State of Iowa v. Christopher Wayne Beamer
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-0975
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 25–0975
Submitted October 13, 2026—Filed November 20, 2026
State of Iowa,
Appellee,
vs.
Christopher Wayne Beamer,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Meghan Corbin
(motion to suppress) and Jeffrey C. McDaniel (sentencing), judges.
The defendant seeks further review of the court of appeals decision
affirming his conviction and sentence. Court of appeals decision affirmed in
part and vacated in part, district court conviction affirmed, sentence
vacated, and case remanded for resentencing.
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman,
Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., joined. McDonald, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Oxley and May, JJ., joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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Christensen, Chief Justice.
Before imposing a sentence, a judge must do more than listen to the
lawyers. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3) requires the district court
to “[a]ddress the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to make
a statement or present any information to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.”
That is known as the right of allocution.
Here, the district court asked the defendant’s counsel whether the
defendant wished to address the court at his sentencing hearing, but it did not
ask the defendant himself. On appeal, the defendant argues that this violated
his right of allocution. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. On further review, we affirm
the defendant’s conviction but remand for resentencing because the district
court failed to afford the defendant a longstanding right of allocution.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Around 7 a.m. on November 16, 2022, Christopher Beamer drove his
vehicle over the center line and crashed head-on into another vehicle in
Bettendorf. He admitted to police that he had consumed “a couple of beers.”
Additionally, the responding officer learned that police “had just dealt with
[Beamer] the night before” on a call for a fire at his residence in his bedroom.
During that response, Beamer admitted to being “a regular meth user,” and
police spotted a glass pipe with residue—drug paraphernalia—in plain view.
A sample of Beamer’s blood following the crash tested positive for
methamphetamine, and a search of his vehicle pursuant to a warrant uncovered
approximately twenty-seven grams of methamphetamine. The State
subsequently charged Beamer with possession with intent to deliver a
schedule II controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code
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section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2022), failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of
Iowa Code section 453B.12, and operating while intoxicated, first offense, in
violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a).
Beamer moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of his
vehicle and his statements made following the search, but the district court
denied the motion. Consequently, he entered a conditional guilty plea under Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(9) that preserved his ability to challenge the
suppression ruling. In exchange for the State’s dismissal of the drug tax stamp
violation charge, Beamer pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated, first
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a), and a reduced charge of
possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance in violation
of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6).
The district court held a sentencing hearing on March 11, 2025. After
defense counsel provided Beamer’s sentencing recommendation, the district
court asked, “[Defense counsel], does your client wish to address the Court at
this time, before the Court imposes sentence and judgment?” Beamer and
defense counsel conferred off the record, then defense counsel informed the
district court, “My client does not wish to address the Court, Your Honor.” The
district court heard the State’s sentencing recommendation before issuing its
sentence on the record.
For Beamer’s controlled-substance charge, the district court imposed a
term of incarceration not to exceed ten years with the sentence suspended and
three years of probation that included a requirement for Beamer to obtain and
maintain W-2 employment. On his charge for operating while intoxicated, the
district court sentenced Beamer to sixty days in jail. The district court ordered
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victim restitution in the amount of $30,295.48 in addition to fines and applicable
statutory surcharges.
Beamer filed a timely appeal, which we transferred to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals affirmed Beamer’s conviction and sentence, and we granted
his application for further review. In our discretion, we let the court of appeals
decision stand on Beamer’s challenge to the search warrant. See State v. Wade,
7 N.W.3d 511, 514 (Iowa 2024) (“When we grant further review, we have
discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand on specific issues.”). We focus
our attention instead on Beamer’s claim that the district court violated his right
of allocution.1
II. Analysis.
Beamer contends the district court violated his right of allocution by failing
to personally ask him whether he wished to address the court at his sentencing
hearing. We review his claim for abuse of discretion, which “will only be found if
the district court’s discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Staton, 13 N.W.3d 795,
797 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Craig, 562 N.W.2d 633, 634 (Iowa 1997)
(per curiam)). Here, Beamer’s defense counsel spoke on his behalf to provide
Beamer’s sentencing recommendation. Next, the district court asked defense
counsel, “[D]oes your client wish to address the court at this time, before the
Court imposes sentence and judgment?” The record notes that Beamer and
defense counsel had “[a]n off-the-record discussion,” then defense counsel
answered, “My client does not wish to address the Court, Your Honor.” The
1Beamer raises additional challenges to his sentence that we need not address because
we are vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing.
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district court neither personally addressed nor asked Beamer to confirm defense
counsel’s answer as to whether he wished to address the court.
We begin our analysis with the right of allocution’s historical backdrop,
against which we apply the governing Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
at 798. Since at least 1682, the common law has recognized the right of
defendants to speak on their own behalf before sentencing. Id. And “[a]s early as
1689, it was recognized that the court’s failure to ask the defendant if he had
anything to say before sentence was imposed required reversal.” Id. (quoting
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion)). Accordingly,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Green v. United States that
even though criminal procedure has evolved through major changes, including
the right to counsel, “[n]one of these modern innovations lessens the need for
the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his
plea in mitigation.” 365 U.S. at 304. This is because even “[t]he most persuasive
counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with
halting eloquence, speak for himself.” Id.
A defendant’s right of allocution is set forth in Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(2)–(3), which requires the district court to do the following
before imposing a sentence: “[p]rovide the defendant’s attorney an opportunity
to speak on the defendant’s behalf” and “[a]ddress the defendant personally in
order to permit the defendant to make a statement or present any information
to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.”2 (Emphasis added.) We have consistently
held that “[n]o special language is required to fulfill the rule’s mandate.” State v.
2Beamer’s brief also mentions Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(b), which requires
the district court to “ask whether the defendant has any legal cause to show why judgment
should not be pronounced.” But the substance of his argument only focuses on the language of
rule 2.23(2)(d)(3), so we limit our review accordingly. Notably, Beamer does not cite or discuss
rule 2.23(2)(b) in his reply brief or further review application.
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Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en banc); see also State v. Jackson-
Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2022); Craig, 562 N.W.2d at 634–35.
Substantial compliance is enough, as “[t]he important thing is whether the
defendant is given an opportunity to volunteer any information helpful to the
defendant’s cause.” Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d at 258 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Craig, 562 N.W.2d at 635).
That said, it is clear from the plain wording of rule 2.23(2)(d) that the
district court did not substantially comply with Beamer’s right of allocution. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(d)(2)–(3); see also In re N.F., 17 N.W.3d 667, 674 (Iowa
2025) (“When a rule’s wording is plain, we give effect to that ‘plain wording.’ ”
(quoting Hubbard v. Marsh, 32 N.W.2d 67, 68 (Iowa 1948))). This is evident from
the rule’s use of the term “shall” in declaring that the district court “shall”
“[a]ddress the defendant personally” about the defendant’s desire to make a
statement to the court “[b]efore imposing sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.23(2)(d)(3). “ ‘[S]hall’ ‘imposes a duty’ that is not discretionary.” In re J.B., 35
N.W.3d 132, 137 (Iowa 2026) (quoting State v. Flynn, 13 N.W.3d 843, 847 (Iowa
2024)); see also Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a). And applying its ordinary meaning, the
inclusion of the term “personally” in the rule imposes a duty for the district court
to ask the defendant “as oneself” as opposed to asking the defendant’s attorney.
Personally, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1687 (unabr. ed. 2002).
That the rule also mandates the district court to “[p]rovide the defendant’s
attorney an opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf” is further proof that
simply asking defense counsel—instead of Beamer personally—about whether
Beamer wished to address the court was inadequate. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.23(2)(d)(2). Otherwise, the rule could have stopped at requiring the district
court to provide defense counsel with the opportunity to speak on the
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defendant’s behalf and made no mention of addressing the defendant personally.
See State v. Lind, 37 N.W.3d 23, 34 (Iowa 2026) (“[W]e have often said that ‘every
word and every provision in a statute is to be given effect, if possible, and not
deemed mere surplusage.’ ” (quoting Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d
686, 703 (Iowa 2022))).
Our conclusion that the district court must directly address the defendant
to substantially comply with the rule aligns with state and federal precedent on
the issue. This includes our decision in State v. Craig, in which we held that our
rule “affords ‘counsel for the defendant, and the defendant personally,’ the right
to address the court ‘where either wishes to make a statement in mitigation of
punishment.’ ” 562 N.W.2d at 637 (quoting Iowa R. Crim. P. 22(3)(d)). We based
this conclusion on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Green, in
which the Supreme Court examined a defendant’s right of allocution under the
similarly worded federal rule. Green, 365 U.S. at 304. There, the Court rejected
the argument “that merely affording defendant’s counsel the opportunity to
speak fulfills” the rule, stating, “[T]here can be little doubt that the drafters of
Rule 32(a) intended that the defendant be personally afforded the opportunity to
speak before imposition of sentence.” Id.
The Court also acknowledged the appellate record’s inability to portray the
full picture, explaining, “[U]nlike a play, [a record] is unaccompanied with stage
directions which may tell the significant cast of the eye or the nod of the head.”
Id. at 304–05. Thus, it emphasized,
[T]o avoid litigation arising out of ambiguous records in order to
determine whether the trial judge did address himself to the
defendant personally, we think that the problem should be, as it
readily can be, taken out of the realm of controversy. This is easily
accomplished. Trial judges before sentencing should, as a matter of
good judicial administration, unambiguously address themselves to
the defendant. Hereafter trial judges should leave no room for doubt
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that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak
prior to sentencing.
Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
We echoed these words in Craig, and we do so again today. See 562 N.W.2d
at 637. Let this case serve as a reminder that a defendant’s right of allocution is
personal to the defendant. A district court does not sufficiently comply with this
right by merely asking defense counsel whether the defendant wishes to address
the court before imposing a sentence.
Finally, “[t]he fact that [defense] counsel spoke in mitigation of punishment
does not constitute substantial compliance with the rules and does not render
the court’s error harmless.” Id. We cannot know what Beamer might have said
or how it may have impacted the district court’s sentencing decision. Thus, the
proper remedy is to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
III. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated, we affirm Beamer’s conviction, vacate his sentence,
and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Court of appeals decision affirmed in part and vacated in part, district
court conviction affirmed, sentence vacated, and case remanded for
resentencing.
Waterman, Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion.
McDonald, J., files an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Oxley and
May, JJ., join.
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#25–0975, State v. Beamer
McDonald, Justice (concurring in the judgment).
There is a distinction between rights, rules, and remedies that is relevant
to the disposition of this case and future cases raising a similar issue. A criminal
defendant’s right of allocution is of ancient origin. The rules of criminal
procedure specify the manner in which the right is to be implemented. The
nature and scope of the right of allocution are thus not necessarily coextensive
with the rules designed to implement the right, and a violation of the rules alone
does not necessarily establish a violation of the underlying right. Further,
whether a violation of the right or the rules requires a remedy is a separate
question. The court does not directly address the distinction between rights,
rules, and remedies and appears to hold that the district court’s failure to
substantially comply with the rules, standing alone, compels resentencing. I
respectfully disagree. I would hold that a violation of the defendant’s right of
allocution or the rules designed to implement the right does not require
resentencing where the record affirmatively establishes the violation did not
prejudice the defendant. Because the record in this case shows that the district
court did not substantially comply with the rules and because the record does
not affirmatively establish a lack of prejudice to the defendant, I agree that
resentencing is required here. I thus concur in the judgment.
I.
The right of allocution and the rules of criminal procedure designed to
implement the right are separate and distinct. The right of allocution—the right
of a criminal defendant to speak in mitigation of punishment before sentence is
imposed—is of ancient common law origin. See State v. Staton, 13 N.W.3d 795,
798 (Iowa 2024); State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Iowa 2022). The right of
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allocution serves both instrumental and dignitary purposes. As to the first
purpose, the right affords the defendant a final opportunity to present
information bearing on the appropriate sentence. “The most persuasive counsel
may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting
eloquence, speak for himself.” Staton, 13 N.W.3d at 798 (quoting Green v. United
States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion)). As to the second purpose,
the right of allocution ensures that the accused has the opportunity to be heard
before the sovereign’s judgment is imposed.
Although the right of allocution is of ancient origin and has beneficent
purposes, it is not constitutionally required. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 428 (1962). The United States Supreme Court has described the failure to
afford allocution as “neither jurisdictional nor constitutional” and “not a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Id. Courts thus have discretion in choosing the manner to implement
the right. Nothing in the common law origins of the right required the sentencing
court to address the defendant personally or to use any particular formulation
of words in affording a defendant the right of allocution. What the common law
demanded was that the defendant have the opportunity to speak. This court has
said, “The important thing is whether the defendant [was] given an opportunity
to volunteer any information helpful to the defendant’s cause.” Staton, 13 N.W.3d
at 798–99 (quoting State v. Craig, 562 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1997) (per
curiam)).
This court has codified the manner in which sentencing courts are to
implement the right of allocution in Iowa. Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3) directs the sentencing court to “[a]ddress the defendant
personally in order to permit the defendant to make a statement or present any
11
information to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.” This rule is prophylactic. It
serves the underlying common law right by prescribing a mechanism that, when
followed, eliminates doubt about whether the defendant was actually afforded
the opportunity to speak. Cf. State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 402–05 (Iowa
2017) (analyzing the relationship between prophylactic rules and the underlying
rights they protect); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)
(explaining the prophylactic function of procedural rules designed to protect
underlying rights).
II.
This case demonstrates the distinction between the right of allocution and
the rule designed to implement or give effect to the right. While it is not clear to
me that the district court denied the defendant his right of allocution, it is clear
to me that the district court failed to substantially comply with prophylactic
rule 2.23(2)(d)(3).
It appears that the district court afforded the defendant the right of
allocution. This court has repeatedly said the important question with respect to
the right of allocution is whether the defendant had the opportunity to speak at
sentencing and volunteer information helpful to his cause. See, e.g., Staton, 13
N.W.3d at 798–99; State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2022);
Davis, 969 N.W.2d at 788; State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001)
(en banc). Here, the district court asked defense counsel whether the defendant
wished to address the court. Defense counsel then conferred with the defendant
and informed the court that the defendant did not wish to speak. On this record,
it appears that the district court in fact afforded the defendant an opportunity to
speak on his own behalf, even if the opportunity to speak was extended indirectly
through counsel.
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But the appearance may be deceiving. The difficulty in concluding that the
district court in fact afforded the defendant the right of allocution is that the
record is silent as to what defense counsel communicated to the defendant.
Counsel may or may not have accurately conveyed the court’s invitation. Counsel
may have told the defendant that he had no right to speak and that the lawyer
was going to speak on his behalf. The record is silent on the issue. This
uncertainty is precisely what prophylactic rule 2.23(2)(d)(3) was designed to
eliminate. When the court addresses the defendant personally, there can be no
doubt that the defendant received a direct and unfiltered invitation to speak.
There is no uncertainty or ambiguity for an appellate court to resolve: the
defendant was afforded the right of allocution. Thus, I agree with the court that
“[t]rial judges before sentencing should, as a matter of good judicial
administration, unambiguously address themselves to the defendant.” Green,
365 U.S. at 305.
The district court in this case did not unambiguously address the
defendant and thus failed to comply or substantially comply with Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3). The rule required the district court to direct its
question or extend the opportunity to the defendant “personally” rather than to
the defendant’s counsel. Id. Whether or not the district court complied with the
rule is a binary proposition. Either the district court personally addressed the
defendant, or it did not. Here, it did not. Because of the binary nature of the
inquiry, there is also no doubt that the district court did not substantially comply
with the rule. Substantial compliance, which focuses on the conduct of the
district court, Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d at 404; see also State v. Smothers, 309
N.W.2d 506, 508 (Iowa 1981), cannot be found where the court failed to engage
in the required conduct.
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III.
Whether the district court failed to comply or substantially comply with
rule 2.23(2)(d)(3) is an issue separate and distinct from what remedy, if any, is
required. See Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d at 404 (distinguishing between rules and
remedies and agreeing “substantial compliance focuses on whether the district
court adequately followed” the rule “while the remedy focuses on whether the”
violation of the rule “was otherwise harmless”). “Technical defects in procedure
do not call for reversal unless it appears they have in some way prejudiced [the]
complaining party.” State v. Rank, 214 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1974). When the
district court fails to substantially comply with the rules, this court will presume
prejudice and will reverse “unless the record affirmatively establishes otherwise.”
State v. Jordan, 779 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Paredes, 775
N.W.2d 554, 571 (Iowa 2009)).
The presumption of prejudice is not irrebuttable. In State v. Cason, 532
N.W.2d 755 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam), this court confronted a violation of the
predecessor to rule 2.23(2)(d)(3) and declined to reverse. There, the defendant
contended that the district court did not afford him an opportunity to allocute.
Id. at 757. This court concluded that any error was harmless because the
defendant had “agreed to the recommendation of sentence proposed by the
State.” Id. The court does not discuss Cason but instead relies on the statement
in State v. Craig that “[t]he fact that [defense] counsel spoke in mitigation of
punishment does not constitute substantial compliance with the rules and does
not render the court’s error harmless.” Craig, 562 N.W.2d at 637. Craig, however,
addressed and rejected only the specific contention that counsel’s speaking in
mitigation could satisfy the rule’s requirements or render any error harmless.
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Craig did not hold that a prejudice analysis is foreclosed whenever the rule is
violated, and this court’s decision in Cason demonstrates as much.
Federal courts confronting allocution errors routinely conduct a prejudice
analysis before requiring resentencing. Where a defendant has received the
lowest possible sentence, several circuits have held that resentencing would be
a “fruitless exercise” because the sentence “could not have been lower.” United
States v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993)); accord
Lewis, 10 F.3d at 1092; United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1991),
abrogated on other grounds by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Where,
by contrast, the sentence could have been lower, prejudice is presumed. See
United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (11th Cir. 2017); Bustamante-
Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1139–40; United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 352–53
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir.
2001).
The case for conducting a prejudice analysis with respect to allocution
errors is more compelling in Iowa than in the federal system. Federal sentencing
operates under an advisory guidelines model in which the sentencing judge
selects a specific term of months within a calculated range. See, e.g., United
States v. Rushton, 738 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2013). Because the sentencing
judge exercises discretion along a continuum, allocution may influence precisely
where on that continuum the sentence falls. Iowa’s sentencing system is
structurally different. Iowa employs an indeterminate sentencing model. See,
e.g., Iowa Code § 902.3 (2022) (requiring the court to order incarceration “for an
indeterminate term” for felonies other than class “A” felonies). The sentencing
court’s principal discretionary choice is whether to execute the sentence and
15
order the defendant to be incarcerated or to suspend the sentence and place the
defendant on probation. See id. § 907.3. The Iowa Board of Parole, not the
sentencing judge, determines the actual duration of incarceration within the
statutory range. See id. § 906.3. This structural feature of Iowa’s sentencing
system means that resentencing will often be incapable of producing a more
favorable result for the defendant. Courts generally consider an error that has
no possible effect on the result nonprejudicial.
To elaborate further on the distinction between rights, rules, and remedies,
consider the following example. Suppose that during a sentencing proceeding,
the district court did not address the defendant personally and ask whether the
defendant wished to address the court. Further suppose that at some point early
in the sentencing hearing, the defendant interrupted the proceeding and began
to speak on his own behalf without interruption from the district court. If the
district court finished the sentencing proceeding without addressing the
defendant personally regarding the allocution right, there would clearly be a
violation of rule 2.23(2)(d)(3). I think it equally clear, however, that there would
also not be a violation of the right. Further, it seems that there would also be no
need for a remedy because the defendant in fact spoke on his own behalf.
Unlike the example, the error in this case might have been prejudicial. The
district court did not impose a stipulated disposition, as in Cason, nor did it
impose the minimum sentence allowed by law. Here, the district court suspended
the sentence of imprisonment, but it exercised its discretion to impose a
contested condition of probation: the requirement that Beamer obtain and
maintain W-2 employment. This condition was not part of the plea agreement.
Beamer challenges this condition as unreasonable. The existence of a contested,
discretionary sentencing condition distinguishes this case from one in which a
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defendant received a bargained-for sentence or the most favorable disposition
allowed by law, or one in which the defendant actually spoke on his own behalf
although not expressly invited to do so. Had Beamer been personally afforded
the opportunity to speak, he might have addressed the W-2 employment
condition directly and persuaded the district court not to impose it. I cannot say
on this record that the district court’s failure to address Beamer personally could
not have affected the outcome. The presumption of prejudice stands, and
resentencing is warranted.3
IV.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
Oxley and May, JJ., join this concurrence in the judgment.
3I reserve the question, as the Supreme Court did in Hill v. United States, of what result
would obtain if the district court affirmatively denied the defendant any opportunity to speak at
sentencing, even where the denial could not have affected the outcome. See 368 U.S. at 429
(reserving the case in which a “defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak”). In
that case, the defendant’s dignitary interest may be implicated. Today’s case does not present
that question or that concern. The district court afforded Beamer an opportunity to speak,
although the invitation was extended indirectly through counsel rather than directly to the
defendant personally.