Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0882 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Aisha Ahmad Nyala, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, The Honorable Joel Dalrymple, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, P.J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge. Aisha Nyala appeals her conviction of intimidation with a dangerous weapon in violation of Iowa Code section 708.6 (2024), asserting there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the district court should have initiated a hearing sua sponte to determine her competency. Upon our review, we affirm. I. Background Facts & Proceedings In 2018, Nyala was a student attending the University of Northern Iowa (UNI) and began meeting with the Dean of Students, Allyson Rafanello, in Gilchrist Hall. The building contained many university services, was heavily trafficked by students and university employees, and was open to the public. Following the pandemic in 2020, Nyala struggled with interacting with other students and attending classes. Because of these issues, Nyala frequently met with Rafanello for student services. Nyala also reported that an employee at UNI had sexually assaulted her. Nyala felt the university was not handling the report correctly. In 2023, Nyala began using social media to attack Rafanello personally and professionally. These posts were made using Nyala’s personal accounts, a UNI student club account, and fake accounts under Rafanello’s name. The posts included language reflecting that Nyala knew Rafanello’s address and that Nyala hoped Rafanello’s “kids get shot.” And Nyala called the suicide hotline and made a threat directed toward the UNI campus. Rafanello filed a police report based on these posts and others and began taking precautions to protect her family and children. 2 In early 2024, Nyala began submitting messages through UNI’s online student complaint forms. These messages stated that “Rafanello deserves to be shot in the face,” that Rafanello is racist and a liar, and Nyala promised revenge. Rafanello reported these messages to law enforcement. Nyala also contacted the Iowa Board of Regents several times to complain about UNI, asserting she “would call back every day until she gets to speak with someone in authority.” On January 22, 2024, Nyala called the Board of Regents and spoke to the executive assistant. Nyala stated, “I filed a complaint with the Board of Regents over [two] months ago and no one has gotten back to me. Therefore, if something is not done within the next two days I am going to the University and will shoot that woman in her head.” Law enforcement then obtained a warrant and arrested Nyala. During pretrial proceedings, Nyala sought to disqualify her attorney through several motions that claimed the attorney’s representation was causing her to become suicidal. During a hearing on one of these motions, Nyala withdrew her request, explaining the motion stemmed from a mental- health episode. The district court asked Nyala if she was still suffering from the mental-health episode, and Nyala responded negatively. Following trial, a jury found Nyala guilty of intimidation with a dangerous weapon. At sentencing, Nyala delivered an allocution that reiterated her accusations against Rafanello and UNI, including assertions of racism, bullying, and harassment. Nyala also stated she had “become severely suicidal” and would take her life after her sentence was complete. After the allocution, the district court stated: COURT: So the Court has basically had you read to me of your intent to commit suicide. Is that what you’ve read to me? 3 NYALA: At some point, yes. COURT: Okay. We may be considering committal proceedings immediately following this and in all likelihood you may not be released from jail to supervision until these committal proceedings are finalized based upon that. The district court sentenced Nyala to ten years’ imprisonment for the intimidation with a dangerous weapon conviction. Nyala pled guilty to the stalking and harassment charges pursuant to a plea agreement. The court imposed a sentence of ten years for the stalking convictions, and two years for each harassment conviction. The district court ran all the sentences concurrently, suspended them, placed Nyala on probation, and ordered her to be placed in a residential treatment facility for one year. Nyala now appeals. II. Analysis Nyala argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of intimidation with a dangerous weapon because section 708.6(1) requires that Nyala make the threat of discharging a weapon in an assembly of people or in a building. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). We consider the evidence in a “light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]e consider whether the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence exists when the evidence would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). 4 When jury instructions are not objected to, those instructions become the “law of the case for the purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Banes, 910 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). Here, Nyala did not object to the following instruction outlining the required elements for intimidation with a dangerous weapon: The State must prove all of the following elements of Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon with Intent: 1. On or about the 22nd day of January, 2024, the defendant threatened to shoot a firearm at, into or in a building or vehicle which was occupied by [Rafanello] or within an assembly of people. 2. A firearm is a dangerous weapon. 3. The defendant made the threat under circumstances raising a reasonable expectation perceived by a reasonable person that the threat would be carried out. 4. The defendant threatened to shoot or discharge the firearm with the specific intent to cause fear or anger to [Rafanello]. We agree with the State that Nyala’s threat to “go to the University to shoot that woman” was sufficiently specific for the jury to reasonably infer that Nyala would carry out the threat within a building or assembly of people. As the State points out, the evidence shows that Rafanello worked primarily at Gilchrist Hall, a building on UNI’s campus that is busy with employees, students, and the public. See State v. Bush, 518 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1994) (determining “assembly of people” within the statute is intended to have a common meaning: “into or through two or more persons at the same place”). Nyala, during her interactions with Rafanello, met in Rafanello’s office in Gilchrist Hall. Further, the communications and social media posts Nyala made were in reference to grievances about the university, its employees, and specifically Rafanello. 5 The jury was instructed that “[t]he law demands that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your reason and common sense, and these instructions.” (Emphasis added). The evidence showing Nyala stated she would shoot “that woman” at the university could lead the jury to reasonably infer that Nyala intended to “shoot a firearm at, into or in a building or vehicle which was occupied by [Rafanello] or within an assembly of people.” See State v. Orfield, No. 19-1695, 2020 WL 4498925, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020) (“Factfinders are allowed to rely on common knowledge, history, common sense, and experience and observations of the affairs of life.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, we find the evidence is sufficient to show Nyala threatened to shoot a dangerous weapon within a building or an assembly of people. See Iowa Code § 814.28 (stating a jury may return a general verdict and upon review we will not reverse if one of multiple theories “is sufficient to sustain the verdict”). We next address Nyala’s contention that the district court erred by not conducting a competency hearing sua sponte based on Nyala’s statements regarding suicide. “We review whether a trial court should have ordered a competency hearing de novo.” State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018). Iowa Code section 812.3(1) provides that “at any stage of a criminal proceeding” a competency hearing is required when the district court finds probable cause that there exist “specific facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.” The court may make a finding of probable cause either after application by the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, or after holding a probable cause hearing on its own motion. Probable cause exists for a competency hearing when a reasonable person 6 would believe that there is a substantial question of the defendant’s competency. Id. at 779 (internal citation omitted). “Constitutionally, defendants may not be tried or convicted while they are incompetent to stand trial or to assist in their defense,” as doing so violates due process. State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993). The district court, in determining whether a competency hearing is warranted, considers: “(1) the defendant’s apparent irrational behavior, (2) any other demeanor that suggests a competency problem, and (3) any prior medical opinion of which the trial court is aware.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1994). “When ʻsufficient doubt’ exists as to the defendant’s competency, the trial court has an absolute responsibility to order a hearing sua sponte” to satisfy due process. Id. When the court applies these factors, “the critical question facing the trial judge is whether the defendant has a present ability to (1) appreciate the charge, (2) understand the proceedings, and (3) assist effectively in the defense.” Edwards, 507 N.W.2d at 395; accord Iowa Code § 812.3. Upon our review of the record, we do not find that Nyala’s behavior during proceedings and trial was irrational, and her demeanor did not suggest a competency problem. Nyala claims that the district court was aware of evidence showing weekly therapy sessions that Nyala attended for mental- health issues. But that evidence was filed in a different, although related, case, and that evidence is not in the record for this appeal. Nyala, in several motions for new counsel, stated her attorney was “literally making me even more suicidal,” and after withdrawing these motions, the court acknowledged she was in a “mental health crisis.” Then, at sentencing, Nyala again stated she was suicidal. But we are not convinced 7 that “a reasonable person would have doubted [Nyala]’s competence at the time of sentencing” or during trial. See State v. Tatum, No. 24-0613, 2025 WL 2237252, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). A defendant’s “history of mental illness, without more, is insufficient to trigger a competency hearing under Iowa Code section 812.3. . . . The question is one of present competency, not past malady.” State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). The record demonstrates that throughout the proceedings, Nyala “was lucid, oriented to time and place, demonstrated an understanding of the proceedings and the role of the persons present, demonstrated an ability to communicate with [her] lawyer,” and appreciated the charge against her and the potential consequences. Id. Nyala consulted her attorney several times during trial and pretrial proceedings, responded coherently to the court, and filed numerous pro se motions “show[ing] her tenacity in dealing with the situation as she thought appropriate.” See State v. Rhodes, No. 11-0812, 2012 WL 5536685, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012). Further, at no time during the proceedings, including sentencing, did Nyala’s attorney question her competence. See State v. Boon, No. 23-1328, 2024 WL 5153536, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) (noting that because a defense attorney is “best situated to know whether [her] impairments compromise the defense of the case,” the fact the attorney did not raise the issue is an appropriate consideration (citation omitted)). We do not find that Nyala’s due process rights were violated by the district court not initiating a competency hearing, as Nyala’s statements and behaviors did not “raise[] sufficient misgivings about [her] mental capacity.” 8 Tatum, 2025 WL 2237252, at *6 (quoting State v. Irving, No. 21-1839, 2023 WL 1808507, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023)). AFFIRMED. 9