Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0708 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Ahren Joseph Johnston, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, The Honorable Stacy Ritchie, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy (argued), Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Badding, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. Ahren Johnston appeals thirteen criminal convictions related to abusing two children. He asked the supreme court to retain this case and overrule case law on joinder to grant him relief. We could not do that even if we wanted to. We affirm because Johnston’s challenges—concerning joinder, a motion for mistrial, and sufficiency of the evidence—do not warrant relief. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Johnston physically abused his biological daughter, L., and his former girlfriend’s son, S.,1 during weekends the children were in his custody in late 2022 and early 2023. Johnston threatened both children that he would harm them or their mother, Mariah, if they told anyone what happened. He also explained multiple separate injuries to both children by claiming he gave them black eyes while “wrestling.” Both children eventually disclosed the abuse, and both testified at trial, after which a jury found Johnston guilty as charged. S. is not biologically related to Johnston but saw him as a father figure. S. recalled that he and Johnston got along well when he was younger, and Johnston continued to have parenting time with both S. and his sister L. after their mother separated from Johnston. The weekend after Thanksgiving in 2022, when S. was twelve years old, the children were staying at Johnston’s house. Johnston “came into [S.’s] room and stomped on [his] Xbox and broke it.” S. recalled that Johnston was “very mad” and S. felt “scared.” Next, Johnston picked up a model car about the size of a brick and threw it at S.’s head; it struck him in the face and gave 1 Because one of the children elected not to use the defendant’s surname after the abuse, we refer to both children by their first initial and their mother by first name. 2 him a black eye. After throwing the car at S., Johnston dragged S. out of his room and into the hallway, “blaming [S.] for a lot of stuff that happened between [ Johnston] and [S.’s] mom.” S. remembered being “shocked” and “really scared.”2 Johnston dragged S. to the living room, where Johnston pointed a 9 mm pistol at S. from “a couple feet” away. Johnston continued “yelling and blaming [S.] for the stuff that happened with DHS[3] and between [ Johnston] and [S.’s] mom.” S. felt “super scared,” “begging” Johnston “not to shoot” him; Johnston appeared “super . . . mad.” Johnston next forced S. into the garage, threw S. to the ground, and kicked him in the ribs and the side. Johnston continued “blaming [S.] for all of the things that happened.” Johnston grabbed a ball peen hammer and struck S. in the back and shoulder. It hurt “really bad,” and S. had bruises on his shoulder and “all over” his back. S. remembered lying on the garage floor after Johnston went back inside, feeling “super scared” and thinking he “[j]ust didn’t even have the will to do anything at that moment.” S. eventually went back inside, where Johnston forced him to help load ammunition into multiple firearms—an AK-47 rifle, the 9 mm pistol’s magazine, and a .223 rifle. Johnston told S. this was going to be Johnston’s “final stand” and that Johnston was going to kill S.’s mom. While loading ammunition, Johnston continued to point the guns at S. and poke them into his chest; S. recalled “begging for my life, for him not to shoot me.” Johnston made S. hold the 9 mm pistol to his own head and yelled things like, “Come 2 S. thought L. “was in the bedroom” throughout the described events. 3 Witnesses throughout trial referred to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services by its old acronym, “DHS.” 3 on, do it.” S. was “scared out of [his] mind” and eventually complied; the pistol clicked when he pulled the trigger—the gun was empty, though S. didn’t know that at the time. After this, Johnston directed S. to make chicken nuggets. S. tried, but he didn’t really know how to cook. The nuggets came out “burned on the outside and cold on the inside.” Johnston got “super mad,” sent L. back to her room, and held a gun to S.’s head again, telling him he was “worth nothing.” S. told Johnston he needed to use the bathroom. Johnston told him: “Do it right there.” So S. urinated in his pants. Johnston made him clean it up with soap and napkins and then told him to do the dishes. Johnston wasn’t happy with how S. did the dishes; Johnston threw them all back in the sink and made S. wash them again. S. couldn’t sleep that night. He “just sat there in the darkness,” “curled up underneath [his] blankets.” The next morning, Johnston made some apologetic statements to S. But he also told S. that, if he told anyone what happened, Johnston “would come over and kill” S. and his mom. S. didn’t tell the full truth about what happened until after police confiscated Johnston’s guns and S. knew he wouldn’t have to stay with him anymore. At school on Monday, S.’s junior high school counselor saw his black eye and asked what happened. S. “turned his head and put his head down,” without answering; he asked if he could come see her later in the day. When they spoke later, S. seemed uncomfortable and was “very careful with his words.” He told her he got the black eye wrestling with his dad. The next day, S. told the counselor about Johnston smashing the Xbox and more about what happened over the weekend. He also told her it was hard to breathe, and she saw other bruises on his body. The counselor took S. to the school nurse and called the child abuse hotline. The nurse observed “pretty extensive” 4 bruising, including the black eye; she took photographs and also reported the abuse. Police spoke with S. a few days later and observed the black eye and bruising on his body. Johnston told police S. got the injuries “roughhousing, wrestling.” The police captain speaking with Johnston thought the injuries seemed excessive for wrestling with a child. S. was eventually interviewed at a child protection center, where he told the forensic interviewer about Johnston smashing the Xbox, dragging him, throwing the car at him, hitting him with the hammer, and pointing the guns at him. S. also told the interviewer that Johnston told him to tell people he got hurt “wrestling.” S. never went back to Johnston’s house. A few months after the Thanksgiving-weekend assaults against S., L.—then six years old—experienced a February weekend when she stayed with Johnston that she later described as “black eye weekend.” In her words, given during trial testimony at age eight: “My dad threw an egg at me” and “put a gun to my head.” The egg incident involved Johnston throwing an egg at her face, both the egg and her glasses breaking when the egg hit her, and Johnston telling her to lick the broken egg up off the floor. When she refused to lick the floor, Johnston started to “break” more of the children’s possessions around the house. L. described gun incidents involving a “large” gun her dad put against her forehead and a “medium” gun he put “in [her] mouth.” It “scared” her. She also described other incidents in which Johnston hit her on the legs with a “big” bat and poured ranch dressing on her head. It “hurted” when Johnston hit her. She also described one night when Johnston took her for a drive, got out of the car, started using a “smaller” gun to shoot at a sign, and then pretended to drive off without her. This also “scared” her. She recalled seeing Johnston point a gun at S. while 5 they were at his house; Johnston was being “mean” and “hit” S. Again, this “scared” L. Johnston told L. that, if she told anybody what happened, he would “kill” her family. At some point during the weekend all this unfolded with L., Johnston text-messaged Mariah that he and L. were “wrestling” and he “elbowed her eye on accident” and “stepped on her glasses.” Mariah called for a welfare check, but the police did not remove L. from Johnston’s custody. The morning after the text message, when L. returned home to Mariah, Mariah saw L. had a “horrible black eye” and the “side of her face was swollen.” In Mariah’s words: “[L.] just looked like she didn’t have a soul in her body and just her eyes were blank. And she wouldn’t talk to me. She just walked over to me and hugged me and that was it.” Mariah thought L. seemed like a “shell of a little girl” that morning. She found additional bruises under L.’s clothing. Police later took photos. After this, L. never returned to Johnston’s custody. Mariah took L. to urgent care, where a physician documented L.’s black eye and bruising above her right eye, as well as bruising on her right shoulder, right arm, both wrists, both thighs, her left leg, and her right abdomen. The physician took photos and diagnosed a mild concussion. He also reported the injuries as suspected child abuse, as he did not believe they were consistent with typical play for a child L.’s age. L. didn’t go to school Monday, and on Tuesday her kindergarten teacher immediately noticed the black eye and bruises. The injuries were so obvious the teacher had a “hard time not tearing up . . . because it was so drastic.” The teacher sent L. to speak with the elementary school counselor. L. told the counselor about much of the same abuse she shared with the jury, as well as an additional incident in which Johnston made her smoke his vape; L. told the counselor she “didn’t know how” to smoke the vape and ended 6 up coughing a lot. She also told the counselor that the injuries were from “wrestling” before later clarifying what really happened. According to Mariah, L. just wasn’t the same after the abuse perpetrated by Johnston. Before the abuse, L. never had issues at school; after, she would sometimes hide under her desk, rock back and forth with her hands over her ears, and cry. L.’s teacher corroborated this: L. was a “pretty joyful” girl before the abuse, while after she was much quieter, withdrawn, would tear up a lot. Sometimes she would just . . . not respond. So it was almost like she wasn’t there, even when she was looking right at you. It definitely started to affect her schoolwork. She—she kind of participated with other kids less than she had been prior to that. In the teacher’s words, L. “went from being a bubbly kind of happy little girl to being very serious and withdrawn afterwards.” When asked if L. ever returned to how she was before the abuse, the teacher answered: “There would be little glimmers I think, but not completely.” The elementary school counselor testified similarly. Dr. Jennifer Jolly, a licensed mental health counselor, eventually diagnosed L. with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Jolly described for the jury how, when she asked L. about the black eye weekend during their first meeting, L. “did a fetal position fold” into Mariah and had to be peeled off “like Velcro.” L. repeatedly described to Jolly how her dad “hurted her” and, during play therapy, shared what Jolly described as feelings of “fear, guilt, shame, and confusion.” By trial, Jolly had been treating L. for about eighteen months; Jolly believed the PTSD was “significantly impairing” L.’s life and that L. was still experiencing PTSD as of trial. 7 A jury found Johnston guilty as charged on a total of thirteen counts: one count of child endangerment—multiple acts, a class “B” felony violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6 and 726.6A (2022) (against L. only); three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated misdemeanors in violation of sections 708.1(2)(c) and 708.2(3); two counts of harassment in the first degree, aggravated misdemeanors in violation of sections 708.7(1)(b) and (2); four counts of child endangerment causing bodily injury, class “D” felonies in violation of sections 726.6(1)(a) and (7); and three counts of child endangerment, aggravated misdemeanors in violation of section 726.6(1)(a), (4), and (8). The court sentenced Johnston to prison, with the multiple-acts conviction consecutive to two separate class “D” felony child-endangerment convictions, with the rest concurrent. Johnston appeals, and the supreme court transferred the matter to us for resolution. DISCUSSION Johnston raises three issues on appeal: joinder, a motion for mistrial, and sufficiency of the evidence for the multiple-acts conviction. We consider each under separate headings with the appropriate error-preservation considerations and standard of review. I. Joinder Johnston argues the “district court erred in granting the State’s motion to join the cases involving [L.] with the cases involving [S.].” He asserts the charges as to the two children were not part of a “common scheme or plan” and “were not inextricably intertwined.” And he claims introducing the charges involving L. into a trial of the charges involving S. (and vice versa) constitutes “other bad acts evidence” forbidden under our court rules. 8 The State contests Johnston’s joinder argument in part on multiple error-preservation grounds. The State first urges that, after the pertinent motion to consolidate was filed, Johnston’s arguments solely concerned prejudice and res judicata. Although we tend to agree with the State’s reading of the record, we assume without deciding that the broader merits of the joinder ruling are properly before us. Second, the State correctly points out that Johnston never argued below that any of the controlling joinder cases were wrongly decided. We again agree with the State’s reading of the record, but we think this error-preservation concern is moot given the transfer of this case to our intermediate appellate court.4 See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.”). The State also raises a procedural challenge to our review of this issue, stressing that Johnston relies on trial evidence to bolster his appellate claim when our review is limited to “what the district court knew at the time it ruled on the motion for severance [or consolidation], and not what it learned at the conclusion of the trial.” State v. Othow, No. 21-1928, 2024 WL 960960, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2024); cf. State v. Clark, 464 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Iowa 1991) (“In determining whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it overruled [a] motion to sever, finding that defendants would not be prejudiced by a joint trial, we must examine the information 4 That said, we specifically reject the contention made in Johnston’s reply brief that, because he resisted consolidation below, every possible argument in support of that resistance may be advanced on appeal. Foreshadowing the argument’s (lack of ) vitality under Iowa law, Johnston cites an out-of-jurisdiction case, two dissents, and a law review article. None of these tertiary authorities displace controlling Iowa cases rejecting that position, including Ruiz v. State, 18 N.W.3d 453, 457 (Iowa 2025), and State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 509 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc)—both of which this panel is bound to follow. 9 available at the time of the ruling.”). Johnston does not address this scope question in his reply brief. We believe the State’s uncontested position on scope of review is correct, given that Johnston did not make a new motion to sever at trial, and we limit our appellate review accordingly. The district court’s discretionary call turned only on what it knew at the time—not on how the evidence might develop in the future. As the foregoing alludes, our review is for abuse of discretion. State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 457 (Iowa 2006). “To show the district court abused its discretion in consolidating, a defendant must prove that his interest in severance was greater than the State’s interest in judicial economy.” Id. Under the rules of criminal procedure, Two or more indictable public offenses which arise from the same transaction or occurrence or from two or more transactions or occurrences constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, when alleged and prosecuted contemporaneously, shall be alleged and prosecuted as separate counts in a single complaint, information or indictment, unless, for good cause shown, the trial court in its discretion determines otherwise. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.6(1) (2023).5 The presumption is thus in favor of joinder for cases involving a common scheme or plan. See id. Since adoption, the rule has been understood to “liberalize[] and broaden[] charging practices so as to allow prosecutors more leeway in seeking to join multiple offenses for a single prosecution.” State v. Bair, 362 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1985). Offenses involve a common scheme or plan when they “have a common link” and are “the products of a single or continuing motive.” State 5 We quote this rule as it was in effect the first half of 2023. The rule was amended effective July 1, 2023, but the amendment does not affect our analysis. 10 v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Iowa 2000). We consider intent, modus operandi, temporal and geographical proximity of the offenses, and whether the acts were carried out in similar ways. Id.; see also State v. Johnson, No. 22-1139, 2023 WL 8069231, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023) (applying these factors). For this test, our “cases have not set a high bar.” State v. Wise, No. 19-1353, 2021 WL 1400771, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021). The State’s position below, repeated on appeal, is that the common “motive was to terrorize, control, and/or physically and emotionally harm the victims. . . . All crimes occurred within the same timeframe, family unit, and within the same geographic proximity.” Because Johnston did not contest the common-scheme question at the final joinder hearing below, the district court did not expressly adopt this rationale. But we think the district court’s agreement was implicit, given its ruling. We discern no abuse of discretion. As our rendition of the facts makes clear, the child-abuse motive and the power-and-control dynamic exhibited by Johnston were consistent themes across the charged counts and sufficient to trigger the presumption in favor of consolidation. These commonalities were all known to the district court at the time of its ruling through the minutes and additional minutes of testimony. Trying a case with these commonalities in a single trial, rather than multiple severed trials, undoubtedly furthers judicial economy. Our holding on this issue aligns closely with the supreme court’s decision in State v. Romer, where that court found the sexual exploitation of multiple minors over a three-year period warranted consolidation based on a common scheme by the defendant to “victimize children to fulfill his sexual desires.” 832 N.W.2d 169, 182–83 (Iowa 2013). If anything, the commonalities here are more striking. For just a few specific examples, 11 Johnston attempted to blame both children’s black eyes on “wrestling” incidents, he threatened to kill the mother if either child told the truth, and the incidents of abuse against both children involved firearms. And to the extent Johnston points to the three months between the weekend in which S. was abused and the weekend in which Johnston gave L. the black eye, both the supreme court and this court have approved joinder of offenses years apart. State v. Elston, 735 N.W.2d 196, 199 & n.1 (Iowa 2007) (offense range of two years); Johnson, 2023 WL 8069231, at *4 (“[E]ven though Johnson’s motive extended over several years, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the other factors weighed in favor of finding the offenses were part of a common scheme or plan.”). Finally, as a belt-and-suspenders observation, we would affirm the joinder ruling even if Romer and Elston were overruled and we were instructed to conduct an other-bad-acts analysis while evaluating discretionary joinder rulings. On these facts, we are doubtful the trial court would have excluded the evidence Johnston complains about even in separate trials. “Intent” and “lack of accident” are two of the express purposes for which otherwise inadmissible bad-acts evidence may be admitted. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2). The main thrust of Johnston’s defense below was that he did not intend to abuse the children and that he accidentally gave them both black eyes. We have recognized on multiple occasions that a history of vitriol, violence, or other bad acts toward children is probative on intent or lack of accident. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, No. 23-0669, 2024 WL 2842265, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024) (“caregiver’s history of vitriol toward a child” admissible when defense was that child accidentally fell from highchair); State v. Little, No. 19-1062, 2021 WL 1400068, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021) (defendant’s history of “violence and vitriol” toward child admissible when disputed issue was “intentional-versus-accidental” injuries); State v. 12 Weltman, No. 20-0860, 2021 WL 2768910, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021) (events before and after touching victim admissible to evaluate whether the touching was intentional or accidental). The logic of those cases applies here and leads us to believe most—if not all—of the evidence from the joint trial would have been admissible had the offenses against each child been severed. We conclude the district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it granted the motion to consolidate the charges. II. Motion for Mistrial Johnston next contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial after L.’s school counselor repeated a statement L. made on April 12, 2023—rather than April 7 6 —regarding Johnston threatening her with a knife. Johnston objected and sought a mistrial, which the district court denied. The court found the State did not intentionally elicit the testimony and “assume[d]” based on the court’s observations “that it was inadvertent, an unintentional slip, rather than an intentional violation” of the court’s evidentiary ruling. The court offered to strike the testimony and issue a curative instruction, which the defense explicitly declined. Our review is limited. “Ordinarily, abuse of discretion is found upon the denial of a mistrial only where there is no support in the record for the trial court’s determination.” State v. Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. 6 The admissibility of each statement was litigated in the district court in the context of whether Iowa Code section 622.31B(2)(b) applied. Since then, the supreme court has weighed in on the statute. State v. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d 203, 211 (Iowa 2025). We assume without deciding the April 12 statement was inadmissible for purposes of our analysis. 13 App. 1992). A criminal defendant who asserts a curative instruction was insufficient “bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986). This remains true whether the defendant accepts or declines the offered curative instruction. See id. at 700. We give deference to the district court’s first-hand observations of what happened in the courtroom, and we find they are supported by the record. The presumptive remedy for the witness’s improper statement was a curative instruction. E.g., State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 660 (Iowa 2019). While Johnston may have had tactical reasons for rejecting the instruction below, that does not reduce his burden on appeal. He had to prove a clear abuse of discretion, and he cannot do so on this record. The witness’s statement was isolated, and the knife incident was not particularly more egregious than any of the wide array of child abuse admitted at trial, some of which was perpetrated with firearms and death threats. Nor, in our review, do we find that any count depended on this evidence for the jury to return a conviction. See Iowa Code § 814.28 (requiring only one sufficient theory to support a general verdict). Denying a mistrial was within the court’s broad discretion. We wrap up this portion of our analysis by expressly addressing two points raised in Johnston’s briefing. First, he asserts he is owed relief because the State “cannot definitively disprove” the possibility he suffered prejudice. He cites no authority for this proposition, and we believe it incorrect given the standard of review and controlling case law. Second, he asserts prejudice because he could not cross-examine L. about the counselor’s statement. But Johnston did not ask the State to recall L., nor did he seek to call her as a 14 witness in his own case in chief, despite pretrial notice of her statements to the counselor. We find no basis for relief on this argument. III. Sufficiency of the Evidence Johnston’s third and final challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence for the child endangerment—multiple acts count. He only challenges the element requiring the State to prove his acts caused L. to suffer a “serious injury.” We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). We do not require corroboration of victim testimony, nor do we substitute our view of the evidence for that of the jury. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 507–08. The jury was instructed that “[a] serious injury is a disabling mental illness, condition which cripples, incapacitates, weakens, or destroys a person’s normal mental functions, bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or extended loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ.” See Iowa Code § 702.18. After applying the correct standard of review, this is not a difficult question. Jolly diagnosed L. with PTSD as a consequence of the abuse inflicted by Johnston against L. Johnston levies a variety of attacks against Jolly, criticizing what records she relied on and how she formed her conclusions. Those attacks amount to credibility questions for the jury to sort 15 out, not an appellate court. E.g., State v. Lang, 30 N.W.3d 757, 764 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). We also would affirm even absent Jolly’s opinion, given the testimony of L.’s mother, school counselor, and teacher regarding her mental and emotional health before compared to after the abuse: all three described a mental-health condition that crippled, incapacitated, weakened, or destroyed L.’s normal mental functions, as evidenced by—among other things—her placement in a therapeutic classroom away from the general school population. There was adequate evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Johnston caused a serious injury. AFFIRMED. 16