State v. Sanford-Barnes
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket129126
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Nos. 129,126
129,127
129,128
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND KEVIN SANFORD-BARNES,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Ford District Court; LAURA H. LEWIS, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed.
Grace E. Tran, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Natalie Chalmers, principal assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for
appellee.
Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and ISHERWOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM: Raymond Kevin Sanford-Barnes appeals from the district court's
award of jail time credit after it revoked his probation in three separate cases and ordered
him to serve modified underlying sentences. He contends that he is entitled to duplicative
jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-6615, as construed in State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652,
657, 537 P.3d 845 (2023), and clarified in State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 311-12, 566 P.3d
481 (2025). Because Sanford-Barnes committed each of his crimes—and was also
sentenced for them—before the change in law in Hopkins, he had no entitlement to that
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change allowing duplicative credit. As a result, applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)
in this case inflicts no greater punishment than the law allowed when Sanford-Barnes
committed his crimes. Under these circumstances, we find no violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, we affirm the district court's award
of jail time credit.
FACTS
This appeal involves three consolidated cases in which Sanford-Barnes was
convicted of criminal offenses and subsequently placed on probation. The first case arose
out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 11, 2020; the second case involved an
offense committed on July 17, 2020; and the third case was charged for an offense
committed on September 20, 2021. Pursuant to plea agreements, Sanford-Barnes pled no
contest to all three offenses.
First, Sanford-Barnes pled no contest to interference with a law enforcement
officer that occurred on January 11, 2020. The district court sentenced him to 15 months
in prison but granted a dispositional departure to probation for 24 months. Next, Sanford-
Barnes pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine for his actions on July 17,
2020, while he was serving probation in his 2020 case. The district court sentenced him
to 34 months in prison but again granted him a dispositional departure to probation for 24
months. Subsequently, Sanford-Barnes pled no contest to battery on a correctional
officer, which he committed on September 20, 2021, while he was serving probation in
his other two cases. In that case, the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison
but yet again granted him a dispositional departure to probation for 36 months.
On April 15, 2025, the district court revoked Sanford-Barnes' probation and
ordered him to serve his underlying sentences in each of his three cases based on the
commission of a new crime. However, the district court modified his prison sentence to
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85 months and awarded him jail time credit in the journal entries. In his first case, the
district court awarded him 236 days of jail credit. In his second case, the district court
awarded him 245 days of jail credit. In his third case, the district court awarded him 215
days of jail credit.
Thereafter, Sanford-Barnes filed a timely notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Sanford-Barnes contends that he is entitled to the jail credit calculation
under K.S.A. 21-6615, as interpreted in Hopkins and clarified in Ervin. Sanford-Barnes
does not make a specific claim as to how much jail time credit he should be awarded.
Rather, he argues that we should "order that [he] be awarded all of the jail credit he
earned." In response, the State contends that Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to additional
jail credit under the 2026 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6615.
This appeal turns on the interpretation of K.S.A. 21-6615, a question over which
our review is unlimited. See State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). It
is undisputed that this issue was not raised before the district court. However, Sanford-
Barnes asks that we consider this issue for the first time on appeal, and the State makes
no argument against us doing so. Since this is Sanford-Barnes' first opportunity to raise
this issue, we find that it is in the interests of justice for us to consider it on the merits.
The Hopkins decision marked a "change in the law" related to the application of
jail time credit. See State v. Romey, 321 Kan. 400, 419-20, 580 P.3d 1 (2025). Prior to
Hopkins, the long-standing interpretation of the jail credit statute was that defendants
received jail time credit only for time spent in custody "solely" on the charge being
sentenced. Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1, 575 P.2d 524 (1978) (interpreting
predecessor to K.S.A. 21-6615, K.S.A. 21-4614 [Weeks 1974]). In other words,
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Campbell and its progeny reflected Kansas law for 46 years. See State v. Smith, 309 Kan.
977, 981, 441 P.3d 1041 (2019) (a defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in
custody only when they are being held solely on the charge for which they are being
sentenced); State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003); Hooks v. State, 51
Kan. App. 2d 527, 531, 349 P.3d 476 (2015). Under Campbell and its progeny,
defendants had no expectation of receiving duplicative credit for a single period of
custody attributable to multiple cases. Furthermore, for nearly half a century, Kansas
courts, attorneys, and litigants relied upon this well-established interpretation of the
statute. See 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1.
Then, in Hopkins, the Kansas Supreme Court overruled its longstanding reading of
K.S.A. 21-6615(a) and instead held that the statute requires that the district court give a
defendant credit for all time spent in custody pending disposition of the defendant's case.
Hopkins, 317 Kan. at 656-57. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hopkins on
October 20, 2023, and the mandate was filed on January 19, 2024. In Ervin, our Supreme
Court clarified Hopkins—holding that a defendant is entitled to one day of credit for each
day in custody pending disposition of the defendant's case even if some or all of that time
has already been credited against a sentence in another case. 320 Kan. at 311-12; see
State v. Zongker, 322 Kan. 137, 139, 586 P.3d 769 (2026).
In 2024, the Kansas Legislature responded and amended K.S.A. 21-6615(a).
K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A); see L. 2024, ch. 96, § 7. The amended portion of
the statute now reads: "When computing the defendant's sentence, the following shall not
be considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case: (A)
Any time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed on a
defendant." K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A). This court has held that the 2024
amendment is not retroactive. State v. Mitchell, 66 Kan. App. 2d 196, 204-07, 579 P.3d
970 (2025), rev. granted, 321 Kan. 793 (2026). Later, the 2026 Legislature again
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amended K.S.A. 21-6615 by adding subsection (d), which became effective while this
appeal was pending. See L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1.
K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 became law on July 1, 2026. Under the current
version of the statute, "days spent in custody that are attributable to more than one case
shall be credited only once against the aggregated consecutive term." K.S.A. 2026 Supp.
21-6615(d)(1). Additionally, the statute provides that subsection (d) applies to "[a]ll
sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026," and to "any case
posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals, probation revocation proceedings,
motions to correct illegal sentence, habeas corpus actions and actions under K.S.A. 60-
1507, . . . pending on or filed after July 1, 2026." K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2)(A)-
(B). This appeal was pending on July 1, 2026, so by the terms of the amendment,
subsection (d) governs unless its application here is unconstitutional.
In supplemental briefing, Sanford-Barnes asserts that applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp.
21-6615(d) in this appeal would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In response, the State asserts that there
would be no Ex Post Facto Clause violation if K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) is applied
in this appeal because Sanford-Barnes committed his crimes before the Kansas Supreme
Court changed the law in Hopkins, 317 Kan. at 652. As such, the State argues that
Sanford-Barnes had no expectation or vested right to duplicative jail time credit under
these circumstances.
The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give fair warning to individuals
before crimes are committed. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 891,
137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997). A law offends the Ex Post Facto Clause only if it is both
retrospective and disadvantageous to the offender. But the disadvantage is measured
against the law in effect at the time the crime was committed and not against a later, more
favorable rule. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30
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(1990); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 532-33, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 186 L. Ed. 2d 84
(2013); State v. Bellamy, 67 Kan. App. 2d 132, 140-41, 597 P.3d 962 (2026), petition for
rev. filed October 19, 2026. The United States Supreme Court has held that laws
canceling early release credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because they
"'lengthen[ed] the period that [an inmate] must spend in prison.'" Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442;
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-34, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981); see
Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 417, 960 P.2d 227 (1998) (holding that for each
good time credit a defendant failed to earn, the actual term of punishment would be
extended).
With this background of the evolving law on jail time credit cases in Kansas, we
turn to the facts in this appeal. Here, Sanford-Barnes claims that the 2026 amendment to
K.S.A. 21-6615 imposed additional punishment by taking away his right to duplicative
jail time credit. But—as we discussed above—all of his crimes that are the subject of this
appeal were committed before our Supreme Court's decision in Hopkins. This is
significant because the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated when the law did not change
the legal consequences of the act compared to the law in effect on the date of the offense.
See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30-31; Anderson v. Bruce, 274 Kan. 37, 43, 50 P.3d 1 (2002) (if
no additional punishment was inflicted upon defendant as a result of the change in law,
there is no ex post facto violation).
Significantly, the mandate in Hopkins was issued on January 19, 2024. But the
crimes relevant to this appeal were committed by Sanford-Barnes on January 11, 2020;
July 17, 2020; and September 20, 2021. Likewise, Sanford-Barnes was sentenced for
those crimes on June 26, 2020, January 15, 2021, and May 15, 2023. As such, his crimes
were committed and his underlying prison sentences were imposed well before Hopkins
was issued. Moreover, Sanford-Barnes did not file a direct appeal from those sentences.
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At the time Sanford-Barnes committed his crimes, K.S.A. 21-6615(a) stated:
"In any criminal action in which the defendant is convicted, the judge, if the judge
sentences the defendant to confinement, shall direct that for the purpose of computing
defendant's sentence and parole eligibility and conditional release dates thereunder, that
such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in
the sentencing order of the journal entry of judgment. Such date shall be established to
reflect and shall be computed as an allowance for the time which the defendant has spent
incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case. In recording the
commencing date of such sentence the date as specifically set forth by the court shall be
used as the date of sentence and all good time allowances as are authorized by the
secretary of corrections are to be allowed on such sentence from such date as though the
defendant were actually incarcerated in any of the institutions of the state correctional
system."
As a panel of our court recently found, defendants cannot lose what they never
had:
"The prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to criminal statutes 'which
disadvantage the offender affected by them.' Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110
S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990). The ex post facto law is measured against the law
in effect at the time the crime was committed. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533." Bellamy, 67
Kan. App. 2d at 141.
We agree. The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give fair warning to
individuals before crimes are committed. See Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441. Since all of
Sanford-Barnes' crimes were committed prior to Hopkins and years before he was
sentenced, he had no expectation that he would receive duplicate jail time credit in light
of our Supreme Court's time-honored precedent in Campbell and its progeny interpreting
K.S.A. 21-6615 to mean that a defendant was not entitled to receive duplicative jail time
credit. As our Supreme Court found in Romey, 321 Kan. at 419-20, the law changed in
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Hopkins. And the mandate in Hopkins was issued in 2024. Subsection (d) to K.S.A. 2026
Supp. 21-6615 does nothing more than restore the rule that already bound Sanford-
Barnes when he committed his crimes. Consequently, the application of K.S.A. 2026
Supp. 21-6615(d) in this appeal would not inflict a greater punishment than the law
allowed at the time Sanford-Barnes committed these crimes. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 532-
33.
Furthermore, Sanford-Barnes cannot receive duplicative credit for another reason:
this is an appeal from the revocation of his probation and a review of the record reveals
that he did not file a direct appeal from his sentences. In State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585,
591-92, 439 P.3d 307 (2019), the Kansas Supreme Court made a distinction between a
party seeking a "benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of a direct appeal"
and a party seeking that same benefit through a collateral vehicle, such as a motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Our Supreme Court held that the party moving to correct an
illegal sentence "is stuck with the law in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced."
309 Kan. at 592. As in Bellamy, Sanford-Barnes is seeking the benefit of a change in the
law in an appeal of his probation revocation and is not entitled to the benefit of the
change in law announced in Hopkins and clarified in Ervin. See Bellamy, 67 Kan. App.
2d at 142; Murdock, 309 Kan. at 591-92. Accordingly, Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to
the benefit of the later change.
Finally, Sanford-Barnes suggests that he acquired a "vested right" to duplicative
credit when Hopkins and Ervin were decided. A "vested right" is one "'so fixed that it is
not dependent on any future act, contingency or decision to make it more secure.'" State
v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 52, 371 P.3d 862 (2016) (quoting Board of Greenwood County
Comm'rs v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469, 474, 618 P.2d 778 [1980]). Again, at the time Sanford-
Barnes committed the crimes that are the subject of this appeal—as well as at the time he
was sentenced—Campbell and its progeny reflected the current status of Kansas law
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relating to the application of jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-6615. So, we find that he
had no "vested right" to duplicative jail time credit.
In summary, we conclude that Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to receive additional
jail time credit under the circumstances presented in this appeal. He was convicted of
crimes that he committed in 2020 and 2021. Based on the law in effect at the time he
committed those crimes, as well as at the time he was sentenced, we find that Sanford-
Barnes was not entitled to duplicative jail time credit. Likewise, we find that the
application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) in this appeal would not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Further, Sanford-Barnes has not shown
that he has a "vested right" to duplicative jail time credit. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's award of jail time credit.
Affirmed.
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