State v. Stryker
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket130210
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Nos. 130,210
130,211
130,212
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
DOYLE ALLEN STRYKER,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Osage District Court; TAYLOR J. WINE, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
Submitted by the parties for summary disposition under K.S.A. 21-6820(g) and (h).
Before SCHROEDER, P.J., GARDNER and CLINE, JJ.
CLINE, J.: Doyle Allen Stryker appeals his sentence, seeking additional jail credit
and claiming the district court erred in not imposing the sentence in his plea agreement.
We granted Stryker's request for summary disposition of his appeal under Kansas
Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). After reviewing the record, this
appeal is affirmed in part and dismissed in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction on the
remaining issue.
In Case 1, the State charged Stryker with several crimes that occurred on
September 5, 2024. In Case 2, the State charged Stryker with more crimes, which
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occurred on August 29 and 30, 2024. And in Case 3, the State charged Stryker with one
crime that occurred between May 1, 2024, and August 31, 2024.
In August 2025, the parties entered a global plea agreement—resolving all three
cases—in which Stryker agreed to plead no contest to three counts of aggravated assault,
a severity level 7 person felony, in exchange for a recommended 96-month prison
sentence and all remaining counts being dismissed. At sentencing in December 2025, the
district court instead imposed the aggravated presumptive sentence on each count—34
months—followed by 12 months' postrelease supervision, to be run consecutively,
resulting in a controlling 102-month sentence.
We have no jurisdiction over Stryker's challenge to his presumptive sentence.
Stryker now appeals, arguing that although the district court imposed a sentence
within the presumptive range, it erred by failing to impose the jointly recommended
sentence. We may only consider Stryker's claim if we first determine that this court
maintains jurisdiction over his appeal. See State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831, 840-41, 247
P.3d 1043 (2011).
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law, subject to unlimited appellate
review. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 327 P.3d 425 (2014). To the extent that this
question requires us to interpret the sentencing statutes, our review is similarly unlimited.
State v. Moore, 309 Kan. 825, 828, 441 P.3d 22 (2019).
The Revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A. 21-6801 et seq., details a
defendant's right to appeal their sentence. Under K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1), an appellate court
cannot review: "Any sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime." A
"'presumptive sentence'" is defined as "the sentence provided in a grid block for an
offender classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime severity ranking
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of the offender's current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history." K.S.A.
21-6803(q).
Here, the district court imposed an underlying prison sentence of 34 months in
each case, which was the aggravated presumptive term given Stryker's crime and criminal
history score under K.S.A. 21-6804. We therefore have no jurisdiction to consider
Stryker's claim that the district court should have imposed the joint recommendation. See
State v. Farmer, 312 Kan. 761, 764, 480 P.3d 155 (2021) (holding that appellate courts
lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to denial of motions for departure sentence
because courts lack jurisdiction to consider appeals from presumptive sentences). We
must therefore dismiss Stryker's appeal as it pertains to the imposition of a presumptive
sentence.
Stryker is not entitled to additional jail credit.
Stryker also appeals the district court's calculation of jail credit. Statutory
interpretation presents a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited
review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024).
Under K.S.A. 21-6615, for crimes committed before May 23, 2024, defendants in
criminal cases were "entitled to jail time credit against his . . . sentence for all time spent
incarcerated while the defendant's case was pending disposition," even if "the defendant
received a credit for some or all that time against a sentence in another case." State v.
Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, Syl., 537 P.3d 845 (2023); State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, Syl.
¶ 12, 566 P.3d 481 (2025); see L. 2024, ch. 96, §7. However, for crimes committed after
May 23, 2024, defendants in criminal cases are barred from receiving, as jail credit, any
time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed. K.S.A.
2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A) (effective May 23, 2024).
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Stryker contends he is entitled to additional jail credit because he alleges that the
crime he committed in Case 3 was committed before May 23, 2024. This argument is
based on the third amended complaint filed in October 2025 in Case 3, which lists the
date of his crime as occurring between May 1, 2024, and August 31, 2024.
Before addressing Stryker's claim, we pause to clarify an irregularity in the record
in Case 3. At the plea hearing on August 25, 2025, Stryker pleaded no contest to the
crime alleged in the State's second amended complaint in Case 3. But the second
amended complaint mistakenly lists the date of Stryker's crime in that case as occurring
on August 2, 2025. When reviewing the affidavit of probable cause in that case, the
victim reports the crime occurred on August 2, 2024. And, as noted later, Stryker was
given jail credit in Case 3 from December 16, 2024, through December 1, 2025, meaning
he was in custody on August 2, 2025, and therefore could not have committed his crime
on that date. We therefore analyze Stryker's argument based on the date range for his
crime alleged in the third amended complaint in Case 3.
The charged offenses in Case 1 and Case 2 were alleged to have occurred after
May 23, 2024—in September 2024 and August 2024, respectively. And, based on the
date range in the third amended complaint in Case 3, the crime in that case occurred
sometime between May 1, 2024, and August 31, 2024. As for jail credit, in Case 1,
Stryker received jail credit from September 5, 2024, through September 13, 2024. In
Case 2, he received jail credit from September 13, 2024, through December 16, 2024. In
Case 3, he received jail credit from December 16, 2024, through December 1, 2025.
Stryker thus received credit for each day he spent in jail from September 5, 2024, through
his sentencing on December 1, 2025.
Stryker argues that he should be awarded all jail credit in Case 1 and then that jail
credit should be duplicated in Case 3, because the crime in Case 3 was arguably
committed before May 23, 2024, based on the date range for his crime in the third
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amended complaint being May 1, 2024, through August 31, 2024. This would give him
additional jail credit in Case 3 for the time he spent incarcerated from September 5, 2024,
through December 16, 2024, and it would duplicate the credit in Case 1 awarded in Case
2 for his time spent incarcerated from September 13, 2024, through December 16, 2024.
Stryker is not entitled to either of the requested categories of jail credit. First, the
district court imposed consecutive sentences between all three of Stryker's cases. This
nullified his right to duplicative credit in Cases 1 and 2 because the crimes in those cases
occurred after the May 23, 2024 amendment to K.S.A. 21-6615. Next, while the third
amended complaint indicates the crime in Case 3 could have occurred before the May 23,
2024 amendment, Stryker was not charged until December 10, 2024, and the arrest
warrant was not served until December 16, 2024. Thus, the time he spent incarcerated
between September 5, 2024, and December 16, 2024, was not time spent incarcerated
while Case 3 was pending disposition, so the district court did not err in denying Stryker's
request to be awarded additional jail credit in Case 3 and duplicative jail credit in Case 1.
And we note that even if we considered Stryker's jail credit claim based on the date of the
crime he pleaded to in Case 3—which was August 2, 2025—he would not be entitled to
jail credit because that date was after the May 23, 2024 amendment.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
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