Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 24-1741 Filed September 23, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brian Michael Freeman, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, The Honorable Nancy L. Whittenburg, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Doyle, S.J. 1 DOYLE, Senior Judge. A jury found Brian Michael Freeman guilty of homicide by vehicle while operating while under the influence. On appeal, Freeman challenges the admissibility of blood-test results showing his blood alcohol concentration. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence, we affirm Freeman’s conviction. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Freeman was driving his vehicle home from a casino at around 9:00 p.m. when he crossed the center line of the highway and struck an oncoming vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle died at the scene. Freeman was injured but responsive. While waiting to be transported to the hospital, Freeman volunteered that he had been drinking and should not have been driving. He admits consuming one mixed drink and six beers between 3:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Law enforcement obtained a warrant for Freeman’s blood. An Iowa State Trooper brought a collection kit to the hospital, and an emergency room nurse drew two vials of Freeman’s blood. Testing showed Freeman’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.117. The State then charged Freeman with homicide by vehicle by operating while under the influence, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2022), a class “B” felony. Freeman moved to exclude the blood-test results from evidence on authentication and foundation grounds. In its pretrial ruling, the court found the testimony of the nurse and trooper authenticated and laid a foundation for the evidence. To the extent that Freeman claimed that the blood draw violated the hospital’s collection policy, the court held that evidence would affect the weight the jury gave the evidence rather than its admissibility. 2 At trial, the district court overruled Freeman’s renewed objections to the test results on the same grounds. The jury found Freeman guilty as charged. The court sentenced Freeman to an indeterminate term of twenty- five years in prison. SCOPE OF REVIEW We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Manning, 26 N.W.3d 385, 390 (Iowa 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1847, 224 L. Ed. 2d 287 (2026). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion on grounds that are clearly untenable or unreasonable because they are based on an erroneous application of the law or not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. DISCUSSION The sole issue on appeal is the admissibility of the blood-test results. Freeman contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence without a proper foundation or authentication evidence. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). Iowa Code section 321J.11 governs the collection of blood specimens for the purpose of finding alcohol concentration. Three criteria must be met for admissibility. First, the statute limits the categories of people who may collect a specimen of blood to licensed physicians, licensed physician assistants, medical technologists, and registered nurses. Iowa Code § 321J.11(1). Second, the specimen can only be collected if a peace officer requests it. Id. The final requirement governs the way the sample is obtained 3 by requiring that the blood specimen be drawn using only “new equipment kept under strict sanitary and sterile conditions.” Id. I. Was the nurse authorized to take the sample? The evidence shows that a registered nurse with thirty-one years’ experience drew Freeman’s blood sample.1 It also shows that a state trooper asked the nurse to withdraw the sample by presenting the warrant for its collection. Although this appears to meet the first two requirements set out in section 321J.11(1), Freeman contends that the proper test for admissibility is “that the specimen was taken by a duly-authorized person.” Henkl v. Henri, 274 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Iowa 1979) (quoting Lessenhop v. Norton, 153 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 1967)). He claims that the nurse was not “duly authorized” to draw his blood because the hospital policy allows only “laboratory personnel” to collect blood specimens. But the test applied in Henkl was developed under a version of Iowa’s implied consent statute. That version of the law limited those who could collect a blood sample for chemical testing to licensed physicians or medical technologists and registered nurses “designated by a licensed physician to act as his representative.” State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1972) (quoting Iowa Code § 321B.4 (1971)). The legislature repealed that requirement in 1986. See 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220, § 11 (repealing Iowa Code § 321B.4 (1985)), § 50 (enacting Iowa Code § 321J.11 (effective July 1, 1986)). 1 The nurse who drew the blood sample is an advanced registered nurse practitioner. To be an advanced registered nurse practitioner, one must be licensed as a registered nurse. See Iowa Code § 152.1(1). 4 The “obvious legislative purpose” for limiting who may withdraw an individual’s blood specimen “was to protect [an individual’s] health, guard against any claim of resultant infection or pain and to insure, so far as humanly possible, accuracy of various tests for determining alcoholic content of the person’s blood.” State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Iowa 1972); see also State v. Mary, 368 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa 1985) (“Foundation evidence is required for the admission of a blood test to insure the reliability and accuracy of the test.”). Registered nurses undergo specialized training and can legally draw blood beyond the specific authorization in section 321J.11(1) (2022) allowing registered nurses to withdraw blood specimens for law enforcement. See, e.g., Iowa Admin. Code r. 481-620.2(6)(c) (prohibiting registered nurses from delegating administration of blood and blood products to licensed practical nurses), r. 481-620.3(4)(c) (prohibiting licensed practical nurses from performing activities that required the knowledge and education level of a registered nurse, including initiating and administering blood components). For workflow, billing, or cost-saving reasons, hospitals may choose to adopt internal policies that further limit those who routinely draw blood. But those policies do not affect a registered nurse’s legal ability to draw blood for the purpose of measuring blood alcohol concentration. II. Was the sample properly collected? Freeman next complains about the way the nurse drew his blood based on the testimony of his sister, Brenda, a phlebotomist with experience performing legal blood draws. She was in Freeman’s hospital room and is familiar with the hospital’s internal policies for collecting blood samples. Brenda testified that she saw the nurse violate the hospital’s policies when she withdrew Freeman’s blood. She claimed the nurse drew the blood 5 sample from Freeman’s IV rather than by venipuncture and compromised the accuracy of the sample by using an alcohol wipe to clean the site of the draw instead of the kit’s iodine wipe. Under section 321J.11, the only foundational requirement the State must prove related to blood tests is that the equipment was new and kept under strict sanitary and sterile conditions. See State v. Owen, No. 05-0685, 2006 WL 469536, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2006) (holding the district court did not need to apply “extra-321J” requirements in determining whether to suppress the results of the defendant’s blood test). But even if Freeman’s claims bring doubt to the veracity of the blood test results, the nurse and the state trooper contradicted Brenda’s trial testimony and provided a foundation by testifying as to their habits when obtaining blood samples under chapter 321J. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.406 (allowing evidence admitted showing a person acted out of habit even though there was an eyewitness); State v. Shelton, 176 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Iowa 1970) (permitting nurse who could not remember withdrawing blood from specific defendant to testify as to her habit in obtaining blood samples). The state trooper, a sixteen-year law-enforcement veteran, testified that he gave the nurse a sealed, unexpired biological-collection kit used for collecting blood samples. He explained that both the needle and the test tube in the kit are individually sealed and sterile. The trooper testified that he watched the nurse as she used the iodine swab provided in the kit before drawing Freeman’s blood and that the draw “went as it should have gone.” This testimony is enough to establish foundation. See, e.g., State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 336 (Iowa 1979) (finding sufficient evidence to establish the sterile condition of the needle used in a blood test based on similar testimony of the nurse who drew the sample and police officer who witnessed the draw). 6 Although Brenda’s testimony contradicts the trooper and nurse, the jury was left to decide who it believed. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1984) (“[T]he jury is at liberty to believe or disbelieve the testimony of witnesses as it chooses and give such weight to the evidence as in its judgment the evidence was entitled to receive.” (internal citations omitted)). If the jury found Freeman’s sister to be more credible, that finding would affect the weight the jury gave the evidence rather than its admissibility. See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Iowa 2002) (“When the district court has determined that the State has established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the physical evidence, any speculation to the contrary affects the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.”). III. Did the State show a chain of custody? Finally, Freeman complains that the State did not show a chain of custody because the nurse never completed the specimen-release form. But the State must only show that under the circumstances, it is unlikely that anyone tampered with or altered the evidence. Id. at 196. Any speculation to the contrary affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. at 196-97. And “the prosecution [is] aided by the presumption that a state employee would not tamper with the evidence.” See Langlet, 283 N.W.2d at 337. The state trooper testified that the paperwork in the kit was used to record the information needed for custody purposes, including the information about the time and location of the blood draw and the certifications signed by the nurse and the trooper. The paperwork shows that the trooper gave the kit to another state trooper, who transported it to the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations lab. The lab employee who 7 retrieved the kit and tested the sample confirmed that the kit was properly sealed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence. CONCLUSION Freeman did not show the district court abused its discretion by admitting the blood-test results into evidence. We therefore affirm his conviction. AFFIRMED. 8