Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1969 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. James Edward Mason, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, The Honorable Michael Carpenter, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. James Edward Mason appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree and sexual exploitation of a minor.1 On appeal, he argues the district court erred by exhibiting a predetermined sentencing posture, by failing to provide adequate reasons for the sentence, and by imposing a prison sentence that was not supported by substantial evidence. Upon our review, we affirm Mason’s sentence. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In July 2025, the Davis County Sheriff’s Office received a report that twenty-four-year-old Mason was engaged in sexual relations with fifteen- year-old, K.A. Mason was later arrested and admitted that he knew K.A. was fifteen years old, that he had nude photographs of her on his phone, and that he had sexual intercourse with her. The State charged Mason by a six-count trial information. Mason later pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d), and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 728.12(3)(a). In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges. The parties also agreed to an open sentence in the plea agreement, with the State recommending a prison term and Mason seeking probation. At sentencing, the district court sentenced Mason to a prison term not to exceed ten years on the sexual abuse count and a prison term not to exceed 1 Because Mason is challenging the discretionary sentence imposed on his conviction rather than the plea itself, he has good cause to appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 2 five years on the sexual exploitation count, with the sentences running concurrently. The district court reasoned: I’ve considered all the sentencing options provided for in Chapters 901 and 907 of the Code of Iowa, and my judgment relative to sentence is based on that which would provide the maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation, and at the same time protect the community from further offenses by you and others. . . . Going through the factors that I’m required to consider, start by considering your age. I understand that you’re twenty-four years old now. You’re young. That’s somewhat mitigating, but you’re not that young. You’re not eighteen or nineteen. There is still a large gap in age between yourself and [K.A.]. I consider your prior criminal record, that there is none. That is mitigating. I consider your employment. The presentence investigation [report (PSI)] indicates that you were employed back in Arkansas. I consider the nature of the offense committed. That’s a strongly aggravating factor. Sex abuse crimes against children are some of the most serious crimes in Iowa. I consider your need for rehabilitation, and your potential for rehabilitation. Basically, what do we need to do to make sure that this doesn’t happen again? The parts in the [PSI] that, when I was reviewing them before coming down here today that gave me pause, you were asked a series of questions about your sexual fantasies and preferences. You told them you don’t have any sexual fantasies. You don’t have any preferences. There’s no particular type of woman you find desirable. . . . I question whether they’re honest considering why we’re here. In your [PSI], contrary to what you say here today, on page 9, I believe it was, you said that you fully intended to continue—I mean, that you loved—that you were in love with [K.A.]. You stated that one of your goals was—in the next year was to get married, presumably [to K.A.], since she’s the one you’re in love with. It’s almost a roundabout admission is your thought—thought in your head is that you’re going to continue to victimize [K.A.], who is the victim here. Your rehabilitation, because this is a sex crime, it requires you to learn the hard art of brutal honesty, and brutally honest self-reflection on how you ended up in this situation, and why you’re here, why we’re talking about sending you to prison or not for what you did. 3 When I came down here today—and I always keep an open mind because I haven’t heard from [K.A.]. I haven’t heard from you or your attorney. I’ve only seen the [PSI]. I know what you’re pleading to. I was certainly predisposed to send you to prison and send you to prison on consecutive terms. Considering the level of what you’ve done, that’s— that would be appropriate, wouldn’t be an injustice. Given some of those responses that I talk about in your [PSI], I just think that your journey towards rehabilitation, I question whether that has to begin in prison to make that clean break and to make sure that the second that eyes are diverted elsewhere, when you have an opportunity, that you’re not just reconnecting with [K.A.]. I mean, there’s going to be a no contact order. That would be a violation of your probation. That would be—put you in a whole heap of trouble. Mason now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW “When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2015). DISCUSSION I. Predetermined Sentence Mason first argues the district court erred by exhibiting a predetermined sentencing posture that a prison term be imposed. The crux of Mason’s argument stems from the district court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that: When I came down here today—and I always keep an open mind because I haven’t heard from [K.A.]. I haven’t heard from you or your attorney. I’ve only seen the [PSI]. I know what you’re pleading to. I was certainly predisposed to send you to prison and send you to prison on consecutive 4 terms. Considering the level of what you’ve done, that’s—that would be appropriate, wouldn’t be an injustice. According to Mason, this shows that the district court was predetermined to sentence him to a prison term. In support of his argument, Mason points to our decision in State v. Root. See No. 03-1941, 2004 WL 2173422 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2004). The district court in Root began the sentencing hearing by telling the defendant: [Y]ou’re starting out in a hole in this case. It’s a big hole. My intent today is to send you to prison. I’m going to give you the opportunity to talk yourself out of that. You better be real persuasive, . . . it’s your opportunity at this point in time to tell me why I shouldn’t send you to prison. Id. at *2. Based on that statement, we held the district court appeared to exhibit a predetermined sentencing bias which precluded the exercise of its discretion in rendering judgment. Id. This case is distinguishable from Root. Here, the district court considered the relevant factors before making the statement. This was not the case in Root. See id. (“The problem with these statements is they were made before the court considered or discussed any of the relevant sentencing factors and reflect a fixed, predetermined sentencing posture.”). Moreover, the district court’s statement was nowhere near as egregious as was the case in Root. The district court noted that it kept an open mind before hearing from K.A., Mason, and his attorney. As we have said before, “when imposing a potentially decade-long prison sentence, words matter.” State v. Hubler, No. 24-0631, 2025 WL 855934, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). While the district court’s use of the word “predisposed” would perhaps be problematic when read in 5 isolation, context is key. When considering the district court’s entire statement at the sentencing hearing, it is clear that it did not sentence Mason to a predetermined prison sentence. For example, the record shows the district court considered various factors before making the statement at the end of the hearing. Furthermore, although the district court stated it was “predisposed” to sentence Mason to consecutive prison sentences, it ended up ordering the sentences to run concurrently. This was despite the fact the State had urged the district court to follow the PSI recommendation and have the sentences run consecutively. While the district court’s use of the word “predisposed” was not the best word to use during the sentencing hearing, when reviewing the record as a whole, we do not find that the district court sentenced Mason to a predetermined prison sentence. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 112 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The district court, in imposing sentence, usually speaks extemporaneously and may use ‘unfortunate phraseology.’” (quoting State v. Nichols, 247 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Iowa 1976))). II. Adequate Reasons Mason next argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide adequate reasons for imposing his sentence. Mason contends that while the district court referenced factors such as his age, prior criminal record, employment, nature of the offense committed, and the need and potential for rehabilitation, it never connected the factors to its sentence. According to Mason, “Simply identifying factors is not the same as explaining why incarceration was necessary.” Thus, Mason asserts the district court did not articulate a reasoned basis for selecting the sentence it did. 6 Based on our review of the record, it is clear why the district court imposed the sentence that it did. Upon considering the various factors listed above and explaining why each factor was either aggravating or mitigating, the district court determined that a prison sentence was warranted. See State v. Rutter, No. 25-0141, 2026 WL 1020668, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2026) (holding that the district court provided sufficient explanation for its sentence when it discussed the defendant’s age, prospects for rehabilitation, criminal history, employment, the PSI, and the seriousness of the offense). The district court’s reasoning may not have been as detailed as Mason would have liked, but it is nonetheless sufficient for our review on appeal. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (“A terse and succinct statement is sufficient . . . when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record before the court.”). To the extent that Mason is suggesting the district court needed to explain why it rejected sentencing him to probation, we note the district court “is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options.” State v. Smith, 17 N.W.3d 355, 359 (Iowa 2025) (quoting State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam)). Therefore, because the district court provided adequate reasons for imposing Mason’s sentence, we find no abuse of discretion. III. Substantial Evidence Lastly, Mason argues the district court erred by imposing and not suspending the prison sentences because they were not supported by substantial evidence. “A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016). “A district court’s ‘ground or reason 7 is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.’” Id. (quoting State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2014)). Importantly, “[i]f the evidence supports the sentence, the district court did not abuse its discretion.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24–25 (Iowa 2018). While Mason asserts that he is challenging whether the district court’s sentence is supported by substantial evidence, he is in essence renewing the argument he made at the district court arguing that he should have been sentenced to probation instead of a prison term. For example, Mason points out that there are several mitigating factors that support a suspended sentence. According to Mason, the record demonstrates that a prison term was not the best sentence to maximize his rehabilitation and protect the community. Rather, Mason argues that probation would provide him with the best chance for rehabilitation and recovery than a prison sentence. However, “[o]n our review, we do not decide the sentence we would have imposed, but whether the sentence imposed was unreasonable.” Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 554; see also State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023) (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors differently.”); State v. Carlson, No. 19-2113, 2021 WL 210702, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (“It is not our role to decide whether probation is better than prison.”). Based on our review of the record, the district court’s sentence was reasonable and supported by the evidence. We therefore reject Mason’s argument. 8 CONCLUSION We conclude that the district court did not exhibit a predetermined sentencing posture, did not fail to provide adequate reasons for Mason’s sentence, and did not impose a prison sentence that was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm Mason’s sentence. AFFIRMED. 9