Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1075 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Bailey Anne Jenkins, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, The Honorable Mark D. Fisher, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta (argued), Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. Seven children vandalized the public library in Elberon, Iowa while the librarian, Bailey Jenkins, watched. As a result, the State charged Jenkins with solicitation of a felony (in violation of Iowa Code section 705.1 (2024)) and criminal mischief in the second degree (in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.4(1)(b)). A jury found Jenkins guilty of both charges. Jenkins appeals. She claims: (1) insufficient evidence supports the verdicts; (2) the district court abused its discretion in finding that the verdicts were not contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (3) alternatively, her sentences should be vacated because the court allowed victim-impact statements from nonvictims and relied on improper information to conclude that Jenkins lacked remorse. We address each claim in turn. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022). Our review is highly deferential to the jury’s verdict, and the verdict will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is considered substantial if it is sufficient to convince a rational factfinder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 516–17. To determine if evidence is substantial, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ʻlegitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). “Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury was 2 free to reject certain evidence and credit other evidence.” State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006) (cleaned up). A. Solicitation As the jury was instructed, to convict Jenkins of solicitation, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) “[T]he defendant solicited another to commit criminal mischief in the 2nd degree,” (2) “The defendant intended that criminal mischief in the 2nd degree would be committed,” and (3) “The defendant’s intent is corroborated by clear and convincing evidence.” Because Jenkins did not challenge this marshaling instruction, it is the law of the case for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). To resolve Jenkins’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to this charge, we go no further than the first element—that Jenkins solicited the children to commit criminal mischief. As to the crime of solicitation, “the crime is in the asking.” State v. Anderson, 618 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court gave the jury this definition of solicitation: The term “solicited” means to have commanded, begged, entreat[ed], or to have otherwise attempted to convince someone to do something. “Command” means to direct authoritatively or order; “Entreat” means to ask earnestly, to beg for or to persuade; “Persuade” means to induce by argument, to win over by appeal to one’s reason, or plead with. Acquiescence, alone, following a suggestion of criminal activity does not constitute solicitation. As noted in the instruction, acquiescence to the suggestion of criminal activity does not constitute solicitation—a principle adopted from our case law. See State v. Sanders, No. 01-0072, 2002 WL 570921, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002) (“Our supreme court held in Anderson[, 618 N.W.2d at 373,] 3 that acquiescence following a suggestion of criminal activity does not constitute solicitation.”). And the crime requires the defendant to actually ask another to commit a crime, rather than simply going along with it when someone else suggests criminal activity. Anderson, 618 N.W.2d at 373. This is because a person cannot “be solicited into soliciting. [The person] is either the solicitor or the solicitee.” Id. (citation omitted). The State does not argue that Jenkins commanded, begged, or entreated the children to commit criminal mischief. Instead, it relies on the “otherwise attempted to convince” theory of committing the crime. But the evidence upon which the State relies amounts to nothing more than Jenkins acquiescing in or going along with the children vandalizing the library. The evidence showed that animosity developed between the library board and Jenkins. The tensions grew to the point that Jenkins resigned from her job as librarian the same day the children damaged the library. Six of the seven children involved in vandalizing the library testified that they began damaging the library after talking with Jenkins. Jenkins testified that when a child asked her a question that she interpreted as the child asking for permission to damage the library, she responded, “I’m beyond caring at this point. I just—I don’t care what you do at this point; I’m done.” Several other snippets of testimony provide additional examples of Jenkins expressing indifference to the children vandalizing the library. While Jenkins’s proclamations of “I don’t care” and similar sentiments in response to the children’s suggestions to damage the library may understandably rankle one’s sense of accountability, as Jenkins was the only adult in the room, they cannot reasonably be construed as examples of commanding, begging, entreating, or otherwise attempting to convince the children to commit the vandalism in which they engaged. Instead, the proclamations are 4 quintessential examples of acquiescence to the suggestion of vandalism, and acquiescence in or going along with suggestions to commit a crime do not rise to the level of solicitation. See id. Jenkins’s behavior did not constitute the crime of solicitation. Accordingly, we vacate her conviction and sentence for that crime and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charge. B. Criminal Mischief We turn next to Jenkins’s challenge to her conviction for criminal mischief. For Jenkins to be found guilty of that crime, the jury instructions required the State to prove that: (1) Jenkins “damaged, altered, defaced, or destroyed public property; to wit—the Elberon Public Library,” (2) “The defendant acted with the specific intent to damage, alter, deface, or destroy the property,” and (3) “When the defendant damaged, altered, defaced, or destroyed the property, the defendant did not have the right to do so.” The jury was also instructed that Jenkins could be found guilty if she “directly [committed] the crime or knowingly [aided and abetted] its commission.”1 The instructions explained that to aid and abet “means to knowingly approve and agree to the commission of the crime, either by active participation in it or by knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or when it is committed.” The parties generally agree that Jenkins was convicted of criminal mischief as an aider and abettor, so Jenkins focuses her sufficiency 1 Jenkins objected to the aiding and abetting jury instruction at trial but did not raise the issue on appeal. Rather, Jenkins quotes the language she challenged at trial in support of her arguments on appeal. As such, we will treat this instruction as the law of the case. See Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d at 671 (holding that instructions not objected to become the law of the case for purposes of a sufficiency challenge). 5 challenge on the claimed failure to prove that she knowingly advised or encouraged the children to damage the library. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that animosity developed between the library board and Jenkins. The tensions grew to the point that Jenkins resigned from her job as librarian the same day the children damaged the library. Several of the children involved in vandalizing the library testified that they began damaging the library after talking with Jenkins. As previously noted, Jenkins repeatedly made comments to the children that she did not care what they did to the library. Surveillance video recordings from the library showed the children comforting Jenkins before they began to throw items around the library. Some children began climbing on furniture, and then one child knocked over a trash can. At that point, children began taking items and bins off the shelves to throw around the library while periodically talking with Jenkins. The video also shows Jenkins opening a closet five separate times, with children exiting the closet with various materials to throw around each time. When asked about Jenkins opening the locked closet, a law enforcement officer testified that the “kids were going in there and then bringing more stuff out and trashing the rest of the library,” and he concluded “[ Jenkins] was helping them damage the library.” Though the video shows at least two instances when Jenkins talking to the children caused them to stop their destructive behavior and move on to a different action, it also shows numerous instances where the children showed Jenkins an item they had picked up, discussed something with her, then proceeded to throw or dump the item throughout the library. We conclude that the above-described evidence could convince a reasonable juror that Jenkins knowingly advised or encouraged the children’s 6 destructive behavior. Particularly damning is the video evidence showing Jenkins opening the closet door numerous times for the children to grab materials followed by Jenkins watching the children use those materials to damage and deface the library. A reasonable juror could find that Jenkins aided and abetted the children’s vandalization such that she is guilty of criminal mischief herself. II. Weight of the Evidence Jenkins also challenges her conviction for criminal mischief—the only conviction remaining after our vacation of the solicitation conviction—as contrary to the weight of the evidence. She contends the evidence weighs against any finding that Jenkins encouraged the children to damage the library, caused damage to the library, or participated in the destructive behavior. Jenkins raised these contentions in a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. The district court found the record clear “as to the defendant’s actions in this case . . . encouraging . . . the children to engage in conduct that is a felony under Iowa law,” referencing Jenkins’s actions in opening the closet multiple times. Weight-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 211 (Iowa 2013). The district court must consider the credibility of the witnesses in light of all the evidence to determine whether the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence such that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice. See State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Iowa 2003); State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998). Only if the evidence “preponderate[s] heavily against the verdict” should a new trial be granted. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d at 212. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict. As discussed 7 above, the testimony of the children and the video evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The district court, which had a front-row seat to the trial that we do not have, concluded that the verdicts were not contrary to the weight of the evidence. While Jenkins points to the evidence that she contends supports a contrary verdict, we are not persuaded that such evidence so heavily weighs against the jury’s verdict that the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we reject Jenkins’s challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. III. Sentencing Challenge Jenkins challenges the district court’s sentence, requesting that her sentences be vacated and that she be resentenced before a different judge. She contends the district court (1) improperly found that she lacked remorse when it allegedly ignored her allocution and (2) erred by allowing the parents of the children who vandalized the library to give victim impact statements. Because we have vacated one of Jenkins’s convictions, and the court considered the now-vacated charge in arriving at a sentence, we remand for resentencing on the remaining charge. See State v. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 730 (Iowa 2012) (finding it appropriate to remand for resentencing on two counts when a third count was vacated on appeal). As Jenkins will be resentenced, we find it unnecessary to address her first challenge, as it is unlikely to recur. But because the issue raised in her second challenge impacts the remedy of whether resentencing must occur before a different judge, we find it necessary to address. See State v. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244–45 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing before a 8 different judge when a victim impact statement is made by a person who does not meet the statutory definition of “victim”). The district court allowed the parents of three children who vandalized the library to provide victim impact statements expressing their views on how Jenkins’s actions harmed the children. Notably, each victim impact statement was full of references to the children as victims. But the children were the individuals who actually damaged the library. Jenkins was found guilty of aiding and abetting the children in committing criminal mischief, making the children the principals who committed the crimes or delinquent acts—not the victims of those acts. The State tries to support the district court’s decision to permit the children who vandalized the library to be considered victims that were entitled to give victim impact statements.2 In doing so, it points to the statute that defines “victim” as “a person who has suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result of a public offense or a delinquent act.” See Iowa Code § 915.10(3). In its brief, the State proclaims that, in determining whether the children who vandalized the library meet the definition of victim, “[i]t does not matter if the children were also accomplices, principals, or something else. A person can be both a victim and a perpetrator as a factual and legal matter.” Notably and tellingly absent from this proclamation is a citation to any authority. While the State is correct that “[n]othing in the statute forbids that result,” we do not interpret statutes so as to “produce strained, impractical[,] or absurd results.” See Teig v. Hart, 28 N.W.3d 272, 2 The victim impact statements of the children were made by their parents, which would be proper if the children were victims. See Iowa Code § 915.10(3) (defining “victim” to include “the immediate family members of a victim . . . who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense”). 9 278 (Iowa 2025). The law requires “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission” to be “charged, tried[,] and punished as principals.” Iowa Code § 703.1. As such, the children and Jenkins are on the same legal footing when it comes to their conduct in damaging the library. It is a strained, impractical, or absurd reading of the definition of “victim” to permit the children who damaged the library to be treated as “victims” of their own criminal or delinquent acts in damaging the library. See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005) (finding a person to be a “victim” when he suffered harm from criminal mischief “perpetrated by [the defendant] and his accomplices”). We decline to interpret the definition that way. Accordingly, we find that the children, as principals of the criminal or delinquent acts, do not meet the statutory definition of “victim.” And only victims are permitted to give victim impact statements. State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 175 (Iowa 2015). We find the district court erred in permitting the children (through their parents or otherwise) to give victim impact statements.3 3 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the State’s argument that the children were victims is based on the premise that Jenkins corrupted the children into engaging in their destructive behavior. But the State did not charge Jenkins with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See Iowa Code § 709A.1 (making it the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor to “encourage any child under eighteen years of age to commit any act of delinquency”). As such, it would have been improper for the court to consider that uncharged crime in determining Jenkins’s sentence. See State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Iowa 2013) (noting the “well-established rule” that the sentencing court cannot consider “unprosecuted charges” and doing so requires resentencing). And since it would be improper to consider that uncharged crime, it is also improper to allow purported “victims” of that uncharged crime to give victim impact statements. 10 As to remedy, when a person who does not meet the statutory definition of “victim” is permitted to give a victim impact statement and the district court does not “make it clear the offending evidence was not a consideration,” resentencing before a different judge is required. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d at 244–45. Here, persons who did not meet the definition of “victim” were permitted to give victim impact statements and the court did not make it clear that it did not consider those statements. As a result, we vacate Jenkins’s sentences and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See id. IV. Conclusion Jenkins’s conviction for solicitation is not supported by substantial evidence, so we vacate her conviction and sentence for that offense and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charge. There is substantial evidence supporting her conviction for aiding and abetting criminal mischief, so we reject her sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to that charge. We find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in finding that the guilty verdict for aiding and abetting criminal mischief was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. So, we affirm the denial of Jenkins’s motion for a new trial on that charge. Because we have vacated one of Jenkins’s convictions, and the court considered the vacated conviction in arriving at a sentence, we remand for resentencing on the remaining charge. As the children Jenkins aided and abetted in vandalizing the library do not qualify as “victims” under the statute, it was improper to permit them (or their parents) to give victim impact statements. Because the children’s parents were permitted to give 11 victim impact statements, it tainted the sentencing process such that resentencing must occur before a different judge. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. Tabor, C.J., concurs; Greer, J., dissents in part and concurs in part. 12 GREER, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s decision but for one issue. That issue involves the majority’s determination that the parents of the children who vandalized the library could not provide victim impact statements. I would affirm the district court’s decision to allow the statements during the sentencing hearing and thus allow them at the resentencing hearing before the sentencing judge that was originally involved in the case. See State v. Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2020) (noting there is no abuse of discretion when the court appropriately applies the law). “ʻVictim’ means a person who has suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result of a public offense or a delinquent act, other than a simple misdemeanor, committed in this state.” Iowa Code § 915.10(3) (2024). “ʻVictim’ also includes the immediate family members of a victim who died or was rendered incompetent as a result of the offense or who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense.” Id. The parents of three of the involved children offered victim impact statements here, which the majority concedes is proper generally, but asserts not so here. The parents’ victim impact statements described their child’s response to having been “misled into believing they were doing something acceptable, even meaningful.” As one parent stated: My own child has been deeply affected. Today, he cannot hear the name “Bailey” or the word “court” or “library” without becoming visibly distressed. He shakes, cries, and is often inconsolable. This is not simply fear—it’s trauma. He is not alone. These children all bear emotional scars from what happened. The betrayal by an adult they trusted has deeply altered how they see the world and the people in it. 13 The other two statements referenced the emotional toil the other two parents were now having to address with their children as well. The majority challenged the State’s pronouncement that “a person can be both a victim and a perpetrator as a factual and legal matter,” alluding that this would produce a strained, impractical, or absurd result. On its end, the State asserted there is no statutory or case law prohibition to treating these children and their parents as victims as it relates to Jenkins’s crimes. I believe that our legislature expects the statutes involving sentencing protocol to be viewed through a commonsense lens. To that end, I take issue with the majority’s statement that Jenkins and the children are on the same legal footing when it comes to their conduct. At the time of trial, about a year after the vandalism, six children testified. Among those testifying were two second graders, one fourth grader, one fifth grader, and two sixth graders. When considering a juvenile’s role in criminal activity, our case law uses common sense and science. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 56 (Iowa 2013) (“The traditional limitations on juvenile actions and the science . . . suggests that juveniles as a general matter should have diminished culpability for criminal activities.”). To me, the role Jenkins played as a trusted adult in encouraging this criminal act should lead us to consider a child’s lack of maturity and susceptibility to influence in our determination of what constitutes a victim. See State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 142 (Iowa 2017). In fact, Roby requires an analysis of those factors to when a child’s criminal conduct is weighed by the court. Id. at 146 (noting, in sentencing, “attention must be given to the juvenile offender’s actual role and the role of various types of external pressure”). As we know from the legislative history underpinning the right to a victim impact statement, “[o]ur legislature used broad language in defining 14 ʻvictim,’ which has led this court in the past to give an expansive interpretation to the statute.” State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 174 (Iowa 2015) (noting that both State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 452 (Iowa 2005), and State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 760 (Iowa 1998), applied the statutory language broadly to effectuate purpose of statute). For example, construing “victim” broadly, in Tesch, our supreme court rejected the argument that the injured motorist was not a victim because the vandalism crime only directly impacted the owners of the road signs and barricades. 704 N.W.2d at 450– 52. Likewise, as we said in State v. Wilson, “[i]n taking this expansive approach, we have interpreted section 915.10 to cover individuals directly harmed by the offense, even if not the intended victim, at the time of the commission of the offense.” No. 22-1867, 2023 WL 8792974, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2023) (allowing jailers’ victim impact statements because of their emotional harm from overhearing a jail call plan to kill the jailers). As to these facts, I agree the children are the “principals” who committed the vandalism act. But as to the victims related to Jenkins’s conviction of aiding and abetting the children’s vandalism effort, on these facts, I do not accept that the children and their parents cannot also be victims, along with the library board. As was instructed, the jury had to find that Jenkins either actively participated or knowingly advised and encouraged the vandalism. 4 That encouragement from a trusted adult resulted in an emotional trauma to the children involved that the parents had to address. It is from her actions that the children are victims in the case, and thus had 4 The jury was instructed that “aid and abet” means “to knowingly approve and agree to the commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or when it is committed.” 15 appropriate information for the sentencing court to consider.5 See State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024) (“Allowing a victim to be heard at a defendant’s sentencing provides an important avenue of closure for the victim while providing information to the sentencing court about the consequences of the defendant’s criminal behavior.”). The statute allows an immediate family member to provide the impact statement. Here, in each case, it was the parent. A “victim” can be heard if she or he has “suffered . . . emotional . . . harm as the result of a public offense or a delinquent act.” Iowa Code § 915.10(3). To me, this case fits easily into a conclusion that the children and the parents suffered emotional harm from Jenkins’s public offense. As for the position that you cannot commit a crime while also being the victim, there are many examples of crimes committed by vulnerable people who are also victims. For example, a person charged with prostitution may also be a victim because her behavior occurred under the emotional manipulation or threat of harm from a pimp. See Iowa Code §§ 725.1–.2. As another example, a protected person can be charged with contempt and jailed for aiding in the violation of a no-contact order yet still be a victim as it relates to the person encouraging the violation. See Henley v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 533 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1995) (rejecting the argument that as a victim of domestic violence, her punishment for violation of the order 5 While some of the information contained in the victim impact statements was not relevant to the charges against Jenkins, we trust the district court to only consider appropriate details that pertain to its sentencing decision. See Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 764 (noting “we trust that our district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence”). The sentencing court did that here. It noted if the statements were not permissible or related to the offenses, it would “disavow” the statements and not consider them. 16 protecting her should not be imposed). Finally, consider the scenario where a “drug mule” might be forced to carry illegal substances to avoid the threat of harm by a drug dealer. The victim status comes with context. “The polestar of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent of a statute.” Tesch, 704 N.W.2d at 451 (citation omitted). “We consider the objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, seeking a result that will advance, rather than defeat, the statute’s purpose.” Id. (cleaned up). The statute defines “victim” by the harm a person suffers, not by the person’s conduct or role, as the majority suggests. We should follow the statute, and the victim impact statements should be allowed under the facts of this case. 17