Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1546 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brandon Lee Fisher, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, The Honorable Gary P. Strausser, Judge. _______________ APPEAL DISMISSED _______________ Leah Patton of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. In August 2025, Brandon Fisher entered a written guilty plea to driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor, pursuant to a plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 321.561 (2025). In that agreement—which was conditioned on the court’s acceptance under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(3)— Fisher and the State agreed to a 160-day jail sentence, with all but ten days suspended and two years of probation. They also agreed to imposition of a fine and “payment of attorney fees & costs.” And the agreement specifically provided that “the State of Iowa has made the payment of Category B restitution,” including this “repayment for your legal defense” and “court costs,” “a condition of this plea agreement and as a condition thereof, you, the defendant, agree to pay these sums and they will be ordered by the Court in accordance with this agreement.” The court accepted the plea and ultimately imposed the agreed-to sentence.1 Fisher now appeals, arguing that a plea agreement cannot “waive a defendant’s statutory right to a reasonable ability to pay determination of category B restitution” and alternatively that “he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive that right.” He thus seeks to vacate his sentence so that the court can reconsider his reasonable ability to pay any Category B restitution or to withdraw his guilty plea. But we lack appellate jurisdiction because Fisher has failed to show good cause to appeal a sentence that the court was bound to impose under rule 2.10(3) or to appeal a guilty plea when he failed to move in arrest of judgment. 1 At first, the court found that Fisher only had the reasonable ability to pay $100 of Category B restitution. But Fisher successfully moved for the court to correct the sentencing order to replace that provision with one finding that he is able to, and must, pay all Category B restitution as required by the plea agreement. 2 Our jurisdiction over appeals by criminal defendants is set by Iowa Code section 814.6. See State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 534 (Iowa 2024). Relevant here, “[s]ubsection 814.6(1)(a)(3) sets a general rule that there is no right of appeal from a conviction where the defendant has pled guilty.” Id. (cleaned up). That subsection “also specifies two exceptions: one for a guilty plea for a class ‘A’ felony and another for a case where the defendant establishes good cause.” Id. (cleaned up). The defendant “bears the burden of establishing good cause to pursue an appeal of his conviction based on a guilty plea.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). Unless one of those two exceptions applies, we are “without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we must dismiss the appeal.” Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 534 (cleaned up). Fisher pleaded guilty to an aggravated misdemeanor—not a class “A” felony. So we only have appellate jurisdiction if he “establishes good cause.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). The statute does not define “good cause.” But our supreme court has interpreted it to mean “a legally sufficient reason.” Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153 (cleaned up). What constitutes such a legally sufficient reason is “context specific.” Id. And “at minimum,” the reason must be one that “would allow a court to provide some relief on direct appeal.” Id. Fisher seeks to establish good cause solely by framing his appeal as a challenge to his sentence. Our supreme court has held that a defendant generally has good cause to appeal a sentence that is “neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). So too does good cause exist to challenge an error with the sentencing hearing even if the court imposes a sentence consistent with an agreed sentence—at least where the court was not “bound to enter a 3 particular sentence pursuant to” a plea “agreement made under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(3).” State v. Hidlebaugh, 32 N.W.3d 783, 791 (Iowa 2026). But the supreme court has left “for another day” whether good cause would exist for a similar challenge after an accepted rule 2.10(3) plea. Id. And our court has repeatedly held that challenging only the imposition of a binding sentence after an accepted rule 2.10(3) plea is not good cause to appeal. See, e.g., State v. Green, No. 25-0440, 2026 WL 1329718, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 13, 2026); State v. Cordona, No. 25-0083, 2026 WL 221511, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026); cf. State v. Major, No. 19-2055, 2021 WL 3662311, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021) (finding no good cause for an appeal challenging only a mandatory part of the sentence). Fisher and the State entered a plea agreement under rule 2.10(3). He received the full benefit of his plea bargain. Indeed, by negotiating a rule 2.10(3) plea, he expressly made the court’s “[c]oncurrence” in the plea agreement “a condition of the plea agreement” and reserved his right to withdraw the guilty plea and go to trial if the court “refuse[d] to be bound by the plea agreement or reject[ed] its terms.” See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3); Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 542. What’s more, when the court initially failed to include the provision on Category B restitution that Fisher now challenges, Fisher successfully moved for the court to correct the sentencing order to add it, as required by the plea agreement. So he cannot now claim that the court erred by granting his repeated requests to adopt the agreement in its entirety. This conclusion is also consistent with the longstanding rules that “[a] party to a criminal proceeding cannot assume inconsistent positions in the trial and appellate courts” nor “allege an error in which he himself acquiesced, or which was committed or invited by him, or was the natural consequence of his own actions.” State v. Rasmus, 90 N.W.2d 429, 430 (Iowa 1958) 4 (cleaned up). Fisher’s challenge to his sentence does not provide good cause for his appeal. Although Fisher makes an alternative merits argument that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that he should thus be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, he does not rely on this argument in seeking to establish good cause separate from his sentencing challenge. For completeness, we still consider whether this alternative challenge to his guilty plea could provide good cause for his appeal. See Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 534 (noting that jurisdiction can be established for an appeal by showing good cause as to any one issue). But regardless of the challenge’s ultimate merits, we could not provide any relief on this issue either because Fisher waived his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and was immediately sentenced after being advised of the consequence of failing to file that motion. See Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153–54 (holding that the defendant did not show good cause because his “failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment preclude[d] appellate relief”); State v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 692–93 (Iowa 1981) (holding that advisory warning the defendant “if we sentence you immediately that right [to challenge the guilty plea] is gone” was adequate to preclude appellate review). And so, Fisher’s challenge to his guilty plea also does not provide good cause for his appeal. Because Fisher has not shown good cause, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss his appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. 5