Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Nos. 129,126 129,127 129,128 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. RAYMOND KEVIN SANFORD-BARNES, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Ford District Court; LAURA H. LEWIS, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Grace E. Tran, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Natalie Chalmers, principal assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and ISHERWOOD, JJ. PER CURIAM: Raymond Kevin Sanford-Barnes appeals from the district court's award of jail time credit after it revoked his probation in three separate cases and ordered him to serve modified underlying sentences. He contends that he is entitled to duplicative jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-6615, as construed in State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, 657, 537 P.3d 845 (2023), and clarified in State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 311-12, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). Because Sanford-Barnes committed each of his crimes—and was also sentenced for them—before the change in law in Hopkins, he had no entitlement to that 1 change allowing duplicative credit. As a result, applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) in this case inflicts no greater punishment than the law allowed when Sanford-Barnes committed his crimes. Under these circumstances, we find no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, we affirm the district court's award of jail time credit. FACTS This appeal involves three consolidated cases in which Sanford-Barnes was convicted of criminal offenses and subsequently placed on probation. The first case arose out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 11, 2020; the second case involved an offense committed on July 17, 2020; and the third case was charged for an offense committed on September 20, 2021. Pursuant to plea agreements, Sanford-Barnes pled no contest to all three offenses. First, Sanford-Barnes pled no contest to interference with a law enforcement officer that occurred on January 11, 2020. The district court sentenced him to 15 months in prison but granted a dispositional departure to probation for 24 months. Next, Sanford- Barnes pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine for his actions on July 17, 2020, while he was serving probation in his 2020 case. The district court sentenced him to 34 months in prison but again granted him a dispositional departure to probation for 24 months. Subsequently, Sanford-Barnes pled no contest to battery on a correctional officer, which he committed on September 20, 2021, while he was serving probation in his other two cases. In that case, the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison but yet again granted him a dispositional departure to probation for 36 months. On April 15, 2025, the district court revoked Sanford-Barnes' probation and ordered him to serve his underlying sentences in each of his three cases based on the commission of a new crime. However, the district court modified his prison sentence to 2 85 months and awarded him jail time credit in the journal entries. In his first case, the district court awarded him 236 days of jail credit. In his second case, the district court awarded him 245 days of jail credit. In his third case, the district court awarded him 215 days of jail credit. Thereafter, Sanford-Barnes filed a timely notice of appeal. ANALYSIS On appeal, Sanford-Barnes contends that he is entitled to the jail credit calculation under K.S.A. 21-6615, as interpreted in Hopkins and clarified in Ervin. Sanford-Barnes does not make a specific claim as to how much jail time credit he should be awarded. Rather, he argues that we should "order that [he] be awarded all of the jail credit he earned." In response, the State contends that Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to additional jail credit under the 2026 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6615. This appeal turns on the interpretation of K.S.A. 21-6615, a question over which our review is unlimited. See State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). It is undisputed that this issue was not raised before the district court. However, Sanford- Barnes asks that we consider this issue for the first time on appeal, and the State makes no argument against us doing so. Since this is Sanford-Barnes' first opportunity to raise this issue, we find that it is in the interests of justice for us to consider it on the merits. The Hopkins decision marked a "change in the law" related to the application of jail time credit. See State v. Romey, 321 Kan. 400, 419-20, 580 P.3d 1 (2025). Prior to Hopkins, the long-standing interpretation of the jail credit statute was that defendants received jail time credit only for time spent in custody "solely" on the charge being sentenced. Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1, 575 P.2d 524 (1978) (interpreting predecessor to K.S.A. 21-6615, K.S.A. 21-4614 [Weeks 1974]). In other words, 3 Campbell and its progeny reflected Kansas law for 46 years. See State v. Smith, 309 Kan. 977, 981, 441 P.3d 1041 (2019) (a defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody only when they are being held solely on the charge for which they are being sentenced); State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003); Hooks v. State, 51 Kan. App. 2d 527, 531, 349 P.3d 476 (2015). Under Campbell and its progeny, defendants had no expectation of receiving duplicative credit for a single period of custody attributable to multiple cases. Furthermore, for nearly half a century, Kansas courts, attorneys, and litigants relied upon this well-established interpretation of the statute. See 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1. Then, in Hopkins, the Kansas Supreme Court overruled its longstanding reading of K.S.A. 21-6615(a) and instead held that the statute requires that the district court give a defendant credit for all time spent in custody pending disposition of the defendant's case. Hopkins, 317 Kan. at 656-57. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hopkins on October 20, 2023, and the mandate was filed on January 19, 2024. In Ervin, our Supreme Court clarified Hopkins—holding that a defendant is entitled to one day of credit for each day in custody pending disposition of the defendant's case even if some or all of that time has already been credited against a sentence in another case. 320 Kan. at 311-12; see State v. Zongker, 322 Kan. 137, 139, 586 P.3d 769 (2026). In 2024, the Kansas Legislature responded and amended K.S.A. 21-6615(a). K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A); see L. 2024, ch. 96, § 7. The amended portion of the statute now reads: "When computing the defendant's sentence, the following shall not be considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case: (A) Any time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant." K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A). This court has held that the 2024 amendment is not retroactive. State v. Mitchell, 66 Kan. App. 2d 196, 204-07, 579 P.3d 970 (2025), rev. granted, 321 Kan. 793 (2026). Later, the 2026 Legislature again 4 amended K.S.A. 21-6615 by adding subsection (d), which became effective while this appeal was pending. See L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1. K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 became law on July 1, 2026. Under the current version of the statute, "days spent in custody that are attributable to more than one case shall be credited only once against the aggregated consecutive term." K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(1). Additionally, the statute provides that subsection (d) applies to "[a]ll sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026," and to "any case posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals, probation revocation proceedings, motions to correct illegal sentence, habeas corpus actions and actions under K.S.A. 60- 1507, . . . pending on or filed after July 1, 2026." K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2)(A)- (B). This appeal was pending on July 1, 2026, so by the terms of the amendment, subsection (d) governs unless its application here is unconstitutional. In supplemental briefing, Sanford-Barnes asserts that applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) in this appeal would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In response, the State asserts that there would be no Ex Post Facto Clause violation if K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) is applied in this appeal because Sanford-Barnes committed his crimes before the Kansas Supreme Court changed the law in Hopkins, 317 Kan. at 652. As such, the State argues that Sanford-Barnes had no expectation or vested right to duplicative jail time credit under these circumstances. The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give fair warning to individuals before crimes are committed. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997). A law offends the Ex Post Facto Clause only if it is both retrospective and disadvantageous to the offender. But the disadvantage is measured against the law in effect at the time the crime was committed and not against a later, more favorable rule. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 5 (1990); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 532-33, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 186 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2013); State v. Bellamy, 67 Kan. App. 2d 132, 140-41, 597 P.3d 962 (2026), petition for rev. filed October 19, 2026. The United States Supreme Court has held that laws canceling early release credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because they "'lengthen[ed] the period that [an inmate] must spend in prison.'" Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-34, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981); see Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 417, 960 P.2d 227 (1998) (holding that for each good time credit a defendant failed to earn, the actual term of punishment would be extended). With this background of the evolving law on jail time credit cases in Kansas, we turn to the facts in this appeal. Here, Sanford-Barnes claims that the 2026 amendment to K.S.A. 21-6615 imposed additional punishment by taking away his right to duplicative jail time credit. But—as we discussed above—all of his crimes that are the subject of this appeal were committed before our Supreme Court's decision in Hopkins. This is significant because the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated when the law did not change the legal consequences of the act compared to the law in effect on the date of the offense. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30-31; Anderson v. Bruce, 274 Kan. 37, 43, 50 P.3d 1 (2002) (if no additional punishment was inflicted upon defendant as a result of the change in law, there is no ex post facto violation). Significantly, the mandate in Hopkins was issued on January 19, 2024. But the crimes relevant to this appeal were committed by Sanford-Barnes on January 11, 2020; July 17, 2020; and September 20, 2021. Likewise, Sanford-Barnes was sentenced for those crimes on June 26, 2020, January 15, 2021, and May 15, 2023. As such, his crimes were committed and his underlying prison sentences were imposed well before Hopkins was issued. Moreover, Sanford-Barnes did not file a direct appeal from those sentences. 6 At the time Sanford-Barnes committed his crimes, K.S.A. 21-6615(a) stated: "In any criminal action in which the defendant is convicted, the judge, if the judge sentences the defendant to confinement, shall direct that for the purpose of computing defendant's sentence and parole eligibility and conditional release dates thereunder, that such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in the sentencing order of the journal entry of judgment. Such date shall be established to reflect and shall be computed as an allowance for the time which the defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case. In recording the commencing date of such sentence the date as specifically set forth by the court shall be used as the date of sentence and all good time allowances as are authorized by the secretary of corrections are to be allowed on such sentence from such date as though the defendant were actually incarcerated in any of the institutions of the state correctional system." As a panel of our court recently found, defendants cannot lose what they never had: "The prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to criminal statutes 'which disadvantage the offender affected by them.' Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990). The ex post facto law is measured against the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533." Bellamy, 67 Kan. App. 2d at 141. We agree. The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to give fair warning to individuals before crimes are committed. See Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441. Since all of Sanford-Barnes' crimes were committed prior to Hopkins and years before he was sentenced, he had no expectation that he would receive duplicate jail time credit in light of our Supreme Court's time-honored precedent in Campbell and its progeny interpreting K.S.A. 21-6615 to mean that a defendant was not entitled to receive duplicative jail time credit. As our Supreme Court found in Romey, 321 Kan. at 419-20, the law changed in 7 Hopkins. And the mandate in Hopkins was issued in 2024. Subsection (d) to K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 does nothing more than restore the rule that already bound Sanford- Barnes when he committed his crimes. Consequently, the application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) in this appeal would not inflict a greater punishment than the law allowed at the time Sanford-Barnes committed these crimes. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 532- 33. Furthermore, Sanford-Barnes cannot receive duplicative credit for another reason: this is an appeal from the revocation of his probation and a review of the record reveals that he did not file a direct appeal from his sentences. In State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585, 591-92, 439 P.3d 307 (2019), the Kansas Supreme Court made a distinction between a party seeking a "benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of a direct appeal" and a party seeking that same benefit through a collateral vehicle, such as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Our Supreme Court held that the party moving to correct an illegal sentence "is stuck with the law in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced." 309 Kan. at 592. As in Bellamy, Sanford-Barnes is seeking the benefit of a change in the law in an appeal of his probation revocation and is not entitled to the benefit of the change in law announced in Hopkins and clarified in Ervin. See Bellamy, 67 Kan. App. 2d at 142; Murdock, 309 Kan. at 591-92. Accordingly, Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to the benefit of the later change. Finally, Sanford-Barnes suggests that he acquired a "vested right" to duplicative credit when Hopkins and Ervin were decided. A "vested right" is one "'so fixed that it is not dependent on any future act, contingency or decision to make it more secure.'" State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 52, 371 P.3d 862 (2016) (quoting Board of Greenwood County Comm'rs v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469, 474, 618 P.2d 778 [1980]). Again, at the time Sanford- Barnes committed the crimes that are the subject of this appeal—as well as at the time he was sentenced—Campbell and its progeny reflected the current status of Kansas law 8 relating to the application of jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-6615. So, we find that he had no "vested right" to duplicative jail time credit. In summary, we conclude that Sanford-Barnes is not entitled to receive additional jail time credit under the circumstances presented in this appeal. He was convicted of crimes that he committed in 2020 and 2021. Based on the law in effect at the time he committed those crimes, as well as at the time he was sentenced, we find that Sanford- Barnes was not entitled to duplicative jail time credit. Likewise, we find that the application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d) in this appeal would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Further, Sanford-Barnes has not shown that he has a "vested right" to duplicative jail time credit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's award of jail time credit. Affirmed. 9