Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1905 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Matthew William Hoffman, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Kristen Formanek, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Nicholas A. Sarcone of Babich Sarcone, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. Matthew William Hoffman challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of domestic abuse assault impeding airflow causing bodily injury. 1 Hoffman argues the district court erred by not providing adequate reasons for his sentence on the record, not allowing his attorney to speak in mitigation of his sentence, and by improperly weighing the sentencing factors. Upon our review, we affirm Hoffman’s sentence. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On May 31, 2025, Hoffman grabbed his intimate partner by the neck and strangled her. Hoffman was charged by a two-count trial information. Count I charged Hoffman with domestic abuse assault impeding air/blood flow causing bodily injury, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(5). Count II charged Hoffman with domestic abuse assault second offense, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(3)(b). A few days before trial was to begin, Hoffman and his attorney appeared for a scheduled status conference. During the status conference, Hoffman entered a plea agreement with the State where he agreed to plead guilty to count I. In exchange, the State dismissed count II of the trial information, and the parties agreed to jointly recommend a deferred judgment with two years of probation. Hoffman acknowledged in the written plea agreement that the district court was not bound by the agreement. 1 Because Hoffman is challenging the discretionary sentence imposed on his conviction rather than the plea itself, he has good cause to appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 2 Once the parties reached their plea agreement, the district court held a discussion with the parties for purposes of determining sentencing.2 The court began by asking Hoffman if he had read and reviewed the written guilty plea and signed it. He answered that he had. The court then asked Hoffman if he wanted to proceed, and he said he did. Neither party objected when the court asked if there was any legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced. The State recited the terms of the agreement to the court upon request. Hoffman agreed with the terms of the plea agreement and recited them back to the court. The court then asked the State for its sentencing recommendation. The State acknowledged that Hoffman had previously been convicted of domestic assault, but it recommended a deferred judgment because the conviction was almost eleven years old and Hoffman had no other criminal history. The State also noted Hoffman had completed anger management, obtained a substance use evaluation, and was engaged in ongoing mental health therapy. Without providing Hoffman’s counsel with an opportunity to speak on his behalf, the court asked Hoffman if he wanted to make a statement. Hoffman made a brief apology. The court agreed that a suspended sentence was appropriate. However, the court refused to grant a deferred judgment because of the prior domestic-assault conviction, noting that Hoffman had been given an opportunity in the prior case. Thus, the court sentenced Hoffman to a prison term not to exceed five years, before suspending the sentence and placing him on probation for two years. 2 Based on the record, this discussion took place during the course of the status conference. Because this was not a sentencing hearing, we refer to it as a “sentencing proceeding” herein. In the plea agreement, Hoffman waived court reporting and any record or transcription of the proceeding. Thus, a transcript of what happened at the proceeding does not exist. However, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.806, the parties filed a stipulated statement of the proceedings, which the district court approved. We rely on the statement of proceedings on appeal. 3 In its sentencing order, the district court noted its sentence was based on all the available sentencing considerations set out in Iowa Code section 907.5. The sentencing order also included language stating “[t]he court finds the following factors the most significant in determining this particular sentence” followed by a list of numerous factors with a checkbox next to each factor. The court checked the boxes next to “[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime,” “[p]rotection of the public from further offenses,” the “[d]efendant’s propensity for further criminal acts,” “[m]aximum opportunity for rehabilitation,” and “[t]he plea agreement.” The district court left the box next to “[d]efendant’s criminal history” unchecked. Hoffman now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW “When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2015). An abuse of discretion exists when “the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). DISCUSSION I. Adequate Reasons for Sentence Hoffman argues the district court erred by not providing an adequate oral record and inaccurately completing the check-box portion of the written order, thereby inadequately stating the reasons for the sentence imposed. In support of his argument, Hoffman cites Iowa Rule of Criminal 4 Procedure 2.23(2)(g), which provides that when judgment is entered, “The court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed . . . .” “This requirement ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014). The requirement also “affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id. “The district court can satisfy this requirement by orally stating the reasons on the record or placing the reasons in the written sentencing order.” Id. In determining if sufficient reasons have been given, the oral colloquy and the written sentencing order can be combined. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 458 (Iowa 2024). The State asserts that Hoffman waived any oral explanation of the error he now asserts because he waived the right in the guilty plea. We agree. In the plea, Hoffman stated, “I am waiving my right to a hearing in open court for my guilty plea and sentencing” and asked the district court to sentence him immediately. In light of these waivers, the district court was under no obligation to provide Hoffman with an oral explanation for its sentence. Thus, our inquiry could end here. However, because the district court provided an oral explanation for its sentence, we opt to reach the merits of Hoffman’s claim. According to Hoffman, the district court’s oral explanation is inadequate and insufficient to explain why it did not follow the joint sentencing recommendation because it provided only one reason for his sentence; his prior conviction. See State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994) (per curiam) (“Each sentencing decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor alone is determinative.”). However, the record shows that the State, in arguing that a deferred judgment was appropriate, discussed other factors the district court may have considered. 5 See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.”). While the district court was under no obligation to provide Hoffman with an oral explanation due to his waiver of a right to a sentencing hearing, it nonetheless provided him with a sufficient explanation. Therefore, we do not find that the oral record shows the district court abused its discretion. Hoffman also contends that the district court’s oral reasons for the sentence imposed are contradicted by its written sentencing order. “[W]e review a sentence for an abuse of discretion based on the entire record . . . .” Id.; see also State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 76 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“Reviewing courts will ‘look to all parts of the record to find the supporting reasons.’” (citation omitted)). Hoffman points out that while the district court placed importance on his prior conviction during the informal sentencing proceeding, in the sentencing order the box next to “[d]efendant’s criminal history” was left unchecked. Hoffman further asserts the boxes checked in the sentencing order were not discussed by the district court in its oral explanation. And despite its decision not to follow the recommendation of the plea agreement, the district court checked the box for “[t]he plea agreement” in the sentencing order. Thus, according to Hoffman, the district court’s oral rationale for the sentence contradicts the reasons in the sentencing order and leaves questions as to what factors the district court relied on when imposing the sentence. The State counters that the written and oral pronouncements complement each other and that all the reasons checked in the written order apply to the facts of this case. 6 We begin by noting the district court considered the sentencing recommendation in the plea before rejecting it and imposing a different sentence. Thus, we find no issue with the district court indicating that the plea agreement was considered in the sentencing order. As to the remaining checked boxes, while the district court did not explicitly reference these factors at the sentencing proceeding, the State’s explanation for the recommended sentence allowed the district court to consider these factors. See State v. Hirvela, No. 22-0567, 2024 WL 959925, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2024) (“A court’s written order can be relied on to show consideration of other factors in sentencing.”). Thus, we reject Hoffman’s argument that the district court’s oral reasons for the sentence imposed are contradicted by its written sentencing order. Rather, we find that the order provided additional reasons for Hoffman’s sentence. Therefore, we conclude the district court provided adequate reasons for the sentence imposed. II. Defense Counsel’s Opportunity to Speak Hoffman next argues the district court erred by failing to provide his counsel with an opportunity to speak on his behalf as required under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(2). See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(d)(2) (“Before imposing sentence, the court shall . . . [p]rovide the defendant’s attorney an opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf.”). Here again, the State asserts that Hoffman has waived this issue by virtue of his signing of the written guilty plea. The State points out that in the guilty plea Hoffman acknowledged, “I am waiving my right to a hearing in open court for my guilty plea and sentencing” and asked the district court to sentence him immediately. We agree. Hoffman’s waivers in the plea waive this issue. Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(4): 7 With the court’s approval, the defendant may waive personal colloquy in open court in a guilty plea to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor or a nonforcible class “D” felony. In such event, the defendant must sign a written document substantially complying with rule 2.37–Form 12: Waiver of Rights & Written Guilty plea for Serious or Aggravated Misdemeanors or Nonforcible Class “D” Felonies . . . . By pleading guilty to domestic abuse assault impeding airflow causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(5), Hoffman pled guilty to a nonforcible class “D” felony. See Iowa Code § 702.11(2)(g). And Hoffman’s written guilty plea was made with a document that substantially complies with rule 2.37–Form 12. True, the district court rejected the sentencing recommendation in the plea and provided an oral explanation for the sentence it imposed.3 However, the district court’s oral explanation for its sentence was not made on the record at a sentencing hearing because Hoffman waived an on-the-record sentencing hearing in the written plea. Therefore, we conclude Hoffman has waived this issue. III. Weighing of Sentencing Factors Lastly, Hoffman argues the district court abused its discretion by giving too much weight to his prior conviction. According to Hoffman, it is unclear what weight, if any, the district court gave to any other sentencing factors. As explained above, in addition to Hoffman’s prior conviction, the State addressed other factors the district court could have relied on at the sentencing proceeding. Moreover, the sentencing order shows the district court considered additional factors. Thus, the district court relied on other factors in addition to Hoffman’s prior conviction. And despite Hoffman’s 3 Hoffman acknowledged that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement, and thus Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(3) does not apply. 8 argument, “The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors differently.” State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023); see also State v. Latcham, No. 10-1262, 2011 WL 1138569, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011) (“[T]he district court enjoys the latitude to place greater importance on one sentencing consideration over others.”). Therefore, we reject Hoffman’s argument. CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Hoffman’s sentence. AFFIRMED. 9