Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 129,138 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS WILLIAM D. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Lyon District Court; JEFFRY J. LARSON, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 20, 2026. Affirmed. Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant. Amy L. Aranda, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before ARNOLD-BURGER, P.J., ATCHESON and CLINE, JJ. CLINE, J.: William D. Anderson appeals the summary dismissal of a claim in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, in which he alleged his trial counsel's failure to investigate a juror's potential racial bias prejudiced Anderson's right to a fair trial. More than two months after his trial, Anderson's codefendant, Ivan Murillo, sent Anderson's trial counsel a letter claiming Murillo knew one of the jurors in Anderson's trial from high school. Based on that interaction 10 years earlier, Murillo believed that juror was biased against Black people like Anderson. Anderson claimed in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that his attorney should have moved for a new trial based on the allegation in Murillo's letter. 1 On review, we find no error in the district court's summary dismissal of Anderson's claim. Even if we assume his attorney's representation was ineffective, Anderson has not shown or even argued he was prejudiced. Instead, he assumes the juror was biased and assumes the juror did not honestly respond to questions in voir dire. Based on these assumptions—for which Anderson offers no proof—he claims to have suffered a structural defect in his trial because he claims he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury under the United States Constitution. Because we find Anderson failed to preserve this argument, we affirm the district court's decision to summarily dismiss his claim. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A jury found Anderson guilty of several crimes that are not relevant to this appeal. He appealed, arguing that prosecutorial error deprived him of a fair trial and that his criminal history score was improperly calculated. State v. Anderson, No. 121,640, 2020 WL 6371059 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). This court affirmed his convictions but agreed that his criminal history score was improperly calculated and remanded the case for resentencing. 2020 WL 6371059, at *5. Around the time he was resentenced, Anderson filed the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that is the subject of this appeal. The district court appointed counsel to represent Anderson and allowed counsel to refine the issues presented in the motion. Anderson's expansive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and the amended motion filed by counsel, raised many issues. The issues could be grouped into four broad categories: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) prosecutorial error. However, only one of these claims is relevant to this appeal. 2 Anderson alleged that his trial counsel, Paul Dean, was ineffective for failing to follow up on a letter that Dean received from Murillo more than two months after trial in which Murillo accused one of the jurors, B.L., of being biased. Murillo was a codefendant in the case. He testified at trial as a witness for the State in exchange for derivative use immunity. This meant that nothing Murillo said during his testimony in Anderson's trial could be used in the pending criminal case against Murillo. During voir dire, the jury pool was asked if they were acquainted with Murillo by name. No one suggested that they were. However, after Murillo testified, B.L. told the judge that he knew Murillo from high school. He did not disclose this information during voir dire because he did not recognize Murillo's name, only his face. The trial judge had a brief discussion with B.L. outside the rest of the jury's presence. B.L. believed he had gym class with Murillo during his sophomore year of high school in 2009 and 2010, nearly 10 years before the trial. B.L. said they were just classmates, not friends. He did not think there was anything about his relationship with Murillo that would cause him difficulty with being fair and impartial. Neither party objected to Murillo remaining on the jury. Murillo's posttrial letter to Dean alleging that B.L. was biased said: "To Mr. Paul Dean I have reason to believe a person in the jury box was not a good candidate & due to BAD circumstance between me & [B.L.] that my codefendant Will Anderson deserves a mistrial. [B.L.] is in my age group & in my grade & we have many differences & dislike each other therefore darken his judgement of Will [Anderson]. We have BAD BLOOD me & [B.L.]. I also have reason to believe he doesn't like Mexicans or Black there are instances in school where he discriminated ppl not of his race. On top of that he insulted me because I was in special needs classes." 3 Anderson asserted that Dean discussed filing a motion for a new trial based on the letter with Anderson but never did. Anderson is Black and worried that B.L. tried to "poison[] the jury" against him. The district court summarily dismissed Anderson's claim that Dean was ineffective in failing to file a motion for a new trial based on Murillo's letter. The court held that Anderson failed to demonstrate that any juror misconduct took place. The district court noted that, when examined by the trial judge, B.L. said that he could remain fair and impartial to both sides. The district court also reasoned that, had B.L. sought to use his knowledge of Murillo to influence the jury, he would have kept his connection with Murillo to himself rather than disclose it to the court. The district court did grant Anderson an evidentiary hearing on one of his other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Both Anderson and Dean testified at that hearing. Though the specific claim that led to the evidentiary hearing is not relevant to this appeal, additional information on Anderson's claim regarding Murillo's letter was presented at the hearing. Although the district court questioned whether testimony regarding the letter was relevant given the fact that it had already summarily dismissed that claim, the court allowed the testimony to continue and took the question of whether the testimony fell within the scope of the hearing under advisement. Dean was not prepared to discuss Murillo's letter at the evidentiary hearing because he thought it was outside the scope of the issue being heard. But he did recall telling Anderson that he would request more information from Murillo as to other witnesses on the matter and file a motion for a new trial. Dean thought he might have talked to Murillo or, more likely, Murillo's attorney, but he could not recall anything else. Dean did not talk to B.L. after receiving the letter. But Dean pointed out that during voir dire he asked the jurors if they thought they could not be fair and impartial due to Anderson's race and B.L. did not reveal any bias. Ultimately, Dean just did not think that 4 Murillo's letter would make a difference and there was not enough information to justify a motion for a new trial. He did not think a letter from one of Anderson's friends and codefendant in the case would be persuasive to the court, especially as B.L. had already disavowed any prejudice related to Anderson's race. After the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the final outstanding claim in Anderson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The court also expanded upon its reasoning in dismissing Anderson's claim about Murillo's letter. The court said: "This Court acknowledges that trial counsel could have followed up more thoroughly on Murillo's letter by at least talking to Murillo about the assertions made in his letter. However, given juror [B.L.]'s acquaintance with Murillo was brought to the Court's attention during the trial by juror [B.L.] himself, it shows his recognition that Anderson deserved a fair trial. This diminishes any claim by Anderson that juror [B.L.] was biased. Further, Murillo was a relatively minor witness in this case, and his credibility is minimal at best." The court ultimately concluded that even if Dean's assistance on this issue was deficient, it did not find that Anderson was seriously prejudiced. It also found it unlikely that a new trial would have been granted had Dean sought one. REVIEW OF ANDERSON'S APPELLATE CHALLENGE Anderson argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim because the court found Dean could have followed up more thoroughly on Murillo's letter, thereby conceding that Dean's assistance was ineffective. And he contends that Dean's failure to investigate was prejudicial because he was entitled to a jury free from racial bias. 5 Standard of Review and Basic Legal Framework When a district court is presented with a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, it may summarily dismiss the motion without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing "if the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief." Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 836, 283 P.3d 152 (2012). To warrant an evidentiary hearing, "'the movant must make more than conclusory contentions and must state an evidentiary basis in support of the claims or an evidentiary basis must appear in the record."' 294 Kan. at 836. Appellate courts exercise unlimited review over summary dismissals of claims in K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. 294 Kan. at 836. Kansas courts use the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), "for determining if a criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution had been violated by the deficient performance of counsel." Edgar, 294 Kan. at 829. To support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant "must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) counsel's deficient performance was sufficiently serious to prejudice the defense and deprive the defendant of a fair trial." 294 Kan. at 837. Even assuming counsel's performance was deficient, Anderson's argument regarding why he suffered prejudice is unpreserved. Both the United States and Kansas Supreme Courts have held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be disposed of solely on the ground that the defendant failed to establish that he or she suffered prejudice. See 294 Kan. at 843. This is because "[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In many cases, "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice." 466 U.S. at 697; see also Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. 217, 232, 201 P.3d 691 (2009) (stating that "reversal 6 and/or remand when there has been no legal prejudice can usually be characterized as a profligate expenditure of scarce judicial resources"). In the interests of expediency, we therefore assume without deciding that Dean's performance was deficient and proceed directly to analyzing whether that assumed deficient performance prejudiced Anderson. The purpose of the prejudice analysis is to determine whether trial counsel's errors impacted the "fundamental fairness of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. To demonstrate prejudice a litigant must usually show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694. In most cases, this requires appellate courts to "consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Bledsoe v. State, 283 Kan. 81, 90-91, 150 P.3d 868 (2007). If the evidence is overwhelming against a defendant, an appellate court is unlikely to find prejudice. See Edgar, 294 Kan. at 846 ("In light of the nature of closing arguments, the nature of the defense, and the overwhelming evidence against Edgar, our de novo review of the motion, files, and records of the case lead us to conclude Edgar failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel's errors, he would have been found not guilty of felony murder."). But Anderson makes no argument that the outcome of a new trial would have been any different, or that trial counsel would have succeeded in pursuing a motion for a new trial. Instead, he appears to argue that this court must presume prejudice because if Dean had investigated Murillo's letter, he could have discovered a structural error in the proceedings. "Structural errors are defects affecting the fundamental fairness of the trial mechanism, and are not amenable to a harmless error review; such errors require automatic reversal." State v. Allen, 322 Kan. 301, Syl. ¶ 7, 590 P.3d 893 (2026). Anderson argues that he was "entitled . . . to a jury free from racial bias" under the Sixth Amendment and that "[i]f Juror B.L. failed to honestly respond to questioning 7 during voir dire, then Anderson would be able to establish the existence of a structural defect in his trial, that is, the deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury." He also says that "Dean's testimony at the limited evidentiary hearing reinforces why reversal of the district court on this claim is warranted: assuming that Murillo would not be cooperative, he did not investigate the allegations enough for reasonable professional judgment to support any limitation on his investigation, forfeiting potential structural error." His claim is not directly that a structural error occurred, but that Dean failed to investigate an alleged structural error and that this failure prejudiced his right to a fair trial. The problem is Anderson failed to preserve this argument. In his brief, Anderson does not identify where he argued that a court should presume prejudice based on Dean's failure to investigate a potential structural error. "Generally, appellate courts do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal." Schutt v. Foster, 320 Kan. 852, 855-56, 572 P.3d 770 (2025). "[E]ven 'constitutional grounds for reversal asserted for the first time on appeal are not properly before the appellate court for review.'" State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494, 507, 332 P.3d 172 (2014). If an appellant does raise an issue for the first time on appeal, Kansas Supreme Court rules require the appellant to explain why the issue is properly before the court. Schutt, 320 Kan. at 856. "An appellant who fails to do so is deemed to have waived and abandoned any exceptions to the preservation rule." 320 Kan. at 856. Kansas appellate courts have considered arguments like Anderson's when raised for the first time on appeal, but only where the appellant established that an exception to the preservation rule applied. See State v. Z.M., 319 Kan. 297, 312, 555 P.3d 190 (2024) (reviewing claim of presumed prejudice based on trial counsel error for first time on appeal under exception to preservation rule). Anderson does not argue that an exception to the preservation rule applies. His failure to argue why this court should consider his argument for the first time on appeal is fatal to his appeal. See James v. State, 8 No. 125,692, 2023 WL 8109755, at *9 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (reviewing the denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and finding that the appellant's "failure to raise the presumption of prejudice argument, or an argument framed as structural error, at the district court is fatal to this argument on appeal"). In addition to failing to raise his presumed prejudice argument in district court, Anderson also fails to support his argument on appeal. In very rare circumstances, prejudice may be presumed in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and a litigant need not show that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent trial counsel's error. But Anderson's conclusory allegation that trial counsel's failure to investigate the letter may have forfeited the discovery of a structural error is inadequate to show that his case rises to the level that would justify such an exception. "Issues not briefed or not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned. A point raised incidentally in a brief but not argued is also deemed abandoned. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020). Affirmed. *** ATCHESON, J., concurring: Defendant William D. Anderson has failed to show that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, let alone substantive relief, on his claim that the lawyer representing him during and after his trial did not investigate a letter suggesting one of the jurors harbored racial animus toward him because his is Black. Anderson has not demonstrated that an adequate investigation would have yielded any factual support for his assertion challenging the guilty verdicts. The Sedgwick County District Court, therefore, properly denied Anderson's habeas corpus attack, under K.S.A. 60-1507, on his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and other crimes. 9 The record shows that Paul Dean, Anderson's trial lawyer, did not investigate the allegations in the letter he received about two months after the jury returned its verdicts. The lack of any investigation likely fell below the standard required for competent legal representation afforded criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. But in pressing his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Anderson has not established what an adequate investigation would have shown. And that omission necessarily undermines his claim for relief. To set aside convictions under K.S.A. 60-1507, a defendant must show exceptional circumstances—most commonly constitutionally inadequate legal representation calling into question the fairness of the trial resulting in the guilty verdicts. Those claims are analyzed under the Strickland standard. A defendant has to establish both that their legal representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that absent the substandard lawyering there is "a reasonable probability" the outcome in the criminal case would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Phillips, 312 Kan. 643, 676, 479 P.3d 176 (2021). Reasonable representation demands that degree of "skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A reasonable probability of a different outcome "undermine[s] confidence" in the result and marks the criminal proceeding as fundamentally unfair. 466 U.S. at 694. A movant seeking relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 must prove both constitutionally inadequate representation and sufficient prejudice attributable to that representation materially calling into question the resulting convictions. Simply put, Anderson has not set forth a factual basis that would call into question the outcome of his trial. As described in the majority opinion, Dean received a handwritten letter purportedly from Ivan Murillo, a codefendant of Anderson's, who testified as a State's witness during the trial. Murillo recognized B.L., a juror, as someone he went to high 10 school with a decade earlier. In the letter, Murillo asserts he had "reason to believe" B.L. "doesn't like Mexicans or Black[s]" and alluded to "instances in school" where B.L. discriminated based on race. But the letter contains no factual representations or examples supporting those general assertions. Given its speculative and conclusory character, the letter alone would not have furnished grounds for a new trial. And without some evidentiary foundation, it would have been no more than inadmissible hearsay at any hearing. To warrant a hearing on this issue, the lawyer appointed to represent Anderson on the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion would have had to support the motion with evidentiary materials showing that an investigation of the letter would have disclosed circumstances calling into question the outcome at trial. Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 302, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018) (movant must offer "evidentiary basis" rather than "conclusory contentions" for hearing on K.S.A. 60-1507 motion). That showing presumably would entail an affidavit from Murillo or, perhaps, from an investigator who had interviewed Murillo, verifying that Murillo had written the letter and reciting details of the factual bases he had for concluding B.L. was prejudiced against Black people. Assuming Murillo wrote the letter, it might be that he rested his opinion only on secondhand information from other students—in a word hearsay—about what B.L. said or did. Hearsay wouldn't be good enough to get a hearing. An affidavit from Murillo detailing firsthand knowledge might well call for an evidentiary hearing where Murillo's credibility could then be tested through direct and cross-examination. The absence of such testable evidence undercuts Anderson's claim because he has failed to establish that an investigation of Murillo's letter would have supported a valid claim for a new trial in any fashion. Anderson's position on this record trades on nothing more than the ungrounded surmise in the letter. Moreover, as the district court pointed out, B.L. came forward during the trial to report that he recognized Murillo upon seeing 11 him testify—displaying a keen interest in maintaining the fairness of the trial and conduct inconsistent with a desire to punish Anderson with a guilty verdict because of his race. The precise issue here is whether B.L. bore Anderson racial animosity or prejudice during the trial. What B.L. may have said or done 10 years earlier probably has some relevance to that issue despite the conduct's temporal remoteness. See Chuang v. University of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (racial slur attributed to decision-maker made eight years before discrimination action filed properly considered as evidence in response to motion for summary judgment). So the letter would not have been the sole focus of a reasonable investigation. For example, if B.L. posted on social media, those communications could be relevant. More immediately, had B.L. engaged in racial stereotyping or displayed racial animus during deliberations, especially in explaining his decision to convict, a district court could consider such evidence. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 225-26, 137 S. Ct. 855, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017) (no-impeachment rule must give way to allow consideration of evidence regarding juror's statements during deliberations that they relied on racial stereotyping or animus to convict defendant). An inquiry to the presiding juror or other jurors thus would have been a logical avenue of investigation. Again, however, we have nothing to suggest those inquiries would have disclosed facts useful to Anderson's claim for a new trial. Without such a showing in this record, as by an affidavit from Murillo, Anderson has presented no basis for a hearing. Had Anderson made such a showing and if the evidence at such a hearing credibly established that B.L. harbored racial animus, only then would we (and the district court) have to determine the legal significance of that evidence. That is, whether, as Anderson argues, we would have to presume prejudice requiring reversal of his convictions or find a structural error requiring no showing of actual prejudice for relief. But considering the legal significance of such racial animus poses no more than a hypothetical exercise 12 because Anderson has produced nothing of evidentiary value to support such a conclusion. Anderson makes an allied claim that B.L. lied during the jury selection process because he did not respond to a question asking the prospective jurors if they harbored any racial animosity or prejudice. See State v. Jenkins, 269 Kan. 334, 338-39, 2 P.3d 769 (2000) (new trial warranted when juror failed to disclose in response to questions during voir dire that son had been murdered and officers investigating that crime were potential witnesses in pending case); King v. Casey's General Store, 57 Kan. App. 2d 392, 403, 450 P.3d 854 (2019) (new trial generally warranted where juror has given "false answers to material questions during voir dire"). But the claim rests only on Murillo's letter and Dean's failure to investigate those vague assertions rather than on at least some evidence lending depth, detail, and credibility to the assertions. So that argument fails as well. Anderson has not developed a factual threshold requiring an evidentiary hearing to probe his speculative claim that B.L. might have acted on impermissible racial animus in voting to convict him. For that reason, I concur in our decision to affirm the district court's ruling denying his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 13