State v. Elson

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 128,185 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. MICHAEL RAY ELSON, Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Rice District Court; LISA BERAN, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed October 30, 2026. Affirmed. Sean P. Randall, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Remington S. Dalke, county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and ISHERWOOD, JJ. PER CURIAM: Michael Ray Elson appeals his convictions of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a minor and one count of rape. On appeal, Elson contends that the district court erred in admitting K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence of prior sexual misconduct at trial. He also contends that the State committed prosecutorial error during closing arguments. In addition, Elson contends that the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Furthermore, he contends that cumulative errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Based on our review of the record, we find only one harmless error and no reversible error. Thus, we affirm Elson's convictions and sentence. 1  FACTS In May 2021, the State charged Elson with three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and a single count of rape. The complaint alleged that Elson committed these offenses against two minors, Minor 1 (born in 2010) and Minor 2 (born in 2012). The parties are aware of the evidence presented at trial regarding the details of the instances of sexual misconduct allegedly committed by Elson. So, we will briefly summarize the facts in this section of our opinion and discuss additional facts as necessary in our analysis. Highly summarized, Elson was accused of sexually abusing his minor family members in various ways after they moved into Elson's home in 2019. At the time, Minor 1 was around 8 years old, Minor 2 was around 7 years old, and Elson was 29 years old. Ultimately, the State dismissed the charge relating to Minor 2 and the case proceeded to trial based solely on the charges relating to Minor 1. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455(d) seeking to admit evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct against minors allegedly committed by Elson. Specifically, the motion alleged that Minor 2 and three others had reported to the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) that Elson had also sexually abused them when they were children. The State also alleged that Elson was previously charged of committing indecent liberties with another child in a neighboring county. At a hearing on the State's motion, the State withdrew its request to admit the testimony of the victim in the prior case from a neighboring county. Although Elson argued that the remaining evidence of prior sexual misconduct was not sufficiently proven and lacked sufficient similarity to the offenses charged in this case, the district court found K.S.A. 60-455(d) does not require that the alleged prior bad acts resulted in formal charges or convictions and that the potential for prejudice must not outweigh the 2 evidence's probative value. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the K.S.A. 60- 455(d) evidence "would be admissible [at trial] within those parameters." At the ensuing five-day jury trial, the State presented testimony from multiple witnesses in support of the charges in this case as well as to show Elson's propensity to commit such crimes. In addition, the State offered 11 exhibits that were admitted into evidence. In his defense, Elson called his wife, his sister-in-law, and a friend of his wife as witnesses. Furthermore, Elson testified in his own defense and denied that he committed the charged offenses. He also elicited testimony from a DCF child protection supervisor regarding the reports of the alleged prior instances of sexual misconduct committed against minors. During closing arguments, the prosecutor discussed—among other things—the propensity evidence offered under K.S.A. 60-455(d) and argued that the State did not have to prove the prior allegations for them to be considered by the jury. In rebuttal, the prosecutor also argued, "You can have doubts about all sorts of things in this case. But look at those elements. Do you doubt that those children got up here and told you the truth? That's what's important." Before sentencing, Elson filed a motion for a durational departure sentence that was denied by the district court. At the hearing, the State presented a victim impact statement from Minor 1 that was read aloud to the district court. In his comments to the district court, Elson apologized "for what this has done to [his] family" but denied that he committed the offenses. After finding no substantial and compelling reasons for the granting of a durational departure, the district court sentenced Elson to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years for each of his three crimes. The district court ordered that Elson serve the sentences for the first two offenses consecutively and the third sentence to run concurrent. 3  ANALYSIS In his brief, Elson presents four issues. First, he contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of alleged prior acts of sexual misconduct against the minors at trial. Second, he contends that the State committed prosecutorial error during closing argument. Third, he contends that the district court erred in imposing two consecutive life sentences without eligibility for parole for 25 years. Fourth, he contends that cumulative error denied him the right to a fair trial. In response, the State contends that Elson has failed to show that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial. Admission of K.S.A. 60-455(d) Evidence Elson argues that although the district court acknowledged the correct standard analysis for the admission of propensity evidence under K.S.A. 60-455(d), it failed to actually conduct the proper analysis before ruling that the evidence was admissible. We review the district court's weighing of probative value and potential prejudice in the admission of K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Alfaro-Valleda, 314 Kan. 526, 535, 502 P.3d 66 (2022). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion only if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). Under K.S.A. 60-455(a), the admission of propensity evidence at trial is generally prohibited because such evidence may cause a jury to conclude that a defendant is a general wrongdoer who should not be believed. See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 48-49, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). However, K.S.A. 60-455(d) allows the State to present evidence of a person's prior sexual misconduct when a defendant is charged with certain sex offenses, provided the evidence is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. These offenses are set forth in K.S.A. 60-455(g). 4  Before admitting evidence under K.S.A. 60-455(d), a district court must "find the probative value of K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence outweighs its potential for producing undue prejudice." State v. White, 60 Kan. App. 2d 458, 481-82, 494 P.3d 248 (2021), aff'd 316 Kan. 208, 514 P.3d 368 (2022). When evaluating the probative value of evidence about a defendant's prior sexual misconduct, a district court is to consider: (1) "how clearly the prior act was proved"; (2) "how probative the evidence is of the material fact sought to be proved"; (3) "how seriously disputed the material fact is"; and (4) "whether the [State] can obtain any less prejudicial evidence." State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526, 541, 439 P.3d 909 (2019). To assess prejudice, a district court must decide whether the evidence has potential for undue prejudice. The risk of undue prejudice is not whether the evidence is damaging but whether the evidence will likely "'contribute to an improper jury verdict or distract from the central issues at trial.'" State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655, 671, 396 P.3d 78 (2017). In making this determination, the district court should consider: (1) "the likelihood that such evidence will contribute to an improperly based jury verdict"; (2) "the extent to which such evidence may distract the jury from the central issues of the trial"; and (3) "how time consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct." Boysaw, 309 Kan. at 541. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we find that the district court properly fulfilled its gatekeeping role before admitting the propensity evidence offered by the State at trial. The record reveals that it judiciously considered the parties' arguments within the correct legal framework before reaching its decision. In ruling on this issue, the district court determined: "[K.S.A.] 60-455 (d) has been often litigated in the appellate courts, as we might imagine. I was just looking through some case law yesterday to just remind myself of the 5 . . . history. And I had a case pulled up that talked about the actual history and why it was adopted. . . . "[K.S.A. 60-455](d) was specifically added with regard to a case that had been decided in the appellate courts, saying that this evidence could not be used under what would have been the longstanding rules of evidence and that the legislature specifically added (d) to address that. "In terms of 60-455 there is a balancing test . . . from Bowen, from Boysaw. It's discussed [in several] cases, but those are probably the two most often cited. There's a balancing test of those facts to consider. Certainly . . . , the evidence is going to be prejudicial. That's not the test. [Vi]rtually all evidence that's admitted in a trial is prejudicial to one party or the other, otherwise we wouldn't be admitting it. "The question is whether or not the . . . prejudice far exceeds the probative value of the information that's being elicited. This type of evidence is referred to in the case law as propensity evidence. That's what it's being used to establish. And I think the case law is pretty clear that that type of evidence is to be admitted. It doesn't require a conviction. It doesn't even require charges. "It . . . can even be the testimony of the victim . . . in a particular case talking about prior acts. . . . State vs. Barlow addresses that one specifically . . . . That's a 2020 Court of Appeals case where the victim testified about acts that happened in another county. And then they moved and the acts in the new county were what were charged. She testified as to what happened in the prior county. And the Court said, no, that was fine. It didn't matter that it was just her testifying, that that was sufficient. "So, you know, I certainly understand [defense counsel's] points with regard to this. And as he indicated, those points have been litigated many times over. It's pretty clear that those are to be admitted, as long as they meet some of the other requirements. I mean, they need to be of a similar nature. But the other thing that we need to look at is if they fall under the statutes or . . . if they had been charged, if they would fall under the statutes that are set out in 455 (g). "It specifies what is included as an act or offense of sexual misconduct. And the other allegations have to fall within one of those ten [listed] . . . and granted, that's a long list, and it covers a lot of things. But there are some things that it doesn't cover. So . . . if those acts would fall within the statute set out in (g), then I think that they're admissible, assuming that the other requirements for admissibility are met. 6  "And . . . the witnesses are subject to cross-examination. That's part of the whole process, why it is allowed. And yes, I would agree that the jury would be instructed as to, you know, . . . these are the charges that you're looking at. This is what you're to decide. And so . . . at this time I would say that those would be admissible within those parameters." (Emphases added.) This discussion mirrors the applicable legal rules for addressing the admissibility of evidence under K.S.A. 60-455(d) as outlined by both the Kansas Legislature and as interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court. In fact, Elson's attorney candidly recognized at the motion hearing his thoughts regarding the admission of the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence offered by the State: "I knew . . . and I had discussed [with the prosecutor] . . . [about the possibility of] prior bad acts coming in through 60-455 (d). So . . . I'm prepared to make that argument today. It's pretty . . . 'boilerplate'. The case law is the case law. The statute on 60-455 (d) . . . is, I guess, the darling of the prosecutor and the absolute bastard child of the defense." Certainly, K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence should not be automatically admitted without a district court performing its role as gatekeeper. But the Kansas Supreme Court has never ruled that a district court must expressly state its findings on the record so long as it conducts the proper legal analysis. In fact, our Supreme Court has held that appellate courts can presume—in the absence of an objection as to the adequacy of the findings— that a district court conducted the proper K.S.A. 60-455(d) analysis even if it did not explicitly state its reasoning on the record. See State v. Razzaq, 309 Kan. 544, 548-49, 439 P.3d 903 (2019); see also State v. Waisner, No. 125,175, 2023 WL 3912868, at *5 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (applying Razzaq's presumption rule where implicit findings were made); State v. McHenry, No. 119,230, 2020 WL 2503484, at *6 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (same). 7  In Razzaq, the defendant was charged with a sex crime and argued that the district court should exclude evidence of his prior sexual crimes he committed in another state. In ruling that the evidence was admissible under K.S.A. 60-455(d) to show propensity, the district court did not make findings expressly weighing the probity of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. In affirming the district court, our Supreme Court found: "Although the district court did not explicitly determine that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, this court may presume that the district court made all the necessary factual findings to support its judgment in the absence of an objection to inadequate findings. [Citation omitted.] We conclude that the district court implicitly rejected Razzaq's argument of prejudice when it denied his motion." 309 Kan. at 548-49. Similarly, we find in this case that the district court considered the arguments presented by both sides, reviewed statutes and caselaw, and applied the appropriate legal framework in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for undue prejudice. The district court made the findings necessary to support its judgment in the absence of an objection being raised as to the adequacy of its findings. As a result, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence at trial. We also find Elson's argument regarding the State's proffer of the K.S.A. 60- 455(d) evidence at the motions hearing to be unpersuasive. As an initial matter, Elson did not object to the State's proffer and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. He also cites no legal authority for this argument and thus fails to properly brief it. So, we will not consider this argument. See State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) (An issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned.); State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020) (Failure to support a point with pertinent authority is like failing to brief the issue.). Even if we were to consider this argument, it would not change the outcome of this case as our court has found proffers of evidence by the State at a motion hearing to be acceptable in similar cases. See, e.g., State v. Bliss, 28 Kan. App. 2d 8 591, 592-96, 18 P.3d 979 (2001) (granting interlocutory appeal by the State and finding the district court erroneously rejected the State's proffer of K.S.A. 60-455[d] evidence); State v. Nauman, No. 126,911, 2024 WL 3912970, at *10 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion) (reversing the district court's decision to exclude the State's proffered testimony, K.S.A. 60-455[d] evidence). Elson argues that even if the district court made an appropriate implicit finding that the evidence presented no potential for undue prejudice, the finding is unsupported by the record. He thus asks us to independently review the evidence as it relates to its probative value. But Elson does not reference any specific findings by the district court that we can properly review. And, in light of our standard of review, we are not to make factual findings, determine credibility, or reweigh the evidence. See State v. Newman, 311 Kan. 155, 159, 457 P.3d 923 (2020). Again, we note that Elson did not object to the adequacy of the district court's findings below. Likewise, he does not assert that the district court based its decision on a mistake of fact or that the decision was so unreasonable that no one could agree with it. As a result, Elson cannot meet his burden of proving an abuse of discretion. See State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022) (party asserting error has burden of showing abuse of discretion); see also Waisner, 2023 WL 3912868, at *4-5 (similarly finding no abuse of discretion where the defendant failed to object to lack of specific findings when the district court implicitly found no undue prejudice in admitting K.S.A. 60-455[d] evidence). Elson cites two cases in which the State presented strong corroborating evidence to support allegations of prior sexual misconduct. See State v. Satchell, 311 Kan. 633, 642, 466 P.3d 459 (2020) (noting that the defendant pleaded no contest to prior similar offenses involving a child, and although those offenses were not sexual in nature, the defendant still admitted to specific acts of sexual misconduct); State v. Merced, No. 9 116,001, 2017 WL 4848186, at *6 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting claim that prior misconduct was not sufficiently proven because the defendant entered an Alford plea, finding that "by accepting the plea he also accepted the fact that the State could prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). Yet, these cases are factually distinguishable. Contrary to Elson's argument, convictions—whether the result of a plea or a jury verdict—are not required for the State to admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct under K.S.A. 60-455(d). See State v. Brown, 59 Kan. App. 2d 418, 491, 486 P.3d 624 (2021) ("[T]he State may admit evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct even if that defendant was never charged and convicted for that sexual misconduct."). In fact, the plain language of K.S.A. 60-455(d) provides that "evidence of the defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct" may be admissible. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme Court has affirmed the admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct into evidence based solely on the victim's testimony. See State v. Spear, 297 Kan. 780, 786, 788-89, 304 P.3d 1246 (2013); State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, 481, 303 P.3d 662 (2013); see also State v. Barlow, No. 120,166, 2020 WL 593946, at *8-9 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455[d] does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the statute does not differentiate between the form which the evidence arises or whether a previous fact-finder determined a certain burden of proof was met). Elson further argues that the timing of the prior sexual misconduct renders the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence inadmissible. Again, Elson cites factually distinguishable cases in support of his position. See State v. Brazzle, 311 Kan. 754, 756, 762, 466 P.3d 1195 (2020) (affirming the district court's admission of prior bad acts evidence based in part on the closeness in time to the charged offenses, finding prior acts occurred around one week earlier). He does not, however, cite any authority showing the timing of his alleged sexual misconduct with minors necessarily required that the evidence be 10 excluded. He also does not argue that the district court incorrectly based its decision on facts showing the prior acts occurred closer in time to the acts charged than supported by the evidence. He thus fails to establish any legal or factual error on this basis. Here, Elson was charged with sexually abusing Minor 1—when she was 8 years old—in 2019. The prior instances of alleged sexual abuse involving Elson and minors occurred between 2009 and 2020. The minors accusing Elson of sexual misconduct were around 3, 5, and 14 years old at the time he allegedly committed his prior acts. As such, the time between each of the alleged instances of prior sexual misconduct with minors and the crimes charged in this case was 10 years or less. Elson does not challenge the similarities between those alleged prior acts of sexual misconduct and the allegations in this case. In each instance, Elson was an adult and the alleged victim was a minor. Moreover, like Minor 1 and Minor 2, two of the other minor victims were under the age of 10 at the time of the alleged sexual misconduct committed by Elson. As the State also notes, Elson abandons his previous argument to the district court that the admission of the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence would distract the jury from its primary task. Arguably, Elson impliedly raises this argument by suggesting that the evidence was unduly prejudicial. Still, he does not separately brief the issue, so it has been waived or abandoned. See Davis, 313 Kan. at 248. Even so, we do not find evidence in the record to support a claim that the jury was distracted from its duty to weigh the evidence and hold the State to its burden of proof. Significantly, a review of the record reveals that the district court properly instructed the jury on the appropriate elements that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the jury was instructed that the jury could consider the K.S.A. 60- 455(d) evidence in determining Elson's "propensity to commit sexual misconduct" but 11 that it could not convict Elson of the charged offenses "simply because [it] believe[d] he committed another unlawful act." We note that Elson candidly concedes that the prior acts evidence was probative to the State's case, and we find this concession to be supported by the record on appeal. The State's evidence consisted primarily of Minor 1's testimony regarding the sexual abuse that she suffered in 2019. Because Elson denied the allegations that he had sexually abused Minor 1, the prior allegations of sexual misconduct with minors were probative to the issues presented at trial, and it allegedly demonstrated a pattern of sexual abuse that was committed by Elson against similar minor victims. In summary, we find that the district court applied the appropriate legal framework in deciding whether to admit the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence. We also find that because Elson did not object to the district court's findings, he has failed to preserve his fact- specific claims. As discussed above, it is not our role on appeal to reweigh evidence. See State v. Belt, 305 Kan. 381, 404, 381 P.3d 473 (2016). In addition, we find that Elson has not proved that the district court acted unreasonably, committed an error of law, or made a mistake of fact. We further find that the district court also gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury about the propensity evidence, and we presume that the jury appropriately followed the instructions. See State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 18, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the K.S.A. 60-455(d) evidence under the circumstances presented in this case nor do we find that Elson was denied the right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers. Prosecutorial Error Next, Elson contends that the State committed prosecutorial error during closing arguments. Because Elson did not object to the alleged prosecutorial error at trial, we can 12 consider the absence of an objection in our analysis of the alleged error. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Stubbs, 320 Kan. 568, 570 P.3d 1209 (2025). In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial error, we apply a two-step test first articulated in State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). First, we determine whether an error occurred. If so, we then must also determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). During closing arguments, prosecutors are afforded "wide latitude" in presenting their arguments to a jury. State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 164, 513 P.3d 1207 (2022). This allows a prosecutor to comment on the evidence. Likewise, prosecutors are allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 316 Kan. at 164. But a prosecutor cannot misstate the law in pursuit of a conviction. State v. Z.M., 319 Kan. 297, 317, 555 P.3d 190 (2024). In determining whether a prosecutor acted outside these parameters, we are not to "consider any statement in isolation but look to the statement's context to determine whether error occurred." Brown, 316 Kan. at 164. When reviewing for prosecutorial error, we must consider prosecutorial statements in their context. State v. Becker, 311 Kan. 176, 182, 459 P.3d 173 (2020). Hence, prosecutorial error claims are fact specific, and the outcome depends on the particulars of each case. State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905, 911, 468 P.3d 323 (2020). If we determine that error occurred, the constitutional harmless error test is triggered. This test requires the State to prove "'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.'" Z.M., 319 Kan. at 317; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). One way that prosecutorial error can occur is when a 13 prosecutor makes an argument that dilutes the State's burden of proof. State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 743, 415 P.3d 430 (2018). In his brief, Elson argues that the prosecutor lowered the burden of proof by suggesting that the State did not have to prove each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, Elson claims that the prosecutor erred in arguing: "Do you doubt that those children got up here and told you the truth? That's what's important." Likewise, Elson claims the prosecutor erred in arguing that the State has "to prove each crime as its own separate crime, except these." In addition, Elson argues that the State improperly commented on facts not in evidence. Although the "Do you doubt" argument presents a close call, we find that it was erroneous because it unduly focused on whether the other minor victims were telling the truth. When viewed in isolation, it appears that the prosecutor was arguing that the prior instances of alleged sexual misconduct were sufficient to prove that Elson committed the crimes against Minor 1. However, when viewed in the context of the prosecutor's entire closing argument and in light of the jury instructions given by the district court, we find this error to be harmless. A review of the record reveals that elsewhere in the closing arguments, the prosecutor properly discussed the State's burden to prove each of the charges—as well as the elements of each charge—against Elson beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, the district court properly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof. Moreover, we presume that the jurors followed the instructions, and we find nothing in the record to suggest that they did not do so in this case. See State v. Slusser, 317 Kan. 174, 193, 527 P.3d 565 (2023). Elson also argues that the prosecutor commented on facts not in evidence in attempting to explain the Kansas Legislature's reasons for enacting K.S.A. 60-455(d). In support of this argument, Elson cites the Kansas Supreme Court's finding of prosecutorial error in Slusser—which involved possession of methamphetamine. In that case, the 14 prosecutor improperly and repeatedly described an "'inference'" as a "'presumption'" during closing arguments. 317 Kan. at 186. On appeal, our Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statement that the jury could presume the defendant's intent to distribute based on the amount of methamphetamine in his possession improperly relieved the State of its burden to prove that element of the crime. 317 Kan. at 190. In the present case, the prosecutor never argued or implied that Elson was guilty of the charges based on the prior instances of alleged sexual misconduct with other minors. Rather, the prosecutor's argument—when taken in full context—simply attempted to explain the limited purpose of prior acts evidence admitted under K.S.A. 60-455(d). We do not find this argument to be outside the wide latitude given to prosecutors in presenting argument to the jury. See Brown, 316 Kan. at 164. Turning to the prejudice prong of our analysis, we find the alleged errors made by the prosecutor to be harmless based on a review of the entire record. In particular, we find that the State has established that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict in light of the evidence establishing Elson's guilt. We also find that the jury instructions given by the district court clearly explained the State's burden of proof and the limited use of prior crimes evidence. Cumulative Error Elson also contends that cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. Cumulative trial errors—when considered together—may require reversal of a conviction when the totality of the circumstances establish that a defendant was substantially prejudiced by the errors and was deprived of the right to a fair trial. State v. Guebara, 318 Kan. 458, 483, 544 P.3d 794 (2024). But the cumulative error rule does not apply if there are no errors or only a single error. State v. Lowry, 317 Kan. 89, 100, 524 P.3d 416 (2023). Here, because 15 we have found only a single harmless error, we conclude that there has been no cumulative error. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences Finally, Elson contends that the district court erred in sentencing him to consecutive hard 25 sentences because it improperly considered the uncharged instances of alleged sexual abuse he committed against minors other than the victim in this case. The parties agree that we review the district court's decision to sentence Elson to consecutive sentences for abuse of discretion. This is because "'it is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine whether a sentence should run concurrent with or consecutive to another sentence.'" State v. Goens, 317 Kan. 616, 619, 535 P.3d 1116 (2023) (quoting State v. Baker, 297 Kan. 482, 484, 301 P.3d 706 [2013]). Moreover, as the party alleging that the district court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, Elson has the burden of proof as to this issue. See Goens, 317 Kan. at 620. In State v. Vanderveen, 259 Kan. 836, 842-43, 915 P.2d 57 (1996), the Kansas Supreme Court explained: "It is the sentencing judge alone who determines the appropriate sentence to be imposed or other disposition of the case by exercising his or her best judgment, common sense, and judicial discretion after considering all of the reports, the defendant's background, the facts of the case, and the public safety. A sentence imposed within the statutory guidelines will not be disturbed on appeal if it is within the trial court's discretion and not a result of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive." See also State v. Frecks, 294 Kan. 738, 742, 280 P.3d 217 (2012) (quoting Vanderveen with approval). At sentencing, the State asked the district court to impose consecutive life sentences so that Elson's parole eligibility would begin at a later time. The State explained that Elson was 34 years old at sentencing and had been incarcerated pending 16 trial for three years. So, a single hard 25 sentence would likely result in Elson being eligible for parole when he is 56 years old. The State argued that this was too early because although Elson was convicted of only sexually abusing Minor 1 in this case, there was evidence presented at trial that he had been accused of sexually abusing other minors. Accordingly, the State asked the district court to impose consecutive sentences for two of Elson's convictions so that he would not be eligible for parole until he served 50 years. As discussed above, Elson requested a downward durational departure from the mandatory 25-year sentences for each of his offenses. In doing so, he argued that his criminal history was relatively minimal. Moreover, in his statement to the district court, Elson apologized for "what this has done to [his] family." Yet he refused to take responsibility for the crimes of conviction. After considering Elson's statement and the arguments of counsel, the district court denied his request for a durational departure. Specifically, the district court found that Elson had shown no substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutorily mandated sentence. The district court then imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years for each of his three crimes. The district court also ordered that Elson serve his sentences for the first two offenses consecutively and the third sentence to run concurrently. This resulted in a controlling term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 50 years. In considering this issue, we find guidance from the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Frecks, 294 Kan. at 742. In Frecks, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and the district court sentenced him to two consecutive mandatory life sentences without explaining the reasons for doing so on the record. As in this case, this resulted in the defendant not being eligible for parole until he has served 50 years in prison. 294 Kan. at 738-39. 17  On appeal, our Supreme Court found that while it would be better practice for the sentencing court to have explained its reasons for imposing consecutive life sentences, there was no abuse of discretion. 294 Kan. at 742. In reaching this decision, it explained that although reasonable people may disagree as to the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing, "it was not an abuse of discretion to impose the life sentences consecutively." 294 Kan. at 742. See also State v. McMullen, 290 Kan. 1, 10, 221 P.3d 92 (2009) (finding no abuse of discretion by imposing consecutive sentences for two counts of off-grid sexual offenses). Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing consecutive sentences in this case. A review of the record reveals that Elson did not object to the district court's findings. Instead, Elson suggests that the district court was precluded from considering the uncharged offenses at sentencing. In support of this suggestion, Elson cites State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. 470, 481, 213 P.3d 418 (2009); State v. Soler, 25 Kan. App. 2d 1, 5, 957 P.2d 516 (1998); and State v. Hawes, 22 Kan. App. 2d 837, 841, 923 P.2d 1064 (1996). In Hawes, a panel of this court recognized that the facts regarding prior acts may be considered for sentencing purposes when they are of "a continuing pattern intentionally connected with the charged offense." 22 Kan. App. 2d at 841. Likewise, another panel of this court found in Soler that an uncharged crime must be "contemporaneous with and rationally related to the [defendant's] crime of conviction" to be considered at sentencing. 25 Kan. App. 2d at 5. However, both of these cases dealt with the issue of whether the offenses could be considered in deciding a motion for an upward sentencing departure filed by the State. 25 Kan. App. 2d at 5-6; Hawes, 22 Kan. App. 2d at 838, 841-42. Of course, that is not an issue in this appeal, and we find that neither of these cases support the proposition that the district court could not take into 18 consideration the other acts of sexual misconduct against minors allegedly committed by Elson. In Easterling, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a defendant's sentence after he challenged it on the grounds that the district court improperly relied on an arrest report at the sentencing hearing. In particular, the defendant claimed that the district court erred in relying on the arrest report because he was not provided with an opportunity to challenge the contents of the unproven allegations in the report. In affirming the defendant's sentence, our Supreme Court recognized that a sentencing court has discretion to consider any circumstance providing a more complete picture of a defendant's background, history, or behavior as long as the information is reliable, accurate, and trustworthy. 289 Kan. at 481-82. Also, it found that the defendant had been provided with proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the matter. 289 Kan. at 484-85. Although Elson suggests he did not have an adequate opportunity to rebut the allegations that he sexually abused other minors, he does not claim that he was not given proper notice of the prior allegations or that the district court refused him an opportunity to rebut them. Rather, he simply argues that the distric