Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,390 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. COLTER JOSEPH DUCOTE, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Smith District Court; PRESTON A. PRATT, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Sam Schirer, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, for appellant. Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and HURST, JJ. PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Colter Joseph Ducote of multiple counts related to the rape and ongoing sexual abuse of a young child. Ducote appeals those convictions arguing that the district court erred by admitting evidence, suggesting he viewed electronic child sexual abuse material, and that the court inappropriately restricted his counsel's statements during closing argument. Upon review, the district court did not err in the admission of the evidence in question, and this court finds no reversible error related to the limitations imposed during closing argument. Ducote is not entitled to the relief requested and thus his convictions are affirmed. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Jane (a pseudonym) is the daughter of Mother and Father, who separated in 2013. Jane has one brother, Kevin (a pseudonym), from that familial relationship. Mother married Ducote in 2020 after several years of dating. Mother and Ducote had one child, Jane's half-brother, an infant at the time of this case. Father married Mary (a pseudonym), who became Jane's stepmother. At the time relevant to this case, Jane split her time living with Mother and Ducote and Father and Mary, alternating homes on a two-week rotation. According to Mother, when Jane was about six or seven years old she started having outbursts or behavior issues "a little more than what a normal child might do when they get angry or stuff," which was when Mother and Ducote were living together. Jane first disclosed Ducote's abuse at age 10 while at Father's house. According to trial testimony from Jane's stepmother, she and Jane had a bit of a rough relationship, but Mary tried to engage with Jane. On the night of Jane's disclosure, Mary explained that she went to talk to Jane, telling her something like "I know we were having a rough day. . . . [I]f [you] ever needed to speak to me about anything that's going on . . . I will listen to [you.]" Jane did not initially say anything but called Mary into her bedroom to talk about an hour later. Mary testified that Jane "was a little hysteric[al]" and said "she had something she needed to tell [Mary.]" Jane then told Mary that Ducote had been touching her inappropriately, specifically that "he was rubbing her chest area and her butt area with his hands[] [a]nd his genital areas." Mary relayed to Father what Jane had shared and then contacted law enforcement. Mary later testified that she "noticed multiple amounts of bruises on [Jane's] chest and butt areas and on her thighs." According to Mary, when she asked Jane about the bruises, Jane said they were the result of "physical restraints from" Mother and Ducote. 2 The Investigation The sheriff's deputy who responded to the call talked with Mary and Father before meeting Jane. When the deputy spoke with Jane, she told the deputy Ducote had been touching her inappropriately for four years. The deputy asked Jane about the most recent incident, and Jane responded, "he touched it," clarifying she meant her vagina. The deputy later testified that he was not trained in interviewing juveniles about sexual assault, so he stopped talking with Jane because he felt he had enough to proceed with an investigation. The deputy said he told Mary and Father to avoid talking to Jane about the abuse until professionals could interview Jane. A special agent from the KBI later conducted a forensic interview with Jane. According to the agent's testimony, Jane said that Ducote "was doing sexual things to [her]." The agent testified that Jane identified specific incidents of abuse, summarized as follows: • July 2023 incident (Jane was 10 years old): Jane was home with Ducote while her older brother played outside and her baby brother slept. Ducote had Jane go into the bathroom where he proceeded to rape and sodomize her and made her perform oral sex on him. • May 2023 incident (10 years old): Ducote raped and sodomized Jane. • August 2020 incident (7 years old): Ducote raped Jane. • August 2019 incident (6 years old): Ducote approached Jane in her room and sodomized her. Jane mentioned other acts from unspecified dates and made it clear to the special agent that these types of incidents were not uncommon. The agent also testified that Jane said Ducote "had shown her images of young girls that she thought were 13 to 14 years 3 old," telling Jane, "this could be you one day. Or you could be like this one day." According to Jane, Ducote had shown her these images on a laptop, cell phone, and a gaming device. Based on what Jane had said, the agent applied for a search warrant of the home shared by Mother and Ducote. As part of their search, officers collected Ducote's laptop, cell phone, and gaming device, and a second laptop that officers believed could be Ducote's. Officers forensically examined the devices, finding "child sexual abuse material," which an agent described as images of "children that are naked, and . . . posed in a sexual manner or in photographs that are clearly, intentionally taken of their genitals." Specifically, there were eight images of girls that appeared to be between the ages of 8 and 14—who were naked with some posed with their genitals or chests facing the camera. One of the girls pictured was in a bed and one was in a shower, and some of the pictures also contained dildos. A technical special agent who performed the forensic examination said they found the eight images of girls as well as three images of "child erotica," for example "underage children that are depicted in . . . underwear or in a stripping type series." The agent said child erotica is used by people who have an "interest in children sexually." The agent testified that based on how the images were stored in the phone, it suggested the eight images of the girls were viewed individually, meaning a viewer did not click on one link and see all eight images at once. In searching Ducote's phone, the agent also viewed his web history: "I found a web history link and the web history was titled, . . . not 18 full porn videos" but the "not" in some locations was "the prohibited symbol, the red circle with the line through it." A forensic interviewer testified that she interviewed Jane's brother, Kevin, to see if "anything had happened to him" or "if he knew anything that happened to [Jane]." Kevin told the forensic interviewer that "[Jane] used to really like [Ducote]" and that "they would be holding hands all the time," but that they did not do that anymore: "[Jane] was 4 no longer holding [his] hand and [Ducote] was no longer in the room playing with her." Kevin also told the interviewer that he was sometimes left at home with Jane and Ducote and that Ducote would ask Kevin to go outside while Jane had to stay inside with Ducote. A sexual assault nurse examiner performed a physical examination of Jane. The examination did not include an investigation for DNA because of the amount of time that had passed since the last alleged incident. According to the nurse, Jane described the abuse perpetrated by Ducote and her description largely aligned with what Jane had previously disclosed. The nurse testified that over 90 percent of exams of "children with known penetration . . . are going to be normal" or lacking in signs of injury. The nurse confirmed she found no signs of injury on Jane. The State—through a second amended complaint—charged Ducote with three counts of rape; two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy; and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The Trial At trial, Mother testified that she was initially unsure whether to believe Jane or Ducote. She denied seeing any indication that anything other than a normal stepfather/stepdaughter relationship existed between Jane and Ducote. Mother eventually sought a divorce from Ducote, which was finalized before the start of trial. Jane's fifth and sixth grade teacher testified at trial about her interactions with and perceptions about Jane. Her classroom had a policy where the kids could use a thumbs- down gesture to show if they were having a rough day and might "need a little extra attention," and Jane would sometimes use that method to demonstrate her mood. Other times, Jane would show her emotions on her face or come into the room in tears. 5 When asked what Jane would share, the teacher said sometimes Jane needed to talk about getting in trouble or what was on her mind—on one occasion she said she could not sleep because her "window was open and [Jane was] afraid someone's staring at [her]." Jane said that Ducote "wouldn't let [her] put something over it to block [the window]." Upon being asked what Jane had said in describing her relationship with Ducote, the teacher said Jane "felt that he was weird. That he acted weird towards her." The teacher said Jane would often tell her that Ducote is "very mean to her." The teacher recounted that on one occasion Jane "came to school sobbing out of control" and shared that Ducote "had told [Jane] that she's the reason that they are getting a divorce, that she was the cause of it." The teacher testified that Jane's "hard days . . . were because of [Ducote]." During some period, Jane reportedly "stay[ed] somewhere else" other than the home shared by Mother and Ducote—Jane told the teacher she liked it and that "she felt safe and she felt comfortable." A therapist from High Plains Mental Health Center testified at trial that she first started seeing Jane in February 2019 for an initial diagnosis of "adjustment disorder with emotions and anxiety due to family dynamics." When identifying the family dynamics, the therapist testified that Mother and Father had divorced, and Ducote had started seeing Mother. The therapist said Jane "was having a hard time with rules and requests and any type of discipline interventions from [Ducote]." According to the therapist, Jane's diagnoses evolved from her initial diagnosis, noted above, to "disrupted mood, dysregulation disorder" and then to "post-traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD). She admitted she had initially misdiagnosed Jane and that once she began treating Jane for PTSD, Jane's symptoms and behaviors improved. The therapist testified that Jane never made any disclosures of sexual abuse but did tell her about one time when Ducote slapped Jane across the face. When asked if Jane ever explained why she failed to make disclosures related to the sexual abuse, Jane told the therapist that "she was threatened 6 that she would be beat" and that "she felt ashamed and thought no one would believe her." Jane, at age 11, testified at trial. Her testimony largely mirrored the testimony from other witnesses who described her prior disclosures. However, Jane had trouble remembering certain things she had previously disclosed and did not go into much detail. Jane testified about disclosing the abuse to her stepmother and said she had tried reporting the abuse before but that it was too "hard to get it out." She said she finally told Mary out of concern "[i]t was going to happen again until I told." Jane testified that when Ducote was making her touch him or touching her, he would say "it felt good" and that she should "act . . . like you like it." She also testified that Ducote showed her pictures of teenage girls, which matched what she had told officers during their investigation. The jury convicted Ducote on all seven of the off-grid crimes charged. He now appeals. DISCUSSION Ducote raises three trial errors on appeal. First, he argues the district court erred in admitting evidence suggesting he viewed child sexual abuse material (CSAM), specifically the eight images taken from his phone and the weblink about underage porn. Second, he argues the district court erred in restricting defense counsel's comments during closing argument about the State's burden at trial. Third, Ducote alleges cumulative errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. According to Ducote, these errors require reversal of his convictions. 7 I. NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE Ducote argues the district court erred by admitting evidence that he viewed CSAM and visited the link titled "'Full Porn Videos ⦸ 18,'" because it "doesn't speak to his . . . propensity to commit particular types of sex acts" and he was not charged with possession of child sex abuse material. None of the images were introduced as evidence; there was only testimony about the content of the images and the title of the link. Ducote does not challenge the district court's decision that the evidence did not need to be evaluated under K.S.A. 60-455, because it found the alleged conduct did not qualify as "sexual misconduct" under K.S.A. 60-455(d) or as a crime or civil wrong governed by K.S.A. 60-455(a) or (b) or (c). So, the question on appeal is whether the evidence was relevant and admissible. Ducote challenged the admission of the evidence at a pretrial hearing and contemporaneously objected at trial, preserving this issue for appeal. See K.S.A. 60-404; State v. Showalter, 318 Kan. 338, 345, 543 P.3d 508 (2024). Generally, "all relevant evidence is admissible." K.S.A. 60-407(f); see also K.S.A. 60-401(b) (evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency in reason to prove any material fact"). To be relevant, the evidence must be both material and probative. State v. Cunningham, 321 Kan. 384, 391, 580 P.3d 672 (2025). "Evidence is material when a disputed 'fact has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case'" and it is "probative when it has any tendency to prove or disprove a material fact." 321 Kan. at 391. Even when material and probative, the evidence may still be excluded if it is unduly prejudicial. 321 Kan. at 393. This court reviews the district court's determination on whether evidence is material de novo, looking at the issue anew without deference to the district court's decision. However, the district court is given broader discretion in its probative determination and thus this court reviews the district court's decision on whether the 8 evidence is probative for an abuse of discretion. See 321 Kan. at 391. The abuse of discretion standard is also applied to review the district court's decision on whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. 321 Kan. at 391. Finally, if the evidence was erroneously admitted at trial, that error is subject to a harmless error review under either the statutory standard in K.S.A. 60-261 or the constitutional harmlessness standard depending on the nature of the right at issue. See State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 832, 511 P.3d 931 (2022) (applying statutory harmless standard when improper admission did not affect substantial right); State v. Thornton, 312 Kan. 829, 832-33, 481 P.3d 1212 (2021) (applying constitutional harmlessness when the improper admission impacted a substantial right). Before trial, the State moved under K.S.A. 60-455(d) to admit evidence of Ducote viewing child pornography by way of clicking a weblink titled "'Full Porn Videos ⦸ 18,'" and testimony about the eight images of CSAM from his phone. When a defendant is charged with certain sex offenses, "evidence of the defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible . . . for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant and probative." K.S.A. 60-455(d). The State argued the evidence of Ducote viewing CSAM was relevant to demonstrate "the intent necessary" to support the charges against him. The State also argued this evidence would act to corroborate Jane's testimony about Ducote showing her sexual images of teen girls. First, the district court considered whether the evidence was relevant, explaining that "the proper way to analyze this type of evidence is to always start with the relevancy first." The court explained the general rules of admissibility and specifically addressed the evidence at issue here: "So if we look at this general relevance when someone is charged with a sex crime against a child, internet searches, under 18 child pornography is generally relevant to prove some material fact that the person is sexually attracted to underage children. 9 "And that attraction is essential to the case. Because if you're not attracted to underage children then you're going to be likely not committing sex crimes against underage children. .... "And so again, general relevancy is does this clicking on a link that says full porn video under 18, whether or not it actually goes to that link or whether it actually shows people under 18; that is relevant to show that the person who clicked on it had some attraction to people under 18. "And then the . . . images in the cache themselves having—have some interaction with those [images], again is relevant to show that whoever it was that scrolled over, clicked on, did something with those images to get them into that Twitter cache in the first place, has some attraction to children under 18." The district court found the evidence was relevant because it was material to show Ducote was sexually attracted to children, granting the State's motion. It decided the evidence was relevant and admissible without explicitly deciding whether it was also probative or if its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This court can assume the district court impliedly made that probative determination when it found the evidence relevant and admissible. See State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 981, 897 P.2d 152 (1995) (finding that evidence is probative and not outweighed by its prejudicial effect may be implied from the circumstances), abrogated on other grounds by State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 79 P.3d 169 (2003). The Evidence Is Material and Probative and Thus Relevant The district court correctly found the evidence relevant. First, the evidence provides some support for the contention that Ducote tends to be sexually attracted to children which makes it material to support an element of the charged offense. See Cunningham, 321 Kan. at 394. The Kansas Supreme Court explained in Cunningham that evidence of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct can be relevant to demonstrate 10 evidence of the defendant's sexual desire when that sexual desire is a material fact necessary to prove an element of a charged offense. 321 Kan. at 394. Here, Ducote was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child, which has an element that the defendant engaged in lewd fondling or touching of a child under 14 years old done to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the child and/or the offender. K.S.A. 21-5506(b)(3)(A). Therefore, the evidence that Ducote accessed CSAM tends to demonstrate Ducote had sexual desire consistent with the element of the aggravated indecent liberties offense requiring a showing of intent to arouse the sexual desires of one of the parties. The State also argued that the evidence was relevant to bolster the victim's testimony that Ducote had shown her such images and offered to show her such images at other times. Although the district court did not address that particular relevance argument, this court also finds that argument compelling. While the State did not charge Ducote for accessing CSAM, that evidence tends to corroborate the victim's version of events because she testified to Ducote showing her such images. See, e.g., Cunningham, 321 Kan. at 392-94 (affirming admission of evidence of defendant's uncharged online activity that corroborated witness testimony); State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494, 506, 332 P.3d 172 (2014) (noting that a witness' prior statements are generally material and probative because the evidence "either corroborates or undercuts the witness' credibility"). In Cunningham, a strikingly similar case decided by the Kansas Supreme Court during the pendency of Ducote's appeal, the young victim alleged Cunningham had sexually abused her for years starting at about age four, and the State charged Cunningham with several sex offenses. The victim testified about several instances of abuse and alleged that Cunningham had showed her videos of sexually explicit material. 321 Kan. at 385. 11 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of Cunningham's sexual misconduct, specifically "'the titles of the pornographic videos Cunningham had bookmarked on his cell.'" 321 Kan. at 387. The State relied on K.S.A. 60-455(d) to argue the evidence was relevant to prove Cunningham's sexual interest in young girls." 321 Kan. at 390. Cunningham objected and claimed the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. The district court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant based on it showing the "same lines of the same pattern and similar sexual activity with young girls." 321 Kan. at 390. The jury convicted Cunningham of several sexual offenses. Cunningham appealed and argued, like Ducote does here, that the district court erred by admitting the "pornographic titles of his web bookmarks." 321 Kan. at 386. The Kansas Supreme Court did not rely on the admissibility standard under K.S.A. 60-455(d) but instead found the relevance of the evidence was the key analysis: "The material-and- probative analysis discussed earlier governs the admissibility of this evidence." 321 Kan. at 392. In reviewing the titles, the court found they were material to the alleged crimes because they pertained to Cunningham's sexual desire for young girls and other specific acts relevant to the case. Additionally, one of the titles corroborated the victim's testimony about being shown a video with a similar title. 321 Kan. at 392-93. After agreeing the evidence was material, the court next found the material was probative: "The same reasoning extends to making it more likely (i.e., tending to prove) that Cunningham desired unlawful sexual acts with Jane and another young girl." 321 Kan. at 393. After finding the evidence of the bookmarked websites relevant—both material and probative—the court considered whether the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. See K.S.A. 60-445. Cunningham argued the titles "'would inspire an intensely negative reaction from any reasonable juror.'" 321 Kan. at 393. But the court found it did not matter if the jury would find the evidence "'vile,' but whether the jury would reach its result because of its vile nature." 12 321 Kan. at 393. Ultimately, the Cunningham court affirmed the admission of the evidence, finding its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudice. Like in Cunningham, the evidence here was relevant. In looking at the prejudicial effect of the evidence that Ducote accessed CSAM and the weblink, this court notes the amount and type of evidence supporting Ducote's conviction and the nature of the questionably admitted evidence. First, the district court did not admit any images of the CSAM or from the weblink, but merely the title of the weblink and general descriptions of the images. That evidence was not so explicit or out of line with the other evidence in the case as to make it overly prejudicial in this case. Second, the victim's statements to officers and testimony against Ducote were extensive and specific, making the evidence at issue here of little consequence to the overall case. Simply put, the evidence of Ducote's internet activity could not improperly influence the jury verdict or distract from the case's central issues as to be unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655, 671-72, 396 P.3d 78 (2017). Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence of CSAM found on Ducote's phone. II. NO REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING LIMIT TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT Ducote also alleges that the district court erred by limiting closing argument related to the reasonable doubt standard. In closing, Ducote's counsel explained that "[a]n even scale is not beyond a reasonable doubt," to which the State objected, and the court sustained the objection. To understand this dispute, it is helpful to review defense counsel's theme regarding reasonable doubt that started at the beginning of trial. During voir dire, defense counsel discussed the importance of jurors keeping an open mind and hearing all the evidence before making conclusions about Ducote's guilt or innocence. To that end, the 13 defense attorney invoked the image of the scales of justice and discussed the weight of evidence: "[Y]ou know, the necessity of being fair and basically keeping an open mind until you hear the evidence in the case . . . . .... "[A] big part of this is a balance. You know? I think you've all seen the statute [sic] of Lady Justice. And she's holding scales in her hands. "You know, they say that the term reasonable doubt is beyond a reasonable doubt is self-explanatory. But I think part of that has to be analyzed with the scales and who has the weight. "Is there enough weight, enough evidence in the case?" During closing argument, defense counsel harkened back to this image after asking jurors to look at the totality of the evidence and discussing the State's burden: "So please look at all of this. And remember Lady Justice. When I was talking to you in voir dire. An even scale is not beyond a reasonable doubt." The State objected, saying counsel was "attempt[ing] to define reasonable doubt." The district court sustained the objection, and defense counsel resumed her closing, which included an argument that the State failed to meet its burden: "If the facts in this case and the weight of the evidence doesn't convince you that the State is correct, then you have to by the instructions you have in your hands, find my client not guilty. "They don't prove their case. You don't have enough. And I suggest to you and I tell you, look at what's there. There is not enough information to give you. "There's enough doubt because the sex acts that she describes are impossible in the manner in which she described them to have occurred. "Just that alone should be enough to tell you that this is not true. "That this story doesn't add up. I'm asking you all to find my client not guilty of every charge." 14 The district court later provided the jury with instructions that included its duty to consider all the evidence, weigh the evidence, and disregard attorney argument that is not evidence, as well as an explanation of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that Ducote's appeal of the district court's ruling is not properly preserved. According to the State, because Ducote did not respond to the district court sustaining the State's objection, this issue is unpreserved for appeal. Ducote maintains this issue is preserved "[b]ecause the permissible scope of the defense's closing argument was a matter that was raised and ruled upon during trial." "[I]ssues not raised in the district court generally will not be considered on appeal." State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 306, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). However, there are several exceptions to the general rule that a new legal theory may not be asserted for the first time on appeal, including the following: (1) The newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court was right for the wrong reason. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). The preservation requirement is a prudential rather than jurisdictional rule, so even when an exception applies the appellate court may decline review and thus it may also apply an exception it finds appropriate. See State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1192, 390 P.3d 879 (2017). This court finds review appropriate. "'The scope of oral argument generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's rulings will form no basis for a reversal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 332, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). Therefore, a district court's decision to limit counsel's closing argument will be upheld on appeal 15 unless the court's decision is based on an error of law or fact, or is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. See State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022). The concept of reasonable doubt is generally not defined for jurors at trial. See State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 56, 298 P.3d 303 (2013). This is partly because the Kansas Supreme Court has found the concept is one that "[n]o definition can make . . . any clearer than the words themselves." State v. Burton, 235 Kan. 472, Syl. ¶ 8, 681 P.2d 646 (1984). But counsel may make arguments about the meaning of reasonable doubt so long as those comments do not distort or misstate its meaning. State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 816, 441 P.3d 52 (2019). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that "an effort to explain a reasonable doubt is not error when it conforms to the acceptable reasonable doubt definition." 309 Kan. at 816. Ducote alleges the district court's decision was based on an error of law because counsel's statements about the scales of justice did not misstate or attempt to define reasonable doubt. He also maintains the decision was unreasonable. Ducote argues the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection was an error of law because he is entitled to "emphasize what the State's burden of proof is not." Ducote has not established that no reasonable person would have agreed with the court's decision. However, Ducote's argument that the district court made the wrong legal conclusion has some validity. The State's objection was that defense counsel was attempting to define reasonable doubt, but counsel's description was not a definition or inaccurate. Defense counsel merely said, "[a]n even scale is not beyond a reasonable doubt." This seems similar to cases where the State was allowed to draw a distinction between the concepts of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all conceivable doubt—not an attempt to define reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183, 1203-04, 427 P.3d 865 (2018) (finding no reversible error in prosecutor's 16 use of analogies for determining guilt); State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. at 53-54 (finding no reversible error from prosecutor's Wheel of Fortune analogy for reasonable doubt). But even assuming the district court erred by sustaining the State's objection, the error is only reversible if not found harmless. Under the harmless error standard based on K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, the error requires reversal "if there is a '"reasonable probability th[e] error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record."'" State v. Campbell, 317 Kan. 511, 518, 532 P.3d 425 (2023). Under the constitutional harmlessness standard, the court must be convinced "'"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict."'" State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). Ducote argues this court should apply the constitutional standard because the district court's error "prevent[ed] [his] attorney from emphasizing the State's very high burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," which undermines his due process rights. The State disagrees and compels this court to apply the less stringent statutory harmlessness standard. Assuming, without deciding, that the error requires application of the constitutional harmlessness test, the error still does not require reversal. Ducote does not allege any of the jury instructions were inaccurate or that the State made improper statements of law regarding its burden of proof. Ducote also points to no confusion, misunderstanding, or likely prejudice resulting from the court limiting defense counsel's "even scale" description. Rather, Ducote challenges the evidence and the victim's credibility and argues that had defense counsel been permitted to emphasize that the State's burden of proof required more than "even scales," then the jury may have questioned the victim's credibility such as to "sway the jury from returning guilty verdicts on the State's very weak case." 17 Defense counsel referenced the scales of justice during voir dire and had ample opportunity during closing to question the veracity of the evidence and whether the State had met its burden. Ducote has failed to share what more counsel would have said and how those unidentified statements would have impacted the jury's decision. Thus, it is unclear what impact the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection had on the outcome of the trial. The district court properly instructed the jury on the State's burden, which included the statement: "If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty." This court presumes that the jury followed the jury instructions as given. State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 856, 235 P.3d 424 (2010). Therefore, even if the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection constituted an abuse of discretion, the error does not require the reversal of Ducote's convictions because this court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that "'there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737. III. THERE ARE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS Finally, Ducote argues his convictions must be reversed based on the cumulative trial errors that infected the proceedings in his case. Cumulative trial errors, when considered together, may require reversal of the defendant's conviction when the totality of the circumstances establish that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the errors and denied a fair trial. However, "[t]he cumulative error rule does not apply if there are no errors or only a single error." State v. Lowry, 317 Kan. 89, 100, 524 P.3d 416 (2023). 18 Even assuming the district court erred in sustaining the State's objection during closing, that is only one error. Therefore, there are not multiple errors to accumulate here. Ducote is not entitled to relief on this issue. CONCLUSION The district court did not err by admitting testimony about the CSAM and weblink found in the forensic search of Ducote's phone because such evidence was relevant to an element of the charged offense of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court's limitation on defense counsel's closing argument does not require reversal because it was not error and, even if error is assumed, the error was harmless under even the constitutional harmlessness standard. No cumulative error existed under these circumstances, so Ducote's convictions are affirmed. Affirmed. 19