State v. White
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket128614
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 128,614
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA A. WHITE,
Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1.
K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8) proscribes breach of privacy and forbids a person from
disseminating certain illicit material under circumstances in which an identifiable person
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with the intent to harass or intimidate the victim.
For there to be a breach of privacy under K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8), the term "disseminating"
requires that the illicit material be sent to someone other than the person depicted in the
material and who consented to the illicit material being made.
2.
When the journal entry of judgment in a criminal case includes discretionary fees
and costs that the district court did not mention or assess at the sentencing hearing, the
proper remedy for an appellate court is to vacate the fees and direct the district court to
enter an amended journal entry of judgment striking the fees, without remanding the case
to allow the district court to make the necessary findings to assess the fees.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER MAGANA, judge. Oral argument held
October 20, 2026. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded with directions.
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Kasper Schirer and Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.
Before COBLE, P.J., MALONE and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ.
MALONE , J.: Joshua A. White appeals his convictions and sentences for rape,
aggravated battery, two counts of breach of privacy, four counts of stalking, and fleeing
or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer. White claims: (1) The State failed to
present sufficient evidence to support his convictions of breach of privacy; (2) the district
court abused its discretion when it issued a blanket ruling on the admission of K.S.A. 60 -
455 evidence during a pretrial hearing; (3) the State committed prosecutorial error during
closing argument; (4) cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial; and (5) the
district court erred by including certain fees in the journal entry of judgment that were not
ordered at the sentencing hearing. We agree with White that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to support his convictions of breach of privacy. We also agree with
White on the fee issue, but we otherwise affirm the district court's judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
White and Sarah (a pseudonym) met as children and, after reconnecting in their
20s, dated for more than 10 years. During that time, they lived together and were, for a
time, engaged. But, in 2017, their relationship ended and White moved out of Sarah's
home. White and Sarah continued to communicate and see each other occasionally,
maintaining an on-and-off sexual relationship. Over the next two years, White would
persistently call, text, and email Sarah, and if she did not respond to his messages, he
would make threats about committing suicide, which Sarah took seriously. Sarah knew
that the relationship was "toxic" and recognized the "abuse that went on throughout the
years" but believed she was "trauma bonded" to White and still had feelings for him.
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On December 4, 2019, White and Sarah had plans to meet in the morning after
Sarah's daughter went to school, but Sarah's daughter was sick that day. Later in the day,
Sarah told White that they could meet after work to talk. According to Sarah, White
wanted her to explain why she no longer wanted to be with him. They decided to meet in
the parking lot of the Kansas Heart Hospital, where the two had met before because it
was centrally located and usually not crowded.
In the parking lot, White got into Sarah's car and began screaming at her and
pounding her dashboard and windows. Sarah tried to calm White down, but he took her
keys and told her he would not leave until she gave him "a good enough excuse on why
[she] didn't want to be with him." As Sarah tried to escape the car, White grabbed at her
phone and yanked her hair and shoulders, pulling her back into the car. After White
pulled Sarah back into the car, he bashed her head on the gearshift, leaving a big gash on
her forehead, and then repeatedly punched the back of her head. White eventually
stopped hitting Sarah and blamed her for making him attack her.
White then said he would not let Sarah leave unless she had sex with him. Sarah
eventually relented. White ordered Sarah to the backseat of his truck, where he removed
her pants and forcibly performed oral sex on her while she cried. Despite Sarah's protests
and cries, White penetrated her vagina and did not stop until he ejaculated. White again
told Sarah that she had provoked him; he then returned her keys to her and she left.
Sarah fled the parking lot but soon pulled over to call a friend . Bloodied and
crying, Sarah drove to her friend's house, where she told her friend that White had
assaulted her and showed her the injuries, but Sarah did not go into extensive detail and
did not tell her friend about the sexual assault. Sarah took several pictures of herself to
document her injuries. She did not talk to the police that evening to report the ordeal.
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The following morning, White texted Sarah, asking if they could meet in person
and propositioning her for sex. Sarah responded with a picture of the injuries to her head.
Later that day, Sarah asked her boss for time off, told her about being assaulted by White,
and asked about scheduling free counseling services that her job provided. Sarah later
divulged the details of the attack to her boss, showing her the extent of her injuries.
Over the following months, White continued to try to communicate with Sarah,
sending voicemails, texts, and emails, but she stopped responding and eventually blocked
his number. White then began trying to reach her on her work phone. In one of his
messages, White sent Sarah an old picture of them engaging in sexual intercourse. Sarah
did not respond. Finally, on Valentine's Day, White showed up at Sarah's house wearing a
teddy bear costume, leaving flowers, candy, and a note. Realizing that White was not
going to stop trying to contact her, Sarah decided to go to the police.
In February 2020, Sarah reported to the police White's unending messages and
calls as well as the incident in the hospital parking lot. Later that month, she obtained a
temporary protection from stalking order, but White was not served the temporary
protective order until nearly a year later. White was served with a final protective order
on January 27, 2021, but he did not stop sending Sarah texts, emails, and voicemails even
after being served. On one occasion in June 2021, White emailed Sarah with an attached
video of the two of them engaging in sexual activity. Near that same time, White texted
photographs to Sarah of the two of them having sex. Also in June 2021, Sarah reported
White to the police after seeing him out driving. When officers tried to pull White over,
he did not stop. The police eventually ended their pursuit.
On June 29, 2021, the State charged White with two counts of breach of privacy
for White unlawfully disseminating the illicit video and photographs to Sarah in June
2021 and also five counts of stalking in violation of a protective order. The State later
amended the charges to two counts of breach of privacy, four counts of stalking, one
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count each of rape and aggravated battery for the incident on December 4, 2019, and one
count of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement for the incident in
June 2021. All but the final count were charged as domestic violence offenses.
Before trial, the State moved for the admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence, which
primarily consisted of texts and emails White sent to Sarah. The State indicated that the
evidence would be used to show intent, motive, and the ongoing nature of White's
repeated, unwanted communications to Sarah. The district court held two pretrial
hearings on the State's proposed K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. At the first hearing, the district
court found that several proposed exhibits were admissible as direct evidence for the
charged offenses or were otherwise agreed to be admissible. The district court then set
another hearing to rule on the remainder of the State's proposed evidence. Before the
second hearing, the State provided White's counsel with nearly 300 pages of proposed
exhibits, primarily consisting of texts and emails White had sent to Sarah. White's
counsel reviewed these materials and agreed that some of the evidence was admissible as
evidence of charged conduct, but he also provided written objections to much of the
proposed evidence on a variety of different grounds.
At the second hearing, the district court explained that it had reviewed the nearly
300 pages of proposed evidence the State had submitted, as well as White's objections to
it. The district court stated that it was not inclined to go through all of the State's
proposed evidence because doing so would not be an efficient method of addressing the
matter, noting that many of White's objections shared common themes. That said, the
State agreed that certain exhibits that it had proposed would likely be inadmissible. In
response to the district court's comment that it did not plan to go through every exhibit on
the record at the hearing because of the common substance of the exhibits, White's
counsel replied, "That is correct, Judge." White's counsel also conceded that some of his
objections were likely premature and would need to be addressed at trial based on how
the evidence developed. After reiterating that it had reviewed all of the proposed exhibits,
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the district court repeated its belief that addressing every item of communication was not
reasonable or efficient, and noted that it would need to review the full context of the
communications rather than simply viewing each message in isolation.
In short, the district court ruled that except for the messages that the State agreed it
was no longer seeking to admit, most of the rest of the communications from White
would likely be admissible at trial. In announcing its ruling, the district court cited and
applied the applicable test governing the admissibility of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence.
The jury trial began in July 2024. The State's case relied heavily on Sarah's
account of the events on December 4, 2019, and White's pattern of harassment. But
Sarah's testimony was also corroborated by her friend and several law enforcement
officers. Throughout the State's presentation of its case, White repeatedly objected to
pieces of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence as the State introduced them. White testified in his own
defense, telling the jury that the entire encounter on December 4, 2019, was consensual.
He claimed that he and Sarah had frequently met in the parking lot of the hospital to have
sex, and that the December 4 occasion was not unlike any of their prior consensual
encounters. He denied causing any physical injuries to Sarah during the encounter. White
admitted that he had repeatedly contacted Sarah after he was served the protect ion
order—he explained that he did so because he loved her and hoped he could rekindle
their relationship. He also admitted that he was driving the car on the day the police tried
to stop him but claimed he did not stop because he did not see or hear the officer. After
hearing the evidence, the jury found White guilty as charged on all counts.
In November 2024, the district court sentenced White to consecutive terms of 285
months' imprisonment for the rape conviction, 11 months' imprisonment for the
aggravated battery conviction, 7 months' imprisonment for each of the two breach of
privacy convictions, and 5 months' imprisonment for each of the four stalking convictions
for a controlling term of 330 months' imprisonment. The district court also imposed a
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concurrent 6-month jail sentence for the misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude law
enforcement conviction. The journal entry of judgment assessed a witness fee of $80 and
a bond forfeiture alias warrant (B.F.A.W.) fee of $96.50, although neither fee was
addressed at the sentencing hearing. White timely appealed the district court's judgment.
ANALYSIS
Did the State present sufficient evidence to sustain White's convictions for breach of
privacy?
White first claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions of breach of privacy because there was no evidence to establish that he
disseminated the photos and video of Sarah. He contends that under the plain meaning of
the word disseminate, as used in K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8), he could not be convicted for
merely sending photos and videos privately to Sarah without also sending them to a third
party. The State contends that it presented sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, to support White's breach of privacy convictions. Relying on
State v. Jamil, No. 127,664, 2026 WL 632202 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev.
denied 322 Kan. ___ (2026), the State maintains that White's act of sending the sexually
explicit material to Sarah was sufficient to constitute dissemination.
"'When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh
evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses.'
[Citations omitted.]" State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 723, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).
To the extent that this court must engage in statutory interpretation of the language
of K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8) to analyze White's argument, we exercise unlimited review. See
State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 197, 514 P.3d 341 (2022). The most fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that the intent of the Kansas Legislature governs so long as that
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intent can be established. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). This
court will first determine legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving
common words their ordinary meanings. 315 Kan. at 698. Unless the statute is
ambiguous, appellate courts need not resort to canons of statutory construction or
legislative history to determine the legislative intent. Betts, 316 Kan. at 198.
The offense of breach of privacy, as defined in K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8), provides:
"(a) Breach of privacy is knowingly and without lawful authority:
....
(8) disseminating any videotape, photograph, film or image of another
identifiable person 18 years of age or older who is nude or engaged in sexual activity and
under circumstances in which such identifiable person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, with the intent to harass, threaten or intimidate such identifiable person, and such
identifiable person did not consent to such dissemination."
The only element of the offense that White challenges on appeal is whether the
State produced evidence that he disseminated the sexually explicit photographs and video
of Sarah as required under the statute by sending the material only to Sarah without also
sending it to a third party. White reasons that the statute's use of the term "disseminating"
indicates that the offense is targeted at an offender sharing any image, video, or other
recording to someone beyond the person depicted. White refers to some selected
dictionary definitions of the term "disseminate" that, according to White, show that the
term means "more than just sharing between two people—particularly the two people
who created and/or are the people depicted in the shared media."
According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, the ordinary dictionary
meaning of disseminate includes "to spread" or "to disperse," without any requirement of
widespread circulation. And according to Black's Law Dictionary, "dissemination" means
"[t]he act of spreading, diffusing, or dispersing; esp., the circulation of defamatory
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matter." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (12th ed. 2024). Based on White's understanding of
these definitions, a person cannot be found guilty of breach of privacy by sending illicit
photos or videos only to a person who is depicted in them.
The State's brief rests almost entirely on this court's recent decision in Jamil in
which this court construed the term "disseminating" in K.S.A. 21-6801(a)(8). 2026 WL
632202, at *3-5. The facts in that case are important. In Jamil, the defendant took some
illicit videos and photographs of his then-girlfriend without her consent or knowledge.
The defendant later shared the illicit material with the victim's new boyfriend via a
Facebook message, for which he was charged and convicted of breach of privacy in
violation of K.S.A. 21-6801(a)(8). The Jamil panel rejected the defendant's argument that
the statutory term "disseminating" requires a widespread distribution of the material and
that sharing it with only one person was legally insufficient. 2026 WL 632202, at *3 -5.
The panel noted that K.S.A. 21-6801(a)(8) does not define the term "disseminating" but
found that "the lack of a statutory definition or jury instruction defining the term does not
prevent a jury from applying its common meaning." 2026 WL 632202, at *4. The panel
noted that even if it strictly applied the dictionary definitions of the term "disseminate,"
none of those definitions actually "require[s] any specific number of instances of sharing
the materials to satisfy the term[.]" 2026 WL 632202, at *4. The panel concluded that a
jury is "allowed to its 'common knowledge and experience' when considering evidence
and 'may apply [its] understanding of the common, ordinary words.'" 2026 WL 632202,
at *5 (quoting State v. Hambright, 318 Kan. 603, 607-08, 545 P.3d 605 [2024]).
We take no issue with the holding in Jamil limited to the facts of that case. The
Jamil panel construed the term "disseminating" in K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8) and correctly
decided that the term does not require widespread distribution of illicit material and can
be satisfied when the material is sent to only one person. But Jamil is factually
distinguishable because the victim in that case did not know she was being recorded and
the illicit material was later sent to the victim's boyfriend, i.e., someone other than the
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person depicted in the illicit material. Here Sarah consented to the photos being taken and
the video being made. White later emailed and texted the sexually explicit material only
to Sarah. How did that conduct breach Sarah's privacy?
K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8) proscribes breach of privacy and forbids a person from
disseminating certain illicit material under circumstances in which an identifiable person
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with the intent to harass or intimidate the victim.
Sarah had an expectation of privacy as to the photos and the video to the extent that she
could reasonably expect that no one other than she and White would ever see the sexually
explicit images. White did not violate that expectation of privacy. The evidence showed
that White transmitted the sexually explicit material to Sarah with the intent to harass her.
But for there to be a breach of privacy under K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8), the term
"disseminating" requires that the illicit material be sent to someone other than the person
depicted in the material and who consented to the illicit material being made. White's
conduct here more than likely constituted harassment by telecommunication device in
violation of K.S.A. 21-6206, but we find it did not constitute breach of privacy.
Thus, we agree with White that the evidence the State presented at trial, even
considered in the light most favorable to the State, was insufficient to sustain his
convictions of breach of privacy in violation of K.S.A. 21-6101(a)(8). We reverse
White's breach of privacy convictions, vacate his sentences resulting from those
convictions, and remand the case with directions for the district court to enter an
amended journal entry of judgment striking the convictions and sentences, reducing
White's controlling sentence on his felony convictions to 316 months' imprisonment.
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Did the district court abuse its discretion by allegedly issuing a blanket ruling on the
admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence during a pretrial hearing?
White next claims the district court abused its discretion by issuing a blanket
ruling on the admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence during a pretrial hearing. White does
not focus on the admissibility of any individual piece of evidence. He contends the
district court abused its discretion, not because any of the K.S.A. 60-455 evidence should
have been declared inadmissible but because it declined to "consider each piece of
evidence individually" and instead "issued a blanket ruling" at the pretrial hearing. The
State asserts that the district court did not issue a blanket ruling, arguing the court
thoroughly reviewed the exhibits at the pretrial hearing and considered White's
objections, and that it applied the proper test before admitting any evidence at trial.
The parties agree that we should review this issue under an abuse of discretion
standard. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful,
or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact.
State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). The party asserting the
district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing it. State v. Peters, 319
Kan. 492, 497-98, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024).
K.S.A. 60-455 sets out the rules for admitting evidence relating to a person's past
wrongdoing. Subsection (a) generally prohibits evidence of a person's crime or civil
wrongs on a particular occasion from being used as proof of that person's tendency to
commit another crime or civil wrong on a separate occasion. Before admitting evidence
under K.S.A. 60-455, a district court must analyze the materiality of the other crimes
evidence, evaluate whether the material facts are disputed and the evidence would thus be
probative, and weigh the prejudice of the other crime evidence against its probative
value. Then the judge must consider instructions to the jury about how it can consider the
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prior crime evidence and reasons it cannot consider the evidence. State v. Torres, 294
Kan. 135, 139, 273 P.3d 729 (2012).
Under the first step of the analysis, the district court "must determine whether the
fact to be proven is material, meaning that this fact has some real bearing on the decision
in the case. The appellate court reviews this determination independently, without any
required deference to the district court." 294 Kan. at 139. Under the second step, the
district court "must determine whether the material fact is disputed and, if so, whether the
evidence is relevant to prove the disputed material fact. . . . The appellate court reviews
this determination only for abuse of discretion." 294 Kan. at 139-40. Under the third step,
the district court "must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the potential for undue prejudice against the defendant. The appellate court also reviews
this determination only for abuse of discretion." 294 Kan. at 140.
We begin by observing that the K.S.A. 60-455 evidence that the State offered in
White's case did not involve his conviction of any prior crimes. Instead, the evidence
consisted of texts and emails White sent to Sarah, offered to show intent, motive , and the
ongoing nature of their relationship. White complains on appeal that the district court
issued a "blanket ruling" on the admissibility of the evidence at a pretrial hearing without
analyzing each exhibit on the record. He cites State v. Horton, 292 Kan. 437, 440, 254
P.3d 1264 (2011), for the proposition that "[i]t is an abuse of discretion for a district court
to issue a 'blanket ruling' that disposes of a discretionary determination automatically
without analyzing the factors that would enter into the discretionary decision." Horton
does not involve the admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence.
Here, the district court made it clear that it had reviewed all the proposed exhibits
submitted by the State and walked through the steps for the admission of K.S.A. 60-455
evidence at the pretrial hearing. The district court asked the parties to address certain
exhibits that it had questions about, and it allowed both parties to fully present their
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arguments. The district court explained that there were overarching themes or categories
to White's objections, a point with which White's counsel agreed. The district court noted
that in ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits, it was important to consider the
messages in their full context. And perhaps most importantly, the district court expressly
applied the three-prong test governing K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. The district court
concluded that the evidence was material and disputed, that the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial, and that the evidence could show identity, motive, and intent.
The district court also gave a limiting instruction on how the jury should consider the
evidence. While the district court did not address each piece of evidence individually, it
cannot be said that the court abused its discretion and simply automatically permitted the
State to proceed with its proposed K.S.A. 60-455 evidence.
As noted above, White could object to the admission to the State's K.S.A. 60-455
evidence as it was presented at trial—and, as he cites in his brief, he repeatedly did so
throughout the trial. That said, none of these objections were made on the grounds that
the evidence was improperly admitted under K.S.A. 60-455—the vast majority of White's
objections were on the grounds of relevance, foundation, and speculation, though he did
also periodically allude to his pretrial arguments in his objections. While the district court
may have declined to individually assess each piece of evidence during the pretrial
hearing, it addressed each of White's objections as the evidence was introduced at trial.
After all, the district court's ruling at the pretrial hearing was never intended to be its final
ruling on the admission of the K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. See State v. Barber, 302 Kan.
367, 373, 353 P.3d 1108 (2015) (stating party must object to admission of K.S.A. 60-455
evidence at trial even if the trial court had issued a pretrial ruling on the matter).
To the extent White is arguing that the district court erred by making a blanket
ruling regarding the K.S.A. 60-455 evidence, he is entitled to no relief because the record
shows that the court adequately analyzed the evidence at the pretrial hearing and then
individually addressed evidence as it was presented at trial, on the grounds that White's
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counsel objected to it. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in the
manner that it ruled on the State's pretrial motion to offer evidence under K.S.A. 60-455.
Did the State commit prosecutorial error during closing argument?
White next claims the State committed prosecutorial error during closing argument
by stating that Sarah was seeking justice and that White would not stop his conduct
towards Sarah until justice was served—he contends these statements were intended to
inflame the passions of the jury and thus denied him a fair trial. The State contends that
the prosecutor's comments were proper when viewed in context. Alternatively, the State
argues there is no reasonable possibility that any error affected the verdict.
Appellate courts use a two-step process to analyze claims of prosecutorial error.
First, to determine whether an error occurred, this court must "decide whether 'the act
complained of falls outside the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors to conduct the
State's case in a way that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial.'" State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905, 910, 468 P.3d 323 (2020). In determining whether
a prosecutor's statement "falls outside of the wide latitude given to prosecutors, the court
considers the context in which the statement was made, rather than analyzing the
statement in isolation." State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216, 221, 445 P.3d 726 (2019).
If an error occurred, the next step is to determine whether it prejudiced the
defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d
1060 (2016). In doing so, this court will use the constitutional harmlessness inquiry set
forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).
Under this inquiry, prosecutorial error is harmless "if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the
trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the verdict.'" Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109.
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White argues the prosecutor erred by referring to Sarah's pursuit of justice because
the statements were aimed at improperly distracting the jury from its duty to determine
whether he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the prosecutor linked
Sarah's pursuit of justice to the jury's task of deciding his guilt, effectively telling the jury
that it must find him guilty to serve the ends of justice. White highlights the following
portion of the prosecutor's closing argument:
"But later on, she's kind of going around and seeing where he's at, trying to report
this. This is kind of one of those 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' sort of
situations. Because here she is, year or more after all of this is occurring, and nobody
seems to be helping her, and she's desperately trying to find safety and peace. And
sometimes she had to be a little risky about that herself, because [White] wasn't being
held accountable. He's still out there. He's still harassing her.
"So, yeah, she's going out there. She's trying to help the police find him. You
hear anything about her going and confronting him just by herself? No. She has [a friend]
with her as well. He's a big guy. She's got some protection. She's calling the cops, saying,
'Hey, here he is.' She's waiting for the police to arrive. She's not trying to confront him
herself.
"Again, is this the greatest behavior ever? No, but what is she supposed to do
when nobody seems to be helping her, that people who are supposed to be helping her
don't seem to be doing it? Is that her fault? No. She's just looking for justice.
"And, ladies and gentlemen, she's still looking for justice. I ask you to go back
there, to carefully consider all of the evidence, all of the exhibits, and find that the
defendant raped her on December 4th, 2019, when everything changed. That's why
everything changed, that he battered her, that he had stalked her, that he ran from the
police. I didn't really cover that one, but do I need to?
"And I'd ask you to find him guilty as charged of all the counts. Thank you very
much." (Emphases added.)
White is correct that a prosecutor is not permitted to ask the jury to convict a
defendant to give a victim justice. See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 298 Kan. 1059, 1073,
322 P.3d 1016 (2014). But a fair reading of the prosecutor's entire argument shows that is
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not what occurred here. While the prosecutor emphasized Sarah's determination to have
White prosecuted, he did not directly ask the jury to convict White to provide justice for
Sarah. As the State notes, one of White's trial counsel's defense strategies entailed
focusing on the timeline of when Sarah had reported the rape and the circumstances
surrounding the assault. After White's counsel had highlighted the delay in reporting the
sexual assault in his opening statements, the State attempted to address the matter in
closing argument. The prosecutor appears to have tried to explain why Sarah decided it
was necessary to come forward after she first delayed reporting the crimes.
There is a fine line between permissibly referring to a victim's pursuit of justice
and impermissibly attempting to influence the jurors' guilt determination by inflaming
their passions. As the Kansas Supreme Court has observed:
"[I]t is permissible, if not expected, for a prosecutor to argue for justice in general, i.e.,
justice for the citizenry of the State of Kansas. One can certainly perceive a distinction
when the argument is asking for justice for the specific victim. After all, the plaintiff in a
criminal case is the State of Kansas, unlike a wrongful death civil lawsuit. Nevertheless,
we are loathe to draw a bright line. As a practical matter, a criminal case cannot be
completely divorced from the victim. Perhaps the touchstone is whether the argument
seeks to divert the jury from the evidence so as to obtain a con viction based upon
sympathy for the victim." State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 425, 172 P.3d 1165 (2007).
Here, the prosecutor highlighted Sarah's actions in pursuing a prosecution of
White, but there is nothing to support that he attempted to divert the jury from the
evidence. A fair reading of the record shows that most of his closing argument was
devoted to a discussion of the evidence the State presented at trial that supported each of
the charged crimes. And at the end of both portions of his closing argument, the
prosecutor expressly linked his request for a guilty verdict to the evidence, encouraging
the jurors to carefully consider the evidence. We conclude the prosecutor's comments
were within the wide latitude afforded the State in crafting a closing argument.
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Alternatively, we find the State has met its burden of showing there is no
reasonable possibility that any error affected the verdict. The evidence against White was
substantial and corroborated by more than Sarah's testimony. The prosecutor reminded
the jury many times to render a verdict based solely on the evidence. White did not object
at trial to any of the prosecutor's statements he now argues were erroneous, which
although is unnecessary for preservation, may factor into the analysis of the alleged error.
State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021). Finally, the jurors were
instructed that their verdict must be based on the evidence and the law. Jurors are
presumed to follow the district court's instructions. State v. Brown, 321 Kan. 1, 26, 573
P.3d 237 (2025). We conclude that any potential prosecutorial error in closing argument
did not affect the verdict and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt .
Did cumulative error deprive White of his right to a fair trial?
White next argues that even if the above errors are not individually reversible, the
cumulative effect of the errors denied him a fair trial. Cumulative trial errors, when
considered together, may require reversal of the defendant's conviction when the totality
of the circumstances establish that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the
errors and denied a fair trial. In assessing the cumulative effect of errors during the trial,
appellate courts examine the errors in context and consider how the trial judge dealt with
the errors as they arose; the nature and number of errors and whether they are
interrelated; and the overall strength of the evidence. If any of the errors being aggregated
are constitutional, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the cumulative
effect of the errors did not affect the outcome. State v. Bobian, 321 Kan. 169, 185-86, 574
P.3d 385 (2025). Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review to determine
whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced and denied a fair trial due to
cumulative error. State v. Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 505, 501 P.3d 368 (2021).
17
White's breach of privacy convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence,
and we have reversed those convictions and vacated the sentences. At best, White has
shown only one possible trial error, that being the harmless prosecutorial error during
closing argument. But the cumulative error rule does not apply if there are no trial errors
or only a single error. State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. 357, 371, 580 P.3d 20 (2025). White is
entitled to no relief under the cumulative error rule.
Did the district court err by assessing witness and B.F.A.W. fees?
Finally, White claims the district court erroneously included an $80 witness fee
and a $96.50 B.F.A.W. fee in the journal entry of judgment without ever mentioning or
assessing those fees at sentencing. The State concedes this error and agrees the district
court should file an amended journal entry vacating the fees.
"During sentencing, the judge's oral pronouncement is controlling, not the journal
entry." State v. Edwards, 309 Kan. 830, 835, 440 P.3d 557 (2019). Resolution of this
issue requires statutory interpretation, a question of law over which an appellate court has
unlimited review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024).
Upon a criminal conviction, court costs "shall be taxed against the defendant."
K.S.A. 22-3801(a). K.S.A. 28-172a sets out the fees that may be assessed in criminal
proceedings. K.S.A. 28-172a(d) provides: "All other fees and expenses to be assessed as
additional court costs shall be approved by the court, unless specifically fixed by statute."
In interpreting this provision, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that "docket fees and
other costs that are specifically fixed by statute must be taxed against the defendant, but
that other fees to be assessed as court costs need to be approved by the district court
before they are taxed." State v. Alvarez, 309 Kan. 203, 208, 432 P.3d 1015 (2019). The
witness fee and the