Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0542 Filed September 23, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brian Scott Cooper, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Ashley Stewart, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Mullins, S.J. Opinion by Mullins, S.J. 1 MULLINS, Senior Judge. Brian Cooper appeals his convictions for domestic abuse assault, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Specifically, Cooper asserts that the district court allowed him to go unrepresented during six weeks of pretrial proceedings without assuring his waiver of counsel was voluntary and intelligent. Our review is de novo. State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 2000). BACKGROUND The State charged Cooper with two counts of felony domestic abuse assault as a habitual offender after he beat and strangled a woman with whom he lived.1 An attorney representing Cooper in a separate criminal matter was assigned to his defense, and she assisted him in this case through the time of his arraignment in October 2024. Soon thereafter, the relationship soured. Cooper filed a letter detailing several complaints about his attorney’s performance, and she promptly moved to withdraw. Over the course of the next three months, Cooper cycled through two more court-appointed lawyers. The first asked to withdraw due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The next would fare no better. In December, Cooper filed another pro se letter (among other papers), which described conflicts with his latest attorney and asked for permission to represent himself. 1 The State dedicates several pages of its appellate brief to a vivid and primarily gratuitous retelling of the assault. However, the underlying facts—which were captured on video—have no bearing on the procedural question at hand. See Bailey v. Broderick, 212 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Iowa 1973) (“Defendants are not granted or denied counsel on the basis of the nature of the charges against them.”). 2 The court took up Cooper’s request at a hearing on January 15, 2025. All we know about that unreported proceeding comes from a written order entered the same day: The Court has reviewed the Defendant’s motion to have his attorney . . . withdrawn from his case and represent himself Pro Se. The Court will grant the motion. [Defense counsel] is removed from the case and the defendant is representing himself. The Court will now review the defendant’s filed motions and address them in writing or order a hearing, if necessary. The court later appointed a fourth attorney to serve as Cooper’s standby counsel. Trial remained set for early March. Cooper spent the next six weeks filing more pro se motions. In addition to other relief, he asked the court to dismiss his charges, suppress the State’s evidence, continue trial, and authorize depositions. Cooper’s motions to dismiss and suppress were summarily denied. The others remained pending at the time of a February 27 pretrial conference, at which the court elevated his standby attorney to full counsel at Cooper’s request. On March 3, while represented by counsel, Cooper attempted to enter a guilty plea but was unable to satisfy the necessary domestic-relationship element. Cooper continued to be represented at trial, which commenced on March 10. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. Cooper now appeals, arguing the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right when it allowed him to temporarily represent himself “without undertaking the colloquy required by Faretta.” He asks that we set aside his convictions and remand for further proceedings. 3 DISCUSSION In Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may waive the right to counsel so long as the decision is made “knowingly and intelligently.” 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). Before accepting such a waiver, the trial court must hold a colloquy to ensure the defendant is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. The scope of this requirement depends on the circumstances. State v. Miller, 975 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Iowa 2022). That said, an adequate colloquy will typically address “the nature of the charges,” “the range of allowable punishments,” the “possible defenses,” and “the usefulness of an attorney,” along with any other essential facts. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, we do not know whether the district court held a Faretta colloquy before accepting Cooper’s waiver of counsel on January 15. That hearing was unreported, and neither party sought to recreate it with a statement of the proceedings. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.806. To be sure, the duty to do so did not fall on Cooper. It is the State’s burden to show a valid waiver of counsel. Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 53 (Iowa 2007); see also Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 14 (“If the State has reason to believe that an off the record colloquy took place, it is free to . . . produce evidence to that end.”). And we are required to indulge “every reasonable presumption against waiver.” State v. Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 426 (Iowa 2003). While it would surprise us to learn the court granted Cooper’s request to go pro se without any colloquy whatsoever, we must assume as much on this record. The State contends we may nevertheless affirm Cooper’s conviction because any Faretta error was cured by the subsequent appointment of 4 counsel.2 At first glance, that argument seems at odds with our supreme court’s prior renunciations of harmless error in Sixth Amendment cases. See Hannan, 732 N.W.2d at 54 (“Harmless error analysis is not applicable to Sixth Amendment right to self-representation questions.” (quoting State v. Rater, 568 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 1997))); Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 18 (concluding “harmless error analysis cannot be utilized to cure the error incurred by an invalid acceptance of a defendant’s waiver”). However, those cases involved defendants who, despite faulty waivers, were allowed to go unrepresented at trial. See Hannan, 732 N.W.2d at 49; Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 13; Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 657. In that context, the deprivation of counsel affects the very “framework” of the adversarial process, and so the constitutional defect “def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards.” Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 16–17. The same cannot be said here. Following the withdrawal hearing on January 15, Cooper appeared on his own behalf at just one proceeding: an unreported status conference where, according to the minutes, trial scheduling was the only matter discussed. See State v. Borchers, No. 22-1454, 2024 WL 467375, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (finding a defendant’s deficient waiver of counsel for a single pretrial hearing “did not pervade the entire criminal proceeding”). Cooper regained counsel in time to depose witnesses, attempt a plea deal, and proceed to trial on a schedule that counsel agreed was sufficient to prepare. See State v. Gooden, No. 23-1092, 2025 WL 1704318, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding harmless error where a 2 The State also argues that a colloquy was never required because Cooper’s waiver did not extend to any “critical stage” of the proceedings. See State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2016) (explaining the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends only to “critical stage[s] of the prosecution” (cleaned up)). Because we agree with the State’s harmless-error theory, we need not take up that question. 5 defendant renewed his defective waiver of counsel through a proper Faretta colloquy just five days before trial). And as for Cooper’s pro se motions that were denied without hearing, there was nothing to stop defense counsel from renewing any meritorious grounds for relief. “The harmless error rule promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988) (cleaned up). It must yield in cases where “the deprivation of the right to counsel affected—and contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding.” Id. at 257; accord Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 16–17. But this is not one of them. Cooper’s temporary waiver of pretrial representation, even if deficient, did not shake the framework of his criminal process. We thus agree with the State that the harmless error rule applies, and we find that any Faretta error was harmless here. AFFIRMED. 6