Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 129,289 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS CHARLES EDWARD WYNN, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Johnson District Court; TIMOTHY MCCARTHY, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 6, 2026, 2026. Affirmed. Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, for appellant. Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before WARNER, C.J., MALONE and HILL, JJ. HILL, J.: Charles Edward Wynn appeals the district court's summary denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Making only conclusory claims of staleness to us, Wynn has failed to show that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm the court's holding. To preserve her anonymity, a woman we call C.C. reported to police in September 2017, that Wynn had committed several acts of domestic abuse over a six-month span while they were dating. In March 2017, Wynn strangled her. On August 9, 2017, Wynn 1 punched her in the face, fracturing her orbital bone. A friend took her to the hospital where she lied to hospital staff about who had hit her because she did not want to get Wynn into trouble. In early September 2017, Wynn choked her again. On September 27, 2017, C.C. finally reported the abuse to the police because she had learned she was pregnant. Wynn had threatened that if she did not get an abortion he would "take care of it" for her. Later, Wynn was arrested and charged with one count of aggravated battery. The court ordered Wynn to have no contact with C.C. Despite that court order, jail records revealed 84 calls between Wynn and C.C. In an amended complaint, the State charged Wynn with two counts of aggravated battery, five counts of violation of a protective order, two counts of intimidation of a witness or victim, and aggravated domestic battery. A jury found Wynn guilty of one count of aggravated battery (for the August 9 punch in the face incident), five counts of violation of a protective order, and two counts of intimidation of a victim. The district court sentenced him to 162 months in prison. Wynn's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. The mandate was issued on March 4, 2022. Seeking habeas corpus relief, on June 17, 2022, pro se, Wynn filed a timely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion alleging: (a) The court was without jurisdiction due to stale information used to obtain an arrest warrant because there were no immediate police reports filed that corresponded to the two batteries described in the warrant. (b) The probable cause affidavit was defective because the information used in it was stale. Medical information from August 9, 2017, was used to anchor the conviction. 2 (c) The victim gave perjured testimony in court. C.C.'s police report was filed under criminal threat. (d) The prosecution used perjured testimony to obtain the conviction. Wynn also alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the stale information contained in the affidavit used to obtain the arrest warrant. The district court summarily denied the motion, ruling that the information supporting Wynn's arrest was not stale. Victims often delay reporting domestic violence. The victim reported the abuse within the timespan of only a few months. Wynn's counsel was not ineffective because no stale information was used in the case and Wynn had two defense attorneys that each had over 20 years of experience. The court ruled that Wynn's assertions about perjured testimony were conclusory, that there was nothing in the record supporting a claim of perjured testimony, and that there was ample evidence besides the victim's testimony. We are governed by well-established law. A district court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show the movant is not entitled to relief. K.S.A. 60-1507(b); Supreme Court Rule 183(f) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 242). When the district court summarily dismisses a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief. State v. Vasquez, 315 Kan. 729, 731, 510 P.3d 704 (2022). To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, a movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence either: (1) "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction"; (2) "the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to 3 collateral attack"; or (3) "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." K.S.A. 60-1507(b) (grounds for relief); Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (preponderance burden). In this appeal, Wynn continues to press his claim of stale information. He relies on caselaw concerning information that is used to obtain a search warrant. Basically, Wynn argues that the 50-day gap between when the aggravated battery occurred, and the report of such event to the police was too long. He also argues the State knowingly introduced perjured testimony from C.C. at trial. Rather than point to specific examples of the perjury or evidence of perjury, Wynn asks the court to "review the trial testimony carefully to determine if C.C. provided perjured testimony, and whether any perjured testimony was knowingly used by the state to secure a conviction." Wynn asks for an evidentiary hearing on his claims. The State argues that the Kansas cases discussing "stale information" apply only to search warrants and not arrest warrants. The State also argues Wynn's claim that C.C. gave perjured testimony is conclusory with no evidentiary basis nor any citations to the record. The information used to arrest, charge, and convict Wynn was not stale. When issuing search warrants, staleness is primarily considered. Staleness is not primarily considered for arrest warrants. This is because any police seeking a search warrant must show proof that the evidence is still where it is claimed to be. "Stale information is information that no longer informs whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place because sufficient time has elapsed between when the informant acquired the information or an event occurred and when 4 officers act on the information." State v. Hensley, 298 Kan. 422, 429, 313 P.3d 814 (2013). There are no such concerns for an arrest warrant. Here, police arrested Wynn based on the evidence of a crime reported by C.C. Police did not execute a search warrant. The staleness standard does not apply. Rather, the time to charge Wynn with aggravated battery was governed by the five-year statute of limitations. See K.S.A. 21-5107. The prosecution commenced well within that time. Moreover, the information here was not stale because there was less than two months between the time that Wynn punched C.C. in the face, fracturing her orbital bone, and C.C. reported the incident to police. The jury found Wynn guilty beyond a reasonable doubt using the same facts, a higher burden than probable cause. We see no error in the court's ruling on this point. Wynn's claim that C.C. gave perjured testimony is conclusory. A 1507 movant bears the burden of showing entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. To meet this burden, a movant's contentions must be more than conclusions. To be successful, a movant must set forth an evidentiary basis to support those contentions, or the basis must be evident from the record. Thuko v. State, 310 Kan. 74, 80, 444 P.3d 927 (2019). One case that offers us guidance says, "A conclusory argument 'is one whose propounder attempts to persuade by mere assertion and repetition. Because it offers no reasons in support of its conclusion, a conclusory argument is incapable of persuading anyone who does not already agree.'" State v. Ward, 62 Kan. App. 2d 721, 732-33, 522 P.3d 337 (2022) (quoting Gardner, Legal Argument: The Structure and Language of Effective Advocacy, p. 114 [2d ed. 2007]), aff'd 317 Kan. 822, 539 P.3d 1042 (2023). 5 In stating the evidentiary basis, the movant must merely "'set forth a factual background, names of witnesses or other sources of evidence to demonstrate that petitioner is entitled to relief.'" Swenson v. State, 284 Kan. 931, 938, 169 P.3d 298 (2007). Consistent with this requirement, the form approved by the judicial council for K.S.A. 60-1507 motions requires the movant to "[s]tate concisely all grounds on which you base your allegation that you are being held in custody unlawfully" and "[s]tate concisely and in the same order the facts which support each of the grounds set out . . . and the names and addresses of the witnesses or other evidence upon which you intend to rely to prove those facts." 284 Kan. at 938; see Supreme Court Rule 183(e). Even though we liberally construe pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, a pro se movant must still "allege facts sufficient to warrant a hearing on the motion, and 'mere conclusions of the defendant or movant are not sufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact when no factual basis is alleged or appears from the record.'" Mundy v. State, 307 Kan. 280, 304, 408 P.3d 965 (2018). We do not remand for an evidentiary hearing merely to "permit a fishing expedition in the hopes that the 60-1507 movant might catch a fact that could lead to something favorable." Stewart v. State, 310 Kan. 39, 54, 444 P.3d 955 (2019). Wynn does not tell us which statements were lies. He points to neither any witnesses nor any evidence that he would use at an evidentiary hearing to support his claim of perjury or knowledge of such perjury by the State. Rather, he vaguely references the evidence presented at trial. He asks the court to review the testimony provided at trial "carefully to determine" if C.C. committed perjury. That is not our function. We consider proof offered by litigants. We do not search the record to support the claims of the movant. A movant must show us where the record supports his claim. Wynn has the burden to prove entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. Thuko, 310 Kan. at 80. This court is "not required to scour the record to uncover support for factual 6 assertions in an appellate brief for which no meaningful citation to the record is provided." State v. Oliver, 39 Kan. App. 2d 1045, 1050, 186 P.3d 1220 (2008); see Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 35). He has not met his burden. An examination of the trial record provides Wynn no relief. Simply because other trial witnesses contradicted C.C.'s testimony, does not mean that C.C. perjured herself. C.C.'s credibility was a question for the jury. Wynn's defense attorney thoroughly cross- examined her. Wynn testified on his own behalf. The jury heard all the information that Wynn now complains about. The jury found Wynn guilty on some counts and not guilty on the others. Wynn ultimately asks this court to reweigh the evidence, which this court does not do. Affirmed. 7