Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0264 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph David Parker, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Christopher Kemp, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. After pleading guilty to eluding (a felony) and interference with official acts (a simple misdemeanor), Joseph Parker was sentenced to five years in prison on the felony and thirty days in jail on the simple misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 321.279(2)(a), 719.1(1)(b) (2025). He now appeals those sentences, arguing that the district court should have suspended them and placed him on probation because that would have best served the goal of rehabilitation by letting him participate in a long-term, community-based substance-use-treatment program. But Parker’s disagreement with the court’s weighing of the sentencing factors is not enough to show that the court abused its considerable sentencing discretion. We thus affirm Parker’s sentences. We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions, including the exercise of its discretion whether to suspend a sentence, for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id. And even when the court would have been justified in imposing the sentence sought by the defendant, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725. A mere disagreement with the court’s weighing of the sentencing factors and the sentence ultimately selected is thus not a ground to successfully challenge the district court’s exercise of sentencing judgment. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023). At sentencing, Parker argued for a suspended prison sentence and probation so that he could participate in Bridges of Iowa—a long-term 2 substance-use-treatment program into which he had been accepted. According to Parker, this would be “most appropriate for him to meet at the intersection of protecting the public and further rehabilitating him or providing for his maximum opportunity for rehabilitation.” The State argued that the court should impose a five-year prison sentence because of Parker’s extensive criminal history and the fact that these offenses were committed while Parker was on probation. The district court agreed with the State’s recommendation and imposed the prison sentence. After recounting Parker’s criminal history and multiple past unsuccessful placements on probation, the court explained: [The] Court has considered the statutory sentencing considerations. Under Iowa Code section 907.5, I highlight the lack of success on probation; criminal history includes violence; been to prison before. Mitigating factors are Mr. Parker still has family support; per the [presentence-investigation report (“PSI”)], has a job available to him through the apprenticeship program; the recommendation from Bridges of Iowa. There has been significant intervention of 217 days by my count now. The PSI was filed a couple weeks ago, so there’s been about seven months in the Polk County Jail. The Court is concerned about the return to drug use, which I understand isn’t uncommon after a 28-day inpatient. There’s often relapse. But this relapse had significant additional factors that put the community in danger of the eluding charge going 25 or over that was pled to putting both himself, the officers, and the community at large . . . in danger. Per the PSI, during this time, Mr. Parker was engaged, per his own report, with Sober Soldierz, going to church, going to AA, and Full Circle Therapy Services. He was engaging in the services that are designed to keep him from relapsing or to create the intervention when the relapse happens to work back through the steps and start over again. Based on all those considerations, the Court finds that incarceration is necessary in this case. 3 We see nothing untenable or unreasonable in these reasons for Parker’s sentences. Parker makes good points about the potential rehabilitative benefits of his continued participation in the long-term, community-based substance-use-treatment program. And the district court considered them, expressly mentioning the recommendation from Bridges of Iowa as a mitigating factor. But rehabilitation is not the only appropriate sentencing consideration. See Iowa Code § 901.5 (requiring the sentencing court to consider, “[a]fter receiving and examining all pertinent information, including the presentence investigation report and victim impact statements,” which authorized sentence “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others”); id. § 907.5 (providing other factors the court must consider before “deferring judgment, deferring sentence, or suspending sentence”). And it matters not that Parker would have preferred the court to “have weighed the various factors differently.” Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863. Because we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exercise of its considerable sentencing judgment, we affirm Parker’s sentences. AFFIRMED. 4