State v. Corkins

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,613 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. EDWARD ALLEN CORKINS, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Rice District Court; STEVEN JOHNSON, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 13, 2026. Affirmed. Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Remington S. Dalke, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before HURST, P.J., CLINE, J., and MARY E. CHRISTOPHER, Senior Judge. CLINE, J.: A jury convicted Wichitan Edward Allen Corkins of the crime of making false information after he attempted to cash a forged check at a bank in Lyons. Corkins appeals his conviction, claiming the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the charge and the prosecutor erred by commenting on Corkins' silence in cross- examination and closing. After reviewing the record, we are unpersuaded by Corkins' arguments and therefore affirm. 1  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 14, 2024, Corkins attempted to cash a check for $3,588.21 at Lyons Federal Bank. After confirming Corkins was not an existing customer and that the issuing account, which was owned by a sole proprietor plumbing company, did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, the bank teller took the check to her supervisor. The bank supervisor attempted to contact the account holder to ask if he had issued the check, but she could not reach him. The teller then took photocopies of the check and Corkins' ID before returning both to him. She told Corkins the bank could not cash the check due to insufficient funds and that he should contact the issuer to see about getting it cashed. The next morning, the account holder confirmed that he did not issue the check and said they "'better call the police officer in here.'" Sergeant Cory Ryan met with the bank supervisor and the account holder at the bank about the incident. The account holder told Sergeant Ryan that he did not write the check at issue nor did it match his checks. Sergeant Ryan collected video surveillance footage from the bank showing the individual attempting to cash the check as well as the photocopies of the check and Corkins' ID taken by the teller. Corkins was eventually charged with two counts of forgery, one count of making a false information, and one count of attempted theft. During trial, however, the State agreed to dismiss one count of forgery as being multiplicitous. Corkins' Trial At trial, the State called Sergeant Ryan, the bank teller, and the account holder to testify about the events of March 14, 2024. The defense called the bank supervisor and Corkins. 2  During his testimony, Corkins claimed that he never intended to take anyone's money without their authorization. He explained that around the time of the incident, he was living at the City Union Mission in Wichita and did not have a car. Earlier that day, he was walking in south central Wichita, when two men whom he did not know pulled up alongside him. The passenger got out and asked Corkins, "'[D]o you want to make some money today?'" Corkins responded, "'Sure, if it's legal money.'" The passenger told Corkins that he lost his wallet and needed someone to cash a check for him. The passenger said a company owed him money, so "'[w]e're going to go to it. We're going to get the check and put it in your name. If you cash it, I'll pay you a hundred dollars to do it.'" Corkins said he was initially suspicious and asked why the driver could not cash the check. The passenger responded that the driver had an out-of-state ID. Corkins said he needed the money, so he got in the back of the car. The individuals took Corkins to a nearby restaurant, and the passenger grabbed Corkins' ID before going inside. He then returned with a check written on a plumbing company's account. Corkins did not recognize the name of the account holder but he thought the check looked legitimate. They left the business and got on the highway. As they continued driving, Corkins questioned where they were headed, so he asked, "'Where's this bank at I'm going to cash this check?'" and the man responded, "'We're going to the main branch.'" Corkins said they did not talk the rest of the way. Once they arrived in Lyons, they parked across the street, and Corkins got out and walked into the bank. When the teller told him she could not cash the check, Corkins got the check back and walked out the door. When he got back into the car and returned the check, Corkins said the men's attitudes changed and "they wasn't as happy as they were when they first pulled up on me." They drove Corkins back to Wichita but dropped him off 15 blocks from where they 3 originally picked him up because Corkins was suspicious and said he wanted out. Corkins said the men gave him a pack of cigarettes and a Pepsi for his time. When asked whether he had anything he would like to add to his statements for the jury, Corkins said, "[I]f somebody would have questioned me on this a lot sooner, we wouldn't have had this jury trial, and these people wouldn't have been brung in here." Then, during cross-examination, Corkins said, "And I wanted to tell my story sooner, but I couldn't find nobody to tell it to." Earlier in the trial, Sergeant Ryan testified about his investigation of the incident. When asked if he was able to determine during his investigation whether Corkins had a computer, scanner, or printer (to create a check), Sergeant Ryan said that Corkins would not talk to him when he interviewed Corkins. The prosecutor also asked Corkins on cross-examination whether he heard Sergeant Ryan's testimony that Corkins would not talk to him. Defense counsel objected to the question, which the district court sustained. In closing, the prosecutor commented that the jury gets to evaluate the "soundness" of Corkins' defense as well as his credibility. Then, when emphasizing various details about Corkins' story that seemed farfetched, the prosecutor pointed out that Corkins never told law enforcement his side of the story, instead reserving it for the day of trial. The jury acquitted Corkins on the forgery and attempted theft charges but convicted him of making a false information. The district court sentenced Corkins to 21 months in prison. 4  REVIEW OF CORKINS' APPELLATE CHALLENGES Was there sufficient evidence to convict Corkins of making a false information? In his first challenge, Corkins argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He claims the State only proved the check was fraudulent, not that Corkins knew the check was fraudulent or that Corkins intended to defraud the account holder. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework Corkins was convicted of making a false information, which required the State to prove: "1. The defendant distributed a written instrument. "2. The defendant knew that information in the instrument falsely stated or represented some material matter. "3. The defendant intended to defraud. "4. This act occurred on or about the 14th day of March 2024, in Rice County, Kansas." When determining whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support each element of this charge, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 723, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). The State presented sufficient evidence to support Corkins' conviction. To begin, Corkins argues that the State failed to show he had actual knowledge that the check was fraudulent, noting that "'[s]peculation, opinion, or constructive notice that the writing falsely represents a material matter is not sufficient.'" See State v. 5 Edwards, 250 Kan. 320, 324, 826 P.2d 1355 (1992). Corkins claims the State "largely relied" on the account holder's testimony to establish the check was fraudulent. But Corkins unnecessarily heightens the State's burden. "Intent, a state of mind existing at the time an offense is committed, does not need to be and rarely can be directly proven" through direct evidence. State v. Griffin, 279 Kan. 634, 638, 112 P.3d 862 (2005). While the State must present sufficient evidence supporting each element of the charged offense, that evidence may be circumstantial. State v. Hilyard, 316 Kan. 326, 331, 515 P.3d 267 (2022) ("It is not improper for a conviction to be sustained by circumstantial evidence."). And, in fact, "'there is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value' because '"[a] conviction of even the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"'" State v. Rizal, 310 Kan. 199, 209-10, 445 P.3d 734 (2019). In Rizal, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. She challenged the State's proof that she knew the substance she was selling was illegal, claiming she thought it was lawful incense. But our Supreme Court found that her statements and behavior supplied sufficient evidence that she knew the product she was selling was an illegal substance. 310 Kan. at 210. Similarly, here, Corkins admitted he knew the check was not supposed to be written out to him. And he repeatedly noted that he was suspicious and doubted the men's story. When confronted about his account, he could provide no specific details—including the restaurant where the check was printed or the men's names. And he provided no explanation for why the men needed to go into a restaurant to get a check written on a plumbing company's account. The jury could have relied on these facts—the gaps in Corkins' narrative, the elaborate nature of his story, and his admission that he was suspicious and knew he was not the correct payee on the check—to find Corkins knew the check was fraudulent. 6  Corkins next asserts there was no direct evidence of his intent to defraud, pointing out that the account holder's actual checks were substantially similar to the fraudulent check. But this fact is irrelevant to Corkins' knowledge or intent, because Corkins had no business dealings with the account holder plumbing company nor would he have been able to verify the validity of such checks based on his personal knowledge. Corkins similarly highlights the fact that his actual name and address matching his photo ID were printed on the check, and he did not try to conceal his identity when he presented the check to the bank. Even so, the State points out that this is not the first time Corkins has been convicted of a crime of dishonesty without concealing his identity. The jury heard that Corkins was convicted of theft by deception in 2007, after he cashed a check written out to him as a deposit for roofing work he never performed. The jury could have relied on this evidence—that Corkins did not conceal his identity when committing theft by deception in the past—in finding the State met its burden to prove this element of the crime. Again, the State could—and did—sufficiently support this element of the offense with circumstantial evidence based on Corkins' statements and behavior. For one, Corkins said he asked the two men to go with him to cash the check because he did not "'want any problems.'" Also, Corkins offered no explanation for why the men needed someone from Wichita to help them cash a check at a bank in Lyons. The State emphasized the inconsistencies between Corkins' elaborate story and common sense, which can demonstrate his intent to defraud because "jurors may use their common knowledge and experience when assessing witness testimony and examining evidence." State v. Hambright, 318 Kan. 603, 607, 545 P.3d 605 (2024). Sufficient evidence, even circumstantial, need not rise to such a degree of certainty that it excludes any and every other reasonable conclusion. Hilyard, 316 Kan. at 331. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and recognizing it was the jury's task to 7 weigh credibility, we find there was sufficient evidence here to support the jury's findings that Corkins knew that he was presenting a fraudulent check and that he had an intent to defraud. Did the prosecutor err by referencing Corkins' silence in initial police interactions? In his second challenge, Corkins argues that the prosecutor committed reversible error by asking about his failure to talk to police and then discussing this failure during closing argument. The State admits that a prosecutor may not use a defendant's postarrest silence to impeach later testimony from that defendant but argues it is well-settled that a prosecutor may use a defendant's prearrest silence to impeach the defendant at trial. State v. Hernandez, 284 Kan. 74, 82, 159 P.3d 950 (2007). A prosecutor can also impeach a defendant's credibility by pointing out inconsistencies between their testimony and other evidence. 284 Kan. at 84 ("[A] prosecutor may impeach a defendant's trial testimony through use of a prior inconsistent statement given by the defendant after he or she was provided Miranda warnings."); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The State claims that is all the prosecutor did here—impeach Corkins' statements at trial that he wanted to and would have told his story if given the opportunity. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework When considering a claim of prosecutorial error, an appellate court first determines whether an error occurred—that is, whether the prosecutor's actions or statements "f[a]ll outside the wide latitude afforded the prosecutor in conducting the State's case in a way that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to fair trial." State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Stubbs, 320 Kan. 568, 570 P.3d 1209 (2025). As mentioned, "[p]rosecutors may point out inconsistencies in a defendant's statements and argue the evidence reflecting 8 poorly on the defendant's credibility. But in doing so, they may not accuse a defendant of lying." State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 776, 490 P.3d 1206 (2021). If the court discovers error, then it considers whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. An error is harmless if the State shows "'there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" Bodine, 313 Kan. at 406. The prosecutor was pointing out the inconsistency between Corkins' statements and the evidence, which is proper. Corkins does not differentiate whether his silence was pre- or post-Miranda. But this distinction does not matter here since the prosecutor could impeach Corkins at trial based on his prearrest and pre-Miranda silence and, even assuming his silence was post- Miranda, Corkins opened the door for questioning and statements on his silence. Our Supreme Court recently addressed this situation: "Once Miranda warnings have been given, the State is generally prohibited from introducing evidence of a defendant's post-Miranda silence because these warnings may induce silence and implicitly provide government assurance that a defendant will not be penalized for invoking a constitutional right. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976) (prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant's credibility violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). Therefore, the State cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda silence against him or her as evidence of his or her guilt or, in general, to impeach an exculpatory statement made for the first time at trial. "Yet courts have long held that Doyle permits the State to use a defendant's post- Miranda silence to impeach credibility when a defendant's own testimony creates a misleading impression of cooperation with law enforcement; in that circumstance, the State may ask narrowly tailored questions to correct the impression. "Thus, as a limited exception to Doyle, prosecutors may reference a defendant's post-Miranda silence if the defendant first 'opens the door' to this line of inquiry. This 9  exception must be used judiciously and not as a pretext to violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights—there must be sufficient justification, and the prosecution must not stray from the grounds of impeachment to inference of guilt. "This court has held a defendant 'opens the door' to limited admission of post- Miranda silence for impeachment purposes when the defendant implies he or she was of a 'cooperative spirit' to assist law enforcement with the criminal investigation or suggests the State conducted an inadequate investigation by not questioning the defendant to connect the evidentiary dots, even though the defendant had invoked Miranda rights. Our caselaw indicates the key factor in determining whether a defendant opens the door to this generally inadmissible evidence is when defense counsel's questioning or defendant's testimony, viewed in isolation, is blatantly inconsistent with the defendant's post- Miranda silence. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Hardwick, 321 Kan. 519, 540-41, 582 P.3d 555 (2026). The first time Corkins' silence was discussed at trial occurred during cross- examination of a State's witness, when counsel for Corkins asked Sergeant Ryan if during his investigation he determined whether Corkins had a computer, scanner, or printer. Sergeant Ryan responded that Corkins "would not talk to me when I interviewed him." No one objected to this testimony. Then, during the defense's case-in-chief, defense counsel asked Corkins on direct, "Do you have any other—do you have any other questions or thoughts that you wanted to add to your testimony or—" to which Corkins responded, "[I]f somebody would have questioned me on this a lot sooner, we wouldn't have had this jury trial, and these people wouldn't have been brung in here." This response by Corkins asserts a "cooperative spirit" with law enforcement that opens the door to discussing even his post-Miranda silence. 10  The prosecutor's questioning of Corkins did not stray from grounds for impeachment into inferences of guilt. On cross-examination, the State attempted to poke holes in Corkins' story and impeach his credibility. For instance, the State asked Corkins for details—such as the name of the business where the check was printed or the names of either of the men who picked him up—which Corkins could not provide. And it asked about his prior conviction for theft by deception. Finally, the State asked Corkins whether he heard "Sergeant Ryan say that [Corkins] would not talk to him?" Corkins said, "Absolutely." But his attorney objected to this question. The State contended the defense opened the door during Sergeant Ryan's testimony, but the district court sustained the objection because it did not recall a question that would have opened the door. The State then moved on from this line of questioning and asked Corkins if he contacted law enforcement after this incident because he said he became suspicious. Corkins said he did not and then explained that he "wanted to tell [his] story sooner, but [he] couldn't find nobody to tell it to." In context, the prosecutor properly used Corkins' silence—among several other inconsistencies—as a means of impeachment after Corkins opened the door, rather than implying that he was guilty because he did not talk to law enforcement. In closing, the prosecutor properly focused on the inconsistencies rather than guilt. Even if a defendant opens the door, that opening may not be used to excuse actions by a prosecutor during cross-examination or closing argument when such actions are ordinarily improper, erroneous, and are not a necessary or justified response to the actions of the other party to achieve a fair trial. State v. Higgins, 243 Kan. 48, 51-52, 755 11 P.2d 12 (1988), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Warren, 252 Kan. 169, 843 P.2d 224 (1992) (rejecting the Higgins court's multiplicity analysis). Here, the prosecutor properly focused on the inconsistencies between Corkins' statement that he wanted to tell his story sooner and knew something was off, and his decision to not talk to Sergeant Ryan. During closing, the State said to the jury: "You get to analyze this story about the defendant going to—leaving outpatient treatment for his addiction to meth. He's in—walking around Wichita, when a car with two black individuals stop[s] and asks him, a homeless meth addict without transportation, off of his meds, will hop in the car with them, drive an hour and a half away to Lyons, Kansas, and cash a check for them. "Two individuals he spent at least three hours with, and he can't tell you their names. Not only can he not tell you their names, do you know who else he didn't tell the names to? Law enforcement. He never went to the police and said, Hey, you've got the wrong guy here. Let me sketch these two black individuals. Here's the vehicle they were driving. Indiana license plates. "Surely you can put a BOLO out on them, look for these guys who conned me, the innocent person here. They're the two real criminals, not me. But he didn't do that. He didn't tell law enforcement. Instead he waits until the day of trial, takes the stand, and tells you about these two nameless, faceless, black individuals who are the real criminals." The State also referenced Corkins' decision not to talk to law enforcement several other times during closing: • "If he was suspicious, why not call law enforcement? If he wasn't suspicious, why not wait around to get his hundred dollars to cash this check? It doesn't add up. He 12  knew something was going on. He knew the check was fraudulent. That's why he didn't hang around." • "At no point did you hear testimony that he contacted law enforcement to tell them about this—this scam that was being played on him. Instead he remained silent, not—until the day of trial. And that's when we hear this story." • "He doesn't tell anybody until he gets in front of you." Each of these statements is used to counter the cooperative spirit and inadequate investigation assertions made by Corkins. The prosecutor therefore did not err by commenting on Corkins' silence after he opened the door to such remarks. And the prosecutor was justified in pointing out the inconsistency between Corkins' statements at trial and his actions. In his brief, Corkins likens his situation to the one presented in Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 93. In that case, the prosecutor discussed the defendant's post-Miranda failure to inform the police of the details that he was testifying to at trial. For example, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "'Q. [Prosecutor:] Now, Mr. Hernandez, you didn't go to the police. Why is that? .... "'Q. . . . Why is that? "'A. I was scared. "'Q. Okay. Well, we're talking about nine years, sir. Nine years all the way till today. You were charged with murder for a year and a half, haven't you been, prior to today? "'A. (Nodding.)'" 284 Kan. at 90. Then during closing, the prosecutor said: "'He's the Defendant. He's been charged for a year and a half. He sat there and heard all of the evidence in this case and isn't it interesting that his story accounts for the 13  evidence the State has put before it, before you. Isn't that interesting?' (Emphasis added.)" 284 Kan. at 93. The prosecutor continued discussing the defendant's silence during rebuttal: "'Now, bear in mind, the police didn't know that it was his blood at the time and for eight years he never told them. He never brought forth the story he gave you today for the very first time in nine years since her murder. "'The evidence, all of the evidence, points at the Defendant and then find out today—all of it yesterday, when you heard it—points at the Defendant and then all of a sudden we hear after disputing it was his blood, here it was. He was there. We hear that. He was there, in her house, that night. "'But I didn't kill her. Somebody unnamed did. I didn't tell the police. I told Agent Beckham I didn't know her. I didn't tell Agent Beckham the story, had several opportunities to do so. But today before you, charged with murder, he gets on the stand and tells you his story.' (Emphasis added.)" 284 Kan. at 93. Corkins highlights that the Kansas Supreme Court found the prosecutor's references to the defendant's silence in Hernandez implied that were the defendant's testimony true, Hernandez would have provided his story after he was charged. This was an impermissible use of the defendant's silence. However, Corkins' analysis fails to appreciate the context of the statements in Hernandez as compared to the ones made here. In Hernandez, the prosecutor's statements that the defendant did not provide his story to detectives during their interview of the defendant were permissible, as they contrasted the defendant's testimony at trial with the statements he made to the officers a year and a half earlier that he did not know the victim and had never been to her home. 284 Kan. at 94. It was the statement "'[h]e's the Defendant. He's been charged for a year and a half,'" that was considered error because it directly implied that if the defendant was not guilty he would have told his story sooner. 284 Kan. at 93-94. Even so, the Kansas Supreme Court found the comments, when viewed in the context of the whole 14 trial, were harmless because the case did not turn on the fact that the defendant remained silent. 284 Kan. at 95-96. While the prosecutor here pointed out that Corkins told this story for the first time at trial, Corkins fails to acknowledge his repeated statements at trial—that he wanted to cooperate with law enforcement but they did not ask him—opened the door to discussing his silence because it is a direct contradiction from the actual events. Thus, the prosecutor's comments were more like those found admissible in Hernandez because they fairly commented on the inconsistencies rather than guilt. Even if the statements were made in error, they were harmless. A court will declare a constitutional error harmless only when the party benefiting from the error persuades the court "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). Here, the jury considered Corkins' testimony and weighed his credibility in reaching a not guilty verdict on two counts, and a guilty verdict solely on the making a false information charge. This demonstrates that the jury considered Corkins' testimony and presumably found that because he was homeless it was unlikely that he had the means to produce a fraudulent check. But the jury may not have believed that he was entirely ignorant in the scheme based on his inability to provide credible details, such as the name of the restaurant where the check was printed, or the names of the men who printed the check after spending three hours driving with them in their car. Given the evidence and the jury's verdict, we find the State has shown there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's comments on Corkins' silence affected the verdict. The jury must have accepted some of Corkins' testimony as true to have reached 15 this outcome. That is, the jury did not draw an inference of Corkins' guilt from his silence during Sergeant Ryan's investigation since it acquitted him of two of the charged crimes. Affirmed. 16