Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 130,022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant, v. JOSEPH FABRE, Appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Geary District Court; COURTNEY D. CRAVER, judge. Oral argument held October 2, 2026. Opinion filed November 13, 2026. Reversed and remanded. Andrew J. Lohmann, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellant. David S. Patrzykont, of David S. Patrzykont, Attorney at Law, P.A., of Kansas City, for appellee. Before SCHROEDER, P.J., PICKERING and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ. PER CURIAM: In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to consider whether the district court erred in granting a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. We hold that the district court erred in finding that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, and we reverse the district court's order granting the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Law enforcement officials in Riley County believed that Joseph Fabre was transporting drugs between Wichita and Manhattan. As part of that investigation, Detective John Wolf of the Riley County Police Department contacted Geary County Sheriff's Deputy Thomas Umeck to share information about Fabre's activities. Fabre's vehicle had been equipped with a GPS tracker that showed Fabre had just completed a trip between Manhattan and Wichita. Fabre had very recently stopped at a Wichita Quick Trip for around 11 minutes and then appeared to start the trip back to Manhattan. Based on Fabre's driving pattern, Wolf believed Fabre was transporting drugs. Wolf noted that Fabre had made this same trip multiple times. Wolf provided this information to Umeck in the event Geary County was able to conduct a stop, but Wolf also had plans to stop Fabre in Riley County if necessary. Later that night, Deputy Umeck and two other officers pulled Fabre over for a traffic violation—a violation of K.S.A. 8-133, which regulated the use of license plates. Umeck believed Fabre's license plate was not legal under K.S.A. 8-133 because the name of the state was "50 percent obstructed." After Fabre was stopped, a drug detection dog alerted that there were drugs present. A search was conducted, and drugs were found in Fabre's vehicle. Fabre and his passenger were arrested. Fabre was charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, two counts of no drug tax stamp, and obstructed license plate. As the case proceeded toward trial, Fabre filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been collected as a result of the traffic stop. Fabre argued that reasonable suspicion did not support his traffic stop because the stop was based on unsubstantiated information from Detective Wolf and an "obstructed tag by a plate frame that obstructs nothing." Fabre also argued that K.S.A. 8-133 was unconstitutionally vague. The State's response asked the district court to strike the motion for failure to comply with K.S.A. 2 22-3216, which governs motions to suppress evidence. It also argued that K.S.A. 8-133 was not unconstitutionally vague, but even if the district court believed it was, Deputy Umeck acted in good faith in making the stop. Before the district court could rule on Fabre's motion to suppress, the Kansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Beck, 320 Kan. 747, 571 P.3d 537 (2025). As a result, Fabre filed a supplemental motion to suppress, and the State filed a response. The Kansas Supreme Court later modified its opinion. State v. Beck, 321 Kan. 261, 577 P.3d 119 (2025). The district court conducted a hearing on Fabre's motion to suppress. The State called two witnesses: Detective Wolf and Deputy Umeck. Fabre objected to Wolf's testimony because Wolf did not conduct the traffic stop. The district court allowed limited testimony from Detective Wolf to include "the information that he provided Deputy Umeck only." Deputy Umeck testified that he stopped Fabre because of the obstructed license plate. He stated that the name of the state was not clearly visible, as it was around 50 percent obstructed. He believed this to be a traffic violation. The district court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's interpretation of K.S.A. 8-133 in Beck controlled, and an obstructed state name on a license plate could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop Fabre. The State asked the district court to clarify its decision and address whether the officer conducted the stop based on a good- faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court found that no good-faith exception applied. The court did not address the State's alternative argument that it had reasonable suspicion to stop Fabre based on its investigation of Fabre's illegal drug activity. The district court granted Fabre's motion to suppress, finding that Umeck 3 stopped the vehicle due to the obstructed state name on the license plate, which was no longer permitted under Beck. ANALYSIS DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING FABRE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS? Following the district court's order granting Fabre's motion to suppress, the State filed an interlocutory appeal under the authority of K.S.A. 22-3603. The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the district court erred in granting Fabre's motion to suppress. Standard of Review When considering a district court's decision to grant a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence, and we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Garrett, 319 Kan. 465, 469, 555 P.3d 1116 (2024). When reviewing the factual findings of the district court, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Lutz, 312 Kan. 358, 363, 474 P.3d 1258 (2020). Discussion Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Both protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Sharp, 305 Kan. 1076, 1081, 390 P.3d 542 (2017); State v. Garza, 295 Kan. 326, 331-32, 286 P.3d 554 (2012). Courts follow the analysis set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), to determine whether a traffic stop was a lawful seizure. A reviewing court must first consider "whether the officer's action was justified at its 4 inception." 392 U.S. at 19-20. Then, the court must consider whether the detention "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20. "In order for a law enforcement officer's seizure of a citizen to be constitutionally reasonable, the officer must know of specific and articulable facts that create a reasonable suspicion the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction." State v. Jones, 300 Kan. 630, 637, 333 P.3d 886 (2014). When a defendant files a motion to suppress, "the State has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the seizure and generally may do so by producing the officer's testimony that he or she observed a driver commit a traffic infraction before initiating the stop." 300 Kan. at 637. With this legal background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. The parties agree that Deputy Umeck's stop of Fabre was a pretextual stop. In other words, the primary concern of law enforcement was not the visibility of Fabre's license plate; rather, Fabre was the center of an ongoing drug investigation. But in an effort to ensure the legality of the stop, law enforcement waited to stop Fabre until an officer believed Fabre had committed a traffic infraction. While the stop was pretextual, a pretextual stop may nonetheless be constitutionally valid. See 300 Kan. at 639 (noting "general rule that a pretextual stop is constitutionally valid"). Deputy Umeck stopped Fabre because he believed Fabre had violated K.S.A. 8- 133(c). The version of that statute in effect at the time of the stop was last amended in 2021, and stated, in relevant part: "The license plate shall be fastened in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible." K.S.A. 8-133(c). The statute was significantly modified in 2026, but those amendments are not at issue here. See K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 8-133. 5 Umeck testified at the hearing on Fabre's motion to suppress that the state name of Fabre's license plate was obstructed and he believed this to be a traffic violation. The district court granted Fabre's motion to suppress because under Beck, 321 Kan. 261, an obstructed state name on a license plate could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. It is true that generally, without reasonable suspicion, a traffic stop is an unlawful seizure and under the exclusionary rule, the evidence collected during a related search requires suppression. See State v. Sharp, 66 Kan. App. 2d 282, 287, 299, 581 P.3d 853 (2025). "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not expressly prohibit the use of evidence obtained in violation of its protections. Instead, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy to prevent the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal case." State v. Pettay, 299 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 326 P.3d 1039 (2014). The United States Supreme Court has held that exceptions to the exclusionary rule may serve to allow the admission of otherwise illegally obtained evidence. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, Syl. ¶ 1, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the Court held: "The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid." Leon established what we now know to be the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We next consider whether a good-faith exception exists under the facts of this case. Good-Faith Exception Without providing its reasoning, the district court held that no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in Fabre's case. We note that the facts in this 6 case are largely undisputed. As to whether Fabre's license plate was obstructed, the district court found: "The state name is obstructed in the license plate, but the county identifier RL is very clearly legible and the sticker on the top right corner is not obstructed by the Chicago Bears license plate frame. It's just the State name that's obstructed." Fabre does not challenge the district court's findings of fact. We are thus left to determine as a matter of law whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See Jones, 300 Kan. at 642. For many decades, State v. Hayes, 8 Kan. App. 2d 531, 660 P.2d 1387 (1983), abrogated by Beck, 321 Kan. 261, served as binding authority providing an interpretation of K.S.A. 8-133. In Hayes, an officer observed the defendant was driving erratically. The officer attempted to confirm the vehicle's license plate information, but "the state designation was not visible." 8 Kan. App. 2d at 531. Hayes was pulled over, and the officer observed marijuana in plain view. Hayes challenged whether the traffic stop was lawful. The panel found the "covering of the state name on a vehicle's license tag renders the tag illegible within the prohibition of K.S.A. 8-133 [(Ensley 1982)]." 8 Kan. App. 2d at 533. The holding from Hayes interpreting K.S.A. 8-133 was revisited in Beck. The license plate on Beck's vehicle was framed in a way that partially covered the state name. Beck's vehicle was stopped by law enforcement due to the obstructed plate. After Beck consented to a search of his vehicle, law enforcement discovered more than two pounds of methamphetamine. Beck moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, but the district court denied his motion. 321 Kan. at 261-63. In interpreting K.S.A. 8-133, the court concluded: "The obstruction of the state name will not be deemed a statutory violation because the statutory scheme does not 7 require that the state name be printed in such a manner as to be clearly legible." 321 Kan. at 270. The parties agree that post-Beck, Deputy Umeck's stop based on an obstructed license plate would not be valid. But the State argues the stop of Fabre's vehicle was still valid because Deputy Umeck acted in good faith relying on "binding precedent in believing Fabre violated K.S.A. 8-133." Illegally obtained evidence may nonetheless be admitted if a law enforcement officer obtained the evidence under an objectively reasonable belief their conduct was lawful. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). And an officer's reliance on binding precedent may establish that objectively reasonable belief. "Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." Davis, 564 U.S. at 241. In Davis, an officer searched a vehicle incident to the arrest of the occupant, who had been handcuffed. The officer relied on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), for authority to conduct the search. Belton had been interpreted by the officer's own circuit court to authorize the search of an automobile incident to the driver's arrest. Davis, 564 U.S. at 235 (noting United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822, 824-27 [11th Cir. 1996]). The Davis Court found that the Eleventh Circuit case authorized the officer's conduct and noted the officer had applied the "precedent to the letter," in "strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law." 564 U.S. at 239. Similarly, the test here is whether Deputy Umeck reasonably relied on binding precedent. If so, the evidence "is not subject to the exclusionary rule." Davis, 564 U.S. at 241. Hayes was decided in 1983. At the time Umeck stopped Fabre's vehicle in 2023, Hayes remained binding precedent. The Hayes court held that for a license plate to be 8 "'clearly legible'" under K.S.A. 8-133, all of the tag must be visible—including the state name. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 532. "While this statute does not specifically state that the state name must be visible when a license plate is displayed, it does state that the tag must be 'legible.' We read this to mean that all of the tag must be legible, including the state name, which may be the most important information on the tag." Hayes, 8 Kan. App. 2d at 532. The holding from Hayes remained binding until the Supreme Court abrogated the Hayes decision in 2025 through its decision in Beck—two years after Fabre's stop. Deputy Umeck testified that he initiated a traffic stop on Fabre's vehicle because he observed that the state name on the license plate was obstructed. Specifically, Umeck testified that the state name on the plate was about 50% obstructed. The district court made a factual finding that the state name on Fabre's plate was obstructed. Because at the time Umeck stopped Fabre's vehicle, binding authority required "all" of the tag to be visible, "including the state name," it was reasonable for Umeck to conclude Fabre's license plate did not comply with K.S.A. 8-133. See Hayes, 8 Kan. App. 2d at 532. We find that as a matter of law, the district court erred in determining no good- faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied under the facts of this case. Accordingly, we need not consider the State's additional grounds for interlocutory appeal. We reverse the district court's order granting Fabre's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. 9