Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-2144 Filed September 23, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph Hodel Schrock, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, The Honorable Clinton R. Boddicker, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Mark C. Meyer, Iowa City, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tessa Register, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Sandy, J., and Vogel, S.J. Opinion by Sandy, J. 1 SANDY, Judge. Age may bring wisdom but it does not necessarily bring mitigation. At age sixty-three, Joseph Schrock asked the sentencing court to treat his age as a reason for leniency. The court declined to do so, and we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In January 2024, a law enforcement officer conducting an undercover investigation communicated electronically with Schrock while posing as a fifteen-year-old girl. On January 18, Schrock sent an obscene image—a photograph of male genitalia—by phone to the person he believed to be a minor. On January 19, he attempted to entice that same person for the purpose of committing an illegal sex act. Officers arrested and interviewed Schrock, and they recovered a cell phone and a controlled substance from his vehicle. No actual minor was involved in the exchange. The State filed a trial information charging five counts arising from Schrock’s conduct on January 18 and 19: sexual exploitation of a minor, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 728.12(1) (2024); enticing a minor, a class “D” felony, in violation of section 710.10(2); driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of sections 321.555, .560, and .561; possession of a controlled substance, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of section 124.401(5); and telephone dissemination of obscene material to a minor, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of section 728.15. The minutes of testimony referenced a prior possession conviction. Schrock filed a written waiver of rights and guilty plea to three counts: count II, enticing a minor; count IV, possession of a controlled substance, second offense; and count V, telephone dissemination of obscene material to 2 a minor. The remaining counts were to be dismissed. The written plea recited the maximum penalties, the constitutional rights waived, and a factual basis for each count. Under the agreement, Schrock was free to request a suspended sentence and the State was free to recommend any lawful sentence; the plea acknowledged that the court was not bound by the agreement, that Schrock would be required to register as a sex offender, and that the failure to file a timely motion in arrest of judgment would foreclose a later challenge to defects in the plea. The court set the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation report. The presentence investigation report documented a criminal history spanning several decades and including convictions for theft, assault, burglary, operating while intoxicated, domestic abuse, and child endangerment, together with prior terms of probation, parole, and incarceration. Schrock described himself as having been in and out of jail and prison for most of his adult life. At sentencing Schrock asked the court to suspend his sentence, emphasizing that he owns his residence, has family ties in the area, receives steady income from a trust and retirement funds, completed nearly two years of pretrial release without violation, was willing to complete registration and sex-offense treatment requirements, could access mental-health and substance-abuse treatment in the community, and had communicated with an undercover officer rather than an actual minor. In the alternative, counsel asked for concurrent five-year terms. The State recommended incarceration consistent with the recommendation in the presentence investigation report and asked for consecutive terms, stressing Schrock’s criminal history and his belief that he was soliciting a fifteen-year-old girl. 3 The court identified Schrock’s performance on pretrial release, his stable housing, his reliable income, his family ties, and his completion of a GED as mitigating factors. It then identified aggravating considerations, noting that Schrock was “63 years old and not a youthful offender.” The court emphasized Schrock’s “extensive criminal history,” which had gone undeterred for forty years despite fines, probation, incarceration, and other interventions. As to the nature, the court observed that Schrock believed he was communicating with a fifteen-year-old girl when he sent the image and when he committed the enticing offense. The court declined to suspend the sentence. It imposed indeterminate terms not to exceed five years on count II and two years each on counts IV and V, with counts II and V concurrent to one another and consecutive to count IV, for a total term not to exceed seven years. It imposed fines of $1,025 on count II and $855 each on counts IV and V, plus the fifteen percent crime- services surcharge, court costs, $100 in court-appointed attorney fee restitution, and category “B” restitution subject to Schrock’s reasonable ability to pay. The court further ordered a DNA specimen, registration as a sex offender based on counts II and V, and a $260 civil penalty on each of counts II and V. Schrock received credit for time served, appeal bonds were set as cash only, and the State was given thirty days to file a restitution statement. The written order of disposition was filed the following day. It does not identify the code provision authorizing the civil penalties. Schrock filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises two issues. First, he argues the district court abused its discretion by treating his age as an aggravating factor, relying on criminological and actuarial literature— including a 2017 United States Sentencing Commission report and the 4 research underlying the Static-99R instrument—for the proposition that offenders in their sixties present a low risk of reoffending, and he seeks resentencing before a different judge. Second, he argues the $260 civil penalties are illegal because, in his view, they were imposed under Iowa Code section 911.2A, which does not enumerate enticing a minor and, he contends, reaches only offenses involving an actual minor. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a sentence within the statutory limits for an abuse of discretion, beginning with a strong presumption that the sentence is valid and affording the sentencing judge significant latitude. State v. Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d 357, 363 (Iowa 2024). The question is not whether we would have weighed the factors differently, but whether the court based its decision on grounds that were clearly untenable or unreasonable. Id. We review a claim that a sentence is illegal for correction of errors at law, and such a claim may be raised at any time. State v. Hoeck, 843 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Iowa 2014). DISCUSSION I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in treating Schrock’s age as an aggravating factor. Schrock contends the court abused its discretion by identifying his age, sixty-three, as the first of several aggravating factors. We disagree. Age was a permissible consideration. Because Schrock asked the court to suspend his sentence, the court was obligated to consider his age in deciding whether suspension would afford the maximum opportunity for his rehabilitation and for the protection of the community. See Iowa Code § 907.5(1)(a). Age is thus not an improper factor, and Schrock’s argument reduces to a disagreement with the weight the court assigned to it. 5 That disagreement does not establish an abuse of discretion. Sentencing is an individualized exercise; the judge must weigh the particular facts and circumstances and craft a sentence that best serves the public, the victim, and the defendant. State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 301–03 (Iowa 2025). The court did exactly that. It expressly credited Schrock’s mitigating circumstances—his performance on pretrial release, stable housing, steady income, family ties, and education—before turning to the aggravating circumstances, including his age, his criminal history spanning roughly forty years, his many prior unsuccessful interventions, and the nature of an offense he committed believing he was pursuing a fifteen-year- old girl. On this record, viewing Schrock’s continued offenses at an age when he was well past being considered a youthful offender as aggravating rather than mitigating was neither untenable nor unreasonable.1 II. The civil penalties were lawfully imposed. The court assessed two $260 civil penalties, one on the enticing count and one on the dissemination count. Schrock argues these penalties were illegal under Iowa Code section 911.2A because his offense involved an undercover officer rather than an actual minor. The argument misidentifies the governing statute. The penalties rest on Iowa Code section 692A.110(2), which provides that, in addition to any other penalty, an offender convicted of a public offense that requires registration under chapter 692A “shall be assessed a civil penalty.” The penalty for each such conviction is $260. Iowa 1 Schrock’s reliance on criminological and actuarial studies purporting to show that recidivism declines with age does not change the analysis. Those materials were never offered or admitted below and are outside the record on appeal. Our task is not to second- guess the district court or to reweigh the factors it considered; it is only to determine whether the sentence rested on untenable or unreasonable grounds. State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862–63 (Iowa 2023). 6 Code § 602.8105(2)(h). The trigger is conviction of a registrable offense— not proof that the victim was an actual minor. Both of Schrock’s qualifying convictions are enumerated sex offenses that require registration. Telephone dissemination of obscene material to minors in violation of section 728.15 is a tier I offense. See Iowa Code § 692A.102(1)(a)(10)(a). Enticing a minor in violation of section 710.10, where the violation includes the intent to commit sexual abuse, exploitation, contact, or conduct directed toward a minor, is a tier III offense. Id. § 692A.102(1)(c)(32). That condition is satisfied here. Section 710.10(2) defines the offense by the intent to commit an illegal sex act upon or the sexual exploitation of a minor under the age of sixteen, and the factual basis recited in Schrock’s written plea tracked that language. Schrock was ordered to register based on both convictions. The civil penalty follows from those convictions as a matter of course, consistent with how the section 692A.110 penalty has been imposed upon conviction of a registrable sex offense. See State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Iowa 2019) (“The court ordered Petty to pay a civil penalty of $250, in accordance with Iowa Code section 692A.110.”) Schrock’s premise—that the penalty requires an actual minor victim—finds no footing in section 692A.110 or in the offenses of conviction. The dissemination statute expressly reaches conduct directed at “a law enforcement officer or agent posing as a minor.” Iowa Code § 728.15(1)(b). So does the enticing statute found in Iowa Code § 710.10(2). That an officer, rather than a child, received his communications does not undo his convictions, his resulting registration obligation, or the civil penalty that attaches to it. Because the penalties were authorized by law, the sentence is not illegal. 7 AFFIRMED. 8