introducing new arguments or evidence."), petition for review filed September 5, 2025. Elliott points out in his brief that other panels of our court have opted to reach an unpreserved Apprendi challenge on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 66 Kan. App. 2d 182, 185, 579 P.3d 1278 (2025), rev'd on other grounds 322 Kan. ___, 2026 WL 2671971 (2026); State v. Conkling, 63 Kan. App. 2d 841, 843, 540 P.3d 414 (2023); State v. Lunsford, No. 127,962, 2026 WL 972956, at *3 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion); State v. Duckworth, No. 126,677, 2024 WL 4579265, at *2 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 320 Kan. 864 (2025); State v. Kewish, No. 121,793, 2021 WL 4352531, at *2 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion); State v. Schmeal, No. 121,221, 2020 WL 3885631, at *8 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). We agree with the prudential considerations thoughtfully articulated in Jelinek and Bednarz and apply them here. The fact that other panels have elected to address unpreserved Apprendi claims for the first time on appeal does not obligate this panel to do so. Sandate v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 58 Kan. App. 2d 450, 454, 471 P.3d 700 (2020). 19 Affirmed. 20