State v. Mwenye

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,976 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. OWEN MWENYE, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER MAGANA, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed October 30, 2026. Affirmed. Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Daniel Wells, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before SCHROEDER, P.J., PICKERING and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ. PER CURIAM: Owen Mwenye was convicted by a jury of rape. On appeal, he first argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence that required the State to file a pretrial motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455. The evidence at issue was a text message soliciting a sexual act that Mwenye sent to a witness on the same evening the rape was committed. Mwenye argues that this text message constituted evidence "that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion" under K.S.A. 60-455(a), and K.S.A. 60-455(e) required the State to "disclose the evidence to the defendant" at least 10 days before trial. We are unpersuaded by Mwenye's argument. His text message 1 soliciting a sexual act was not a prior crime or civil wrong that required disclosure by the State under K.S.A. 60-455(e). Second, Mwenye alleges that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him on his knowledge of the English language. Mwenye argues that the prosecutor's questions were not relevant and that the questions were also highly prejudicial. We find that as to relevance, Mwenye made his fluency in English relevant by his own testimony. Mwenye's defense theory was that the victim consented to sexual intercourse and lied about being raped to save her marriage. Mwenye believed that many of the eyewitnesses were motivated to testify against him because they were not from his country of Malawi, and they communicated in their own language—Swahili. The prosecutor's questions demonstrated that Mwenye was able to communicate to the victim, eyewitnesses, and others in English, controverting his defense theory. Finally, Mwenye's argument that the prosecutor's questions were overly prejudicial was not properly preserved for appeal under K.S.A. 60-404, because his evidentiary objection was made on a different ground. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A jury convicted Mwenye of two alternative counts of rape—one based on the theory that the victim, "Sue," had been overcome by force or fear, and the other based on the theory that Sue was unable to consent due to her intoxication. The events leading up to Mwenye's conviction were described by various witnesses at his jury trial, and we summarize the testimony and evidence relevant to this appeal here. Sue testified at trial that on the evening in question, she had dinner with her friends Martha and Joan. After the dinner ended around 11 p.m., the group went to a local bar where they met a few other people including Sue's brother-in-law and his wife. 2  Later, Sue's friends Sandra and Melinda joined the group, as did a few others. Sue recalled that Mwenye was also at the bar. Mwenye approached Sue, and the two had a casual conversation about Mwenye's sister-in-law, who was Sue's friend. Sue believed that in addition to a glass of wine at dinner, she consumed approximately four alcoholic beverages while at the bar. The group remained at the bar until it closed around 1:30 a.m., at which time Sue's brother-in-law invited the group to his home for more drinks and dancing. Sue and her group of friends agreed to go. After leaving the bar, Sue and her friends remained outside for a few minutes visiting. Mwenye was also present outside of the bar. Sue noticed Mwenye had been speaking with her friend, Melinda, and knew that he had asked Melinda if he could go to the party with her. Mwenye ended up traveling in a different vehicle. Sue rode with Melinda and Sandra to the brother-in-law's home, where a party was going on in a basement living room. In addition to the living room, the basement also had two bedrooms, one bathroom, and a laundry room. Sue testified that her brother-in-law, his wife, Mwenye, Melinda, Sandra, Joan, Sandra's two cousins, and a few others were all present at the party. Sue thought around 14 people were present in total. Once in the basement, Sue said she danced with her brother-in-law and Sandra but did not consume any additional alcohol. Sue testified that she did not talk to or dance with Mwenye. After about an hour of dancing, Sue sat down on a couch next to Joan and Martha. Sue believed she passed out while still sitting on the couch. Sue recalled "seeing the carpet and walking" and then seeing a comforter on a bed. She believed that someone assisted her to a basement bedroom. Sue stated that the next thing she could remember was seeing a light and Sandra. At that point, Sue noticed that someone was on top of her. Sue initially thought the person was her husband. Sue 3 recalled that Sandra was pushed by the person on top of her. She also remembered that her friend Joan came into the bedroom and kicked the person on top of her. Sue then looked at the person on top of her and realized that it was Mwenye. Sue also realized that Mwenye's penis was inside her vagina. She did not remember removing her pants or underwear. Sue then pushed Mwenye who pushed her back. Sue said Mwenye used force to remain inside of her. Mwenye also kicked the door so others could not enter the room. Sue was eventually able to push Mwenye out of the way and move toward the bedroom door. She realized at that point that she was not wearing any pants and that Mwenye was only wearing a shirt. As Sue was standing near the door, Mwenye offered to perform oral sex on Sue, but then quickly left the room and exited the house. Sue stated that she picked up a hand weight and attempted to follow Mwenye to confront him but was unsuccessful. Sue's friends located her walking down the street and assisted her. Sue reported the incident to law enforcement and was examined by medical personnel. Sue's friend, Sandra, also testified. She described that she was at a bar with Sue, Joan, Martha, and Melinda. Mwenye was also there. Sandra remembered speaking with Mwenye and specifically recalled that Mwenye asked if Melinda was seeing anyone. Melinda made it clear to Sandra that she was not interested in Mwenye. After the bar closed, Sandra saw Mwenye outside the bar. Sandra testified that Mwenye wanted to ride with Melinda and Sue to the party, but he ultimately rode in another vehicle. After some time at the party, Sandra noticed that Sue was asleep on the couch. Sandra wanted to stay at the party awhile longer and asked the brother-in-law if there was somewhere where Sue could sleep. The brother-in-law offered to put Sue in a bedroom that was used as a "gym room," and he helped Sandra move some gym equipment and set up an air mattress. Sandra believed that the brother-in-law helped her move Sue to the room. When Sandra left Sue, she was fully dressed and no one else was in the room. 4  Sandra returned to the party. About 15 to 20 minutes later, Sandra checked on Sue and found Mwenye on top of her, and both were undressed from the waist down. Sandra began calling out Sue's name, but she did not respond. Sandra testified that Mwenye stated, "'Sandra, leave us alone,'" to which Sandra responded, "'Owen, please. What's going on?'" Mwenye replied, "'Sandra, get off here.'" Sandra testified that she attempted to open the door further, but Mwenye pushed it shut. Sandra called others for help and then sat on the floor of the basement bathroom, crying. Melinda also testified at trial. Melinda noted that Mwenye was at the bar that night and that she had previously exchanged text messages with him. Melinda testified about a text message she received from Mwenye the same night, prior to arriving at the bar. Melinda recalled that Mwenye asked her in a text message whether he could "eat . . . [her] pussy." Melinda denied ever having received any previous sexual messages from Mwenye. She testified that she was not expecting to receive such a message and replied to Mwenye that she had a boyfriend. Later, at the bar, Melinda danced with Mwenye and she recalled that he was being physical, trying to touch her, but Melinda "shut him down." Melinda also testified that she drove Sue and Sandra to the party. She described that the party was in the basement and there were approximately 12 to 15 people present. Melinda and others danced, and eventually, Melinda noticed that Sue was sleeping on a couch. Melinda testified that Sue was taken to a basement bedroom by others and was fully clothed at that time. Later, Melinda saw Mwenye on top of Sue in the bedroom. She described that as she was looking in to see what was happening, Mwenye used his leg to try to shut the door. Melinda went to find Sandra to help. Melinda recalled that Sandra came to see what was happening, as did others. As people arrived to the bedroom, Mwenye put on his clothes and ran out of the house. Sue was crying and stated that Mwenye had raped her. Sue picked up a hand weight and left the house, trying to find Mwenye. Later, Melinda and others picked up Sue and took her to the hospital. 5  Mwenye testified in his own defense. Mwenye took his witness oath and began his direct examination testimony in English, but after a few statements, he testified through an interpreter. Mwenye stated that his primary language was Chichewa. Mwenye explained that he was from Malawi, while the rest of the people associated with the case were from Kenya and Tanzania, where the primary language was Swahili. Mwenye testified that he could only understand a small amount of Swahili. On cross-examination, Mwenye stated he has been in the United States since 2017 and attended college at Butler County Community College. Mwenye admitted his college classes were not instructed in Chichewa. Mwenye also admitted that on a day-to-day basis, he used English to converse but stated he "does it not well." Mwenye also testified that he worked at the "Butler library" and assisted patrons using English. Mwenye also noted that prior to the interpreter entering the trial proceedings, he had been able to observe the trial which was conducted in English. Mwenye also admitted that he sent a text message to Melinda in English asking to perform a sexual act. Defense counsel objected to the State's questions about Mwenye's use of English, citing "relevance" as the basis for the objection. The district court overruled the objection. Mwenye acknowledged being at the bar that evening and testified that he danced with Sue, Melinda, and Sandra. Mwenye denied pursuing Melinda romantically but admitted he sent a text message asking to perform oral sex on her, though he claimed it was a joke. Mwenye testified that while he had consumed alcohol at the bar, he was not intoxicated. He stated that as the bar closed, Sue invited him to an after party at her brother-in-law's home. Mwenye recalled that there were around 15 people at the party. Mwenye believed that because Sue invited him to the party, she was interested in him. He testified that Sue was dancing, and when she was done, she sat next to him on a couch and began talking to him about having sex. Mwenye claimed that Sue told him she would leave the living room and go to a bedroom and he should follow her. He stated that after Sue stood up and 6 left he followed her into a bedroom. Mwenye testified that Sue was able to walk to the room on her own. Mwenye claimed that he did not know Sue was married. Mwenye denied observing any signs that Sue was intoxicated and did not believe she was slurring her words. Once in the bedroom, Mwenye said Sue was awake and called his name. Mwenye stated that he closed the door and Sue pushed her pants and underwear down to her knees. Mwenye testified that he had no reason to believe Sue was not consenting to sexual contact. Mwenye recalled that Sue asked him if he had a condom. He did not, and stated that Sue told him, "'We can still have sex, but don't finish in me.'" Mwenye said after performing oral sex on Sue, they began to have sexual intercourse, but Sandra came to the door, yelling Sue's name, and saying her brother-in- law was on his way. Mwenye said Sue was scared, and they both started putting on their clothes. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Mwenye of rape as charged in both alternative counts. Mwenye was sentenced to 165 months in prison. ANALYSIS DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MWENYE'S TEXT MESSAGE TO MELINDA? Mwenye's first argument on appeal is that the district court erred in allowing Melinda to testify about a text message she received from Mwenye. The parties agree that Mwenye sent Melinda an unsolicited text message prior to arriving at the bar on the night of the incident. Melinda testified that the message was a request from Mwenye to perform oral sex on her. On appeal, Mwenye argues that the text message should have been considered a prior "crime or civil wrong" that required a K.S.A. 60-455 analysis. 7 Mwenye reasons that because the State did not give the required 10-day notice of the evidence under K.S.A. 60-455(e), the district court erred in allowing Melinda's testimony. The State contends that the district court did not err in overruling Mwenye's objection because the text message is not a prior crime or civil wrong under K.S.A. 60- 455. Standard of Review Whether Mwenye's action in sending the text message to Melinda is a prior crime or civil wrong under K.S.A. 60-455 is a question of law subject to our unlimited review. See State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660, 662, 267 P.3d 743 (2011). Discussion At trial, Melinda was asked about the context of a text message she received from Mwenye, which was a solicitation for a sexual act. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the text was a "prior bad act." In response, the prosecutor stated, "[T]here is nothing inherently wrong with sexually propositioning someone." The district judge ruled, "I would agree that is not a—a bad act. It is not an illegal act. It is, I guess in simplest terms, just an offer or an inquiry for some sort of sexual activity or sexual service. That was declined." Mwenye's "prior bad act" objection was based on K.S.A. 60-455. K.S.A. 60- 455(a) states: "(a) Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, and amendments thereto, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove such person's disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion." 8  However, under K.S.A. 60-455(b), such evidence is admissible "when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident." And under some circumstances, prior bad act evidence may be admissible under K.S.A. 60-455(c) to "show the modus operandi or general method used by a defendant to perpetrate similar but totally unrelated crimes . . . ." Finally, under K.S.A. 60-455(d), when a defendant is charged with a sex offense, "evidence of the defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant and probative." In order for evidence to be offered by the prosecution under any of the provisions of K.S.A. 60-455, "the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses, at least 10 days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause." K.S.A. 60-455(e). And this is the crux of Mwenye's argument: Since the State failed to give notice under K.S.A. 60-455(e) of its intent to offer evidence of Mwenye's prior crime or civil wrong, the district court erred by allowing its admission. The question before us then is whether the text message from Mwenye to Melinda was "a crime or civil wrong" under K.S.A. 60-455. Mwenye argues that while his text message to Melinda was not a crime, K.S.A. 60-455 applies to "actions which could have potentially led to criminal or civil liability." Mwenye cites State v. Evans, 313 Kan. 972, 988, 492 P.3d 418 (2021), in support of his argument. In Evans, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, arson, and aggravated burglary. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion under K.S.A. 60-455 to admit evidence of a series of prior actions by the defendant. These actions included violating a no-trespass order against the victim, violating court orders related to the victim receiving child visitation, solicitation of others 9 to kill the victim, and criminal threats to the victim and his coworkers. 313 Kan. at 988. The district court granted the State's motion to admit the evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed, finding that the acts were relevant to prove motive, intent, and identity under K.S.A. 60-455(b). Evans, 313 Kan. at 992. But Evans does not stand for the point Mwenye cites. Whether any of the defendant's actions were prior crimes or civil wrongs was never at issue. Evans is easily distinguished from the present case. Here, Mwenye sent a text message asking to perform oral sex on Melinda. There was no court order in place prohibiting contact between Mwenye and Melinda. And Mwenye has failed to show that the text message could be considered an uncharged crime or civil wrong. Certainly, two consenting adults could participate in the act described in the text message. Our Supreme Court has provided guidance on this issue. In State v. Campbell, 308 Kan. 763, 773-74, 423 P.3d 539 (2018), the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder of his wife. Prior to trial, the State moved to admit K.S.A. 60-455 evidence that Campbell was "'controlling'" of the victim. 308 Kan. at 771. The State sought to admit evidence that the defendant controlled what the victim could watch on television. The district court admitted the evidence, and Campbell raised the issue on appeal. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed but found the district court was right for the wrong reason. While the evidence was relevant and admissible, it should not have been analyzed under K.S.A. 60-455: "Courts must analyze the specific and concrete evidence in each instance to determine whether the evidence truly qualifies as evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs. Here, evidence that one spouse is 'controlling' of another spouse is evidence of discord, yes, but it is not evidence of a crime or civil wrong. As such, its admission was not properly governed by K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-455." Campbell, 308 Kan. at 773-74. 10  The Kansas Supreme Court has also considered whether consensual, sexual acts between adults may be considered a prior crime or civil wrong. In State v. Sexton, the court held that uncharged sex acts related to bondage were not "governed by K.S.A. 60- 455" because "sexual bondage between consenting adults is neither a crime nor a civil wrong under Kansas law." 256 Kan. 344, 349-50, 886 P.2d 811 (1994). Similarly, Mwenye's characterization of the text message as a prior crime or civil wrong under K.S.A. 60-455 is misplaced. While Mwenye's text message was an invitation to participate in sexual activity, sex between consenting adults is not a crime or civil wrong. 256 Kan. at 349-50. The district court did not err in admitting the evidence because K.S.A. 60-455 was not applicable. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO CROSS-EXAMINE MWENYE REGARDING HIS FLUENCY IN ENGLISH? Next, Mwenye challenges the State's cross-examination of him regarding his ability to understand English. Mwenye makes two separate arguments. First, he argues that the State's questions regarding his English fluency were irrelevant because they had no tendency to prove any material fact. Second, Mwenye argues that the questioning was highly prejudicial. Standard of Review "Relevance has two elements: probative value and materiality. Evidence is probative if it furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof. Probativity is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Evidence is material if it tends to establish a fact that is at issue and is significant under the substantive law of the case. Materiality is reviewed de novo. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Coones, 301 Kan. 64, 78, 339 P.3d 375 (2014). Thus, we review the district court's determination of materiality de novo. State v. McCormick, 305 Kan. 43, 47, 378 P.3d 543 (2016). We review a district court's decisions 11 on the probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Alfaro-Valleda, 314 Kan. 526, 535, 502 P.3d 66 (2022). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). Discussion Mwenye first argues that the district court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask him questions about his understanding of the English language, because those questions were not relevant to any material fact at issue. Under Kansas law, "relevant evidence" is defined as "evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact." K.S.A. 60-401(b). A material fact "'tends to establish a fact that is at issue and is significant under the substantive law of the case.'" McCormick, 305 Kan. at 47. Here, Mwenye used his lack of English proficiency as part of his defense theory. The theory was first introduced in his opening statement, when his attorney stated: "On February 25th of 2023, a woman was caught cheating on her husband. That simple. She did whatever she needed to to protect her marriage, and in doing so, threw the person she was having a consensual relationship with under the bus." The attorney continued: "Now, you'll have to be patient with my client. He has a language barrier. He speaks Chichewa. He's from Malawi. Comparatively, the evidence will show that every other person involved in this case is Kenyan and speaks in Swahili, not Chichewa. 12  "The evidence will show that at the end of the day, my client is an outsider to this group, no matter how much time he spent with all of them. "And at the end of this, I'm going to ask you to acquit him, because the evidence that he will present demonstrates that he's a victim of a woman trying to avoid consequences of cheating on her spouse and getting caught." Mwenye's direct examination began in English. Early in the examination, his attorney asked him questions about his fluency in English. Mwenye testified that his primary language was Chichewa and that he was from Malawi. He also testified that the people he "associated with in this case" were from Kenya and Tanzania, and that they spoke Swahili. Mwenye testified that Swahili is different than Chichewa. Up to this point, Mwenye had listened to his attorney's questions in English and answered in English. But Mwenye began using an interpreter to respond after testifying that Swahili was different than Chichewa. Mwenye then testified that while he had been spending time socially with this group since 2018, and when he was with them, he did not speak much because he did not understand their language. He also testified that at the time of the incident, he believed he was the only person from Malawi living in Wichita. He stated that while he found it comforting to spend time with people from Africa, he had no ties to Kenya and sometimes felt like an outsider because the rest of the group spoke a language he could not understand. On cross-examination, the prosecutor confirmed with Mwenye that he arrived in the United States in 2017. After arriving, he became a student at Butler County Community College. When the prosecutor asked whether Mwenye's classes at Butler County Community College were conducted in Chichewa, defense counsel objected that the "line of questioning" was irrelevant. The district court overruled the objection, and Mwenye confirmed that he studied accounting for one-and-a-half years at Butler County Community College and his classes were given in English. Mwenye testified that at one 13 point he also worked "at the Butler library," and his job responsibility was to help students with passwords on the computer. Mwenye confirmed he was able to assist the students while speaking English. The prosecutor also asked whether Mwenye communicated in English on a daily basis while in the United States. Mwenye responded that he did, but not well. The prosecutor inquired, "You certainly don't know English well enough that you would want to do a criminal trial without the aid of an interpreter; right?" Mwenye replied through his interpreter, "He said because he doesn't understand English well, so he rather have somebody else to explain so that whatever is said is truth." The prosecutor also questioned Mwenye about his use of English when interacting socially with others. Mwenye testified that when he spent time with the group of individuals that were present the night of the incident, he spoke broken English. Mwenye also confirmed that the text message he sent to Melinda was in English. Having established the relevant facts, we must determine whether the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination were relevant in that they helped to "'establish a fact that is at issue and is significant under the substantive law of the case.'" McCormick, 305 Kan. at 47. Here, the heart of Mwenye's defense was that the victim had cheated on her spouse, and that she would do anything to protect her marriage. Mwenye's attorney pointed out that all the members of the social group involved in the incident were from Kenya or Tanzania except Mwenye. And Mwenye claimed that all the members of the group spoke Swahili except him. Part of Mwenye's defense theory was to discredit the testimony of the victim and other witnesses by demonstrating he was the outsider to the group. Certainly, the testimony of the victim and eyewitnesses was material because it established the elements of the crime of rape. Mwenye made his English proficiency a 14 material issue in the case by his own testimony. Once Mwenye testified on direct examination, cross-examination on that issue became relevant. See State v. Albright, 273 Kan. 811, 824, 46 P.3d 1167 (2002). Mwenye's argument that the prosecutor's questions were irrelevant is therefore unpersuasive. We next examine Mwenye's argument that the district court erred because the highly prejudicial nature of the questions and answers outweighed any probative value. Our analysis of this issue must begin with the State's position that Mwenye's argument is unpreserved. The prosecutor's first cross-examination question was whether Mwenye was from Malawi. Then, the prosecutor asked a series of questions about how long Mwenye had been in the United States and confirmed that Mwenye had been a student at Butler County Community College. The prosecutor then asked, "Did they teach your classes at Butler Community College in Chichewa?" Defense counsel objected, "Judge, I'm going to object to this line of questioning. It's wholly irrelevant." The district judge overruled the objection. No other objections were made until the prosecutor asked, "And I understand why you'd want an interpreter. There is speaking the language, and then there is speaking it in court; right? That's a big difference. Fair?" Defense counsel objected based on a "[l]ack of foundation." The district court overruled the objection. The next objection came when the prosecutor asked Mwenye what he was studying at Butler County Community College. Defense counsel objected based on "relevance again," and the district judge overruled the objection. While defense counsel made additional objections during cross-examination, none pertained to testimony concerning Mwenye's use of English. K.S.A. 60-404 provides: 15  "A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection." Kansas appellate courts have long held that a party "'cannot object to the introduction of evidence on one ground at trial and then assert another ground on appeal.'" State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 127, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005); see State v. Patchett, 203 Kan. 642, 645, 455 P.2d 580 (1969) ("The specification of an objection to evidence on one ground waives or estops the objector from making an objection on any other ground."). The Kansas Supreme Court has considered this legal maxim in the context of relevance. In State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 810, 441 P.3d 52 (2019), our Supreme Court considered whether an objection to the admission of evidence based on prejudice may preserve an argument on appeal that the evidence is not relevant—in other words, the opposite of the situation here. Garcia-Garcia was convicted by a jury of attempted capital murder, kidnapping, burglary, and interference with law enforcement. During a pretrial hearing, the defendant challenged the admission of evidence based on the fact its probative value was outweighed by prejudicial effect "while making only a general relevancy challenge to the evidence." 309 Kan. at 810. The defendant then "referred back to that argument at trial by simply stating for the record, 'I'd like to make my contemporaneous objection . . . . This is based on arguments that have previously been made . . . .'" 309 Kan. at 810. But on appeal, in addition to his argument that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant because he was unaware of the evidence. The State asserted that the issue of whether the evidence was relevant was unpreserved. The court framed the question: 16  "Our question now is: May a party lodge only a general relevance objection to a category of testimony, and then on appeal raise a specific ground targeting particular facts within that testimony, when the trial court had no opportunity to address the specific argument advanced on appeal? We have answered that question before in the negative." 309 Kan. at 810. The court found that the defendant's claim the evidence was irrelevant was unpreserved. "The contemporaneous objection rule is not satisfied by objecting on one ground at trial and arguing another ground on appeal because it would undercut the statute's purpose." 309 Kan. at 810. The Kansas Supreme Court answered the question even more specifically in State v. Page, 303 Kan. 548, 558, 363 P.3d 391 (2015). Page was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including abuse of a child and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. At trial, the district court allowed the State to admit multiple pornographic images obtained from an electronic device. While Page's defense attorney objected at trial to the images on the ground of relevance, on appeal Page contended the images "were inadmissible because they were unduly prejudicial." 303 Kan. at 558. In finding Page's prejudice argument was unpreserved, the Kansas Supreme Court restated the longstanding rule that "'[a] defendant may not object to the admission of evidence on one ground at trial and then assert a different ground for objection on appeal.'" 303 Kan. at 558 (quoting State v. Huffmier, 297 Kan. 306, 319, 301 P.3d 669 [2013]). The court held that Page's prejudice argument "is not properly preserved for our consideration on appeal." Page, 303 Kan. at 558. Here, it is clear from the record that Mwenye's defense counsel only objected to the prosecutor's questions concerning Mwenye's fluency in English on the grounds of relevancy and a lack of foundation. Mwenye's counsel did not object on the basis that the questions were prejudicial. Mwenye failed to file a reply brief in this appeal responding 17 to the State's allegation that the issue is unpreserved. Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-404 and Page, we decline to consider Mwenye's prejudice argument because it is unpreserved. Affirmed. 18