Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0404 Filed September 23, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Eric Walter Sparr II, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, The Honorable John M. Wright (continuance) and The Honorable Shane M. Wiley (sentencing), Judges. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. Sparr appeals following his conviction for second-degree robbery. He challenges the good-cause finding that defeated his speedy-trial challenge below, as well as the district court’s calculation of pecuniary-damages restitution. We reject the former because the victim’s out-of-state cancer treatment and the particularized unavailability of judicial resources around the winter holidays adequately support the good-cause finding. And we reject the latter because it is unpreserved and the restitution figure was supported by a statement of pecuniary damages. So we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The facts of the offense are not particularly disputed on appeal. Sparr assaulted a sixty-six-year-old man who was dumpster-diving in Burlington. Sparr punched the victim, pushed him, told him he would “kill” him, and stole his minivan and new cell phone. An eyewitness described the victim as a “little old man” who was “bleeding everywhere.” Later that day, Illinois deputy sheriffs found Sparr in the minivan across the border and arrested him at a traffic stop. The minivan was towed to a nearby impound lot where the victim soon retrieved it, but his cell phone was never recovered. After he was charged by trial information, Sparr demanded speedy trial. Trial was confirmed for the first week of December 2024. In late November, the victim left a message at the county attorney’s office that he would be out of state receiving cancer treatment during the expected trial week. The county attorney “immediately” moved to continue trial after learning of the victim’s unavailability. The speedy-trial deadline was set to run on December 28, 2024, and no other trial dates were available on the Des Moines County calendar before then. 2 The county attorney asked court administration to add a trial date to accommodate Sparr’s request. Court administration essentially said no. The county attorney followed up, in strong language: “Is there nothing that can be moved? My understanding is that criminal speedy trial cases are priority over other cases.” Court administration responded that the chief judge of the district said: “the 8th District resources do not allow for the accommodation of an extra criminal trial week in December 2024.” The county attorney moved for a continuance to January 14, 2025—two weeks past the ninety-day deadline—and a finding of good cause. The record of the hearing on the motion for continuance establishes that, in December in Des Moines County, there were multiple speedy-trial demands that could not be continued, and that January 14 was the first available date. Sparr resisted the continuance, essentially because he did not think any delay was attributable to him and any scheduling problems were “systemic.” When the court pressed Sparr’s attorney to identify how his client was prejudiced by the two-week delay, he pointed to continued incarceration. The county attorney explained that, even if Sparr was released on the pending robbery charge, he was still held pending jail on a separate aggravated misdemeanor and could not be released. In a written ruling granting the continuance, the court expressly found good cause for the delay. The court emphasized that the delay was due to the victim’s cancer treatment and related unavailability, the length of delay was only two weeks, trial would be held the first available date, and Sparr was detained on other charges regardless of whether the present charge was dismissed. Sparr filed a written motion to dismiss, seeking to relitigate the good- cause finding. The court, through a different judge than the original ruling, 3 denied the motion. The court’s later order found the earlier order “was correct” and re-affirmed the good-cause finding. The court also found that “[a]ny prejudice” to Sparr was “minimal,” since the sentence that eventually resulted from his aggravated-misdemeanor charge likely would have meant he remained for at least “the bulk of” the two-week delay. A jury found Sparr guilty of second-degree robbery, a class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 (2024). The court sentenced Sparr to prison and ordered him to pay pecuniary-damages restitution to the victim in the amount of $1,429.04. A statement of the victim’s pecuniary damages sought payment in that amount, itemized with $1,200 for the stolen phone and $229.04 for towing charges. The presentence investigation report (PSI) recited the same figure as the victim’s reported loss. Sparr appeals, challenging the speedy-trial issue and the pecuniary-damages calculation. We consider each. SPEEDY TRIAL We review interpretation of the “procedural rules governing speedy trial” for correction of errors at law. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). We review good-cause-for-delay findings for an abuse of discretion, giving latitude to the district court’s assessment of the facts. State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017). In reviewing good cause in the context of speedy-trials claims, we focus on “the reason for the delay.” State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). “[G]ood cause may be shown by the State without establishing fault on the part of defendant or his counsel.” State v. LaPlant, 244 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1976). While “general statements about court congestion are insufficient” to establish good cause, “a showing of 4 specific circumstances arising out of unique, nonrecurring events which create a particular scheduling problem” may be sufficient. State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Iowa 2016). We agree with the district court here that the specific circumstances that led to the scheduling problem were unique and nonrecurring: the victim’s out-of-state cancer treatment leading to his unavailability on a date certain. Case law from our appellate courts recognizes that witness unavailability can establish good cause to go beyond a speedy-trial deadline. See, e.g., McNeal, 897 N.W.2d at 705–08; State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Iowa 1991); State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980); State v. Searcy, 470 N.W.2d 46, 47–48 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). And while here we find the county attorney acted diligently in attempting to reschedule, we “do not require that the State be entirely blameless in retrospect” when considering good cause based on witness unavailability. State v. Ellis, No. 23-1852, 2025 WL 855642, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). We hold the victim’s unavailability was sufficient cause for the two-week continuance. But even if witness unavailability was not enough on its own, there is more here: the unavailability of judicial resources. Although the record is not clear whether the resources lacked were a judge, court reporter, courtroom, or something else, we do not think the record reflects merely chronic generalized court congestion. The county attorney detailed the multiple speedy-trial-demand cases in leadoff position on the relevant dates, she asked court administration if anything else could be moved, and her request for another trial date was rebuffed by the chief judge. Our common sense also tells us the holiday season was a complicating factor—the two-week continuance period included the week between Christmas and New Year’s 5 Day. This judicial-resources constraint, in tandem with witness unavailability, was ample support for the good-cause finding made below. That said, we understand Sparr’s frustration (shared by the county attorney on the record) that the judicial branch did not do more to accommodate his speedy-trial demand. If a chief judge is going to reject a request for an extra trial date to accommodate a speedy-trial demand, it would be a better practice to make findings on the record than have a case coordinator relay the decision via e-mail. The reality is that chronic funding challenges and resource constraints in the state budget have consequences, and limited availability of courtrooms and judges is one of those consequences. On this record, Sparr is owed no relief. But we encourage district courts facing similar requests in the future to make more detailed records on exactly what resources are lacking and why that prevents scheduling a speedy trial, particularly for in-custody defendants. RESTITUTION Sparr challenges the $1,429.04 restitution award and claims “[i]t is entirely unclear how this amount was calculated.” The threshold problem with this argument is that it was never made in the district court. To the extent Sparr’s complaint is that the district court did not show its work, that is something Sparr never asked the district court to do. He made no objection whatsoever to the restitution calculation below and did not challenge it by motion under Iowa Code section 910.7 (2025) or otherwise. The General Assembly has made very clear we should not be deciding unpreserved restitution claims for the first time on appeal. See Iowa Code § 910.7(4) (“An appellate court shall not review or modify an offender’s plan of restitution, restitution plan of payment, or any other issue related to an 6 offender’s restitution under this subsection, unless the offender has exhausted the offender’s remedies under this section and obtained a ruling from the district court prior to the issue being raised in the appellate courts.”). We doubt we have authority to entertain Sparr’s unpreserved challenge given this legislative mandate. See State v. Delmott, No. 25-0025, 2025 WL 3654012, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (discussing the statutory restitution scheme).1 And even if we did have authority, the $1,429.04 restitution figure was contained in the PSI, to which Sparr did not object; this waives his claim. See State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018) (“A court has a right to rely on the information in the PSI when the defendant fails to object to the information contained in the PSI.”). To the extent we can reach the question, our review would be for abuse of the district court’s “broad discretion in determining the amount of restitution when the record contains proof of a reasonable basis from which the amount may be inferred.” State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 2018). There is some conflicting evidence in the record about the cost of the cell phone and thus the total pecuniary damages, but the $1,429.04 tracks the county attorney’s most recent statement of pecuniary damages. A tow invoice matching that portion of restitution award also appears in the record. Given Sparr’s complete failure to challenge the restitution figure below, we cannot find the district court abused its discretion in relying on the statement of pecuniary damages and the PSI for the value of the cell phone. AFFIRMED. 1 In his reply brief, Sparr cites State v. Janz, 358 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Iowa 1984), to suggest Delmott is wrongly decided. A close reading of both the code and the case law establishes Janz was superseded in part by statutory amendments to section 910.7(4). See 2020 Iowa Acts ch. 1074, § 80 (codified at Iowa Code § 910.7(4)–(5)). 7