State v. Ducote
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket128390
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 128,390
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
COLTER JOSEPH DUCOTE,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Smith District Court; PRESTON A. PRATT, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed.
Sam Schirer, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, for appellant.
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for
appellee.
Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and HURST, JJ.
PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Colter Joseph Ducote of multiple counts related to
the rape and ongoing sexual abuse of a young child. Ducote appeals those convictions
arguing that the district court erred by admitting evidence, suggesting he viewed
electronic child sexual abuse material, and that the court inappropriately restricted his
counsel's statements during closing argument. Upon review, the district court did not err
in the admission of the evidence in question, and this court finds no reversible error
related to the limitations imposed during closing argument. Ducote is not entitled to the
relief requested and thus his convictions are affirmed.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jane (a pseudonym) is the daughter of Mother and Father, who separated in 2013.
Jane has one brother, Kevin (a pseudonym), from that familial relationship. Mother
married Ducote in 2020 after several years of dating. Mother and Ducote had one child,
Jane's half-brother, an infant at the time of this case. Father married Mary (a pseudonym),
who became Jane's stepmother.
At the time relevant to this case, Jane split her time living with Mother and Ducote
and Father and Mary, alternating homes on a two-week rotation. According to Mother,
when Jane was about six or seven years old she started having outbursts or behavior
issues "a little more than what a normal child might do when they get angry or stuff,"
which was when Mother and Ducote were living together. Jane first disclosed Ducote's
abuse at age 10 while at Father's house.
According to trial testimony from Jane's stepmother, she and Jane had a bit of a
rough relationship, but Mary tried to engage with Jane. On the night of Jane's disclosure,
Mary explained that she went to talk to Jane, telling her something like "I know we were
having a rough day. . . . [I]f [you] ever needed to speak to me about anything that's going
on . . . I will listen to [you.]" Jane did not initially say anything but called Mary into her
bedroom to talk about an hour later. Mary testified that Jane "was a little hysteric[al]" and
said "she had something she needed to tell [Mary.]" Jane then told Mary that Ducote had
been touching her inappropriately, specifically that "he was rubbing her chest area and
her butt area with his hands[] [a]nd his genital areas." Mary relayed to Father what Jane
had shared and then contacted law enforcement. Mary later testified that she "noticed
multiple amounts of bruises on [Jane's] chest and butt areas and on her thighs."
According to Mary, when she asked Jane about the bruises, Jane said they were the result
of "physical restraints from" Mother and Ducote.
2
The Investigation
The sheriff's deputy who responded to the call talked with Mary and Father before
meeting Jane. When the deputy spoke with Jane, she told the deputy Ducote had been
touching her inappropriately for four years. The deputy asked Jane about the most recent
incident, and Jane responded, "he touched it," clarifying she meant her vagina. The
deputy later testified that he was not trained in interviewing juveniles about sexual
assault, so he stopped talking with Jane because he felt he had enough to proceed with an
investigation. The deputy said he told Mary and Father to avoid talking to Jane about the
abuse until professionals could interview Jane.
A special agent from the KBI later conducted a forensic interview with Jane.
According to the agent's testimony, Jane said that Ducote "was doing sexual things to
[her]." The agent testified that Jane identified specific incidents of abuse, summarized as
follows:
• July 2023 incident (Jane was 10 years old): Jane was home with Ducote while her
older brother played outside and her baby brother slept. Ducote had Jane go into
the bathroom where he proceeded to rape and sodomize her and made her perform
oral sex on him.
• May 2023 incident (10 years old): Ducote raped and sodomized Jane.
• August 2020 incident (7 years old): Ducote raped Jane.
• August 2019 incident (6 years old): Ducote approached Jane in her room and
sodomized her.
Jane mentioned other acts from unspecified dates and made it clear to the special
agent that these types of incidents were not uncommon. The agent also testified that Jane
said Ducote "had shown her images of young girls that she thought were 13 to 14 years
3
old," telling Jane, "this could be you one day. Or you could be like this one day."
According to Jane, Ducote had shown her these images on a laptop, cell phone, and a
gaming device. Based on what Jane had said, the agent applied for a search warrant of the
home shared by Mother and Ducote.
As part of their search, officers collected Ducote's laptop, cell phone, and gaming
device, and a second laptop that officers believed could be Ducote's. Officers forensically
examined the devices, finding "child sexual abuse material," which an agent described as
images of "children that are naked, and . . . posed in a sexual manner or in photographs
that are clearly, intentionally taken of their genitals." Specifically, there were eight
images of girls that appeared to be between the ages of 8 and 14—who were naked with
some posed with their genitals or chests facing the camera. One of the girls pictured was
in a bed and one was in a shower, and some of the pictures also contained dildos.
A technical special agent who performed the forensic examination said they found
the eight images of girls as well as three images of "child erotica," for example "underage
children that are depicted in . . . underwear or in a stripping type series." The agent said
child erotica is used by people who have an "interest in children sexually." The agent
testified that based on how the images were stored in the phone, it suggested the eight
images of the girls were viewed individually, meaning a viewer did not click on one link
and see all eight images at once. In searching Ducote's phone, the agent also viewed his
web history: "I found a web history link and the web history was titled, . . . not 18 full
porn videos" but the "not" in some locations was "the prohibited symbol, the red circle
with the line through it."
A forensic interviewer testified that she interviewed Jane's brother, Kevin, to see if
"anything had happened to him" or "if he knew anything that happened to [Jane]." Kevin
told the forensic interviewer that "[Jane] used to really like [Ducote]" and that "they
would be holding hands all the time," but that they did not do that anymore: "[Jane] was
4
no longer holding [his] hand and [Ducote] was no longer in the room playing with her."
Kevin also told the interviewer that he was sometimes left at home with Jane and Ducote
and that Ducote would ask Kevin to go outside while Jane had to stay inside with Ducote.
A sexual assault nurse examiner performed a physical examination of Jane. The
examination did not include an investigation for DNA because of the amount of time that
had passed since the last alleged incident. According to the nurse, Jane described the
abuse perpetrated by Ducote and her description largely aligned with what Jane had
previously disclosed. The nurse testified that over 90 percent of exams of "children with
known penetration . . . are going to be normal" or lacking in signs of injury. The nurse
confirmed she found no signs of injury on Jane.
The State—through a second amended complaint—charged Ducote with three
counts of rape; two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy; and two counts of aggravated
indecent liberties with a child.
The Trial
At trial, Mother testified that she was initially unsure whether to believe Jane or
Ducote. She denied seeing any indication that anything other than a normal
stepfather/stepdaughter relationship existed between Jane and Ducote. Mother eventually
sought a divorce from Ducote, which was finalized before the start of trial.
Jane's fifth and sixth grade teacher testified at trial about her interactions with and
perceptions about Jane. Her classroom had a policy where the kids could use a thumbs-
down gesture to show if they were having a rough day and might "need a little extra
attention," and Jane would sometimes use that method to demonstrate her mood. Other
times, Jane would show her emotions on her face or come into the room in tears.
5
When asked what Jane would share, the teacher said sometimes Jane needed to
talk about getting in trouble or what was on her mind—on one occasion she said she
could not sleep because her "window was open and [Jane was] afraid someone's staring at
[her]." Jane said that Ducote "wouldn't let [her] put something over it to block [the
window]." Upon being asked what Jane had said in describing her relationship with
Ducote, the teacher said Jane "felt that he was weird. That he acted weird towards her."
The teacher said Jane would often tell her that Ducote is "very mean to her."
The teacher recounted that on one occasion Jane "came to school sobbing out of
control" and shared that Ducote "had told [Jane] that she's the reason that they are getting
a divorce, that she was the cause of it." The teacher testified that Jane's "hard days . . .
were because of [Ducote]." During some period, Jane reportedly "stay[ed] somewhere
else" other than the home shared by Mother and Ducote—Jane told the teacher she liked
it and that "she felt safe and she felt comfortable."
A therapist from High Plains Mental Health Center testified at trial that she first
started seeing Jane in February 2019 for an initial diagnosis of "adjustment disorder with
emotions and anxiety due to family dynamics." When identifying the family dynamics,
the therapist testified that Mother and Father had divorced, and Ducote had started seeing
Mother. The therapist said Jane "was having a hard time with rules and requests and any
type of discipline interventions from [Ducote]." According to the therapist, Jane's
diagnoses evolved from her initial diagnosis, noted above, to "disrupted mood,
dysregulation disorder" and then to "post-traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD). She
admitted she had initially misdiagnosed Jane and that once she began treating Jane for
PTSD, Jane's symptoms and behaviors improved. The therapist testified that Jane never
made any disclosures of sexual abuse but did tell her about one time when Ducote
slapped Jane across the face. When asked if Jane ever explained why she failed to make
disclosures related to the sexual abuse, Jane told the therapist that "she was threatened
6
that she would be beat" and that "she felt ashamed and thought no one would believe
her."
Jane, at age 11, testified at trial. Her testimony largely mirrored the testimony
from other witnesses who described her prior disclosures. However, Jane had trouble
remembering certain things she had previously disclosed and did not go into much detail.
Jane testified about disclosing the abuse to her stepmother and said she had tried
reporting the abuse before but that it was too "hard to get it out." She said she finally told
Mary out of concern "[i]t was going to happen again until I told." Jane testified that when
Ducote was making her touch him or touching her, he would say "it felt good" and that
she should "act . . . like you like it." She also testified that Ducote showed her pictures of
teenage girls, which matched what she had told officers during their investigation.
The jury convicted Ducote on all seven of the off-grid crimes charged. He now
appeals.
DISCUSSION
Ducote raises three trial errors on appeal. First, he argues the district court erred in
admitting evidence suggesting he viewed child sexual abuse material (CSAM),
specifically the eight images taken from his phone and the weblink about underage porn.
Second, he argues the district court erred in restricting defense counsel's comments
during closing argument about the State's burden at trial. Third, Ducote alleges
cumulative errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. According to Ducote, these
errors require reversal of his convictions.
7
I. NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
Ducote argues the district court erred by admitting evidence that he viewed CSAM
and visited the link titled "'Full Porn Videos ⦸ 18,'" because it "doesn't speak to his . . .
propensity to commit particular types of sex acts" and he was not charged with
possession of child sex abuse material. None of the images were introduced as evidence;
there was only testimony about the content of the images and the title of the link.
Ducote does not challenge the district court's decision that the evidence did not
need to be evaluated under K.S.A. 60-455, because it found the alleged conduct did not
qualify as "sexual misconduct" under K.S.A. 60-455(d) or as a crime or civil wrong
governed by K.S.A. 60-455(a) or (b) or (c). So, the question on appeal is whether the
evidence was relevant and admissible. Ducote challenged the admission of the evidence
at a pretrial hearing and contemporaneously objected at trial, preserving this issue for
appeal. See K.S.A. 60-404; State v. Showalter, 318 Kan. 338, 345, 543 P.3d 508 (2024).
Generally, "all relevant evidence is admissible." K.S.A. 60-407(f); see also K.S.A.
60-401(b) (evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency in reason to prove any material
fact"). To be relevant, the evidence must be both material and probative. State v.
Cunningham, 321 Kan. 384, 391, 580 P.3d 672 (2025). "Evidence is material when a
disputed 'fact has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case'" and it is
"probative when it has any tendency to prove or disprove a material fact." 321 Kan. at
391. Even when material and probative, the evidence may still be excluded if it is unduly
prejudicial. 321 Kan. at 393.
This court reviews the district court's determination on whether evidence is
material de novo, looking at the issue anew without deference to the district court's
decision. However, the district court is given broader discretion in its probative
determination and thus this court reviews the district court's decision on whether the
8
evidence is probative for an abuse of discretion. See 321 Kan. at 391. The abuse of
discretion standard is also applied to review the district court's decision on whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. 321 Kan. at
391. Finally, if the evidence was erroneously admitted at trial, that error is subject to a
harmless error review under either the statutory standard in K.S.A. 60-261 or the
constitutional harmlessness standard depending on the nature of the right at issue. See
State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 832, 511 P.3d 931 (2022) (applying statutory harmless
standard when improper admission did not affect substantial right); State v. Thornton,
312 Kan. 829, 832-33, 481 P.3d 1212 (2021) (applying constitutional harmlessness when
the improper admission impacted a substantial right).
Before trial, the State moved under K.S.A. 60-455(d) to admit evidence of Ducote
viewing child pornography by way of clicking a weblink titled "'Full Porn Videos ⦸
18,'" and testimony about the eight images of CSAM from his phone. When a defendant
is charged with certain sex offenses, "evidence of the defendant's commission of another
act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible . . . for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant and probative." K.S.A. 60-455(d). The State argued the evidence of
Ducote viewing CSAM was relevant to demonstrate "the intent necessary" to support the
charges against him. The State also argued this evidence would act to corroborate Jane's
testimony about Ducote showing her sexual images of teen girls.
First, the district court considered whether the evidence was relevant, explaining
that "the proper way to analyze this type of evidence is to always start with the relevancy
first." The court explained the general rules of admissibility and specifically addressed
the evidence at issue here:
"So if we look at this general relevance when someone is charged with a sex
crime against a child, internet searches, under 18 child pornography is generally relevant
to prove some material fact that the person is sexually attracted to underage children.
9
"And that attraction is essential to the case. Because if you're not attracted to
underage children then you're going to be likely not committing sex crimes against
underage children.
....
"And so again, general relevancy is does this clicking on a link that says full porn
video under 18, whether or not it actually goes to that link or whether it actually shows
people under 18; that is relevant to show that the person who clicked on it had some
attraction to people under 18.
"And then the . . . images in the cache themselves having—have some interaction
with those [images], again is relevant to show that whoever it was that scrolled over,
clicked on, did something with those images to get them into that Twitter cache in the
first place, has some attraction to children under 18."
The district court found the evidence was relevant because it was material to show
Ducote was sexually attracted to children, granting the State's motion. It decided the
evidence was relevant and admissible without explicitly deciding whether it was also
probative or if its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. This court can assume the district court impliedly made that probative
determination when it found the evidence relevant and admissible. See State v. Haddock,
257 Kan. 964, 981, 897 P.2d 152 (1995) (finding that evidence is probative and not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect may be implied from the circumstances), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 79 P.3d 169 (2003).
The Evidence Is Material and Probative and Thus Relevant
The district court correctly found the evidence relevant. First, the evidence
provides some support for the contention that Ducote tends to be sexually attracted to
children which makes it material to support an element of the charged offense. See
Cunningham, 321 Kan. at 394. The Kansas Supreme Court explained in Cunningham that
evidence of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct can be relevant to demonstrate
10
evidence of the defendant's sexual desire when that sexual desire is a material fact
necessary to prove an element of a charged offense. 321 Kan. at 394.
Here, Ducote was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child, which
has an element that the defendant engaged in lewd fondling or touching of a child under
14 years old done to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the child and/or the offender.
K.S.A. 21-5506(b)(3)(A). Therefore, the evidence that Ducote accessed CSAM tends to
demonstrate Ducote had sexual desire consistent with the element of the aggravated
indecent liberties offense requiring a showing of intent to arouse the sexual desires of one
of the parties.
The State also argued that the evidence was relevant to bolster the victim's
testimony that Ducote had shown her such images and offered to show her such images at
other times. Although the district court did not address that particular relevance
argument, this court also finds that argument compelling. While the State did not charge
Ducote for accessing CSAM, that evidence tends to corroborate the victim's version of
events because she testified to Ducote showing her such images. See, e.g., Cunningham,
321 Kan. at 392-94 (affirming admission of evidence of defendant's uncharged online
activity that corroborated witness testimony); State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494, 506, 332 P.3d
172 (2014) (noting that a witness' prior statements are generally material and probative
because the evidence "either corroborates or undercuts the witness' credibility").
In Cunningham, a strikingly similar case decided by the Kansas Supreme Court
during the pendency of Ducote's appeal, the young victim alleged Cunningham had
sexually abused her for years starting at about age four, and the State charged
Cunningham with several sex offenses. The victim testified about several instances of
abuse and alleged that Cunningham had showed her videos of sexually explicit material.
321 Kan. at 385.
11
Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of Cunningham's sexual
misconduct, specifically "'the titles of the pornographic videos Cunningham had
bookmarked on his cell.'" 321 Kan. at 387. The State relied on K.S.A. 60-455(d) to argue
the evidence was relevant to prove Cunningham's sexual interest in young girls." 321
Kan. at 390. Cunningham objected and claimed the evidence was irrelevant and
prejudicial. The district court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant based on it
showing the "same lines of the same pattern and similar sexual activity with young girls."
321 Kan. at 390. The jury convicted Cunningham of several sexual offenses.
Cunningham appealed and argued, like Ducote does here, that the district court
erred by admitting the "pornographic titles of his web bookmarks." 321 Kan. at 386. The
Kansas Supreme Court did not rely on the admissibility standard under K.S.A. 60-455(d)
but instead found the relevance of the evidence was the key analysis: "The material-and-
probative analysis discussed earlier governs the admissibility of this evidence." 321 Kan.
at 392. In reviewing the titles, the court found they were material to the alleged crimes
because they pertained to Cunningham's sexual desire for young girls and other specific
acts relevant to the case. Additionally, one of the titles corroborated the victim's
testimony about being shown a video with a similar title. 321 Kan. at 392-93.
After agreeing the evidence was material, the court next found the material was
probative: "The same reasoning extends to making it more likely (i.e., tending to prove)
that Cunningham desired unlawful sexual acts with Jane and another young girl." 321
Kan. at 393. After finding the evidence of the bookmarked websites relevant—both
material and probative—the court considered whether the evidence's probative value was
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. See K.S.A. 60-445. Cunningham
argued the titles "'would inspire an intensely negative reaction from any reasonable
juror.'" 321 Kan. at 393. But the court found it did not matter if the jury would find the
evidence "'vile,' but whether the jury would reach its result because of its vile nature."
12
321 Kan. at 393. Ultimately, the Cunningham court affirmed the admission of the
evidence, finding its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudice.
Like in Cunningham, the evidence here was relevant. In looking at the prejudicial
effect of the evidence that Ducote accessed CSAM and the weblink, this court notes the
amount and type of evidence supporting Ducote's conviction and the nature of the
questionably admitted evidence. First, the district court did not admit any images of the
CSAM or from the weblink, but merely the title of the weblink and general descriptions
of the images. That evidence was not so explicit or out of line with the other evidence in
the case as to make it overly prejudicial in this case. Second, the victim's statements to
officers and testimony against Ducote were extensive and specific, making the evidence
at issue here of little consequence to the overall case. Simply put, the evidence of
Ducote's internet activity could not improperly influence the jury verdict or distract from
the case's central issues as to be unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 306 Kan.
655, 671-72, 396 P.3d 78 (2017). Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the
evidence of CSAM found on Ducote's phone.
II. NO REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING LIMIT TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLOSING
ARGUMENT
Ducote also alleges that the district court erred by limiting closing argument
related to the reasonable doubt standard. In closing, Ducote's counsel explained that "[a]n
even scale is not beyond a reasonable doubt," to which the State objected, and the court
sustained the objection.
To understand this dispute, it is helpful to review defense counsel's theme
regarding reasonable doubt that started at the beginning of trial. During voir dire, defense
counsel discussed the importance of jurors keeping an open mind and hearing all the
evidence before making conclusions about Ducote's guilt or innocence. To that end, the
13
defense attorney invoked the image of the scales of justice and discussed the weight of
evidence:
"[Y]ou know, the necessity of being fair and basically keeping an open mind until you
hear the evidence in the case . . . .
....
"[A] big part of this is a balance. You know? I think you've all seen the statute [sic] of
Lady Justice. And she's holding scales in her hands.
"You know, they say that the term reasonable doubt is beyond a reasonable doubt
is self-explanatory. But I think part of that has to be analyzed with the scales and who has
the weight.
"Is there enough weight, enough evidence in the case?"
During closing argument, defense counsel harkened back to this image after
asking jurors to look at the totality of the evidence and discussing the State's burden: "So
please look at all of this. And remember Lady Justice. When I was talking to you in voir
dire. An even scale is not beyond a reasonable doubt." The State objected, saying counsel
was "attempt[ing] to define reasonable doubt." The district court sustained the objection,
and defense counsel resumed her closing, which included an argument that the State
failed to meet its burden:
"If the facts in this case and the weight of the evidence doesn't convince you that
the State is correct, then you have to by the instructions you have in your hands, find my
client not guilty.
"They don't prove their case. You don't have enough. And I suggest to you and I
tell you, look at what's there. There is not enough information to give you.
"There's enough doubt because the sex acts that she describes are impossible in
the manner in which she described them to have occurred.
"Just that alone should be enough to tell you that this is not true.
"That this story doesn't add up. I'm asking you all to find my client not guilty of
every charge."
14
The district court later provided the jury with instructions that included its duty to
consider all the evidence, weigh the evidence, and disregard attorney argument that is not
evidence, as well as an explanation of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State contends that Ducote's appeal of the district court's ruling is not properly
preserved. According to the State, because Ducote did not respond to the district court
sustaining the State's objection, this issue is unpreserved for appeal. Ducote maintains
this issue is preserved "[b]ecause the permissible scope of the defense's closing argument
was a matter that was raised and ruled upon during trial."
"[I]ssues not raised in the district court generally will not be considered on
appeal." State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 306, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). However, there are
several exceptions to the general rule that a new legal theory may not be asserted for the
first time on appeal, including the following: (1) The newly asserted theory involves only
a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the
case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent
denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court was right for the wrong reason.
State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). The preservation requirement is a
prudential rather than jurisdictional rule, so even when an exception applies the appellate
court may decline review and thus it may also apply an exception it finds appropriate. See
State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1192, 390 P.3d 879 (2017). This court finds review
appropriate.
"'The scope of oral argument generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the court's rulings will form no basis for a reversal absent a showing of abuse
of discretion.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 332, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). Therefore, a
district court's decision to limit counsel's closing argument will be upheld on appeal
15
unless the court's decision is based on an error of law or fact, or is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable. See State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022).
The concept of reasonable doubt is generally not defined for jurors at trial. See
State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 56, 298 P.3d 303 (2013). This is partly because the
Kansas Supreme Court has found the concept is one that "[n]o definition can make . . .
any clearer than the words themselves." State v. Burton, 235 Kan. 472, Syl. ¶ 8, 681 P.2d
646 (1984). But counsel may make arguments about the meaning of reasonable doubt so
long as those comments do not distort or misstate its meaning. State v. Garcia-Garcia,
309 Kan. 801, 816, 441 P.3d 52 (2019). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that
"an effort to explain a reasonable doubt is not error when it conforms to the acceptable
reasonable doubt definition." 309 Kan. at 816.
Ducote alleges the district court's decision was based on an error of law because
counsel's statements about the scales of justice did not misstate or attempt to define
reasonable doubt. He also maintains the decision was unreasonable. Ducote argues the
district court's decision to sustain the State's objection was an error of law because he is
entitled to "emphasize what the State's burden of proof is not."
Ducote has not established that no reasonable person would have agreed with the
court's decision. However, Ducote's argument that the district court made the wrong legal
conclusion has some validity. The State's objection was that defense counsel was
attempting to define reasonable doubt, but counsel's description was not a definition or
inaccurate. Defense counsel merely said, "[a]n even scale is not beyond a reasonable
doubt." This seems similar to cases where the State was allowed to draw a distinction
between the concepts of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all
conceivable doubt—not an attempt to define reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Lowery,
308 Kan. 1183, 1203-04, 427 P.3d 865 (2018) (finding no reversible error in prosecutor's
16
use of analogies for determining guilt); State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. at 53-54 (finding no
reversible error from prosecutor's Wheel of Fortune analogy for reasonable doubt).
But even assuming the district court erred by sustaining the State's objection, the
error is only reversible if not found harmless. Under the harmless error standard based on
K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105, the error requires reversal "if there is a '"reasonable
probability th[e] error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire
record."'" State v. Campbell, 317 Kan. 511, 518, 532 P.3d 425 (2023). Under the
constitutional harmlessness standard, the court must be convinced "'"beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in
light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the verdict."'" State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).
Ducote argues this court should apply the constitutional standard because the
district court's error "prevent[ed] [his] attorney from emphasizing the State's very high
burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," which undermines his due
process rights. The State disagrees and compels this court to apply the less stringent
statutory harmlessness standard.
Assuming, without deciding, that the error requires application of the
constitutional harmlessness test, the error still does not require reversal. Ducote does not
allege any of the jury instructions were inaccurate or that the State made improper
statements of law regarding its burden of proof. Ducote also points to no confusion,
misunderstanding, or likely prejudice resulting from the court limiting defense counsel's
"even scale" description. Rather, Ducote challenges the evidence and the victim's
credibility and argues that had defense counsel been permitted to emphasize that the
State's burden of proof required more than "even scales," then the jury may have
questioned the victim's credibility such as to "sway the jury from returning guilty verdicts
on the State's very weak case."
17
Defense counsel referenced the scales of justice during voir dire and had ample
opportunity during closing to question the veracity of the evidence and whether the State
had met its burden. Ducote has failed to share what more counsel would have said and
how those unidentified statements would have impacted the jury's decision. Thus, it is
unclear what impact the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection had on the
outcome of the trial.
The district court properly instructed the jury on the State's burden, which
included the statement: "If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the
claims required to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty." This
court presumes that the jury followed the jury instructions as given. State v. Becker, 290
Kan. 842, 856, 235 P.3d 424 (2010).
Therefore, even if the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection
constituted an abuse of discretion, the error does not require the reversal of Ducote's
convictions because this court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that "'there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737.
III. THERE ARE NO CUMULATIVE ERRORS
Finally, Ducote argues his convictions must be reversed based on the cumulative
trial errors that infected the proceedings in his case. Cumulative trial errors, when
considered together, may require reversal of the defendant's conviction when the totality
of the circumstances establish that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the
errors and denied a fair trial. However, "[t]he cumulative error rule does not apply if there
are no errors or only a single error." State v. Lowry, 317 Kan. 89, 100, 524 P.3d 416
(2023).
18
Even assuming the district court erred in sustaining the State's objection during
closing, that is only one error. Therefore, there are not multiple errors to accumulate here.
Ducote is not entitled to relief on this issue.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err by admitting testimony about the CSAM and weblink
found in the forensic search of Ducote's phone because such evidence was relevant to an
element of the charged offense of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district
court's limitation on defense counsel's closing argument does not require reversal because
it was not error and, even if error is assumed, the error was harmless under even the
constitutional harmlessness standard. No cumulative error existed under these
circumstances, so Ducote's convictions are affirmed.
Affirmed.
19